

CHAPTER IX

THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

COMMUNICATIONS RELATING TO THE OBSERVANCE OF THE ARMISTICE
AGREEMENTS IN THE PERIOD JANUARY-MAY 1967COMMUNICATIONS CONCERNING
RELATIONS BETWEEN
ISRAEL AND SYRIA

In five successive letters dated 8, 9, 11, 15 and 17 January 1967, Israel complained to the Security Council of a serious intensification by Syria of acts of aggression along and across the border with Israel. These included machine-gun fire and shelling from tanks from Syrian military positions at Israel villages, tractors, farmers and fishing boats on Lake Tiberias, in the Demilitarized Zone and defensive area. Acts of sabotage by mines and explosives also had been committed by terrorists coming from Syria. Such gross violations of the Israel-Syrian General Armistice Agreement, Israel said, inflamed the tension along the border, endangered the peace of the whole area and could not be tolerated.

In letters of 10 and 13 January 1967, Syria informed the Council that the grave deterioration along the demarcation lines was the result of the dual Israel aim to increase tension so as to justify subsequent large-scale aggression against Syria and to expand its illegal occupation of the Demilitarized Zone by liquidating what remained of the rights of Arab cultivators. Regarding charges made in Israel's letters of 8, 9 and 11 January, Syria stated that in every instance where there was a Syrian firing, it was in return of provocative Israel fire directed against peaceful Arab farmers or Syrian posts.

APPEAL BY SECRETARY-GENERAL

On 15 January 1967, the Secretary-General informed the Security Council that he had, by cable, urgently appealed to the Governments of Israel and Syria, in view of disturbing reports received that morning from the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine (UNTSO) of a threatening military build-up on both sides of the Armistice Demarcation Line, to restrain

their military forces from any action which might result in an armed clash, and to accept, without delay or pre-conditions, the proposal of the Chief of Staff for holding an immediate emergency or extraordinary meeting of the Israel-Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission (ISMAC) on an agreed agenda, with a view to reaching an understanding on the problems of cultivation in the area which had given rise to the recent incidents.

In response to the Secretary-General, Syria stated, on 16 January, that it accepted, without any condition, the proposal of the Chief of Staff to hold an emergency meeting and that his proposed agenda was fully agreeable. The Syrian Government later informed the Chief of Staff that Syria undertook not to initiate the opening of firing and that it would not enter the disputed areas provided the other party did not enter them. In its reply of 18 January, Israel said that it had on 16 January accepted the proposal of the Chief of Staff and was in consultation with him on the agenda and procedure.

As later reported by the Secretary-General, the Chief of Staff of UNTSO obtained the agreement of Israel and Syria to attend an "emergency and extraordinary meeting" of ISMAC on an agreed agenda item on cultivation problems. The first meeting took place on 25 January. After the parties had met three times, an impasse was reached. On 7 April, a serious incident broke out between Israel and Syria over a cultivation problem, and this led to a further increase of the tension between the two countries.

A number of communications were submitted to the Security Council by Israel and Syria between January and May concerning the meetings of ISMAC, an incident of 7 April, other firing incidents along the border, acts of sabotage inside Israel and the responsibility of the parties for increased tension.

In its communications, Israel said that, at meetings of ISMAC, Syria had not responded to Israel's concrete proposals for cultivation arrangements but had put forward pre-conditions to discussing the agreed agenda and had obstructed the resumption of meetings by refusal to attend. Also, renewed and frequent opening of fire by Syrian forces against Israel farms in the Demilitarized Zone, in violation of the unconditional cease-fire commitment, showed that Syria would rather shoot than settle cultivation problems by negotiation.

Israel charged that by firing on 7 April at Israel tractors cultivating in the Demilitarized Zone, Syria had initiated a major clash, involving use of machine-guns, mortars, artillery, tanks and planes and had then violated cease-fire arrangements of United Nations Military Observers. Israel aircraft eventually had silenced Syrian gun positions and shot down Syrian planes.

Simultaneously, renewed acts of sabotage, mine-laying and armed infiltration into Israel had been carried out by terrorists trained in and directed from Syrian territory. The Syrian Government did not conceal its responsibility, Israel continued. Its spokesmen repeatedly declared that Syria would in no way be protectors of Israel from the Palestine Arab fedayeen. Thus, Israel charged, Syria had blatantly repudiated its obligations under the Armistice Agreement "to refrain from all kinds of hostile or aggressive actions." In Security Council debates which had, for instance, taken place in October and November 1966,¹ Israel added, the Syrian claim of non-responsibility for infiltration across the border had been categorically rejected by a great majority of the Council's members.

In addition, Syrian leaders had frankly manifested their avowed aim to open a total war against Israel. The statements of Israel leaders, from which Syria deduced aggressive intentions on the part of Israel, clearly referred to the intolerable situation created by Syrian aggressiveness and the need to take counter-measures to curb it. So long as the Syrian Government persisted in this policy, the Government of Israel must hold it responsible for all the consequences; and, in the face of continuous Syrian provocation and threats, Israel regarded itself

as fully entitled to act in self-defence as circumstances warranted.

Syria, in its communications during this period, charged that Israel was constantly harassing Arab farmers in the Demilitarized Zone and opening fire on Syrian military positions, while Israel armoured tractors were cultivating Arab land in the Demilitarized Zone, backed by Israel armed forces illegally placed there.

While it falsely attributed incidents to Syria, Israel, Syria also charged, was undertaking provocative acts which were aimed at paralysing the work of ISMAC and blaming it on Syria. As proof of Israel's ill faith, Syria cited the contradiction between (i) Israel's attendance at meetings to discuss cultivation problems in the Demilitarized Zone while reiterating its claim to and imposing its sovereignty over that Zone, and denying the competence of the Mixed Armistice Commission and its Chairman (the only responsible authority in the Demilitarized Zone according to the General Armistice Agreement) to deal with the cultivation problems there which Israel had agreed to discuss, and (ii) Israel's refusal to consider Syria as a party to any dispute concerning the Demilitarized Zone. Syria rejected these Israel positions.

Syria stated that reports by the Secretary-General of 1 November 1966 and 2 November 1966 (dealing respectively with the inability of ISMAC to function and the status of the Demilitarized Zone set up by the General Armistice Agreement between Israel and Syria) had established that Israel had been responsible for the inability of ISMAC to function since 1951 and that Israel's military occupation of the Zone was illegal. Syria said it would continue to accept attending the agreed-upon meetings of ISMAC to make practical arrangements to assure cultivation and other civilian work along the Armistice Line, provided that such arrangements did not in any way prejudice its rights provided for in the General Armistice Agreement or in the final solution of the Palestine question.

The incident of 7 April, Syria charged, was initiated by an Israel tractor cultivating a disputed land parcel. Israel had carried out a pre-meditated attack in accordance with a well-

¹ See Y.U.N., 1966, pp. 170-172.

prepared plan to provoke Syria into a full-scale war. During the battle, Israel had refused a cease-fire proposal of the Chairman of ISMAC and had resumed its air bombardment. Moreover, Israel had continued its acts of provocation after 7 April, encouraged by the imperialist powers and the forces of reaction.

As for Israel's accusation of a "people's war" against Israel, Syria stated that it was not responsible for and would not obstruct the activities of Palestinian Arabs seeking to restore their inalienable right to self-determination. The Government and people of Syria were determined not to accept more humiliation from the Zionist settlers in Arab Palestine, in spite of all the backing they received from their masters and regardless of the results. The threats and invocation of the right of self-defence by Israel officials pointed to the conclusion that another Suez was in the making, Syria stated.

On 8 May, the Secretary-General circulated to the Security Council a message which he had sent that day to the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, noting the latter's untiring efforts to effect resumption of the eightieth emergency and extraordinary meeting of ISMAC and his disturbing conclusion that the serious incidents of 7 April had widened the gap between the positions of the parties on the resumption of that meeting and that consequently it was not possible for the time being to expect any fruitful convening of such a meeting. The interests of peace in the area nevertheless dictated continued efforts and he had asked the Chief of Staff to initiate separate talks with each of the parties with a view to achieving an understanding on practical arrangements for cultivation problems along the Armistice Demarcation Line without prejudice to the positions of either party. Also, he had strongly endorsed the appeal of the Chief of Staff to both parties to exercise the utmost restraint, to observe the unconditional cease-fire and to make use of the ISMAC machinery in order to resolve any differences which arose between them.

COMMUNICATIONS ABOUT AN ISRAEL MILITARY PARADE IN JERUSALEM

On 6 February 1967, in a communication to the Secretary-General, Jordan protested a decision by Israel to hold a military parade on

15 May 1967 in Jerusalem in defiance of the General Armistice Agreement and a Security Council resolution (162(1961)) of 11 April 1961.² In a further communication dated 18 May, Jordan said that Israel had held the parade, not heeding the warning of the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission concerned, who had said that as the proposed parade in Jerusalem would increase tension in the area, he could not support it.

In replies dated 9 February and 2 June, respectively, Israel said that the Israel Government had publicly announced on 11 December 1966 that the army parade on Independence Day would be held in Jerusalem, "within the framework of the Israel-Jordan Armistice Agreement." The parade had been held as planned.

On 10 May, the representative of Algeria, acting in that capacity and as Chairman of the Arab group of Members for the month of May, drew the Secretary-General's attention to the serious situation arising from Israel's decision to hold a military parade in Jerusalem, stating that it was nothing but a step toward strengthening the Israel conquest of the "Holy City" of Jerusalem to establish that city as Israel's political capital.

FURTHER COMMUNICATIONS FROM ISRAEL AND JORDAN

On 6 February, Jordan, referring to an Israel complaint of 30 December in which Israel alleged that landmines, laid by persons coming from and withdrawing to Jordan, had been discovered on 9 December on tracks near the Hebron sector, said that adequate investigation of the Israel charges had not been permitted by the Israel authorities who had refused to comply with the provisions of the General Armistice Agreement and were intent on destroying the United Nations Armistice machinery in the area. Jordan asked the Secretary-General to circulate to the Council a comprehensive report covering the full investigation of Israel's charges against Jordan.

In a communication of 9 February, Israel stated, *inter alia*, that questions concerning the investigation of a complaint to the Israel-Jordan

² See Y.U.N., 1961, p. 155.

Mixed Armistice Commission were matters to be dealt with on the local Commission level.

On 15 March, the Secretary-General submitted to the Council the requested report on the investigation by the Israel-Jordan Mixed Armistice Commission, based on information received from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO. The Commission stated that at first Israel had limited its co-operation with the Commission, in particular by rejecting a request to show footprints referred to by a witness. By the time the investigation was resumed, no additional physical evidence could be found, owing to weather conditions, and the investigation had ended inconclusively.

In two communications dated 16 and 23 March, Jordan said that the report, as submitted, was not the whole truth and that the findings of the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission had corroborated Jordan's presentation of the facts.

In two communications dated 21 and 23 March, the Secretary-General emphasized that the primary purpose of reports submitted by the Chief of Staff and by the Secretary-General was to try to bridge differences and not to aggravate them; he added that he was satisfied that the report submitted fairly covered the essential facts.

In a letter dated 17 April, addressed to the Secretary-General, Jordan complained that on 16 March, Israel forces had crossed the Armistice Demarcation Line south of Hebron, causing the death of two Jordanian civilians. The Israel-Jordan Mixed Armistice Commission had found that the Israel act constituted a complete disregard and a flagrant violation of the General Armistice Agreement.

In a further communication dated 17 May, Jordan said that the Mixed Armistice Commission had, in a decision of 3 May, condemned the Israel authorities for crossing the Armistice Demarcation Line into Latrun no-man's land on 15 April, and for ploughing areas situated in Jordan and in no-man's land.

COMMUNICATIONS ON REPARATION CLAIM AGAINST JORDAN

Four letters were addressed by the Secretary-General to Jordan, on 24 April, 4 May, 12 May and 1 June, concerning a claim for reparation

from Jordan in connexion with the death of a United Nations Military Observer, Lieut.-Colonel George A. Flint of the Canadian Army, on Mount Scopus on 26 May 1958 while serving on behalf of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO). The Secretary-General said that the claim for reparation was presented under the authority given to the Secretary-General by General Assembly resolutions of 1 December 1949³ and 21 December 1952⁴ because reports had established that the death of Lieut.-Colonel Flint was caused by a deliberate shot fired from Jordanian territory while Lieut.-Colonel Flint was carrying a white flag. Having carefully studied the reasons given in a Jordan letter dated 23 August 1966, to the effect that the Government of Jordan was not responsible in this matter, the Secretary-General said he was bound to point out that those reasons did not appear reconcilable with the relevant findings reported to the Security Council. In making this claim for reparation, he was in no way seeking to attribute responsibility for the incident in the Mount Scopus area on 26 May 1958; nor did he consider the total investigation carried out by UNTSO into the chain of events which brought it about relevant to the issue.

In three communications to the Secretary-General on 1, 8 and 15 May, Jordan reaffirmed its position that the whole chain of events which had culminated in the death of Lieut.-Colonel Flint had commenced with Israel's violation of the Mount Scopus Area Agreement, and that the bullet causing the death had come from an Israel position. Israel was therefore fully and solely responsible and liable to pay reparations.

Jordan also disagreed with the conclusions and statements contained in the reports about the incident submitted to the Security Council in 1958 by the UNTSO Chief of Staff, General Carl Von Horn. It had been said that these reports seemed to be strongly at variance, to say the least, with the views expressed some years later in a book by General Von Horn,

³ See Y.U.N., 1948-49, p. 945, text of **resolution 365 (IV)**.

⁴ See Y.U.N., 1952, p. 815, text of resolution 690 (VII).

entitled *Soldiering for Peace*, concerning the nature of the investigation. On this basis, Jordan maintained, the facts were still in dispute and needed further investigation.

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REPORTS OF SECRETARY-GENERAL CONCERNING WITHDRAWAL OF
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BY THE SECURITY COUNCILSECRETARY-GENERAL'S
REPORTS OF
18 AND 19 MAY 1967

On 18 May 1967, the Secretary-General submitted a special report to the General Assembly concerning the withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) from Sinai

and the Gaza Strip. On that day, the report said, the Secretary-General received a message from the Foreign Minister of the United Arab Republic, informing him that the Government of the United Arab Republic had decided to terminate the presence of UNEF in Sinai and the Gaza Strip and requesting that the neces-

sary steps be taken for the withdrawal of the Force as soon as possible.

In a reply sent on the evening of the same day, the Secretary-General recalled that UNEF had entered Egyptian territory with the consent of the United Arab Republic Government and in fact could remain there only as long as that consent continued, and he stated that the United Arab Republic Government's request would be complied with and that instructions would be issued for the necessary arrangements to be put in train without delay for the orderly withdrawal of the Force. The Secretary-General also indicated in the reply that he had serious misgivings about the action taken by the United Arab Republic, as he believed that UNEF had been an important factor in maintaining relative quiet in the area of its deployment during the past 10 years and that its withdrawal might have grave implications for peace.

The special report to the General Assembly also contained an account of the events which had led to the present situation. On the evening of 16 May, the report stated, the Commander of UNEF, Major-General I. J. Rikhye, received from the Chief of Staff of the United Arab Republic Armed Forces, General Fawzy, a request to withdraw all United Nations troops at observation posts along the border. General Rikhye replied that he had noted the contents of the letter and would report immediately to the Secretary-General since he had no authority to withdraw any troops of UNEF or in any other way to redeploy them except on instructions from the Secretary-General.

On learning of the substance of General Fawzy's letter, the Secretary-General met with the Permanent Representative of the United Arab Republic who was requested to convey urgently to his Government the Secretary-General's views to the effect, in particular, that General Rikhye was correct in taking no action until he had received instructions from the Secretary-General and that any request for the withdrawal of UNEF must come directly to the Secretary-General from the United Arab Republic Government.

On 17 May, the Commander of UNEF reported that United Arab Republic troops had moved into the UNEF area at El Sabha and El Kuntilla and that General Fawzy had re-

quested the withdrawal of UNEF troops from Sinai, including Sharm El Sheikh, within 24 hours. On that day, the Secretary-General handed to the Permanent Representative of the United Arab Republic an aide-mémoire recalling the aforementioned events, together with an aide-mémoire recording the declaration made by the Government of Egypt at the time of the establishment of UNEF that, in exercising its sovereign rights on any matter concerning the presence and functioning of UNEF, it would be guided, in good faith, by its acceptance of the General Assembly resolution (1000 (ES-I)) of 5 November 1956⁵ and the declaration of the United Nations that the activities of UNEF would be guided, in good faith, by the task established for the Force in this resolution.

In the late afternoon of 17 May, the Secretary-General held an informal meeting with the representatives of the countries providing contingents to UNEF to inform them of the situation and exchange views.

On 18 May, troops of the United Arab Republic asked UNEF forces to withdraw from El Amr, Sharm El Sheikh, and Ras Nasrani; two artillery shells, apparently ranging rounds from United Arab Republic artillery, were reported to have burst between the UNEF Yugoslav camps at El Quseima and El Sabha. Later in the afternoon of 18 May, the Secretary-General convened a meeting with the UNEF Advisory Committee to inform it of the developments and consult it on the situation.

After mentioning the foregoing events, the Secretary-General set forth the reasons which had compelled him to agree to withdraw UNEF. UNEF, he pointed out, was introduced into the territory of the United Arab Republic on the basis of an agreement reached in 1956 in Cairo between the Secretary-General and President Nasser and therefore, since United Arab

⁵ See Y.U.N., 1956, pp. 36-37, text of resolution 1000 (ES-I), by which the Assembly decided, *inter alia*: to establish a United Nations command for an emergency international force to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities arising from Israel military action into Egyptian territories; and to invite the Secretary-General to take such administrative measures as might be necessary for the prompt execution of the actions envisaged in the resolution.

Republic consent had been, withdrawn, it was incumbent on the Secretary-General to give orders for the withdrawal of the Force. The consent of the host country was a basic principle which had applied to all United Nations peace-keeping operations, and in practical fact, UNEF could not remain or function without the continued consent and co-operation of the host country. The Secretary-General said he was also influenced by his deep concern to avoid any action which would either compromise or endanger the contingents which made up the Force. In the face of the request for the withdrawal of the Force, there seemed to the Secretary-General to be no alternative course of action which could be taken by him without putting in question the sovereign authority of the Government of the United Arab Republic within its own territory.

In concluding his special report, the Secretary-General expressed the deepest concern as to the possible implications of the latest developments for peace in the area. He recalled that for more than 10 years, UNEF, acting as a buffer between the opposing forces of Israel and the United Arab Republic on the Armistice Demarcation Line in Gaza and the international frontier in Sinai, had been the principal means of maintaining quiet in the area. Its removal inevitably restored an armed confrontation of the United Arab Republic and Israel and removed the stabilizing influence of an international force operating along the boundaries of the two nations. Much as he regretted this development, the Secretary-General had no option but to respect and acquiesce in the request of the Government of the United Arab Republic and he could only express the hope that both sides would exercise the utmost calm and restraint in this new situation which otherwise would be fraught with danger.

(See also pp. 258-59.)

On 19 May, the Secretary-General submitted a report to the Security Council in which he conveyed his deep anxiety about recent developments in the Near East and the increasingly dangerous deterioration in the relations between the Arab States and Israel. In his opinion, the current situation was more disturbing, indeed more menacing, than at any time since the autumn of 1956. Since January

1967, there had been a steady deterioration along the line between Israel and Syria, particularly with regard to disputes over cultivation rights in the Demilitarized Zone. In late January, the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) had obtained the agreement of Israel and Syria to attend an emergency and extraordinary meeting of the Israel-Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission (ISMAL) on an agreed agenda item on cultivation problems. Although three meetings had actually been held, the agreed item had not been discussed because both parties had insisted on first bringing up broader issues. Resumption of the meetings had not been possible owing to an impasse over a position taken firmly by Syria. In the absence of an agreement on cultivation arrangements, tension along the line continued high and the possibility of new armed clashes in disputed areas was ever present.

A number of factors had served to aggravate the situation to an unusual degree, the Secretary-General's report added. A major factor was the sabotage and terrorist activities of El Fatah, which provoked strong reactions in Israel from the Government and population alike, and which UNTSO was unable to arrest. There was no verified information available about the organization, central direction and originating source of these acts. The Governments of Jordan, Lebanon and Syria had officially disclaimed responsibility for those acts but the fact was that they recurred with disturbing regularity. Intemperate and bellicose utterances eagerly reported by press and radio were unfortunately more or less routine on both sides of the line. Recent reports from Israel attributed to some high officials in Israel statements so threatening that they could only increase tensions on the other side of the line. Persistent reports in the previous few days about troop movements and concentrations, particularly on the Israel side of the Syrian border, had caused anxiety, although reports from UNTSO observers had confirmed the absence of troop concentrations and significant troop movements on both sides of the line. The decision of the Government of the United Arab Republic to terminate its consent for the continued presence of UNEF was sudden and un-

expected, the Secretary-General continued. The reasons for that decision certainly had nothing to do with the conduct of UNEF, which had discharged its responsibilities for more than 10 years with remarkable effectiveness and great distinction. That was a very long time for any country to have foreign troops, even under an international banner, operating autonomously on its soil. But, because of the prevailing tensions in the area, the timing of the withdrawal of UNEF left much to be desired. It added one more frontier on which there was direct confrontation between the military forces of Israel and those of her Arab neighbours.

The Secretary-General noted that there was widespread misunderstanding about the nature of the United Nations peace-keeping operations in general, and UNEF in particular. As he had pointed out in his special report of 18 May 1967 to the General Assembly, the United Nations Emergency Force was a peace-keeping operation, not an enforcement operation. It was based entirely on its acceptance by the governing authority of the territory on which it operated and it was not in any sense related to Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. (For text of Chapter VII of the Charter, see APPENDIX II.) Neither UNEF nor any other United Nations peace-keeping operation thus far undertaken would have been permitted to enter the territory involved if there had been any suggestion that it had the right to remain there against the will of the governing authority. Moreover, United Nations peace-keeping operations, such as UNEF, depended for their presence and effectiveness not only on the consent of the authorities in the area of their deployment but on their goodwill and co-operation. When the United Arab Republic decided to move its troops up to the line, the buffer function of UNEF was eliminated; its continued presence was thus rendered useless and its position untenable, and its withdrawal became virtually inevitable.

The Secretary-General observed that the presence of UNEF had been a deterrent, particularly in sensitive areas such as Sharm El Sheikh and Gaza, and had to a considerable extent allowed the Organization for 10 years to ignore some of the hard realities of the underlying conflict. The Governments concerned and the

United Nations were now confronted with a brutally realistic and dangerous situation.

Referring to the Egyptian-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission (EIMAC), the Secretary-General said it remained in existence with its headquarters in Gaza and could, as it had prior to the establishment of UNEF, provide a limited form of United Nations presence in the area, as in the case of the other Mixed Armistice Commissions which were served by the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO). The Government of Israel, however, had denounced EIMAC and for some years had refused to participate in it. The United Nations had never accepted as valid that unilateral action by Israel. It would be very helpful if the Government of Israel were to reconsider its position and resume its participation.

Finally, the Secretary-General stated that, although troop movements on both sides of the Israel-United Arab Republic line had been observed following the decision of the United Arab Republic regarding UNEF, as of the evening of 19 May these did not seem to have attained alarming proportions, nor was there any indication of any major offensive action. Nevertheless, the confrontation along the line between the armed forces of the two countries had begun to reappear; unless there was great restraint on both sides of the line, a series of local clashes which might easily escalate into heavy conflict could readily be envisaged, the Secretary-General's report concluded.

CONSIDERATION BY SECURITY COUNCIL ON 24 MAY 1967

In order to discuss the situation with the Government of the United Arab Republic, and especially in order to examine with that Government the situation created by the withdrawal of UNEF, the Secretary-General travelled to Cairo, United Arab Republic, where he stayed from 23 to 25 May. While he was still in Cairo, the Security Council met to consider the situation in the Middle East.

On 23 May 1967, Canada and Denmark requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider the extremely grave situation in the Middle East which was threatening international peace and security, and they cited

further deterioration of the situation since the issuance of the Secretary-General's report of 19 May 1967. On 24 May, the Council decided to place the question on its agenda.

During its discussion of the situation in the Middle East, at 23 meetings held between 24 May and 9 July, the Security Council invited the representatives of the following United Nations Members, at their request, to participate in the debate, without vote: Algeria, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia and the United Arab Republic.

During the two meetings held by the Council on 24 May, the representatives of Canada and Denmark maintained that since the beginning of the withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF), the situation along the border between Israel and the United Arab Republic had been deteriorating at an alarming speed. There had been a military build-up along the border. Moreover, on 22 May, the President of the United Arab Republic had announced that Israel ships and other ships carrying certain cargoes to Israel would be prevented from passing through the Strait of Tiran; the Government of Israel, on the other hand, had declared that it would consider such a move as an attack. The slightest miscalculation or misunderstanding by either side of the other's intentions could lead to large-scale hostilities. The Secretary-General's current mission to that area, which their delegations fully supported, could not relieve the Council of any of its responsibilities.

A draft resolution was submitted by Canada and Denmark whereby the Security Council would: (1) express full support for the efforts of the Secretary-General to pacify the situation; (2) request all Member States to refrain from any steps which might worsen the situation; and (3) invite the Secretary-General to report to the Council upon his return to enable it to continue its consideration of the matter.

The representative of the United States, supporting the initiative taken by Canada and Denmark, said that the Security Council would be burying its head in the sand if it did not recognize the threat to peace implicit in developments in the Middle East since the Secretary-General's departure for Cairo, in particular

the threat to customary international rights exercised for many years in the Gulf of Aqaba. The Council should support the efforts of the Secretary-General to work out a peaceful accommodation of the situation and to call upon all States to avoid any action which might exacerbate the tense situation. The United States was on record as opposed to the use of violence and aggression by any side in the situation and was firmly committed to the support of the political independence and territorial integrity of all nations in the area. It was prepared to join with other great powers—the USSR, the United Kingdom and France—in a common effort to restore and maintain peace in the Middle East.

The representatives of Japan and the United Kingdom welcomed the request for action by the Security Council. The United Kingdom stated that the Council's first aim must be to counsel restraint and to keep the peace until new plans for peace-keeping could be worked out.

The representative of France declared that his country was deeply attached to the maintenance of peace in the Middle East and had, from the outset of the crisis, advised moderation to all parties concerned. As long as the principal powers were not in agreement, the Security Council could take no action and must limit itself to an appeal to the parties to refrain from any initiatives that might jeopardize peace.

The representatives of Bulgaria and the USSR did not see sufficient grounds for such a hasty convening of the Security Council. In their view, the situation in the Middle East was being dramatized by certain Western powers for reasons other than a true concern for peace. The USSR representative drew attention to a statement issued by his Government on 23 May which said, *inter alia*, that a situation giving rise to anxiety from the viewpoint of the interests of peace and international security had been taking shape in the Near East. After the armed attack by Israel forces on Syrian territory on 7 April, the ruling circles of Israel had threatened punitive operations against Syria. Israel could not have so acted without encouragement from certain imperialist circles which sought to restore colonial oppression and to have Israel play the role of colonial overseer

over Arab lands which pursued independent national policies. The statement warned that any aggression in the Middle East would be met not only with the united strength of the Arab countries but also with strong opposition from the USSR and all peace-loving States. The USSR would do everything in its power to prevent a violation of peace and security in the Near East and to safeguard the legitimate rights of its peoples.

The United Arab Republic's representative said that his country was discharging its responsibility to safeguard its security and to uphold its obligations towards the Arab nation. The countries which had championed the submission of the question to the Security Council had deliberately ignored repeated provocations by Israel. It was his country's legitimate right, as well as its national obligation and inescapable duty, to rise up in self-defence in the face of Israel's overt aggression against its Arab neighbours. The draft resolution which had been introduced by Canada and Denmark was, in his opinion, an attempt to sabotage the mission on which the Secretary-General was at that moment engaged.

The representative of Israel said that his Government had in recent months brought to the attention of the Security Council its growing concern about the campaign of ever-increasing violence being carried out by neighbouring States against Israel and the ceaseless threats against the very existence of Israel. The allegation that Israel had concentrated large forces along the Israel-Syrian border was, as the Secretary General's report had indicated, without any foundation. On the other hand, massive troop concentrations had been built up in the Sinai Peninsula along Israel's southern borders and, along with the peremptory eviction of UNEF, were part of an over-all plan culminating in the threats of President Nasser to interfere with shipping in the Gulf of Aqaba. The Prime Minister of Israel had stated on 23 May that interference with freedom of navigation in the Gulf of Aqaba and the Strait of Tiran was a gross violation of international law and would be an act of aggression against Israel.

The representatives of Mali and India considered the meeting of the Council untimely and felt that any precipitate action by the

Council could only complicate the Secretary-General's mission. The representatives of Ethiopia and Nigeria, while not opposing the discussion of the question in the Council, thought that it would be best to await the report of the Secretary-General on his mission before taking any action.

SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REPORT OF 26 MAY 1967

After returning to United Nations Headquarters, New York, the Secretary-General, on 26 May 1967, submitted a report to the Security Council on his visit to Cairo.

In that report, the Secretary-General stated that he could only reiterate the assessment he had made in his report of 19 May to the effect that the general situation in the Middle East was at present more disturbing, indeed more menacing, than at any time since the autumn of 1956. He added that the allegation that the prompt withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) was the primary cause of the crisis in the Middle East ignored the fact that the underlying basis for this and other crisis situations in the area was the continuing Arab-Israel conflict, which had been present all along.

Reviewing both legal and practical reasons for his decision, the Secretary-General stated that the essential basis of UNEF's presence ceased to exist with the withdrawal of consent by the United Arab Republic. In no official document relating to UNEF had there been any suggestion of a limitation of the sovereign authority of the United Arab Republic. Delay in complying with that Government's request, after its troops had already moved up to the Line, would have endangered the personnel of UNEF which itself would also have quickly disintegrated due to withdrawal of individual contingents. He also noted that UNEF had functioned in a buffer zone exclusively on the United Arab Republic side of the Line. Had UNEF been deployed on both sides of the Line, as originally envisaged by the General Assembly, its buffer function would not necessarily have ended; however, its presence on the Israel side of the Line had never been permitted. That fact was a recognition of the unquestioned right of Israel to withhold its consent for the

stationing of the Force. Acquiescence to the United Arab Republic request for withdrawal of the Force—after more than 10 years—was likewise a recognition of the sovereign authority of that Government.

The Secretary-General stated that the decision of the United Arab Republic to restrict shipping in the Strait of Tiran had created a new situation. Free passage through the Strait was one of the questions which Israel considered most vital to its interests. The position of the United Arab Republic was that the Strait was territorial waters in which it had a right to control shipping; Israel contested that position and asserted the right of innocent passage through the Strait. Furthermore, Israel had declared that it would regard the closing of the Strait of Tiran to Israel flagships and any restrictions on cargoes of ships of other flags proceeding to Israel as a *casus belli*.

While in Cairo, the Secretary-General said, he had called to the attention of the Government of the United Arab Republic the dangerous consequences which could ensue from restricting innocent passage of ships in the Strait of Tiran and had expressed the hope that no precipitate action would be taken. He had received assurances from both President Nasser and the Foreign Minister that no offensive action would be initiated against Israel. Their general aim as expressed to him, he reported, was a return to the conditions prevailing prior to 1956 and to full observance by both parties of the provisions of the General Armistice Agreement between Egypt and Israel.

The Secretary-General pointed out that a legal controversy had existed prior to 1956 as to the extent of the right of innocent passage by commercial vessels through the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba. Since March 1957, when UNEF forces were stationed at Sharm El Sheikh and Ras Nasrani, at the entrance of the Gulf of Aqaba, there had been no interference with shipping in the Strait of Tiran. He would not, he added, go into the legal aspects of the controversy or discuss the merits of the case. His major concern at that critical juncture was to try to gain time in order to lay the basis for a *détente*. The fact was that, in view of the conflicting stands taken by the United Arab Republic and Israel, the

situation in the Strait of Tiran represented a serious potential threat to peace. He feared that a clash between the two countries over freedom of navigation through the Strait would inevitably set off a general conflict in the Middle East.

However, the situation in the Strait of Tiran, the Secretary-General said, was not the only immediate issue which was endangering peace in the area; other problems, such as sabotage and terrorist activities and rights of cultivation in disputed areas in the Demilitarized Zone between Israel and Syria could also lead to further serious fighting.

In the Secretary-General's view, a peaceful outcome to the crisis would depend upon a breathing spell which would allow tension to subside from its present explosive level. He therefore urged all the parties concerned to exercise special restraint, to forgo belligerence and to avoid all other actions which could increase tension, in order to allow the Council to deal with the underlying causes of the crisis and to seek solutions.

There were other possible courses of action which could contribute substantially to a reduction of tension in the area, such as reactivation of the Israel-Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission (ISMAL) and the Egyptian-Israeli Mixed Armistice Commission (EIMAC), as had been suggested in his report of 19 May. It would also be useful for the Council to recall that, by its resolution 73(1949) of 11 August 1949⁶, the Council had found that the General Armistice Agreements constituted an important step towards the establishment of permanent peace in Palestine, had reaffirmed to the parties concerned its order to observe an unconditional cease-fire and had relied upon the parties to ensure the continued application and observance of those Armistice Agreements.

CONSIDERATION BY SECURITY COUNCIL (29 MAY-3 JUNE 1967)

On 27 May 1967, the United Arab Republic requested the inclusion of an additional item in the agenda of the Council entitled: "Israel aggressive policy, its repeated aggression threatening peace and security in the Middle East and endangering international peace and security."

⁶ See Y.U.N., 1949, p. 189, for text of resolution.

On 29 May, the United Kingdom requested that the Secretary-General's report of 26 May be included in the Council's provisional agenda.

At its meeting of 29 May, the Council agreed to consider together the three items on its agenda. They were considered at four meetings from 29 May to 3 June.

The President, in an opening statement, expressed the belief that the Secretary-General's report would provide the basis for urgent and constructive action by the Council.

The United States representative declared that the Council should, as an interim measure and without delay, endorse the Secretary-General's appeal for a breathing spell—which would allow tension to subside from the explosive level—and his urgent request that the parties concerned exercise special restraint and forgo belligerence so that the Council could deal with and seek solutions for the underlying causes of the crisis. The Council must also address itself in longer-range terms to the points of tension mentioned in the Secretary-General's report—namely, the Gulf of Aqaba situation, the confrontation in the Gaza area and on the Syrian-Israel frontier, and the problem of terrorism.

The United States considered the Gulf of Aqaba an international waterway and felt that a blockade of Israel shipping was illegal and potentially dangerous to the cause of peace. Not only were the rights of the immediate parties at stake but also the rights of all trading nations under international law. It was particularly important, in the light of what the Secretary-General had stated in his report, that the long-established practice in the Gulf of Aqaba not be disturbed unilaterally while efforts were being made under Article 33 of the United Nations Charter⁷ to deal with the claims raised. This, said the United States representative, was the United States Government's specific understanding of the meaning, in the context of the Aqaba problem, of the Secretary-General's appeal to the parties to exercise special restraint and to forgo belligerence. The Council must also find practical means, through whatever United Nations machinery was available, to minimize the danger of a military clash and to help the opposing forces to disengage. As to sabotage, terrorism and the rights of cultivation in the disputed areas of the Demilitarized Zone

between Israel and Syria, the United States representative added, effective steps must be taken by the Security Council to reaffirm the General Armistice Agreements and revitalize the armistice machinery.

The United Kingdom representative stated that the report of the Secretary-General confirmed the immediate dangers of the situation and pointed the way in which the Council should act. First and foremost was the need to find a solution to the critical problem of the Gulf of Aqaba, one which took into account not only the normal requirements of the States bordering on the Gulf but also the interests of all maritime powers. With regard to other issues causing tension in the area, the Secretary-General in his report had made practical proposals, which the Council should urgently study, for reducing tension, keeping the peace and achieving a just settlement of the problem within the framework of the United Nations.

The representative of the United Arab Republic observed that the basic problem now before the Council was the aggressive policy of Israel and its repeated aggression against the Arab States. Since its implantation in the area as a tool of colonial interests, Israel's record had been one of a long series of violations of international law and agreements concluded under United Nations auspices, intimidation of its neighbours and insatiable expansionism. More recently, Israel's repeated attacks against the Arab States had been intensified and escalated. The United Arab Republic had every reason to believe that on 17 May the Israel authorities had seriously contemplated an attack against Syria. The United Arab Republic, in co-operation with other Arab countries, had decided to defend the Arab nation by all measures. Since the presence of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) would have conflict-

⁷ Article 33 of the United Nations Charter states :

"1. The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.

"2. The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties to settle their dispute by such means."

ed with that decision, and also for the safety of UNEF, his Government, in the exercise of its sovereign rights, had requested the Secretary-General to withdraw the Force, thus peacefully bringing the situation back to what it was before the Israel aggression against his country in 1956.

The Gulf of Aqaba, the representative of the United Arab Republic stated, had always been a national inland waterway subject to Arab sovereignty. Since the Gulf's only three legitimate littoral States—Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Republic—were all in a state of war with Israel, their right to bar enemy vessels was recognized under international law. The claim that Israel had a port on the Gulf had no validity, as Israel had illegally occupied several miles of coastline on the Gulf, including Om Rashrash, in violation of Security Council resolutions of 1948 and the Egyptian-Israeli General Armistice Agreement. The Armistice Agreements did not vitiate his Government's rights to impose restrictions on navigation in the Strait; nor had the 1956 aggression changed the legal status of the Gulf of Aqaba or the United Arab Republic's rights over its territorial waters. Furthermore, the Secretary-General had stated in his report of 22 February 1957⁸ that the stationing of UNEF could not be used to impose a solution for a political or legal question that was controversial, since its function was to prevent hostilities. Nothing that had been said in the General Assembly by Israel or some other delegations could affect the lawful rights of the United Arab Republic. While his Government did not contemplate any offensive action, it would not hesitate to exercise its inherent right of self-defence to repel any aggression.

The representative of Israel said that the unfounded charge of alleged Israel troop concentration for an attack on Syria was the key-stone of the Egyptian case for moving its forces against Israel. When, on 16 May, President Nasser had moved against UNEF, the Government of Israel had taken limited precautionary measures. Regarding the proclamation of a blockade of the international waterway of the Gulf of Aqaba, he confirmed the position of his Government that every interference with the freedom of navigation in those waters was an act of aggression against Israel.

He recalled that the international character of the Strait of Tiran had been recognized by many countries in the General Assembly in March 1957 and that, in response to the recent unilateral action of the United Arab Republic, many statements by these and other Governments had supported Israel's vital rights and interests in the Strait and the Gulf. The eviction of UNEF from its position at Sharm El Sheikh not only defied the will of the United Nations and violated Egypt's pledged word, but signaled the revival of belligerence after 10 years of tranquillity in the Gulf of Aqaba. The policy of belligerence pursued by the United Arab Republic was the underlying cause of past and present crisis in the Middle East and had made an empty shell of the Egyptian-Israeli General Armistice Agreement. The two central violations of that Agreement were the denial of free passage in the Suez Canal and the denial of free passage in the Gulf of Aqaba. Whereas the Security Council had ruled that belligerence was incompatible with the Armistice régime, Egypt wanted to use the Armistice Agreements and United Nations machinery as a cover for the continuation of its belligerence. That was the meaning of President Nasser's assurance that all he wanted was "a return to the conditions prevailing prior to 1956." Israel would not permit a return to those conditions. In 1948, Egypt and other Arab States had attacked Israel with the avowed aim of destroying it. Today, Egypt's objectives were the same.

It was not too late for reason to prevail, Israel believed. Israel's representative called for: an end to inflammatory statements and threats against the territorial integrity and political independence of any State; strict compliance with the Charter obligation of non-belligerence; withdrawal of armed forces from their positions as at the beginning of the month; and an end to sabotage, terrorism and interference with shipping in the Gulf of Aqaba.

The USSR representative said that the real culprit in the dangerous aggravation of tensions in the Middle East was Israel, which did not wish to abandon its policy of provocation and military adventures against the neighbouring Arab States—acts made possible by aid from

⁸ See also Y.U.N., 1956, pp. 42-43.

certain imperialist powers seeking to restore colonial domination over the lands of the Arabs. He expressed regret that the United States was showing partiality and was defending the extremist circles in Israel which it so generously assisted, while making pious appeals to both sides. Military provocations by Israel and the declarations of its leaders had proved the intention to settle Israel-Arab differences through force of arms. He warned that those who were pushing Israel to the brink of war should realize the dangers involved in fanning the flames of a military conflict. The USSR condemned the designs of the forces of imperialism against the freedom and independence of the Arab peoples and decisively supported their struggle to strengthen their security and protect their inalienable and sovereign rights. The USSR Government considered that the maintenance of peace and security in the Middle East which was adjacent to its own shores, was vital to the interests of its own people, and that the Security Council must decisively condemn Israel's provocations and threats against the Arab States.

The representatives of Argentina, Brazil, Canada, China, Denmark, Ethiopia and Japan supported the Secretary-General's appeal to the parties concerned to exercise special restraint and to avoid armed confrontation and any action that might increase tensions.

The representative of India stated that the utmost restraint by all parties concerned was necessary to allow the Security Council to work for a *détente* and seek to consolidate peace in the area. He supported the Secretary-General's suggestions for reactivation of the Egyptian-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission (EIMAC) and the Israel-Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission (ISMAC). The United Arab Republic, he also said, was only exercising its sovereignty in asking for the withdrawal of UNEF and the Secretary-General had acted wisely in acceding to the request. India understood the reasons for certain precautionary measures taken by the United Arab Republic, which were defensive in nature. In his Government's view, expressed as far back as 1957, the Gulf of Aqaba was an inland sea and entry into it lay within the territorial waters of the United Arab Republic. No State or group of States should attempt to

challenge by force the sovereignty of the United Arab Republic over the Strait of Tiran. A *modus vivendi* was most desirable, although any arrangement worked out must be within the framework of the sovereignty of the United Arab Republic.

The representative of Nigeria supported, as a first step, an immediate appeal for restraint but declared that his Government would not support any action that might imply interference with the sovereign right of a country to maintain the integrity of its territory and waters. Serious consideration should be given to the Secretary-General's proposals—for instance, the proposal to reactivate the Mixed Armistice Commissions. Further, the Secretary-General should be encouraged to continue his most useful contacts with the principal parties in the Middle East and with the other interests involved.

The representative of Lebanon declared that his Government would stand beside the United Arab Republic in the defence of its sovereign rights over the entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba. He warned that if Israel committed aggression, the responsibility would fall fully and squarely on Israel. The resulting war would be a total war that would array all the Arab States against Israel. The Arab peoples would pursue their aim of undoing the great injustice inflicted on the Arabs of Palestine and of restoring their rights to their usurped homeland. He appealed to the Security Council to prevent Israel aggression and to preserve peace.

The representative of Syria stated that the crisis in the Middle East was the direct outcome of the unprovoked massive attack carried out on 7 April 1967 by Israel forces against Syrian villages. That aggression had taken place over the issue of cultivation rights in the Demilitarized Zone which, over the years, Israel had used as an instrument to provoke Syria. In contravention of the General Armistice Agreement and Security Council resolutions, Israel had carried out a policy of piecemeal invasion in the Demilitarized Zone on the Syrian-Israel Armistice Demarcation Line, expelling hundreds of Arab civilians and building military fortifications. The basic cause of the tragedy with which the Council was dealing was the fact that the Arab people of Pales-

tine had been completely and consistently ignored. No peace could be lasting until and unless the rights of the Arab people of Palestine to their homeland were fully recognized.

On 31 May 1967, the United States submitted a draft resolution by which the Security Council would: (1) call upon the parties concerned, as a first step, to comply with the Secretary-General's appeal; (2) encourage the immediate pursuit of international diplomacy in the interests of pacifying the situation and seeking reasonable, peaceful and just solutions; and (3) decide to keep the issue under urgent and continuous review so that the Council might determine what further steps it might take in the exercise of its responsibilities for the maintenance of international peace and security.

This draft resolution, the representative of the United States stressed, was an interim measure designed to provide the time for more deliberate disposition of the underlying issues without prejudice to the ultimate rights and claims of any party.

Also on 31 May, the representative of the United Arab Republic introduced a draft resolution containing, he said, suggestions in support of ideas in the Secretary-General's report which were essential in his Government's opinion for partial alleviation of the tension in the Middle East. By the United Arab Republic's draft resolution, the Security Council would: (1) decide that the Egyptian-Israel General Armistice Agreement was still valid and reiterate that the United Nations machinery emanating therefrom should be fully operative; (2) call upon the Israel Government to respect and abide by its obligations and responsibilities as stipulated in that Agreement; (3) instruct the Chief of Staff of UNTSO to proceed promptly and to reinstitute within two weeks the headquarters of EIMAC in El-Auja from which it had been expelled by Israel's unilateral action; (4) decide to take additional measures for the full implementation of this resolution in case of non-compliance by the Israel Government; (5) request the Secretary-General to contact the parties to the Egyptian-Israel General Armistice Agreement for the immediate implementation of the decision and report to the Council within 15 days for its approval

with regard to additional measures; and (6) decide to reconvene to discuss the Secretary-General's report immediately upon its submission.

The representative of Iraq stated that the crisis in the Middle East had arisen because of Israel's threat to start a war if its demands concerning navigation in the Gulf of Aqaba were not met. The Government of the United Arab Republic, he observed, had declared that it would not initiate any offensive action, but no such assurance had been given by the Israel Government.

He fully endorsed the views of the United Arab Republic about its right to control navigation through its territorial waters whenever it felt that its security was threatened. Those powers that demanded an immediate solution to the problem of navigation in the Gulf of Aqaba, on which the United Nations had taken no position, showed no such urgency, he said, regarding the fundamental question of Palestine and the one and a quarter million Arabs whose rights to repatriation to their homeland had been proclaimed and reaffirmed in no less than 18 General Assembly resolutions. Nor did they seem perturbed by Israel's repeated violations of the General Armistice Agreements. The problem before the Council, in the opinion of Iraq's spokesman, was to prevent Israel, which alone was threatening war, from carrying out its threat. The Council should not do this by yielding to expediency, giving in to demands and allowing itself to become an instrument for the consolidation of aggression. It should take up the real issues underlying the crisis, for if they were not solved there could be no peace in the area.

The representative of Jordan declared that time and again his delegation had reminded the Security Council of the determination of the Israel authorities to create a situation convenient for their expansionist designs and had recently brought before the Council accounts of serious incidents and acts of aggression committed by Israel, which proved beyond doubt Israel's repeated violation of the Armistice Agreement, the Demilitarized Zone, the no man's land and the Armistice Demarcation Line. The situation had now reached serious dimensions.

It was incumbent upon the Council to prevent the recurrence of such acts of aggression, all the more so since Israel was boycotting two of four Mixed Armistice Commissions in the area, despite repeated requests by the Security Council to co-operate with them.

Some members of the Council, Jordan's representative added, had spoken of sabotage and terrorism, but could a Palestinian be called a trespasser in his own land or a foreigner in his own country? Could Israel cite a single incident where El Fatah worked in any place not an Arab area under United Nations resolutions? The people of Palestine were becoming impatient. They had waited for 19 years for a just United Nations solution and their present action was the result of the Council's inaction. They were the victims of injustice and they were determined to regain their homeland.

In a letter dated 2 June 1967, Israel drew the attention of the Security Council to a new act of aggression committed by Syria on that day, when a group of marauders had been intercepted by an Israel patrol at a distance of one kilometre from the Syrian border. In the subsequent exchange of fire, casualties had been suffered on both sides.

By a letter dated 2 June 1967, the United Arab Republic transmitted a statement to the President of the Security Council noting that certain maritime powers were attempting to exercise pressure on the United Arab Republic and declaring that it would consider any collective measure undertaken by those States an encroachment on its sovereignty in the exercise of its legitimate rights over its territorial waters.

At the Security Council's next meeting, on 3 June, the representative of Israel said that the situation had deteriorated since the Council's first meeting on 24 May. While claiming that they would not initiate offensive action against Israel, Arab States had advanced false allegations before the Council to conceal their preparations for war and to portray the intended victim of their aggression as the aggressor. The combined effect of the Arab States' headlong rush to arms, a propaganda barrage of unprecedented violence with the theme of wiping Israel off the map and proclamations of a holy

war had created a most explosive situation and made it the elementary duty of his Government to place the country on a full defence footing. This was not the first time Israel had faced such an emergency; the Arab invasion of 1948 had been thrown back and the war terminated by Armistice Agreements. The Arab States had refused to take a single step towards restoring the peaceful conditions envisaged in the Agreements, but had, instead, illegally continued the conflict and practised belligerence. The mutual reduction and withdrawal of armed forces to their normal levels and positions was the obvious first step towards alleviating the crisis. The representative of Israel added that nothing less than complete non-interference with free and innocent passage through the Gulf of Aqaba was acceptable to his Government.

The representative of Bulgaria said that the measures taken by the Government of Israel were only the outward manifestations of the policy of intervention practised by certain imperialist circles to re-establish their control of the region. In response to Israel provocations, the Arab States had been compelled to adopt the necessary measures to defend themselves. The Council had the duty to call for the strictest restraint and to make every effort to ensure Israel's observance of the General Armistice Agreements and its participation in the United Nations truce supervision machinery. Bulgaria supported the draft resolution submitted by the United Arab Republic.

The representatives of Morocco and Saudi Arabia maintained that Israel's persistent violations of the General Armistice Agreements, its aggressive expansionist plans and its continued defiance of United Nations decisions were at the root of the present crisis. Twice in 20 years, said the Moroccan representative, the Middle East had had war and both times it had been caused by Zionist aggression, prepared and supported from outside. A considerable part of the present territory of Israel had been conquered after the Armistice Agreements of 1948 and the aggression of 1956. For 20 years, one and a half million Arabs had lived as stateless persons. Any resolution, said the representative of Saudi Arabia, which fell short of dealing with the restoration

of a united Palestine to its indigenous people and the repatriation of the transplanted alien Zionist Jews, would be an evasion by the Council of its responsibilities. With reference to the Gulf of Aqaba, the Arab representatives maintained: that the Gulf was and had always been an Arab gulf; that Israel's presence on the Red Sea was the result of an illegal occupation by Israel in violation of Security Council resolutions; that the Arab States were in a state of war with Israel and that therefore the United Arab Republic was acting within its sovereign rights in excluding Israel ships or any foreign ships bearing cargo destined for Israel.

The representative of Mali declared that the problem before the Council was the old question of Palestine and would not be solved unless the Palestinians were allowed to return. He supported the United Arab Republic's posi-

tion regarding the Gulf of Aqaba, adding that Mali would support any objective measure that would restore peace to the Middle East.

The representative of France observed that the Council's immediate objective should be to agree on the terms of an appeal to the parties to abstain from supporting their claims by resorting to force of any kind. In the view of his delegation, the appeal should be fashioned in such a way that it neither approved nor disapproved of the positions of the parties. He appealed to the other permanent members of the Council to join in the efforts to steer the crisis to the only road which in the opinion of his Government could lead to peace, namely, a reduction of tension and, later, negotiations. It would be useless to continue the discussion of draft resolutions on which the likelihood of consensus was highly doubtful.

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CONSIDERATION BY SECURITY COUNCIL ON 24 MAY 1967

SECURITY COUNCIL, meetings 1341, 1342.

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S/7903, S/7904. Letters of 24 May 1967 from Israel and United Arab Republic respectively (containing requests to participate in discussion).
S/7905. Canada and Denmark: draft resolution.

SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REPORT OF 26 MAY 1967

S/7906. Report of 26 May 1967 by Secretary-General.

CONSIDERATION BY SECURITY COUNCIL (29 MAY-3 JUNE 1967)

SECURITY COUNCIL, meetings 1343-1346.

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S/7908; S/7912; S/7909; S/7911; S/7914; S/7915; S/7920; S/7921; S/7934. Requests to participate in discussion from Syria; Jordan; Lebanon; Iraq; Morocco; Saudi Arabia; Kuwait; and Libya (dated variously between 27 May and 2 June 1967).
S/7910. Letter of 29 May 1967 from United Kingdom.
S/7916 and Rev.I. United States: draft resolution and revision.
S/7917. Report by Secretary-General on credentials (Syria).
S/7919. United Arab Republic: draft resolution.
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S/7925. Letter 2 June 1967 from United Arab Republic.

OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES ON 5 JUNE 1967 AND CONSIDERATION BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL

OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES AND ADOPTION OF FIRST CEASE-FIRE RESOLUTION ON 6 JUNE 1967

On the morning of 5 June 1967, the Security Council met in emergency session following re-

ceipt of charges made to the President of the Council by Israel and the United Arab Republic concerning the outbreak of hostilities in the Middle East earlier that same morning.

In explaining the circumstances of the meet-

ing, the President of the Council stated that at 0310 hours, New York time, the representative of Israel had informed him that Egyptian land and air forces had moved against Israel, whose armed forces were engaged in repelling the attack. At 0330 hours, New York time, the representative of the United Arab Republic had informed him that Israel had launched a treacherous, premeditated aggression against the United Arab Republic, attacking at points in the Gaza Strip and Sinai, airports in Cairo and the Suez Canal area and several other airports inside the United Arab Republic.

At the same meeting, the Secretary-General told the Security Council that the United Nations sources had no means of ascertaining how the hostilities had been initiated, particularly as the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) was concentrated in its camps and was in the process of being withdrawn. However, all reports agreed that serious military action on land and in the air was taking place at a number of points and that it was spreading. The Commander of UNEF had reported violations of United Arab Republic air space by Israel aircraft over Gaza and El Arish, heavy fighting between United Arab Republic and Israel forces across the frontier (these incidents both occurring at 0800 hours local time), and the strafing by Israel aircraft of a UNEF convoy on the road between Gaza and Rafah, killing three Indian soldiers and wounding others.

The Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) had reported that firing in Jerusalem had started at 1125 hours, local time. United Nations observers had reported an attack on Damascus airport at 1110 hours, local time, and air battles between Israel and Syrian planes beginning at 1155 hours, local time, along the Armistice Demarcation Line. Despite assurances received from Israel and Jordan by the Chief of Staff of UNTSO that they would respect the inviolability of the UNTSO headquarters in Jerusalem, Jordanian soldiers had occupied the garden of Government House and an exchange of fire had begun between them and Israel soldiers. The Secretary-General said that he had sent an urgent appeal to the King of Jordan for the immediate removal of Jordanian troops from the Government House compound.

The representative of Israel charged that in the early hours of 5 June, Egyptian armoured columns had moved in an offensive thrust against Israel's borders while at the same time Egyptian planes from airfields in Sinai had struck out towards Israel. Egyptian artillery in the Gaza Strip had shelled several Israel villages in that area. Israel was acting in self-defence.

The representative of the United Arab Republic charged that Israel had once again committed an act of treacherous aggression against his country. He asserted that the attacks carried out in the early hours of the morning indicated beyond doubt the premeditated nature of the aggression which Israel had as usual engineered and planned, in defiance of the United Nations Charter. He called on the Security Council to condemn vigorously the Israel aggression, against which his country was defending itself.

Before the Security Council reconvened on the evening of 6 June, the Secretary-General circulated additional information. On the evening of 5 June, the Secretary-General informed the Council that heavy firing was taking place in and around Jerusalem and that Damascus airport had been under intermittent air attack since 1110 hours GMT. The Commander of UNEF had reported that in artillery firing on the Indian battalion main camp, near which were United Arab Republic military positions, one Indian officer and an Indian soldier had been killed, and nine soldiers were wounded. The Chief of Staff of UNTSO had reported that the Jordanian soldiers in the Government House compound had been attacked and later driven out by Israel troops, who had subsequently forcibly occupied Government House and that he and his staff had been escorted into Israel. The report contained the texts of messages sent by the Secretary-General to Israel protesting the strafing of the UNEF convoy in the Gaza Strip and the occupation of Government House in Jerusalem, and requesting Israel to restore Government House to exclusive United Nations control.

On 6 June, in a supplemental report, the Secretary-General conveyed to the Security Council further information received from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO and United Nations observers in the field on continued fighting in Jerusalem, along the Israel-Syrian Armistice

Demarcation Line, in Gaza and El Arish, as well as on unsuccessful efforts by United Nations observers to obtain a cease-fire. UNEF headquarters in Gaza had come under direct Israel artillery fire during the night of 5-6 June, forcing the Commander of UNEF to re-establish headquarters at the Tre Kroner Camp, near the beach in Gaza. During the shelling, three Indian soldiers had been killed and another three wounded.

On the evening of 6 June, the Council adopted unanimously, without debate, as resolution 233(1967), a draft text introduced by the President by which it: (1) called upon the Governments concerned to take forthwith, as a first step, all measures for an immediate cease-fire and cessation of all military activities in the area; and (2) requested the Secretary-General to keep the Council promptly and currently informed on the situation. (For full text, see

DOCUMENTARY REFERENCES below.)

The United States representative stressed that adoption of the resolution calling for a cease-fire, which his Government had been urging for 36 hours, was the first step towards peace in the Middle East, and expressed his fervent hope that the Council's appeal would be immediately and fully complied with.

The representatives of the United Kingdom and the United States, denying categorically charges that their aircraft had been involved in the hostilities in the Near East, stated that they would welcome an investigation by the United Nations.

The representative of the USSR drew attention to a statement by his Government on 5 June, which had condemned Israel for committing aggression against the United Arab Republic and other neighbouring Arab States, in flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter and elementary rules of international law. The United Nations must discharge its primary duty, condemn the actions of Israel and take urgent measures to restore peace in the Middle East, the USSR declared.

The USSR and Bulgaria considered the Council's resolution a minimum first step and urged that a decision concerning the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Israel forces behind the Armistice Lines be adopted without further delay.

The representatives of Argentina, Brazil, Canada, China, Denmark, Ethiopia, France and Japan stressed the need to put the cease-fire into effect immediately and expressed the hope that the resolution would be an effective and constructive first step towards the restoration of peace in the area and the solution of the underlying problems.

The representative of Mali condemned Israel's aggression and pledged his Government's full support for the United Arab Republic and other Arab peoples.

The representative of India stated that while his delegation welcomed the unanimous decision of the Council, it would have preferred a resolution that linked the cease-fire with a withdrawal of armed forces to positions held prior to the outbreak of hostilities. Such a decision would have been in accordance with past practice of the Council based on the principle that the aggressor should not enjoy the fruits of aggression. He strongly protested the Israel attacks on the withdrawing Indian contingent of UNEF and asked for guarantees for the safety and security of those elements of UNEF that remained in the area.

The representative of Israel told the Council that his country, by its independent effort, had passed from serious danger to successful resistance against the combined forces of the United Arab Republic, Jordan, Syria and Iraq whose basic aim was the destruction of Israel. After Egyptian forces had attacked on 5 June, Israel had defended itself under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.⁹ Efforts by the Government of Israel to prevent the expansion of the conflict had been ignored by Jordan, which

⁹ Article 51 of the United Nations Charter reads as follows:

"Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security."

had opened artillery fire across the whole frontier, including Jerusalem, and by Syria, which had started bombing and artillery attacks on Israel villages.

The representative of Israel then stated that the sudden withdrawal of UNEF had not been accompanied by due international discussion and that no attempt had been made to help Israel surmount the grave prejudice to its vital interests consequent on the withdrawal. When the United Nations undertook a function, it had the right to ask that the termination of that function not take place in circumstances that would lead to situations contrary to the Charter. After reviewing the main elements of tension that had led to the conflict, the Israel representative said that it was now the task of the Governments concerned to elaborate among themselves a new system of relationships based on the acceptance of Israel's statehood and on the principle of the peaceful settlement of disputes. It was also important that States outside the region, and especially the great powers, should have a balanced attitude towards the problems of the area and exercise an even-handed support for the integrity and independence of States. Israel welcomed the Council's call for a cease-fire, but its implementation depended on the acceptance and co-operation of the Governments that were responsible for the present situation.

The representatives of Iraq and Morocco stated that the adoption of the cease-fire resolution, without defining the responsibility of Israel for its aggression, might have grave consequences since it allowed Israel, the aggressor, to maintain the fruits of that aggression. The representative of Iraq asserted that negotiations aimed at working out a cease-fire resolution, which would be accompanied by a call for the withdrawal of forces back to positions held before the outbreak of hostilities, had failed because of the refusal of certain States, in particular the United States, to support such a resolution.

The representative of Syria denounced Israel as the aggressor and charged that the United States and the United Kingdom had proved themselves the enemies of the Arab nation, having acted in collusion with Israel by joining in the air attack against Arab towns and by

providing air cover for the Israel armed forces. He announced that his country, along with Algeria, Iraq and the United Arab Republic, had severed diplomatic relations with the United States. The solution of the Arab-Israel conflict could be achieved by dealing with the basic issue—the fate of the Arab people of Palestine. The Syrian Government's position in regard to the Security Council's resolution was clear: it strongly opposed any gains made by Israel stemming from a *fait accompli*. It was the Council's absolute duty to take immediate measures to condemn the aggressor and to apply the sanctions provided for by the Charter.

The representatives of the United Kingdom and the United States, in reply, reiterated their categorical denials of participation in the conflict.

ADOPTION OF SECOND CEASE-FIRE RESOLUTION (ON 7 JUNE 1967)

On 7 June 1967, the Security Council met again at the urgent request of the representative of the USSR who stated that the forces of the aggressor continued to engage in military operations, paying no heed to Security Council resolution 233(1967) of 6 June (see page 189 for text). It was therefore essential that the Council act without delay in reaffirming its call for a cease-fire. The USSR submitted a draft resolution whereby the Council would: (1) demand that the Governments concerned should, as a first step, cease fire and discontinue all military activities at 2000 hours GMT on 7 June 1967; and (2) request the Secretary-General to keep the Council promptly and currently informed on the situation.

At the same meeting, the Secretary-General reported receipt of a cable dated 7 June from Jordan, stating that its Government accepted the cease-fire resolution and had issued orders to its armed forces to observe it, except in self-defence. In view of the continued occupation by Israel troops of the headquarters of both UNTSO in Jerusalem and UNEF in Gaza, the Secretary-General stated that he had approached the Government of Israel to ask for assurances that the records and documents of both of those headquarters be preserved and protected. He also informed the Council of casualties suffered by UNEF and UNTSO and reported on efforts

to find means for the evacuation of the remaining UNEF contingents.

At a second Council meeting in the afternoon of 7 June, the USSR proposal was adopted unanimously as resolution 234(1967). (For text, See DOCUMENTARY REFERENCES below.)

The representative of Canada then proposed a draft resolution whereby the Security Council would request the President, with the assistance of the Secretary-General, to take the necessary measures to bring about full and effective compliance with its resolutions of 6 and 7 June. He explained that this proposal was intended to fill a gap in definition of responsibility as regarded implementation of the Council's cease-fire resolutions. There was a requirement to do more than simply keep the Council informed of the situation.

In the discussion, the representative of the United Arab Republic repeated earlier charges that the United States and the United Kingdom had participated in the air operations on Israel's side. Israel, he said, was continuing its aggression against Jordan and the United Arab Republic, in violation of the Council's resolution, and had not withdrawn its forces. Therefore the Council should condemn Israel, order it to cease fire immediately and to withdraw to positions behind the Armistice Demarcation Lines and points held prior to the outbreak of hostilities.

The Foreign Minister of Israel refuted charges that his country was the aggressor and emphasized that Israel had received no help from either the United States or the United Kingdom in repelling Arab aggression. He noted that while his country had accepted the cease-fire resolution, the United Arab Republic, Syria and Iraq had not done so. Moreover, Jordan's acceptance of the cease-fire was conditioned by the fact that its forces were under United Arab Republic command, and Egyptian commando units in Jordan were carrying out military operations against Israel. Therefore, acceptance of the cease-fire by the United Arab Republic was crucial not only for what happened on the Egyptian-Israeli front but also for what happened on the Jordan-Israel front. Algerian and Kuwaiti troops, he said, were also taking part in the fighting. He suggested that the Council's cease-fire resolutions be communicated to

every State which could reasonably be regarded, on the strength of its own pronouncements, to be taking part in the conflict.

The representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom again rejected the charges made by the representative of the United Arab Republic and repeated their proposals for a United Nations investigation on the spot.

The representative of the USSR drew attention to a USSR statement addressed on 7 June 1967 to the Government of Israel, declaring that if Israel continued its aggressive war and did not immediately comply with the Council's cease-fire demand, the USSR would revise its attitude in respect of Israel and adopt a decision concerning the further maintenance of diplomatic relations.

The Secretary-General informed the Council that, according to information received from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, the cease-fire in the area of Jerusalem was not effective. During the night of 6-7 June, Israel forces had bombarded and occupied the crest of Mount Scopus dominating the city of Jerusalem. A sector of the city had come under Jordanian mortar fire for a short period in mid-morning on 7 June, and at about 1030 hours GMT, heavy Israel bombardment had started in the vicinity of Bethlehem.

ADOPTION OF FURTHER CEASE-FIRE RESOLUTIONS ON 9 AND 11 JUNE 1967

On 7 June 1967, Israel informed the Security Council by letter that, at 4:45 p.m. New York time, it had advised the Secretary-General that the Israel Government accepted the Security Council's call for immediate cease-fire, provided that the other parties accepted.

In cables dated 7 and 8 June, Jordan informed the Secretary-General of its Government's acceptance, respectively, of the cease-fire resolutions of 6 and 7 June.

In a cable dated 8 June, Kuwait informed the Secretary-General that it would not observe nor adhere to the Security Council's cease-fire resolutions, which did not condemn the Israel aggressors and ignored the just rights of the Palestinians in their homeland.

On 8 June, the Council met urgently at the

request of both the United States and the USSR in view of the continued fighting in the Middle East. It held seven meetings between 8 June and 11 June.

The Secretary-General reported messages from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO stating that Jordan had charged bombing of Mafrq by Israel on 8 June, and crossing of the Jordan river by some Israel troops. Israel had subsequently informed him that Iraqi troops and aircraft were in the Mafrq area.

The cease-fire resolutions, said the Secretary-General, had been transmitted to Iraq but no response had been received. The Chief of Staff had also reported continuous air and ground fire around the Israel-Syrian Demilitarized Zone. The Secretary-General also announced receipt of a letter dated 8 June, stating that the United Arab Republic had decided to accept the cease-fire call, as prescribed by the Council's resolutions of 6 and 7 June 1967, on condition that the other party ceased fire.

The USSR introduced a draft resolution whereby, as subsequently revised, the Security Council, noting that Israel had disregarded the Council's cease-fire resolutions of 6 and 7 June, and that Israel not only had not halted military activities but had made use of the time elapsed to seize additional territory, would: (1) vigorously condemn Israel's aggressive activities and its violation of the Council's resolutions 233(1967) of 6 June and 234(1967) of 7 June (see p. 189); and (2) demand that Israel immediately halt its military activities against neighbouring Arab States, remove its troops from the territory of those States and withdraw them behind the Armistice Lines and respect the status of the Demilitarized Zones.

The representative of the USSR declared that the extremist circles of Tel Aviv, inebriated by their temporary success, were continuing their aggression against the Arab States, ignoring the Council's decisions and taking advantage of time to conquer additional Arab territories. Israel had hurled a challenge at the United Nations and the Security Council. This had created a situation pregnant with great danger. Appeals for cessation of military activity were not enough. It was essential to condemn the aggressor and to prevent Israel from enjoying the fruits of its criminal aggression.

The United States introduced a draft resolution by which, as subsequently revised, the Council would: (1) call for scrupulous compliance by Israel, Jordan and the United Arab Republic with their agreements to a cease-fire; (2) insist that all the other parties concerned immediately comply with the Council's repeated demands for a cease-fire and cessation of all military activity as a first urgent step towards the establishment of a stable peace in the Middle East; (3) call for discussions promptly thereafter among the parties concerned, using such third party or United Nations assistance as they might wish, looking towards the establishment of viable arrangements encompassing the withdrawal and disengagement of armed personnel, the renunciation of force regardless of its nature, the maintenance of vital international rights and the establishment of a stable and durable peace in the Middle East; (4) request the President of the Security Council and the Secretary-General to take immediate steps to seek to assure compliance with the cease-fire and to report to the Council within 24 hours; and (5) also request the Secretary-General to provide such assistance as might be required in facilitating the discussions called for in paragraph 3.

The purpose of this resolution, said the United States representative, was to stop the fighting and to provide for movement towards the final settlement of all outstanding questions between the parties. The objective must be a decision by the warring powers to live in peace and to establish normal relations, as contemplated and pledged by the United Nations Charter. He renewed the pledge of his Government to join in efforts to bring a lasting peace to the Middle East.

The representative of the United Kingdom stated that acceptance by the United Arab Republic of the Council's cease-fire resolutions should transform the situation. He appealed to the Council members and to the parties to the conflict to realize and to accept that an effective United Nations presence in the areas of conflict must be established to cope with the tasks ahead. The Canadian draft resolution before the Council was a first step towards restoring the effectiveness of the United Nations. He trusted that the purposes of this draft

resolution could be promptly achieved (see above, p. 178).

The representative of Israel declared that, owing to the failure of certain Arab States to observe the cease-fire, fighting and bloodshed continued in the Middle East. The only established and effective cease-fire agreement was that between Israel and Jordan. The acceptance of the cease-fire by the United Arab Republic raised the immediate prospect of the end of hostilities, except in the case of Syria. Syria had not accepted the cease-fire, and the fighting on the Israel-Syrian border was becoming more intense.

The Israel spokesman criticized the Soviet draft resolution as based on premises that were not accurate and upon responsibilities that were not fairly distributed. Israel had been the first to accept the cease-fire resolutions and had halted military activities as soon as a cease-fire had been achieved with any of its neighbours. As for the draft resolution submitted by the United States, he noted that the emphasis seemed to be on the need to move not backwards to belligerence, but forward to peace, and it was in the context of peace negotiations that the draft proposed agreed measures of disengagement. He added that the emphasis in Israel's thinking was not so much on the authority of international bodies, but on direct bilateral contacts between the Governments concerned to work out the conditions for their coexistence.

The representative of Bulgaria stated that the United States draft resolution was unacceptable because it placed Jordan and the United Arab Republic on the same footing with the aggressor. It amounted to allowing Israel troops to remain where they were so as to make sure that Israel's demands with respect to territorial and other concessions from the Arab States were satisfied.

The representative of Jordan expressed astonishment that the Council had not attempted to establish the clear fact of Israel aggression. Israel had answered appeals for restraint by further expansion of its dream of a Zionist state. With the forces of Zionism and imperialism working against the struggle for liberation of the Arabs of Palestine, that struggle would not be easy. Even if Jordan did not have the

means now to repel the aggressor, Jordan and the other Arab states would not compromise with aggression.

On 9 June, the Security Council held an urgent meeting at the request of Syria. The President informed the Council of the receipt of a telegram dated 9 June from Syria announcing its acceptance of the two appeals for a cease-fire contained in the Council's resolutions of 6 and 7 June, provided the other party accepted it. The President also informed the Council of charges made to him by Israel and later by Syria that hostilities were continuing.

The Secretary-General told the Council that early on the morning of 9 June, the Chairman of the Israel-Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission (ISMAC) had advised him that he had received a message from Syria stating that Syria was being subjected to an Israel attack by aircraft, tanks, artillery and infantry along the whole length of the Israel-Syrian Armistice Demarcation Line. The Chief of Staff of UNTSO had reported shelling and air bombardment in the Central Demilitarized Zone and also north of Lake Tiberias. The report confirmed bombing in the vicinity of Damascus, and movement of troops and targets engaged as far east as Kuneitra. General Bull had also reported that Israel authorities had informed him of heavy shelling in the north, including the town of Safad, and that earlier, about 16 Israel villages had come under heavy Syrian artillery fire.

Following charges by Syria of continuing Israel attacks inside Syria and counter-charges by Israel of continued shelling of Israel villages, the Council unanimously adopted, at 1306 hours on 9 June 1967, a proposal, introduced by the President, as resolution 235(1967).

By this resolution, the Council: (1) confirmed its resolutions 233(1967) of 6 June 1967 and 234(1967) of 7 June 1967 (for texts, see page 189) about immediate cease-fires and cessation of military action; (2) demanded that hostilities should cease forthwith; and (3) requested the Secretary-General to make immediate contacts with Israel and Syria to arrange immediate compliance with the aforementioned Council resolutions of 6 and 7 June and to report to the Council in not later than two hours.

The representative of the United States regretted the delay in adoption of the resolution,

stating that part of the problem had been the unwillingness of some Council members to authorize the appropriate officials of the United Nations to take action in the implementation of the Council's resolutions.

The representatives of Bulgaria, India and the USSR condemned Israel for continuing the aggression and forcibly occupying new Arab territory in violation of Council decisions and the Charter. They criticized certain members of the Council for refusing to include in the Council's cease-fire resolutions provisions condemning the aggressor and demanding withdrawal from the occupied territories. The representative of India also proposed that the Security Council should reinforce its call for a cease-fire and immediately order the withdrawal of all armed forces, reactivate and strengthen the United Nations machinery to enforce the cease-fire and secure withdrawal on the lines proposed by the Secretary-General in his report of 26 May 1967. He also suggested that the Secretary-General be requested to send a personal representative to the area to help restore peaceful conditions and to ensure the safety of the civilian Arab population in the occupied areas.

The representatives of Argentina, Brazil, Canada and the United Kingdom expressed the hope that the adoption of the resolution would bring the military operations to a halt and strengthen the United Nations presence in the area.

The representative of Syria informed the Council at 1435 hours on 9 June that his Government had already accepted resolution 235 (1967) adopted earlier that day but that the Israel attack was increasing and paratroopers had been dropped over Kuneitra.

The representative of Israel declared that a USSR statement to the Council that the Council had proclaimed Israel to be an aggressor was false. Not a single United Nations resolution had labelled Israel as an aggressor: in its only application of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, in 1948, the Council had referred to Arab aggression against the new State of Israel. (For text of Chapter VII, see APPENDIX II.)

In reply, the representative of Syria stated that no other Member of the United Nations

had ever been condemned or censured so often by the Security Council and General Assembly as Israel had been.

The representative of Israel announced that Israel accepted the Council's resolution (235 (1967)) of 9 June 1967, provided that Syria accepted and implemented the cease-fire. A report, he said, indicated that Syrian forces were continuing to shell Israel border villages.

The Secretary-General read communications from Syria and Israel confirming their acceptance of the Council's resolution 235(1967) of 9 June, in the terms previously announced by their representatives.

After some discussion on the implementation of the resolution, the Council adjourned for two hours, pending confirmation that orders to cease fire had been issued on both sides and that fighting had actually stopped.

When the Security Council reconvened in the evening of 9 June 1967, the Secretary-General reported that Syria had replied that orders had been issued to its forces to stop military operations forthwith, but that Israel was continuing military activities inside Syria, including air attacks. Israel had replied that it had issued orders for the cessation of hostilities and that on its part all fighting had stopped except for measures of self-defence where Israel was still being attacked.

During the discussion, the representative of Syria repeated charges that Israel was continuing, with increasing intensity, vast air and land operations, leaving no doubt that its aim was total invasion of Syria. The representative of the United Arab Republic told the Council that many parts of his country had been bombed by Israel after acceptance of the cease-fire by his Government.

Israel denied both charges and accused Syria of continuing its shelling of Israel villages.

In response to requests by some members of the Council that further information on the charges of cease-fire violations be obtained from United Nations sources in the area, the Secretary-General stated that if certain conditions in respect of co-operation with the United Nations observers by the parties concerned were obtained, including restoration of the use of Government House in Jerusalem, with its communications facilities, to the Chief of Staff of

UNTSO and freedom of movement for United Nations observers on both sides, he would be able to report promptly to the Council regarding the observance of the cease-fire.

Following a brief discussion, the President stated that members agreed the Council should request the parties concerned to extend all possible co-operation to United Nations observers in the discharge of their responsibilities, request the Government of Israel to restore the use of Government House to the Chief of Staff of UNTSO and ask the parties to re-establish freedom of movement for United Nations observers.

On 9 June, the United States draft resolution (see p. 179) was again revised. By this revision, the first operative paragraph would insist on an immediate scrupulous implementation by all the parties concerned of the Council's repeated demands for a cease-fire and cessation of all military activity as a first urgent step toward the establishment of a stable peace in the Middle East.

On 10 June, the Security Council held a pre-dawn emergency meeting at the request of the representative of Syria who had stated that there had been a serious deterioration of the situation, with Israel forces occupying the Syrian town of Kuneitra and moving towards Damascus. The USSR had requested in a letter of 9 June that an item entitled "Cessation of military action by Israel and withdrawal of the Israeli forces from those parts of the territory of the United Arab Republic, Jordan and Syria which they have seized as a result of an aggression" be placed on the Council's agenda. The Council agreed to include the USSR item in its agenda and to consider the four items now before it simultaneously.

In the course of the meeting, the Secretary-General gave the Council oral reports on the developing military situation as reported to him by the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) and the Chairman of the Israel-Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission (ISMAC). These reports included an assessment of the situation to the effect that United Nations observers had reported bombing and hostilities continuing in Syria, along the ridges overlooking the eastern shores of Lake Tiberias, and on the eastern bank of the Jordan River, and that Damascus

airport and suburbs had been bombed by the Israel air force. The Israel Foreign Office had denied the air attack on Damascus or its airport, asserting that Israel aircraft were over Syria only to provide protective cover for Israel forces, and had requested that UNTSO observers be sent to Kuneitra to confirm that Israel's forces were not in Kuneitra. The Secretary-General observed that the fragmentary reports reflected the extreme difficulties under which UNTSO was operating because its observers had no freedom of movement.

In the debate over responsibility for violations of the cease-fire, Syria charged that the representative of Israel was deliberately attempting to mislead the Council by his assertions that Israel was abiding by the cease-fire, and asked the Security Council to apply sanctions against Israel for its flagrant violations of the cease-fire resolutions.

The representatives of Bulgaria, India, Mali and the USSR made similar statements calling on the Council to take immediate measures to halt Israel's aggression.

The representative of Israel declared that, despite the acceptance of the cease-fire resolutions, Syria had not ceased, for 36 hours, the shelling of Israel villages. He maintained that the only Israel activity was against those gun emplacements in Syria.

The representative of the United States declared that his Government did not condone any violation of the cease-fire by any party and believed that both parties had an obligation to comply with the cease-fire. But his Government would not pass judgment on which party was responsible on the basis of allegations coming from the parties.

When the Council reconvened later the same morning, the Secretary-General reported that the Chairman of ISMAC had confirmed air attacks in the vicinity of Damascus. General Odd Bull, Chief of Staff of UNTSO, had reported that Israel was ready to make arrangements for a cease-fire. The Secretary-General added that a meeting had been arranged between General Bull and the Israel Defence Minister.

The representative of the USSR drew attention to a statement issued by his Government on 10 June declaring that if Israel did not forth-

with put an end to its military activities, the USSR, together with all peace-loving States, would have to apply sanctions against Israel. It further declared that in view of the continuation of aggression by Israel, the USSR had decided to break off diplomatic relations with Israel.

The representative of Jordan charged that thousands of Jordanians were being expelled from their homes in the Israel-invaded territory of the western bank of the Jordan River, and were fleeing to Amman. He requested the Council, as a matter of the utmost urgency, to adopt measures which would prevent further atrocities against the civilian population.

Bulgaria, Canada, Ethiopia, Japan and the United Kingdom expressed their concern over the plight of the refugees and appealed to the parties to give the utmost humanitarian consideration to the civilian victims of the war and prisoners of war.

The representative of Israel said that at the meeting between the Minister of Defence of Israel and the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, the Defence Minister had stated that Israel would accept any proposal by the Chief of Staff for the implementation of the Security Council cease-fire resolutions and arrangements for the supervision of the cease-fire. He stressed that those arrangements would not be part of the General Armistice Agreements.

The representative of the United States declared that his Government deemed it of the gravest importance that the Security Council resolutions should be complied with in letter and in spirit by Israel and by the Arab countries involved.

The Secretary-General informed the Council that General Odd Bull had proposed practical arrangements for the cessation of all firing and troop movements to be effective at 1630 hours GMT on 10 June. Israel had advised General Bull that it was ready to agree to the proposal provided that Syria also agreed and provided that United Nations observers were deployed on each side at the time of the cease-fire.

In a supplemental report issued on 10 June, the Secretary-General stated that both Israel and Syria had accepted the proposed cease-fire arrangements. On the morning of 11 June,

United Nations observers would be deployed from Kuneitra on the Syrian side and from Tiberias on the Israel side.

On 10 June, Argentina, Brazil and Ethiopia submitted a draft resolution which was subsequently revised on 14 June. By the revised text, the Council would: (1) call upon Israel to ensure the safety, welfare and security of the inhabitants of the areas where military operations had taken place and to facilitate the return of those inhabitants who had fled the areas since the outbreak of hostilities; (2) recommend to the Governments concerned the scrupulous respect of the humanitarian principles governing the treatment of prisoners of war and the protection of civilian persons in time of war, contained in the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949; and (3) request the Secretary-General to follow the effective implementation of the resolution and report to the Council.

In the evening of 10 June, the Council was convened in response to a request of the representative of the USSR that it consider the question of the flagrant violation by Israel of the Council's decisions calling for a cessation of military activities.

The representative of the USSR said that, despite the decision of the Security Council, Israel had not given up its intention to continue trying to achieve its military purposes on the territory of Syria. He stressed that the Security Council had no right to postpone the resolute condemnation of the Israel aggressors for their flagrant violation of its decisions.

The Secretary-General stated that in response to inquiries which he had made to General Bull regarding the current military situation, he had received confirmation of a bombing raid south of Damascus and of artillery shelling directed from Syria to Israel—both incidents occurring after the time fixed for a cease-fire. Israel and Syria had confirmed the occupation of Kuneitra by Israel forces, Israel claiming that this had taken place prior to the cease-fire.

The representative of India believed that the Council should take swift action not only to assert its authority but also to put a stop to the loss of life and to ensure that the defiance of its decision by one of the parties did not continue.

The representative of the United States declared that it had been the consistent view of his Government from the very beginning of the conflict that the Council should have a single goal: to quench the flames of war in the Middle East and to begin to move towards peace in the area.

He submitted another draft resolution whereby the Council would: (1) condemn any and all violations of the cease-fire; (2) request the Secretary-General to order a full investigation of all reports of violations and to report to the Council as soon as possible; (3) demand that the parties scrupulously respect its cease-fire appeals contained in Council resolutions 233 (1967), 234(1967) and 235(1967) of 6, 7 and 9 June respectively; and (4) call upon the Governments concerned to issue categorical instructions to all military forces to cease all firing and military activities as required by those resolutions.

In reply to questions raised by the representative of France concerning the Secretary-General's report of 10 June, the Secretary-General stated, among other things, that Israel claimed that its forces had occupied Kuneitra prior to the cease-fire. The United Nations observers were not in a position to report on that point.

The representative of the USSR, referring to the United States draft resolution, said that its object was to assist the Israel aggressor in legalizing the occupation of Arab territory by means of violence.

In a further oral report, the Secretary-General informed the Council that, according to information received from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO: (a) bombs had definitely been dropped south of Damascus; (b) there had been no Arab breaches of the cease-fire; (c) a spokesman of the Israel Foreign Office had categorically denied the bombing by Israel aircraft; and (d) steps taken to achieve observance of the cease-fire on either side had been reported.

Late in the evening of 11 June, the Security Council was convened at the request of Syria to consider the continued deterioration of the situation resulting from Israel's further military penetration into Syrian territory.

The Secretary-General informed the Council orally that he had received messages from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO that same evening

indicating movement of Israel tanks south-west of Rafid. The Secretary-General stated that he had urgently sought further information from the Chief of Staff on whether Israel troops were in Rafid and its environs before the cease-fire of 10 June or whether they had advanced to that sector after the time fixed for the cease-fire to go into effect.

The representative of Syria charged that a column of Israel armoured cars and tanks supported by military helicopters had moved, at 1800 hours local time, eastward and southward from Rafid, which had been occupied three hours and 17 minutes after the cease-fire had gone into effect, and had occupied new sites and localities where fighting had not taken place previously. The new advance was aimed at the Yarmuk River, a large tributary of the Jordan River.

The representative of Israel said, with respect to the Rafid area, that there had been no advance beyond the truce lines established by the cease-fire on 10 June at 1630 hours GMT. He also stated that there was no fighting whatsoever anywhere along the front line, that the cease-fire was being scrupulously observed, and that the Kuneitra Control Centre had been reopened with the co-operation of the Israel authorities.

The representative of the USSR stated that Israel was trying by every means, with the support of the United States and others, to enable the Israel army to take as much territory as possible. He demanded the adoption of decisive and immediate measures to ensure the implementation by Israel of the Security Council resolutions. He stressed the importance, in this connexion, of the USSR draft resolution submitted on 8 June.

The representatives of Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States favoured action to bring about a complete cessation of hostilities and appealed to the parties for compliance with the previous cease-fire resolutions and a return to an atmosphere of calm that would facilitate the examination of problems created by the war.

Argentina, Canada and France strongly endorsed the Secretary-General's request that Government House be returned to the Chief of Staff of UNTSO.

The representatives of Bulgaria and Mali demanded that Israel be condemned for its aggression and for its violation of the cease-fire agreements and demanded the unconditional withdrawal of the Israel troops to the position of 4 June.

The representative of India said that the most important step the Council could take would be to order an immediate withdrawal of all forces to the positions they occupied on 4 June 1967. He urged the Council to consider his programme of 9 June (see p. 181).

After a brief recess, the Council resumed its meeting and adopted unanimously, as resolution 236(1967), a draft resolution which had been introduced by the President. By this resolution, the Council: (1) condemned any and all violations of the cease-fire; (2) requested the Secretary-General to continue his investigations and to report to the Council as soon as possible; (3) affirmed that its demand for a cease-fire and discontinuance of all military activities included a prohibition of any forward military movements subsequent to the cease-fire; (4) called for the prompt return to the cease-fire positions of any troops which might have moved forward subsequent to 1630 hours GMT on 10 June 1967; and (5) called for full co-operation with the Chief of Staff of UNTSO and the observers in implementing the cease-fire, including freedom of movement and adequate communications facilities.

Meanwhile the Secretary-General, in a supplemental information report, indicated that the cease-fire arrangements of 10 June, as proposed and negotiated by the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, were being observed and that as of 1500 hours, New York time, on 11 June, no serious breaches had been reported.

He regarded it as highly serious that Israel continued to refuse to permit the return of UNTSO to its headquarters in Government House in Jerusalem, where its communications set-up and its records were located.

Between 5 and 11 June, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Guinea, Hungary, Mauritania, Mongolia, Romania and Yugoslavia transmitted to the Council statements condemning Israel's aggression against the United Arab Republic and other Arab countries defending their independence.

SECURITY COUNCIL

RESOLUTION OF 14 JUNE 1967

Between 12 and 13 June 1967, the Secretary-General issued three additional reports concerning compliance with the Security Council cease-fire resolutions and the positioning of United Nations observers on the Israel and Syrian sides. In connexion with the question of Israel troop positions in Rafid and its environs, raised earlier, the Secretary-General informed the Council that the Chief of Staff had no information as to whether Israel troops were in Rafid and environs before the time fixed for the cease-fire to go into effect, or whether they had advanced to that sector after that time.

The Secretary-General also referred to the serious handicap imposed by the continued lack of access to UNTSO headquarters in Government House, Jerusalem. In a telegram to the Prime Minister of Israel he had again urged the return of Government House to UNTSO. He had also addressed a note to the representative of Israel requesting assurances regarding the safety and well-being and the protection of the interests and rights of the civilian populations in the areas under military occupation.

On 13 June, the Security Council met at the request of the representative of the USSR, who submitted a revision of the draft resolution he had proposed on 8 June (see p. 179), by which the Security Council, noting that Israel, in defiance of the three Council resolutions, had seized additional territory of the United Arab Republic, Jordan and Syria, would: (1) vigorously condemn Israel's aggressive activities and continued occupation of part of the territory of those States, regarding that as an act of aggression and the grossest violation of the United Nations Charter and generally recognized principles of international law; and (2) demand that Israel should immediately and unconditionally remove all its troops from the territory of those States and withdraw them behind the Armistice Lines and that it should respect the status of the Demilitarized Zones as prescribed in the General Armistice Agreements.

The representative of the USSR stated that the Council's decisions on cessation of hostilities had been only the minimum first step possible in the face of resistance by some members

of the Council to more radical and necessary measures. The Council should no longer merely repeat or confirm earlier resolutions which were totally inadequate, but must insist on the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Israel forces from the occupied territories of the neighbouring Arab States. In its resolution 236(1967) of 11 June (see p. 190), the Council had taken a first step towards the condemnation of Israel's actions. He rejected any attempts at linking withdrawal of Israel forces with a settlement of the general situation in the Middle East.

The representative of Jordan charged that Israel was carrying out a well-calculated plan to expel more Arabs with a view to repeating the pattern of 1948. He was grateful for the efforts of the Secretary-General to alleviate the situation of the civilian population and hoped for a report from him on that important and most urgent matter. He considered that the most serious and important question was the condemnation of the invaders and a demand for their immediate withdrawal.

The representative of the United States considered the revised USSR draft resolution as a prescription for renewed hostilities, a step backwards towards another war. The purpose of the United States draft resolution was to encourage the warring parties to live together in peace. It was necessary to move promptly towards a full settlement of all outstanding questions between the parties, such as that contemplated in resolutions of the United Nations for nearly 20 years. He urged Israel to exert every effort for the return to their homes of civilians displaced by the conflict.

The representative of Saudi Arabia, upholding the rights of the Palestinian Arabs, said that the Arabs would never accept an artificial State created in their midst.

The representative of Israel, while noting that the cease-fire was in full effect with Jordan, Syria and the United Arab Republic, said that the Governments of Algeria, Iraq and Yemen had openly proclaimed their intention to pursue belligerence against his country. Until all the Governments concerned had accepted the Council's resolutions, Israel considered that the cease-fire could not be regarded as fully in effect. Speaking on the situation of the civilian population, he said there had been movement

of civilians, but he asserted that a large-scale return movement from east to west had begun and the Israel authorities were doing nothing to prevent it. The USSR draft resolution was negative and one-sided. It was designed to restore the conditions of Arab belligerence towards Israel.

Tunisia asserted that the Israel authorities were exerting intolerable pressure on the population of the western bank of the Jordan to leave their homes and called upon the Council to adopt a clear-cut resolution putting an end to those inhuman actions.

The representative of Morocco requested the Secretary-General and the specialized agencies to render at once all possible humanitarian aid to the refugees and the civilian population. He reviewed the events leading to the conflict and pointed out that the Council had done nothing to safeguard the territorial integrity of the area. Peace could not be established when two thirds of Jordan, the Gaza Strip and Elath had been occupied and the Suez Canal was controlled.

The representative of Bulgaria, supporting the USSR draft resolution, said that the United States draft resolution was designed to serve the aims of Israel and to legalize its aggression.

The representative of the United Arab Republic said that it was the elementary duty of the Council to condemn the Israel aggression and to call upon the aggressor to withdraw its forces immediately behind the Armistice Demarcation Lines without any conditions. Referring to the paragraph of the revised United States draft resolution of 8 June 1967, calling for discussions among the parties (see p. 179), he said that it would clearly amount to legalizing Israel aggression.

The representative of Canada pointed out that the cease-fire call by the Council was only a first step which should be followed by other steps, including, first, an arrangement for the disengagement and withdrawal of forces; second, immediate attention to the human problems; and third, the development of understanding which would guarantee the vital interests of the States in the area. He endorsed the idea of dispatching to the area a special representative of the Secretary-General.

Mali warned that Israel could not keep control indefinitely of the Arab regions which it

occupied. The first positive action for peace would be the unconditional withdrawal of the Israel troops to the positions of 4 June.

In a supplemental information report issued on 14 June, the Secretary-General stated that the situation remained calm.

At a Security Council meeting on 14 June, the representative of the United Kingdom urged that the Council should turn to the problems of disengagement, withdrawal and the building of a just and lasting peace. Disengagement and withdrawal could not in fact be secured without discussions and action on the spot. The Council should appoint a mediator who could at once undertake discussions with the Governments concerned.

The representative of Pakistan thought that there was no way for the Security Council to repair the situation except by, first, a condemnation of the aggression committed by Israel; second, a demand under Article 39 of the United Nations Charter¹⁰ for the immediate withdrawal of the Israel forces to the Armistice Demarcation Lines; and third, after the completion of withdrawals, active participation by the Council in the exploration of ways and means for implementing the substantive United Nations resolutions on the Palestine question.

The representative of Argentina considered that the necessary conditions for a permanent settlement could not be established unless, on the one hand, troops were withdrawn and, on the other, assurances were given of free transit through international waterways. No one should have to negotiate under the threat of force.

The representative of France stated that a right to occupy territory could not be based on conquest by force of arms. On the level of principles, he could only support the USSR draft resolution. He considered that the members of the Council should strive together to facilitate conversations which could lead to agreements acceptable to all parties.

The Ethiopian representative insisted on the prompt withdrawal of forces and on the creation of just conditions for a negotiated settlement of the underlying causes of the crisis. He favoured the reactivation of the United Nations presence in the area.

Nigeria reiterated its firm conviction that the first matter requiring the Council's urgent atten-

tion was the withdrawal of forces to their respective territories as they were before the outbreak of hostilities.

The representative of the USSR opposed the Canadian draft resolution as introduced on 7 June 1967 (see p. 178) because to implement it could lead to a violation of the United Nations Charter. With regard to the draft resolution of Argentina, Brazil and Ethiopia (see p. 183), he remarked that it was limited to one aspect of the problem. In order to put an immediate end to the human suffering it was necessary to take energetic measures for the withdrawal of the Israel troops.

China, while opposed to the use of force, said it was not unmindful of Israel's declarations that it had no territorial designs against its neighbours and therefore would abstain on the USSR's draft resolution.

The representative of Japan stated that it was necessary for the Council to proceed in complete unity in order to achieve a settlement. His delegation doubted that the USSR revised draft resolution would facilitate that task and therefore he would abstain.

The representative of Israel assured the Council that his Government had made great efforts to restore normal civilian life in the area of the recent conflict. With regard to the treatment of prisoners of war, he asserted that they were treated by Israel with full regard to their legal and human rights in accordance with the international conventions.

Commenting on the USSR revised draft resolution, the representative of Brazil said that he was not in a position to state categorically which of the parties involved in the conflict had first violated the cease-fire resolutions. He stated further that the occupation by Israel of territory of the neighbouring Arab States had resulted from the state of war. He took note of the statement made by the Minister of Defence of Israel that his country had "no aim of conquest,"

¹⁰ Article 39 of the United Nations Charter reads:

"The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security."

and said his Government had been consistently opposed to any territorial conquest by military means; however, the problem of withdrawal could not be envisaged as an isolated step. Accordingly, he could not support the USSR revised draft resolution.

The representative of Canada withdrew the draft resolution submitted by Canada and Denmark on 24 May (see p. 166) because it had been overtaken by events. He asked that voting be deferred on the Canadian draft resolution proposed on 7 June (see p. 178).

The representative of the United States submitted another revision of his draft resolution of 8 June. By this new text, the Security Council would: (1) insist on the continued scrupulous implementation by all the parties concerned of the Council's repeated demands for a cease-fire, and on the cessation of all military activity as a first urgent step towards the establishment of a stable peace in the Middle East; (2) request the Secretary-General to continue to report to the Council on compliance with the cease-fire; (3) call for discussions promptly among the parties concerned, using such third party or United Nations assistance as they might wish, looking towards the establishment of viable arrangements encompassing the withdrawal and disengagement of armed personnel, the renunciation of force regardless of its nature, the maintenance of vital international rights and the establishment of a stable and durable peace in the Middle East; and (4) also request the Secretary-General to provide such assistance as might be required in facilitating the discussions called for in this text.

He said his delegation would be glad to consider constructive suggestions for the improvement of the draft resolution and would not ask for a vote today.

The representative of the United States added that he would not press for a vote on the other two United States draft resolutions which had been submitted on 31 May and 8 June 1967. (See pp. 172 and 179.)

The revised USSR draft resolution was put to the vote, a separate vote being taken on each operative paragraph. The first operative paragraph (on condemning Israel's aggressive activities and continued occupation of parts of the territories of the United Arab Republic,

Jordan and Syria) received 4 votes in favour (Bulgaria, India, Mali and the USSR), 0 against and 11 abstentions. The second operative paragraph (on demanding the immediate and unconditional removal of all Israel troops from those territories and their withdrawal behind the Armistice Lines, and respect for the status of the Demilitarized Zones) received 6 votes in favour (Bulgaria, Ethiopia, India, Mali, Nigeria and the USSR), 0 against and 9 abstentions. The draft resolution was not adopted, the paragraphs having failed to obtain the required majority.

The representative of the USSR stated that, as a consequence of the vote, an extreme situation had been created demanding extreme measures by the United Nations and all peace-loving States for the immediate and decisive cessation of the continuing aggression in the Middle East.

The representatives of Iraq and the United Arab Republic stated that the outcome of the vote on the USSR draft resolution was one more injustice to be added to the many injustices directed against the Arabs. Referring to the United Arab Republic's resolution submitted on 31 May (see p. 172), the representative of the United Arab Republic said that for the time being he would not insist on its being put to the vote.

RESOLUTION ON HUMANITARIAN ASPECTS OF PROBLEMS ARISING FROM HOSTILITIES

At the Security Council's meeting in the evening of 14 June 1967, several representatives, including those of Argentina, Bulgaria, Canada, France, India and Mali, stressed the need for adopting a draft resolution proposed by Argentina, Brazil and Ethiopia on 10 June on the humanitarian aspects of the problem. The proposal was adopted unanimously, as resolution 237(1967), on 14 June.

The preambular paragraphs of this resolution stressed the urgent need to spare the civilian populations and the prisoners of war in the area of the conflict in the Middle East from additional sufferings, and further stressed that essential and inalienable human rights should be respected even during the vicissitudes of war.

By the operative paragraphs of the resolution, the Security Council: (1) called upon Israel to ensure the safety, welfare and security

of the inhabitants of the areas where military operations had taken place and to facilitate the return of those inhabitants who had fled the area since the outbreak of the hostilities; (2) recommended to the Governments concerned the scrupulous respect of humanitarian principles governing the treatment of prisoners

of war and the protection of civilian persons in time of war, as contained in the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949; and (3) asked the Secretary-General to follow up the effective implementation of this resolution and to report to the Security Council. (For full text, see DOCUMENTARY REFERENCES below.)

DOCUMENTARY REFERENCES

OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES AND
ADOPTION OF FIRST CEASE-FIRE
RESOLUTION ON 6 JUNE 1967

SECURITY COUNCIL, meetings 1347, 1348.

S/7926. Letter of 5 June 1967 from United Arab Republic.

S/7928. Letter of 5 June 1967 from Tunisia (containing request to participate in discussion).

S/7929. Note verbale of 5 June 1967 from Yugoslavia.

S/7930 and Add.1. Supplemental information received by Secretary-General, dated 5 and 6 June 1967.

S/7932. Letter of 6 June 1967 from Italy.

S/7933. Note verbale of 5 June 1967 from Guinea.

S/7935. Draft resolution by Security Council members.

S/7936. Letter of 6 June from United Kingdom.

S/7937. Letter of 6 June 1967 from Mauritania.

S/7942. Letter of 6 June 1967 from Bulgaria.

RESOLUTION 233(1967), as presented by Council members, S/7935, adopted by Council, unanimously, on 6 June 1967, meeting 1348.

"The Security Council,

"Noting the oral report of the Secretary-General in this situation,

"Having heard the statements made in the Council,

"Concerned at the outbreak of fighting and with the menacing situation in the Near East,

"1. Calls upon the Governments concerned to take forthwith as a first step all measures for an immediate cease-fire and for a cessation of all military activities in the area;

"2. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Council promptly and currently informed on the situation."

ADOPTION OF SECOND CEASE-FIRE
RESOLUTION (ON 7 JUNE 1967)

SECURITY COUNCIL, meetings 1349, 1350.

S/7938. Letter of 7 June 1967 from USSR (containing request for immediate meeting of Security Council).

S/7939. Letter of 7 June 1967 from United Kingdom.

S/7940. USSR: draft resolution.

S/7941. Canada: draft resolution.

S/7943 and Corr.1. Telegram of 7 June 1967 from Jordan.

RESOLUTION 234(1967), as proposed by USSR, S/7940, adopted unanimously by Council on 7 June 1967, meeting 1350.

"The Security Council,

"Noting that, in spite of its appeal to the Governments concerned to take forthwith as a first step all measures for an immediate cease-fire and for a cessation of all military activities in the Near East (resolution 233(1967)), military activities in the area are continuing,

"Concerned that the continuation of military activities may create an even more menacing situation in the area,

"1. Demands that the Governments concerned should as a first step cease fire and discontinue all military activities at 2000 hours GMT on 7 June 1967;

"2. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Council promptly and currently informed on the situation."

ADOPTION OF FURTHER CEASE-FIRE
RESOLUTIONS ON 9 AND 11 JUNE 1967

SECURITY COUNCIL, meetings 1351-1357.

S/7930/Add.2-5. Supplemental information received by Secretary-General, dated between 10 and 12 June 1967.

S/7945. Letter of 7 June 1967 from Israel.

S/7946, S/7947. Cables of 7 and 8 June 1967 from Jordan.

S/7948. Cable of 8 June 1967 from Kuwait.

S/7949. Letter of 7 June 1967 from Czechoslovakia.

S/7950. Letter of 8 June 1967 from United States (containing request for urgent meeting of Security Council).

S/7951 and Rev.1. USSR: draft resolution and revision.

S/7952 and Rev.1, 2. United States: draft resolution and revisions.

S/7953. Letter of 8 June 1967 from United Arab Republic.

S/7954. Letter of 8 June 1967 from USSR (containing request to convene Security Council).

S/7955. Letter of 8 June 1967 from Hungary.

S/7956. Letter of 8 June 1967 from Haiti.

S/7957. Letter of 8 June 1967 from India (UNEF),

S/7958. Letter of 9 June 1967 from Syria,

S/7959. Letter of 7 June 1967 from Philippines.
S/7960. Draft resolution, introduced by President.

RESOLUTION 235(1967), as presented by Council President, adopted unanimously by Council on 9 June 1967, meeting 1352.

"The Security Council,

"Recalling its resolutions 233(1967) of 6 June and 234(1967.) of 7 June 1967,

"Noting that the Governments of Israel and Syria have announced their mutual acceptance of the Council's demand for a cease-fire,

"Noting the statements made by the representatives of Syria and Israel,

"1. Confirms its previous resolutions about immediate cease-fire and cessation of military action;

"2. Demands that hostilities should cease forthwith;

"3. Requests the Secretary-General to make immediate contacts with the Governments of Israel and Syria to arrange immediate compliance with the above-mentioned resolutions, and to report to the Security Council not later than two hours from now."

S/7962. Letter of 9 June 1967 from Israel.

S/7963. Letter of 9 June 1967 from United States.

S/7964. Letter of 9 June 1967 from Tunisia.

S/7965. Letter of 8 June 1967 from Portugal.

S/7966. Letter of 9 June from Mongolia.

S/7967. Letter of 9 June 1967 from USSR (request to place on agenda item entitled: "Cessation of military action by Israel and withdrawal of the Israeli forces from those parts of the territory of the United Arab Republic, Jordan and Syria which they have seized as the result of an aggression").

S/7968. Argentina, Brazil, Ethiopia: draft resolution.

S/7970. Letter of 10 June 1967 from USSR (containing request for immediate meeting of Security Council).

S/7971. United States: draft resolution.

S/7972. Letter of 11 June 1967 from Romania.

S/7973. Letter of 11 June 1967 from Syria (containing request to convene Council).

S/7974. Letter of 12 June 1967 from Tunisia.

S/7975. Letter of 12 June 1967 from Jordan.

RESOLUTION 236(1967), introduced after consultations, adopted unanimously by Council on 11 June 1967, meeting 1357.

"The Security Council,

"Taking note of the oral reports of the Secretary-General on the situation between Israel and Syria, made at the 1354th, 1355th, 1356th and 1357th meetings and the supplemental information supplied in documents S/7930 and Add.1-3,

"1. Condemns any and all violations of the cease-fire;

"2. Requests the Secretary-General to continue his investigations and to report to the Council as soon as possible;

"3. Affirms that its demand for a cease-fire and

discontinuance of all military activities includes a prohibition of any forward military movements subsequent to the cease-fire;

"4. Calls for the prompt return to the cease-fire positions of any troops which may have moved forward subsequent to 1630 hours GMT on 10 June 1967 ;

"5. Calls for full co-operation with the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization and the observers in implementing the cease-fire, including freedom of movement and adequate communications facilities."

FURTHER CONSIDERATION BY COUNCIL AND ADOPTION OF RESOLUTION OF 14 JUNE 1967 ON HUMANITARIAN ASPECTS

SECURITY COUNCIL, meetings 1358-1361.

S/7930/Add.6, 7. Supplemental information received by Secretary-General, dated 13 and 14 June 1967.
S/7951/Rev.2. USSR: revised draft resolution, rejected by Council on 14 June 1967, meeting 1360, as follows : Operative para. 1, by 4 votes in favour (Bulgaria, India, Mali, USSR), 0 against, 11 abstentions (Argentina, Brazil, Canada, China, Denmark, Ethiopia, France, Japan, Nigeria, United Kingdom, United States) ; operative para. 2, by 6 in favour (Bulgaria, Ethiopia, India, Mali, Nigeria, USSR), 0 against, 9 abstentions (Argentina, Brazil, Canada, China, Denmark, France, Japan, United Kingdom, United States).

S/7952/Rev.3. United States: revised draft resolution.
S/7979. Letter of 13 June 1967 from USSR (containing request to convene Council).

S/7980. Report by Secretary-General on credentials (Israel).

S/7983. Letter of 13 June 1967 from Syria.

S/7984. Letter of 14 June 1967 from Pakistan (coning request to participate in Council's discussion).

S/7985. Note verbale of 15 June 1967 from Israel.

S/7987 (A/6718). Letter of 15 June 1967 from United States.

S/7989. Letter of 15 June 1967 from Israel (concerning UNEF).

S/7997. Letter of 17 June 1967 from United Kingdom.

RESOLUTION ON HUMANITARIAN ASPECTS OF PROBLEMS ARISING FROM HOSTILITIES

S/7968/Rev.1-3. Argentina, Brazil, Ethiopia: revised draft resolution.

RESOLUTION 237(1967), as proposed by 3 powers, S/7968/Rev.3, and orally amended by Mali, adopted unanimously by Council on 14 June 1967, meeting 1361.

"The Security Council,

"Considering the urgent need to spare the civil populations and the prisoners of the war in the area of conflict in the Middle East additional sufferings,

"Considering that essential and inalienable human rights should be respected even during the vicissitudes of war,

"Considering that all the obligations of the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of 12 August 1949 should be complied with by the parties involved in the conflict,

"1. Calls upon the Government of Israel to ensure the safety, welfare and security of the inhabitants of the areas where military operations have taken place

and to facilitate the return of those inhabitants who have fled the areas since the outbreak of hostilities;

"2. Recommends to the Governments concerned the scrupulous respect of the humanitarian principles governing the treatment of prisoners of war and the protection of civilian persons in time of war contained in the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949;

"3. Requests the Secretary-General to follow the effective implementation of this resolution and to report to the Security Council."

CONSIDERATION OF THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

CONSIDERATION AT FIRST PART OF FIFTH EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION (17 JUNE-5 JULY 1967)

In a letter dated 13 June 1967, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR requested the Secretary-General to convene an emergency special session of the General Assembly as promptly as possible. He stated that, despite the Security Council's demands for a cease-fire, Israel had seized further territories belonging to the Arab States; accordingly, the Assembly should act under Article 11 of the Charter (for text, see APPENDIX II) to consider the situation and take a decision to liquidate the consequences of aggression and secure the immediate withdrawal of Israel forces behind the Armistice Lines.

The fifth emergency special session of the General Assembly opened on 17 June. Between that date and 5 July, 25 meetings were devoted to the discussion of the question; many States were represented by Heads of State or Ministers for Foreign Affairs.

During this part of the session, seven draft resolutions were placed before the Assembly.

On 4 July, the Assembly adopted two resolutions (2252 and 2253 (ES-V)) dealing, respectively, with humanitarian assistance and with measures taken by Israel to change the status of the City of Jerusalem.

On the same day, four of the other five draft resolutions, relating to underlying political aspects of the question, were voted upon and rejected, none having obtained the required majority of votes. (For further details, see below.)

During a recess of the session for consultations between 5 and 12 July, the Security Council

met on 8 and 9 July (see pp. 226-28) to consider complaints by the United Arab Republic and Israel of non-compliance with the Council's cease-fire resolutions.

Upon resumption of the Assembly session, nine meetings were held between 12 and 21 July. On 14 July, the Assembly adopted a further resolution (2254 (ES-V)) on measures taken by Israel to change the status of the City of Jerusalem. On 21 July, it adopted another resolution (2256 (ES-V)) by which it decided to adjourn the session temporarily and to request the Secretary-General to forward its records to the Security Council in order to facilitate the resumption by the Council, as a matter of urgency, of its consideration of the tense situation in the Middle East. The special emergency session reconvened on 18 September and adopted a resolution (2257 (ES-V)) expressing its utmost concern about the situation in the Middle East and deciding to place the question on the agenda of its twenty-second regular session as a matter of high priority. (For further details, see below.)

At its fifth emergency special session, which began on 17 June, the General Assembly decided to place the USSR letter on its agenda. Ninety-eight Member States had responded affirmatively to the USSR request for the session, three abstained and three did not concur (Botswana, Israel and the United States). In a letter of 15 June, the United States stated its reservations as to the propriety, in the light of the Assembly's "Uniting for Peace" resolution of 3 November 1950,¹¹ of convening an emer-

¹¹ See Y.U.N., 1950, pp. 193-95, text of resolution 377 A(V).

gency special session when the Security Council was still engaged in consultations regarding further action on the Middle East.

In the statements made by the 69 delegations participating in the session's general debate, divergent views were expressed on the origins and development of the situation and of the attitude and measures which the General Assembly should adopt with regard to it.

The Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, speaking on 19 June, explained that his Government had taken the initiative in convening the session because a military conflict could flare up at any moment with new intensity as long as Israel troops continued to occupy the territories seized by them and urgent measures were not taken to eliminate the consequences of the aggression. It was up to the Assembly, he said, to adopt decisions that would clear the way towards the restoration of peace in the Middle East. This was a task which concerned all States and which could be solved only if the multiple and complex nature of today's world did not push into the background the common objectives that joined States and peoples together. Above all, he stressed, there was the need to prevent a military disaster; nobody doubted that if a new world war started it would inevitably be a nuclear one.

He went on to say that relations between Israel and the Arab States during the past year had been characterized by continuously increasing tension, a mounting scale of attacks by Israel troops against one or another of Israel's neighbours and concentration of Israel troops on the Syrian border for an end-of-May strike, all culminating on 5 June when Israel had started war against the United Arab Republic, Syria and Jordan. Not until the Security Council had adopted a fourth decision on cessation of hostilities and a number of States had severed diplomatic relations with Israel and given a firm warning about the use of sanctions had Israel troops stopped military actions. In fact, the greater part of presently occupied Arab territories had been seized after the Council had taken a decision concerning immediate cessation of hostilities.

Israel had no arguments which could justify its aggression, the Chairman of the USSR Coun-

cil of Ministers added. Israel should have presented any claims which it might have had against its neighbours to the United Nations and searched there for a peaceful settlement as prescribed by the United Nations Charter. There was no alternative to the resolute condemnation of the aggressor and the elimination of the consequences of the aggression. On the basis of the principle that every people enjoyed the right to establish an independent national State of its own, the USSR had voted for the partition of Palestine in 1947. However, it just as resolutely condemned attempts by any State to conduct an aggressive policy towards other countries. Israel's ruling circles had unfortunately conducted a policy of conquest and territorial expansion into the lands of neighbouring Arab States, as the records of the Security Council since 1948 had made clear, and had enjoyed outside support from certain imperialist circles. These powerful circles had made statements and taken practical actions which might have been interpreted by Israel extremists as direct encouragement to commit acts of aggression. How else, he asked, could one qualify the demonstrations by the United States Sixth Fleet off the coast of the Arab States, the build-up of the British Navy and Air Force in the Mediterranean and the Red Sea area, or the increase in modern arms and ammunition deliveries for the Israel army?

After the start of hostilities, he went on to say, the same forces—accomplices in aggression—did all they could to help Israel to gain time and to carry out new conquests. As a result, the Security Council found itself unable to take the decision prompted by the existing emergency—the adoption of the proposal concerning an immediate withdrawal of Israel troops behind the Armistice Lines. Statements by the United States in support of the political independence and territorial integrity of the Middle East countries were meaningless.

In demanding that the Assembly condemn the aggressor and ensure the withdrawal of Israel troops from the occupied territories of the United Arab Republic, Syria and Jordan, the USSR said it had in mind not only the creation of the essential conditions for peace in the Middle East, but its preservation in many regions of the world where would-be aggressors

eager to seize foreign territories might attempt to overrun their neighbours if Israel's claims were not rebuffed. Otherwise, many States might conclude they could not expect protection from the United Nations, and funds earmarked for development would be channelled into the arms race. Having fallen victim to aggression, the Arab States were entitled to expect full reconstitution, without delay, of their sovereignty and territorial integrity and full reimbursement for material damages.

The USSR, the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers added, was prepared to work together with all other delegations in order to attain those goals. Since much depended on the efforts of the big powers, it would be well if their delegations found a common language in order to reach decisions meeting the interests of peace in the Middle East and elsewhere.

USSR DRAFT RESOLUTION

To that end, the USSR introduced a draft resolution whereby the Assembly would, *inter alia*: (1) vigorously condemn Israel's aggression; (2) demand that Israel immediately and unconditionally withdraw all Israel's forces behind the Armistice Demarcation Lines, as stipulated in the General Armistice Agreements, and respect the status of the demilitarized zones, as prescribed in the Armistice Agreements; (3) demand that Israel should make good in full and within the shortest possible time all the damage inflicted on the United Arab Republic, Syria and Jordan and on their nationals and should return to them all seized property and other material assets; and (4) appeal to the Security Council to take immediate effective measures to eliminate all the consequences of Israel's aggression.

Speaking on 20 June, the representative of the United States declared that the ultimate aim of the Assembly must be nothing less than a stable and durable peace in the Middle East. The record of two decades revealed that crises had been constant because of the failure of the parties concerned to come to grips with the underlying causes of tension in the area and to seek permanent solutions.

During the early part of 1967, he said, ten-

sion had become greater in the area, acts of violence more frequent, and threats and declarations more bellicose. Then, on 17 May 1967, President Nasser had demanded the withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF), had immediately moved large forces into the area and shortly thereafter had declared a blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba and the Strait of Tiran. With the major insulator, UNEF, stripped away, the hostile forces stood in direct confrontation. Threats of war filled the air; peace hung suspended by a thread. On his return from Cairo, the Secretary-General had appealed for a breathing spell and the exercise of special restraint by all parties. Efforts by the United States on 30 May 1967 to secure Security Council endorsement of a draft resolution to provide such a breathing spell had not succeeded. When, on 5 June 1967, the thread of peace was broken, the most urgent need was to stop the fighting before its dimensions grew. The United States had, with others, sought to obtain a call by the Council for an immediate cease-fire. That effort was resisted and prolonged discussion had gone on for 36 hours before the Security Council had finally reached a unanimous decision on a simple cease-fire.

The United States representative added that efforts to secure a cease-fire on the Syrian front had later met the same obstruction. Much time had been devoted to totally false accusations that the United States had encouraged and prompted Israel to conflict and even that its armed forces had intervened in the hostilities on the side of Israel. The United States reiterated its offer of co-operation with any impartial investigation of those charges—charges which had been made in an attempt to find a scapegoat for what had occurred and perhaps for an even more sinister purpose: to engage the great powers with each other.

Now, the United States added, the problem was before the General Assembly, where the USSR had introduced a draft resolution essentially the same as that which the overwhelming majority of the Security Council had refused to accept. Its one-sided condemnation of Israel as an aggressor would be neither equitable nor constructive, and its call for withdrawal of the Israel forces would return the situation to that of 5 June, with opposing forces standing in

direct confrontation and with no international machinery present to keep them apart. Once again, in short, nothing would be done to resolve the deep-lying grievances on both sides that had fed the fires of war in the Middle East for 20 years.

Rather than approve such a prescription for renewed hostilities, the United States sought steps towards real peace based on five essential principles which the President of the United States had enunciated on 19 June.

UNITED STATES DRAFT RESOLUTION

The United States therefore proposed a draft resolution by which the Assembly would inter alia: (1) endorse the cease-fire achieved by the Security Council and call for its scrupulous respect; (2) decide that its objective must be a stable and durable peace in the Middle East; (3) consider that the objective should be achieved through negotiated arrangements with appropriate third-party assistance based on: (a) mutual recognition of the political independence and territorial integrity of all countries in the area, encompassing recognized boundaries and other arrangements, including disengagement and withdrawal of forces, that would give them security against terror, destruction and war; (b) freedom of innocent maritime passage; (c) a just and equitable solution of the refugee problem; (d) registration and limitation of arms shipments into the area; (e) recognition of the right of all sovereign nations to exist in peace and security; and (4) request the Security Council to keep the situation under careful review.

The United Kingdom's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs rejected the charges which had been made against the United Kingdom and repeated that his Government would welcome investigation by the United Nations of the allegations. He also rejected the implication that the United Kingdom had caused delay in the Security Council. On the contrary, it was among the first to urge that the Council call for an immediate cease-fire. The whole aim of the United Kingdom's policy had been to prevent a highly inflammable issue from developing into a war.

In reviewing the principles which should guide the search for a lasting settlement, he stressed that war should not lead to territorial aggrandizement, and called upon Israel not to take any steps in relation to Jerusalem that would conflict with that principle. The problem of the refugees required a great international effort. Any settlement must recognize the right of all States in the area to exist in true dignity and real freedom, and that must include the ability to earn their living in assured peace. There must be respect for the right of free and innocent passage through international waterways for the ships of all nations. The countries of the Middle East must be freed from the pressures which had driven them to waste their resources in an arms race. It was imperative that the Arab communities whose lands had been overrun should be allowed to stay where they were, or to return if they had fled. A further escalation of the already intractable refugee problem could not be allowed and no time must be lost in bringing relief to those in need.

The United Kingdom called for the nomination by the Secretary-General of a representative to go at once to the area to advise the Secretary-General on the whole conduct of relations arising from the cease-fire and the subsequent keeping of the peace on the frontier. He should also play an active part in relations with all the parties in the area itself, and advise the United Nations on the form which a future United Nations presence should take.

The Foreign Minister of France said that the war had settled nothing and had made everything more difficult. He recalled his Government's insistence, prior to 5 June 1967, on the necessity of avoiding hostilities and of arriving at a negotiated settlement. It had made clear that those first to take up arms would have neither France's approval nor support. The existing problems had been, apart from navigation through the Gulf of Aqaba, the situation of the Palestinian refugees and the situation existing between the neighbouring States concerned. As a result of the hostilities, the divergencies were sharper than ever. The situation was precarious and perilous and it was the duty, interest and mission of all to see that it did not continue as it was, for peace might rot

last long. No fait accompli on the spot regarding the territorial boundaries and the situation of the citizens of the States concerned could be considered as permanent. Only a freely negotiated settlement accepted by all the parties and recognized by the international community could one day solve all those problems as a whole. Obviously, this was far away. After the current discussion in the Assembly, it would be incumbent on the international community to take the first initiative. In that connexion, the French Foreign Minister stressed the role of the Security Council for taking action on behalf of the United Nations. It was not in the interest of any of the countries in the region to become elements which the great powers could use to further their policy. Nor was it in the interest of the great powers themselves, if they sincerely desired peace, to fan local rivalries. He considered that the end of war in Viet-Nam could also open up new prospects for settlement.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel declared that the crisis of recent weeks had many consequences but only one cause. Israel's right to peace, security, sovereignty, economic development and maritime freedom, and indeed its very right to exist had been forcibly denied and aggressively attacked. The threats were directed against it by neighbouring Arab States, but tension had been aggravated by the unbalanced policy of the USSR, which had provided Arab States with tremendous supplies of offensive weapons, trained their armies and encouraged their military preparations, and, by use of the veto, inhibited the Security Council from any constructive action in many disputes between an Arab State and Israel.

Describing the course of events, the Israel Foreign Minister insisted that statements and actions of Arab Governments proved beyond any doubt that between 14 May and 5 June they had methodically prepared and mounted an aggressive assault designed to bring about Israel's immediate and total destruction. His convictions about this were based on statements and actions of the Arab Governments, which had remained blatantly hostile, despite hopes for relative stability engendered by the arrange-

ments discussed in the General Assembly in March 1957.¹²

Statements by Syria, he went on to say, had indicated that its policy was to deny Israel its sovereignty, to destroy its statehood and to kill as many of its citizens as possible. The Israel Foreign Minister referred, in particular, to the initiation by Syria in 1966 of what it called a "popular war," a technique of aggression consisting of inflaming the Israel frontier by training and dispatching terrorists through Jordan and Lebanon to attack not the armed forces but Israel's civilian population in an effort to embroil other Arab States in conflict with Israel.

The Egyptian and USSR claim about Israel troop concentrations being poised for a mid-May invasion of Syria was a monstrous fiction, Israel's Foreign Minister stated. Egyptian forces had begun on 14 May to move in strength into Sinai, and two days later the Egyptian command ordered the United Nations Emergency Force to leave the border. On 18 May, Egypt had called for the total removal of UNEF, and the Secretary-General had with disastrous swiftness acceded to that request without reference to either the Security Council or the General Assembly, without consulting Israel, without heeding the protesting voices of some permanent members of the Security Council and without seeking such delay as to enable alternative measures to be concerted for preventing belligerency by sea and a dangerous confrontation of forces by land. Israel was resolved never again to allow a vital Israel interest to rest on such a fragile foundation. As a consequence of the above-mentioned developments, there had been a sudden disruption of the local security balance and a clear threat to an international maritime interest. As the Egyptian concentrations had increased daily in Sinai and their precise intention made clear, Israel had taken corresponding precautionary measures.

On 21 May 1967, the Israel Foreign Minister continued, President Nasser had announced that he would blockade the Gulf of Aqaba and the Strait of Tiran to Israel ships, an act

¹² See Y.U.N., 1956, pp. 51-53, 55-56.

which was by definition an act of war and which was regarded by Israel as an attack justifying her acting in self-defence under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.¹³ In the following week, the United Arab Republic had signed a defence agreement with Jordan and associated Iraq with it soon thereafter. By early June, Israel had been surrounded by vast armies on her borders in Sinai, the Syrian hills and the frontier with Jordan, subjected to Egyptian air reconnaissance and illegally blockaded from all its commerce with the eastern half of the world.

On 5 June 1967, when Egyptian forces moved by air and land against Israel's western coast and southern territory, the choice for Israel was to live or to perish. For five days Israel employed armed force alone and unaided in a just and righteous self-defence. Israel's Foreign Minister rejected totally the USSR description of Israel's resistance as aggression. What should be condemned, he said, was not Israel's action, but the attempt to condemn it. Israel had showed that even a small State had the right to live, which was the very essence of the Charter.

The Security Council, he added, had wisely rejected the backward step advocated by the USSR of returning to the situation as it was before 5 June 1967; such a course was totally unacceptable. The Assembly must not prescribe a formula for renewed hostilities, but a set of principles for the construction of a new and peaceful future in the Middle East, which would only be elaborated in frank and lucid dialogue between Israel and each of the neighbouring States. Peace and security, with their juridical, territorial, economic and social implications, could only be built by the free negotiation which was the true essence of sovereign responsibility. The only constructive course for the Assembly, Israel's spokesman considered, was to call upon the recent combatants to negotiate the conditions of their future coexistence. Israel would maintain the cease-fire which the Security Council had decided upon and would reject the course of a return to the situation of belligerency.

The President of Syria, the Deputy Premier of the United Arab Republic and the King of Jordan declared that the Arab people looked

to the emergency special session of the Assembly as a last hope for the triumph of law, reason and justice over the laws of the jungle and the logic of force, since the Security Council had been unable to discharge its responsibilities.

Among the points they made were the following: The aggression of 5 June by Israel, supported by imperialist powers, was but the latest in a long list of acts scarcely interrupted since 1948. Frequent condemnations, in many United Nations resolutions, had been persistently disregarded by Israel. An increase in the frequency and destructiveness of aggressive acts by Israel during the past year had culminated in its aggression against Syria on 7 April 1967. That had been followed in May 1967 and at the beginning of June 1967 by military and other Israel threats and provocations including, in particular, a troop build-up against Syria. The Arab countries, while trying to take the necessary precautions, had exerted themselves to keep the situation under control, taking—in Sinai, as well as elsewhere—a posture of defence and not of attack. On his visit to Cairo, the Secretary-General had been assured that it was their firm policy not to take the offensive. They had not spared any effort to avoid an eruption and had been in continuous consultations with many capitals in the world, including Washington. But Israel, despite its claim not to have any aggressive intentions, had launched its sneak attack on 5 June 1967, plans for which had long before been carefully prepared by Israel and its co-conspirators. Israel's invasion had been coupled with deliberate delaying tactics in the Security Council by the representatives of the United States and the United King-

¹³ Article 51 of the United Nations Charter states: "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security."

dom who had blocked all efforts to secure an immediate cease-fire and withdrawal of forces. The President of Syria added that it was only after Syria and Israel had agreed to the Security Council cease-fire order that the Israel invasion and occupation of Syrian territory took place.

It was further pointed out that the claim that the blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba itself constituted an act of war and justified the Israel aggression as an act of self-defence provided no excuse for the massive assault. The Strait of Tiran had never been opened to Israel until the aggression of 1956. No vital interests had suffered; not an Israel ship had passed through the Strait in the last two and a half years. The action of Israel was not legitimate self-defence within the meaning of Article 51 of the Charter because no armed attack on its territory had in fact occurred. On 5 June 1967, the United Arab Republic had not yet even completed its defensive precautions in Sinai, and a similar condition had prevailed in Syria and Jordan.

The United Nations must accordingly condemn the aggressor and enforce the withdrawal of Israel troops to their pre-June 5 positions. To permit Israel the use of the fruits of its aggression as a bargaining weapon to gain its ends would not be borne. Proof of the United States blessing of aggression could be found in its official statements seeking to impose solutions that would accommodate aggression and justify the logic of force. The Arab States would reject any conditions or discussions based on an invasion, and asked the General Assembly to condemn aggression firmly and to liquidate its traces immediately. Any other approach sought through occupation would be firmly rejected because it would mean giving in to the logic of force and conquest. On the other hand, approval of the USSR draft resolution would lead to the safeguarding of peace and prevent a new explosion and would constitute a victory for the principles of the United Nations Organization.

While many countries had been subjected to old and new forms of colonialist interference, the Syrian President said, the Arab people had the distinction of being subjected to the domination of a most peculiar alliance between tra-

ditional colonialism and international Zionism in Israel, based in essence on the total extermination of the Arab people and their replacement by other conquering elements. The gains achieved through struggle and sacrifice by the Arab masses were being nullified because the colonial powers wished to exploit their strategic location, their petroleum resources and their huge potential wealth. The Arab struggle was a part of the battle of all peace-loving peoples who looked to a future free of threats, and was waged so that the Arab homeland could be built into a wall between the imperialist conquerors and the countries of Asia and Africa, added the President of Syria.

In reply to Israel comments on terrorism coming from Syria, he said that neither Syria, the United Arab Republic, Lebanon nor any other State had any right to prevent the Palestinian people, whose rights to their homeland had been upheld by the United Nations, from returning to their homeland.

In a statement to the Assembly on 20 June, the Secretary-General said he felt it necessary to reply to statements made by the Israel Foreign Minister concerning the decision to comply with the request of the United Arab Republic for the withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF). The picture given by the Foreign Minister of Israel, he said, could be very damaging to the United Nations with regard to its peace-keeping functions, past and present. He sought to restore in that picture the balance warranted by the facts. The reasons for his decision, said the Secretary-General, had been set forth in previous reports to the General Assembly and the Security Council (see pages 162-65).

The Secretary-General went on to say that the indispensable basis for the effective buffer function exercised by UNEF for more than a decade had been the voluntary decision of the Government of the United Arab Republic to keep its troops away from the line, with only United Nations troops in the buffer zone, which was exclusively on the United Arab Republic side of the lines. Despite the intent of the General Assembly resolution that United Nations troops should be stationed on both sides of the line, Israel had always refused to accept them

on Israel territory on the valid grounds of national sovereignty. It would have been very helpful if Israel had at any time accepted the deployment of UNEF also on its side of the line. Prior to receiving and replying to the United Arab Republic request for the withdrawal of UNEF, the Secretary-General said, he had raised the possibility of stationing elements of UNEF on the Israel side of the line. He had been told that the idea was completely unacceptable to Israel. Moreover, he added, for all those ten years Israel's troops regularly patrolled alongside the line and had now and again created provocations by violating it.

The Secretary-General subsequently submitted a report, on 26 June, setting out a detailed chronology of the dates and times of significant events and actions between the first message from the United Arab Republic's Chief of Staff on 16 May to the completion of UNEF's withdrawal on 17 June. The report also contained comments on some of the main points at issue, stating that the presence of UNEF had not touched the basic problem of the Arab-Israel conflict and that it was entirely unrealistic to maintain that that conflict could have been solved or its consequence prevented if a greater effort had been made to maintain UNEF's presence against the will of the United Arab Republic. It was the negotiations with the Government of Egypt on the question of the withdrawal of UNEF which had delayed the arrival of the Force in November 1956 after its establishment by the General Assembly, and in discussions over the years it had invariably been taken for granted by United Arab Republic representatives that if their Government officially requested its withdrawal, the request would be honoured by the Secretary-General. As a practical matter, delay would have been fruitless because the effectiveness of UNEF had already vanished before the request for withdrawal was received, owing to the movement of United Arab Republic troops up to the line and into Sharm El Sheikh. Moreover, the Secretary-General's report added, once the United Arab Republic had withdrawn its consent to the presence of the Force, the Force's disintegration was automatically set off since contributing Governments indicated that their contingents would be withdrawn. As for consulta-

tions, the Secretary-General said he had not only consulted with the Advisory Committee on UNEF, as he was obliged to do, but he had also consulted the representatives of the seven countries providing contingents of UNEF.

The Secretary-General also dealt with the legal and constitutional considerations which had been of great importance in determining his actions, and in that connexion set out a chronology of the relevant actions in 1956 and 1957. The consent of the host country to the presence and operation of United Nations peace-keeping machinery was a basic prerequisite to all such operations, and Egyptian representatives appeared to have made it clear to Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld and in the General Assembly that their Government held to the view that if its consent was no longer maintained, UNEF should be withdrawn.

In conclusion, the Secretary-General noted in his report a failure to appreciate the essentially fragile nature of the basis for UNEF's operation throughout its existence. It depended completely on the voluntary co-operation of the host Government. Its basis of existence was the willingness of Governments to provide contingents to serve under an international command and at a minimum of cost to the United Nations. It was a symbolic force, small in size, equipped with light weapons only. It had no mandate of any kind to open fire except in the last resort of self-defence. It had no formal mandate to exercise any authority in the area in which it was stationed. In recent years it experienced an increasingly uncertain basis of financial support, which in turn gave rise to strong annual pressures for reduction in its strength. Despite those practical weaknesses, UNEF's remarkable success for more than a decade might have led to wrong conclusions about its nature. It had also, however, pointed the way to a unique means of contributing significantly to international peace-keeping.

In the course of the general debate in the Assembly, a number of speakers expressed concurrence with the decision taken by the Secretary-General to withdraw UNEF when so requested by the Government of the United Arab Republic. These included the representatives of Afghanistan, Albania, Brazil, Burundi, Ceylon, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Guinea, India, Indo-

nesia, Mauritania, Morocco, Nepal, Pakistan, Poland, Sudan, the Ukrainian SSR, Yugoslavia and Zambia.

Thus, Brazil, noting that it had contributed a battalion to the Force and greatly regretting that UNEF's services should have been terminated at a time when it could still have fruitfully discharged its functions, declared that it had never disputed the right exercised by Israel to decline to admit the Force on its territory nor the right of the United Arab Republic to request its withdrawal.

Guinea considered that it was obvious that in requesting the withdrawal of UNEF, the United Arab Republic was exercising the prerogatives of its national sovereignty. In accordance with the agreement on the establishment of the United Nations presence, and in keeping with the spirit and practice of all peace-keeping operations in any Member country, the Secretary-General had acceded to that request, thus discharging his obligations and reaffirming the impartial and neutral character of the United Nations.

The general debate revealed differences of opinion over the assessment of responsibility for the eruption of hostilities in the Middle East on 5 June 1967, and on the advisability of attempting to make any such assessment.

Denmark, for example, stated that the evidence produced offered no grounds for identifying the country which had struck first, let alone for answering the question whether any of the parties could be identified as an aggressor. Belgium considered it would be pointless and harmful for the Assembly to start trying to apportion blame for the crisis. The representative of Norway did not find it constructive or useful to indulge in recrimination or condemnation. The representative of New Zealand shared the view that the Assembly could not usefully attempt to ascribe blame for aggression solely to one side, since any fundamental and objective examination would require dissection, layer by layer—a task which could not be essayed lightly without ample time and sufficient evidence. The Ivory Coast hoped the Assembly would not waste its energies in seeking to attribute blame, but would rather pin-point the causes and consequences of the conflict and suggest ways of ensuring a just and lasting peace.

Canada considered that no Government could be held wholly responsible for what had happened and that the impartial reports of the Secretary-General supported this assessment. In Uruguay's opinion, the Assembly had not met to point out responsibilities or to pass judgment on attitudes, but to co-operate in a search for solutions that would ensure a just and stable peace in the Middle East. France's Minister for Foreign Affairs recalled that since the crisis had erupted—under conditions that it was no longer necessary to bring up at this juncture—France had not ceased to advocate moderation.

Other speakers shared the views of Jordan, Syria, the United Arab Republic and the USSR that Israel had launched an aggressive assault on its neighbours on 5 June. Among those of this opinion were representatives of Arab States and of Albania, Bulgaria, Burundi, the Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, Guinea, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Mali, Mongolia, Pakistan, Somalia, Spain, Sudan, the Ukrainian SSR, the United Republic of Tanzania, and Zambia.

The Prime Minister of Czechoslovakia, for instance, observed that at a time when the attention of the peace-loving States was concentrated on the peaceful solution of pending questions, the militarist forces of Israel had unleashed a premeditated, sudden and perfidious attack and, with wide support from well-known imperialist forces, had invaded the Sinai Peninsula, conquered part of Jordan and, despite insistent appeals of the Security Council to cease their military operations, attacked the territory of Syria.

The United Republic of Tanzania made the point that one of the striking features which had accompanied the growth of Israel had been its use of armed force as a means of territorial expansion. Nowhere in the statement of the representative of Israel was it categorically asserted or admitted who fired the first shot; but it was clear from the record of events who did. Israel had committed aggression against the Arab States, aided and abetted by colonialist and imperialist powers.

The representative of Spain said that one need merely to consider the deployment of the tank formation of the attacking army and its lines of advance, as well as the technique of mass bombardment by surprise, in order to

reach a strong moral conviction about who unleashed the hostilities.

India's Minister of External Affairs considered it incontrovertible that Israel had struck the first blow. The concept of a pre-emptive strike or a preventive war was contrary to the United Nations Charter.

The representative of Pakistan, drawing attention to a basic Charter principle that force should not be used against the territorial integrity of Member States except in self-defence against armed attack, said the very fact that the Arab countries were caught unawares, and had sustained grievous losses during the first hours of the war when Israel wiped out their air forces, showed who had taken the initiative. Despite any arguments relating to the so-called blockade of the Strait of Tiran or other assertions of belligerent rights, the concept of *casus belli* was totally contrary to the Charter. If each nation had a right by itself to determine what constituted a cause justifying war, nothing would be left of that international order predicated in the Charter. As did other speakers, he urged the Assembly to take note of and to condemn Israel's aggression.

In reply to charges of Israel aggression, the Foreign Minister of Israel declared that his Government rejected with indignation any statement that Israel was responsible for the hostilities and accused the United Arab Republic and Jordan of unprovoked aggression. During the last weeks of May and early June, he said, a reckless decision had been taken by the United Arab Republic to disrupt the security balance established by general agreement in March 1957. As the successive stages of the United Arab Republic's aggressive design unfolded, more than 50 declarations between 14 May and 4 June had been made by President Nasser, his ministers, his army chiefs and his officially controlled radio stations, explaining that the aim was to fight a war for Israel's annihilation. If there was anything unusual in Israel's action, it lay in the patience it had shown in the interval between the Egyptian blockade and the movement of forces against it on 5 June. How, he asked, would any other Member State have reacted if a group of neighbouring States had encircled it with divisions, issued orders on how to bomb its airfields and

capture its territory, announced their intention to wage a war of annihilation, announced a blockade of its coasts for the purpose of precipitating a war and then, with the Security Council ignoring its peril, dispatched their aircraft and shelled its frontier villages.

With regard to Jordan, the Foreign Minister of Israel said that even after Jordan had opened aggression on its front by firing on Jerusalem, Israel had offered Jordan the opportunity to disengage by having King Hussein informed that Israel would not attack any State which refrained from attacking it.

Throughout the discussion, emphasis was placed on the principles and methods by which the General Assembly might best attempt to find a course of action leading to a peaceful solution of the problems which had for so long plagued the Middle East. The questions raised included: condemnation of aggression; withdrawal from occupied territories unconditionally or linked to a negotiated settlement; non-recognition of acquisition of territory by force; the end of the state of belligerency and ensuring respect for the territorial integrity and political independence of all States in the area; freedom of innocent maritime passage through the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba; development of national economies and an end to the arms race; the status of Jerusalem and the Holy Places; humanitarian assistance and the refugee problem; and also the role of United Nations organs, a special representative of the Secretary-General and United Nations military observers in arrangements for a durable settlement.

A major question in the debate concerned the relationship between the principle of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force and other principles or considerations mentioned by various delegations as relevant to the practical problem of the withdrawal of Israel forces from occupied Arab territories.

Calls for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of the Israel armed forces, together with non-recognition of the acquisition of territory by force, before negotiations on other issues, were demanded by the representatives of Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Bulgaria, Burundi, the Byelorussian SSR, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Ecuador, Greece, Guinea, Hungary, Indonesia, Iran, Lebanon, Mali, Mauritania, Mongolia,

Morocco, Nepal, Nigeria, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Spain, Sudan, Tunisia, Turkey, the Ukrainian SSR, the USSR, the United Arab Republic, the United Republic of Tanzania, Venezuela and Zambia. Some of them linked that step with further measures to promote a settlement. Several of these speakers also demanded condemnation of Israel for its aggression.

King Hussein of Jordan, noting that Israel troops were on the soil of three Members of the United Nations and that the whole of the West Bank of his country, Jordan, was still occupied, declared that that was a completely unacceptable and intolerable situation. It was the duty of the United Nations swiftly to condemn the aggressor and enforce the return of Israel troops to the lines held before the attack of 5 June. To permit Israel to retain its gains as a bargaining weapon would be to permit the aggressor to use the fruits of its aggression to gain the ends for which it went to war.

In the opinion of Iraq's Minister for Foreign Affairs, the central issue emerging from the debate was whether the military occupation of territories of United Nations Member States was to be permitted, regardless of whether it was used as a means for bargaining or as a step towards formal annexation. To allow Israel to maintain its occupation would be a prescription for war. There could be no settlement, nor even the beginning of a rational discussion of the underlying causes, before withdrawal was effected—it was the *sine qua non* of peace.

Libya's Minister for Foreign Affairs said that the Assembly must stand up to its responsibility and order the invading forces to evacuate the territories they had seized; that must be done prior to an examination of any other aspect of the problem. Moreover, by failing to condemn Israel, the Assembly would create a precedent which would encourage other States to achieve expansionist ambitions by the force of arms without fearing either the United Nations or the world's conscience.

Kuwait's Foreign Minister maintained that if the United Nations did not secure the withdrawal of Israel forces from the occupied territories, in accordance with the Charter, a situation would be created in which the Arab States would feel compelled, sooner or later, to under-

take through all means at their disposal the restoration of their lands and the safeguarding of their rights. It would embolden Israel to resort to armed aggression again in the future in order to attain further territorial aggrandizement and it would leave the door open for any other State which harboured aggressive or expansionist designs against its neighbours to try to use occupation by armed aggression as a bargaining point for exacting political concessions. It would undermine the United Nations itself.

The Prime Minister of Afghanistan considered it impermissible for Israel to exploit the fruits of its aggression and to blackmail its Arab neighbours.

The representative of Hungary declared that it was characteristic for an aggressor to make the issue of unlawfully occupied territories a bargaining point in negotiations. Israel had no right to propose any settlement until it had withdrawn from the occupied areas. Only then could there be any question of negotiations. To negotiate in a state of occupation and terror would be contrary to the very concept of negotiation.

The Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Romania favoured the immediate withdrawal of Israel troops from occupied territory and its renunciation of all claims to territorial gains resulting from its military actions. He stressed that questions in dispute should be settled by a negotiated arrangement between the parties and that it was in the interest of the peoples of the area that relations of co-operation be established so as to ensure the economic, national and social progress of the countries concerned. The second goal to be achieved, in his view, was the elimination of all foreign interference in the affairs of the countries of the region, because it hampered their normal development and the exercise of their right freely to determine their own destiny. Third, he emphasized respect for the fundamental interests of each Middle Eastern State, with due regard for its independent and sovereign existence, and he also stressed that the question of the Arab refugees of Palestine should be settled in accordance with the resolutions of the General Assembly and that the newly displaced population should be given assistance.

The representative of Cuba declared that the armed forces of Israel must withdraw and if they did not do so without delay the Arab peoples would be justified in resuming the fight in the awareness that the restoration of their rights would basically depend on their willingness and determination to resist and fight, rather than on the behaviour of this international Organization, which was obedient to the dictates of imperialism.

Albania's Foreign Minister expressed the belief that the world was faced by a great plot by American imperialists and revisionist leaders to divide world hegemony between the two great powers, as was evidenced by recent meetings between President Johnson and Chairman Kosygin. Not only should Member States attached to the cause of peoples vigorously condemn the imperialist-Israel aggressive plot against the Arab peoples, but the Zionists must get out of Arab lands, and the rights of the Palestinian and all other Arab peoples must be restored without delay.

ALBANIAN DRAFT RESOLUTION

Rejecting both the United States and the USSR draft resolutions, Albania introduced a draft resolution by the operative parts of which the Assembly would: (1) resolutely condemn the Government of Israel for its armed aggression against the United Arab Republic, Syria and Jordan and for its continued aggression through the maintenance of its occupation of part of their territories; (2) firmly condemn the United States and the United Kingdom for their incitement, aid and direct participation in the aggression and because they continued to support the aggression and annexationist claims of Israel; (3) insistently demand the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Israel troops from the occupied territories; (4) declare Israel responsible for all the consequences of the aggression and demand complete and immediate reparation for all damage caused by it and the return of all property which had been plundered; and (5) confirm that it rested with the Government of the United Arab Republic alone to decide whether or not it could permit the passage of vessels of the Israel aggressors through the Suez Canal and the Strait of Tiran.

The Foreign Minister of India insisted that the first thing to be required was the total, unqualified, immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all Israel forces from all Arab territories. The international community could not acquiesce in Israel's reaping the fruits of conquest. Apart from that, other measures necessary to strengthen and ensure lasting peace in the area were cited, including enlargement and strengthening of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) in order to ensure strict compliance with the various provisions of the General Armistice Agreements, and appointment of a special representative of the Secretary-General to help reduce tension in the area and assure the safety and security of the civilian Arab population under Israel occupation, and facilitate the return of those who were forced to leave their homes. In India's opinion, control of the Strait of Tiran by the United Arab Republic could not in itself justify assertion by Israel of the right to use force against several Arab States because it was not established under international law that there was a right of free passage through that Strait.

The representative of Malaysia also considered it unacceptable that withdrawal of Israel forces should be linked to a political settlement. Unless they withdrew to the positions that existed prior to the recent fighting, a peace settlement could not be worked out fairly and the Assembly might, by implication, be condoning aggression by one State against another.

The Foreign Minister of Pakistan maintained that the United Nations could not take a more disastrous course than to allow the continuance of Israel forces on Arab territory as a means of putting pressure on the Arab States in the oft-misused name of peace.

The Foreign Minister of Indonesia declared that neither international law nor morality would ever condone territorial expansion through acts of aggression and conquest. The cease-fire and unconditional withdrawal would not alone constitute a solution but should serve as a sound and equitable basis for further efforts to achieve an integral and permanent solution of the whole problem, taking into full consideration the legitimate aspirations of the peoples concerned, including the rights of the Pal-

estine refugees set out under the General Assembly's resolution 194(III) of 11 December 1948.¹⁴

The representative of Ceylon stated that the withdrawal of Israel forces should not be subject to pre-conditions or tied up with negotiations on wider issues. He stressed the principle that the sovereign rights of States over their territories, on land, at sea and in the air, should be respected, and any adjustment should be the result of negotiations and discussions, within the framework of the United Nations, independent of the issue. Any attempt to compel recognition of the State of Israel by the Arab States in the present context would amount to a proposal which would place the Arab States under duress to do so. He further supported any proposal for the establishment or reactivation of any United Nations presence or peace-keeping force which might contribute to the easing of tension before long-term solutions were sought.

Expressing views similar to those of several other speakers, the Prime Minister of Yugoslavia said that the Middle East had been an area of constant unrest because the Arab countries had been ceaselessly subjected to various pressures by those powers which could not reconcile themselves to the emancipation of the Arab countries from colonial and imperialist subjection. The realization of territorial and other pretensions through the use of force could not be tolerated. Nor was it permissible to use force to impose political solutions violating the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of States. Such solutions would give rise to hatred and resistance and inevitably lead to more serious conflicts fraught with danger to world peace. Consequently, he considered it imperative to condemn the aggression and demand the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all the armed forces of the aggressor to the positions of 4 June 1967. Israel and others who were linking the withdrawal with, or making it dependent on, negotiations involving the entire Arab-Israel dispute, he said, intended to dictate conditions to the victims of the aggression. Such attempts must be resolutely opposed; there could be no negotiations prior to the execution of the withdrawal, nor could there be any search for arrangements that would otherwise be necessary for the long-term stabilization of the

situation as long as the forces of the aggressor were not withdrawn from the occupied territory. Any other approach would be tantamount to rewarding the aggression and sanctioning attempts to solve disputes among States by force.

The arguments cited above with regard to withdrawal were rejected by Israel's Minister for Foreign Affairs. On 26 June he declared that the USSR proposal called for withdrawal to the same situation out of which the conflict arose: the same situation, the same frontiers, the same insecurity, the same blockade of waterways, the same belligerent doctrine, the same divided city, the same choked access on vital roads, the same confrontation of unseparated armies, the same guns on Syrian hills threatening settlements in the valley, the same arms race and, above all, the same absence of peace treaties requiring a mutual recognition of sovereignty. Every proposal or resolution, however worded, which recommended an unnegotiated withdrawal without a prior mutual and effective commitment to peace would have the same consequences. They were prescriptions for a renewal of the conflict. However, if a peace treaty were established, the entire solution would become transformed; therefore, the problem of troop dispositions was integrally linked to the manner in which political and juridical relations were defined. That, said Israel's Foreign Minister, was why the problem of the withdrawal of troops was integrally linked, in law and reality, to withdrawal from a state of war,

¹⁴ See Y.U.N., 1948-49, pp. 174-76, for text of resolution 194(III). By operative paragraph 11 of this resolution, the General Assembly:

"Resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible;

"Instructs the Conciliation Commission [for Palestine] to facilitate the repatriation, resettlement and economic and social rehabilitation of the refugees and the payment of compensation, and to maintain close relations with the Director of the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees and, through him, with the appropriate organs and agencies of the United Nations."

with a corollary advance to peace and the establishment of conditions of security.

Representatives of other Member States considered that the withdrawal of Israel forces was essential, but linked it to various other essential steps which they considered should be taken to promote a peaceful and enduring settlement. Among these Members were: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Ecuador, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, the Ivory Coast, Malta, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Sweden, Thailand, the United Kingdom, the United States and Uruguay.

The representative of Sweden, for instance, emphasized that the United Nations must unequivocally confirm the principle that no right to occupy and no right to annex territory could be based on military conquest; occupation troops must be withdrawn. That was one of the conditions for a constructive outcome of the Assembly's discussion.

Denmark's Prime Minister suggested that the Security Council dispatch a special representative to the capitals directly involved, and linked the necessity of withdrawal of troops to the urgent solution of the political problems underlying the crisis. Withdrawal of troops could not be envisaged as an isolated step apart from such sensitive political problems as the final settlement of borders and the claim of all States for safeguarding their territorial and political integrity. Part of a comprehensive arrangement would require a great concession also for the Arab States—to recognize Israel *de jure* or even *de facto*, and also, possibly, the arrangement of international guarantees, in a United Nations context, for safeguarding political and territorial integrity, together with provisions for halting the military build-up, thus reducing tension and promoting economic development. A durable solution of the problem of innocent passage through international waterways in the area would be dependent on firm guarantees.

The Prime Minister of Denmark added that the United Nations could play a useful role if United Nations observer teams were interposed between the forces of the parties, and he believed further consideration should be given to the creation of demilitarized zones sufficiently deep to be effectively controlled.

The representatives of Canada, the Netherlands and Norway were also among those who favoured a United Nations presence, either an enlargement of UNTSO or some other kind of organization, and were willing to contribute to such an operation.

Reviewing his country's close association with United Nations efforts in connexion with the Palestine question, Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairs stated that his Government still considered the valid basis of peace in the Middle East to be its expectations of 1948 and 1957: if Israel had a right to live free from the fear of strangulation by its neighbours, the Arab States also had the right to feel confident that Israel would not attempt to expand its territory by conquest. One-sided political solutions were no solutions at all. The chief responsibility for finding a solution rested with the parties to the dispute. However, the United Nations must help. The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) and UNTSO would continue to have an indispensable contribution to make. The function of conciliation would also be a vital one on the road to a settlement. Perhaps the most important action the Assembly could take would be to recommend the appointment of a special representative of the Secretary-General to maintain full contact with all the Governments concerned and prepare the way for subsequent negotiations towards peace. For any enduring settlement the withdrawal of the Israel forces, vital as it was, must be related to other essential requirements.

The Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs also laid stress on the principle of respect for the territorial integrity of the nations of the area, including provision for the security and international supervision of frontiers. The rights of all nations to innocent passage through international waterways must be assured. There must be an early and just solution of the refugee problem. International concern for Christian, Jewish and Moslem religious interests in Jerusalem must be recognized, perhaps by giving the United Nations an international supervisory responsibility.

A vital step to durable peace in the Middle East, in Canada's view, required that justice be done to the Palestinian refugees. The prob-

lem was, however, of such magnitude that only a combination of methods could produce a solution. It would be an illusion, he thought, to go on believing that the problem of the refugees would be solved simply on the basis of their return to Israel. Similarly, the Arab States could not be expected to shoulder alone the burden of resettling and integrating in Arab countries those refugees who might make this choice. An international effort in a United Nations context directed at regional economic development in the Middle East and related to resettlement was a prime requirement which Members of the United Nations had an obligation to consider.

The Prime Minister of Italy considered that once the urgent humanitarian relief measures were taken, the Assembly must attack the more basic unresolved problems. First, it must reaffirm that, under Articles 1 and 2 of the United Nations Charter (for text, see APPENDIX II), every Member State had the right to political independence, territorial integrity and protection against the threat and use of force. That was the framework in which it must deal with the problem of disengagement and withdrawal of troops and of an equitable territorial settlement which ought to be freely accepted by the parties and be permanent in nature. Pointing out that peace-keeping operations were, by definition, provisional measures, he said that the role of the United Nations should be primarily a political and subsequently an economic one. The United Nations should be the forum for securing a pledge from all Members to facilitate the process of rapprochement between the parties and for avoiding an arms race in the Middle East. He also advocated that the United Nations take the initiative in setting up a plan for economic development of the entire region.

The Italian Prime Minister favoured exploration of the idea advanced by others of appointing a special United Nations representative to assist in reducing tension and restoring peaceful conditions or to facilitate the starting of discussions with the Governments concerned.

The Foreign Minister of the Netherlands believed that a mere withdrawal of troops which was not encompassed by arrangements to solve the basic problems of the area would merely result in a revival of the dangerous conditions

existing before 5 June 1967. A just settlement must take into account both the pressure created by Israel's military occupation of large amounts of Arab territory and the equally intolerable pressure upon Israel by the constant refusal of the Arab States to recognize its existence. Declaring that the arrangements should be just and acceptable to all parties, he outlined elements of a settlement essentially similar to those suggested by Canada and Italy.

Ireland's Minister for External Affairs stated that anything less than complete withdrawal would be intolerable on the part of a signatory of the United Nations Charter. Making a point expressed by a number of other speakers, he said that blame for the recent conflict could not be laid entirely on the States of the Middle East, but reflected to some degree on all who had neglected to press with sufficient energy for effective collective measures to eliminate the conditions inevitably leading to hostilities. He appealed to the great powers to live up to their primary responsibility under the Charter, to keep their dangerous rivalry within the bounds of common sense, to refrain from promoting further dissension in the Middle East, to prevent another arms race in the area, and to make a formal declaration that they were prepared, in co-operation with the other Members of the United Nations, to guarantee a treaty of peace and non-aggression signed by the parties to the conflict.

Referring to the recent meeting between Chairman Kosygin of the USSR and President Johnson of the United States, the representatives of Canada and Sweden also stressed the responsibility of all Member States, in particular the great powers, to assist in the solution of the Middle East crisis.

The Foreign Minister of Brazil observed that inflexible positions had caused the Middle East to live for 20 years under a régime of latent or active belligerence—namely, the obstinacy on the part of the Arab States in refusing to acknowledge the fact of the legal existence of the State of Israel, which came into being under the aegis of the United Nations and which was a Member State, and the refusal on the part of the Government of Israel to seek a just solution for the problem of the Arab refugees of Palestine.

An effective United Nations solution, in his view, should include recommendation of the following fundamental principles: (i) recognition of Israel by the Arab States as a sovereign State, and hence qualified to enjoy the privileges and the guarantees which the Charter assured Member States; (ii) a formal guarantee on the part of Israel to settle the problem of the refugees on equitable and permanent bases; (iii) an equally formal guarantee on the part of Israel not to incorporate into its national territory the areas occupied as a result of its recent military successes and, consequently, the withdrawal of Israel troops; (iv) a formal guarantee on the part of the United Arab Republic to assure free navigation through the Strait of Tiran under adequate international control; (v) negotiations by the United Arab Republic envisaging the opening of the Suez Canal to ships of any flag, having in mind the sovereignty of the Egyptian Government and the Constantinople Convention of 1888, ratified by the Government of Cairo in its declaration of 24 April 1957; (vi) the placing of Jerusalem under permanent international administration, with special guarantees for the protection of the Holy Places with a *corpus separatum*, in accordance with the spirit of the United Nations General Assembly resolution of 29 November 1947;¹⁵ (vii) negotiations for the settlement of all pending problems, including, on the basis of mutual consent, the eventual establishment of demilitarized zones by the methods of peaceful solution envisaged in the Charter and with the collaboration, if required, of a special representative of the Secretary-General who could play an important role in establishing contact between the parties and in expediting the negotiations.

Representatives of other Latin American States, particularly Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela, expressed similar ideas. The representatives of Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela placed special emphasis on withdrawal of Israel forces.

As the debate progressed, various groups of delegations engaged in intensive informal consultations in an effort to arrive at texts which would be able to command sufficient support when put to the vote.

17-POWER DRAFT RESOLUTION

On 28 June 1967, the representative of Yugoslavia introduced a draft resolution on behalf of delegations which believed that the first order of priority must be withdrawal of Israel forces and, later, consideration of ancillary questions. The original version of this text was sponsored by the following delegations: Afghanistan, Burundi, Ceylon, the Congo (Brazzaville), Cyprus, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mali, Pakistan, Somalia, the United Republic of Tanzania, Yugoslavia and Zambia. Voting priority was requested for the text.

By the operative paragraphs of the original version of this text, the General Assembly would: (1) call upon Israel immediately to withdraw all its forces behind the Armistice Lines established by the General Armistice Agreements between Israel and the Arab countries; (2) request the Secretary-General to ensure compliance with the resolution and, with the assistance of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization established by the Security Council, to secure strict observance by all parties of the provisions of the General Armistice Agreement; between Israel and the Arab countries; (3) call upon all States to render every assistance to the Secretary-General in the implementation of this resolution; (4) request the Secretary-General to report urgently to the Assembly and to the Council on Israel's compliance with the terms of this resolution; and (5) request the Security Council, after the withdrawal of Israel's armed forces behind the Armistice Lines had been completed, to give consideration to questions pertaining to the situation in the area.

On 30 June, the representative of Yugoslavia introduced a revised version of this text, stating that the co-sponsors (which now included Kenya and Senegal), had had extensive exchanges of views with a large number of delegations and desired to take all constructive suggestions into consideration. Operative paragraph 1 (on the withdrawal of Israel's forces) was revised to have the Assembly call upon Israel to withdraw immediately all its forces to the positions they held prior to 5 June 1967.

¹⁵ See Y.U.N., 1947-48, pp. 247-56, text of resolution 181(II) A.

An additional operative paragraph was inserted to have the Assembly ask the Secretary-General to designate, at the appropriate time, a personal representative who would be in contact with the parties concerned in dealing with the problems of the area.

The original operative paragraph 5 (by which the Assembly would ask the Security Council to give consideration, after the withdrawal of Israel's forces, to questions pertaining to the situation in the area) was reworded to have the Assembly ask the Security Council, immediately after completion of the withdrawal, to consider urgently all aspects of the situation in the Middle East and seek peaceful ways and means for the solution of all problems—legal, political and humanitarian—through appropriate channels, guided by the principles of the Charter, in particular those contained in Articles 2 and 33. (For text of these Charter Articles, see APPENDIX II.) By a second revision of the text, circulated on 1 July, a reference was added to the paragraph to point out that the Security Council was "already seized of the question."

A third revision of the text, submitted on 3 July, was also sponsored by 17 countries, Cambodia having joined the sponsors and Kenya having withdrawn. The representative of Burundi, introducing the text, explained that the sponsors had made concessions and revised their draft resolution because they were aware that, confronted with a crucial problem, all Members must be determined to make the greatest possible contribution to the achievement of a positive solution. By this version, the paragraph whereby the Assembly would call on all States to render every assistance to the Secretary-General in the implementation of the resolution was revised so as to have the Assembly call on all States to render every assistance to the Secretary-General in the implementation of the resolution "in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations." The paragraph asking the Secretary-General to report urgently to the Assembly and to the Council on "Israel's compliance with the terms" of the resolution was revised to ask him to report on "compliance with the terms" of the resolution.

In addition, the paragraph on the request to the Security Council to consider urgently all

aspects of the situation "immediately after the withdrawal of the Israel armed forces had been completed" was reworded to have the Assembly ask the Security Council to "consider all aspects of the situation in the Middle East and seek peaceful ways and means for the solution of all problems—legal, political and humanitarian—through appropriate channels, guided by the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, in particular those contained in Articles 2 and 33."

By the final version of the 17-power text, the General Assembly, therefore, would: (1) call upon Israel to withdraw immediately all its forces to the positions they held prior to 5 June 1967; (2) request the Secretary-General to ensure compliance with the present resolution •and to secure, with the assistance of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization established by the Security Council, strict observance by all parties of the provisions of the General Armistice Agreements between Israel and the Arab countries; (3) further request the Secretary-General to designate a personal representative who would assist him in securing compliance with this resolution and be in contact with the parties concerned; (4) call upon all States to render every assistance to the Secretary-General in the implementation of this resolution in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations; (5) request the Secretary-General to report urgently to the General Assembly and to the Security Council on compliance with the terms of this resolution; and (6) request that the Security Council consider all aspects of the situation in the Middle East and seek peaceful ways and means for the solution of all problems—legal, political and humanitarian—through appropriate channels, guided by the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, in particular those contained in Articles 2 and 33.

Amendments to the revised 17-power draft resolution were submitted on 30 June by Albania and by Cuba.

The Albanian amendment called for insertion of a new first operative paragraph whereby the Assembly would strongly condemn Israel for its aggression against the United Arab Republic, Syria and Jordan.

By the Cuban amendments, the Assembly would: (1) condemn "the aggression committed by the State of Israel against Jordan, Syria and the United Arab Republic, and its principal instigator, the imperialist Government of the United States of America"; and (2) call upon Israel to withdraw immediately all its forces to the positions they held prior to 5 June 1967. All the other operative paragraphs of the 17-power text would be deleted.

20-POWER DRAFT RESOLUTION

Also on 30 June, the representative of Trinidad and Tobago introduced a draft resolution, on behalf of the Latin American group, which he hoped represented a suitable compromise between conflicting views, having been prepared by States not directly concerned and thus perhaps able to view the situation more objectively.

As subsequently revised, the draft was co-sponsored by the following 20 Members: Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Trinidad and Tobago, and Venezuela.

By this 20-power text, the Assembly, considering that all Member States had an inescapable obligation to preserve peace and, consequently, to avoid the use of force in the international sphere, and considering further that the cease-fire ordered by the Security Council and accepted by the States concerned was a first step towards the achievement of a just peace in the Middle East, a step which had to be reinforced by other measures to be adopted by the Organization and complied with by the parties, would: (1) urgently request Israel to withdraw all its forces from all the territories occupied by it as a result of the recent conflict, and urgently request the parties in conflict to end the state of belligerency, to endeavour to establish conditions of coexistence based on good neighbourliness and to have recourse in all cases to the procedure for peaceful settlement indicated in the Charter; (2) reaffirm its conviction that no stable international order could be based on the threat or use of force, and declare that the validity of the occupation or acquisition of territories

brought about by such means should not be recognized; (3) request the Security Council to continue examining the situation in the Middle East with a sense of urgency, working directly with the parties and relying on the presence of the United Nations to: (a) carry out the provisions of the first part of the first operative paragraph (i.e., that which urgently requested Israel to withdraw all its forces from all the territories it occupied as a result of the recent conflict); (b) guarantee freedom of transit on the international waterways in the region; and (c) achieve an appropriate and full solution of the problem of the refugees and guarantee the territorial inviolability and political independence of the States of the region, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones; and (4) reaffirm, as in earlier recommendations, the desirability of establishing an international régime for the City of Jerusalem, to be considered by the Assembly at its twenty-second session (due to open in September 1967).

Also discussed by the General Assembly at its fifth emergency special session were proposals concerning the status of Jerusalem and the Holy Places (for further details, see pp. 209-11), and the provision of humanitarian assistance to alleviate the suffering inflicted on civilians and on prisoners of war as a result of the recent hostilities in the Middle East (for further details, see pp. 211-15).

On 4 July, the Assembly agreed, without objection, to the request of Yugoslavia for priority to be given to the 17-power draft resolution (see pp. 206-07).

The first Cuban amendment to this proposal was rejected by a roll-call vote of 78 against to 20 in favour, with 22 abstentions. Cuba did not insist on a vote on the rest of its amendments. (For details of Cuban proposals, see above.)

The Albanian amendment (see p. 207) was rejected by a roll-call vote of 66 against to "2 in favour, with 22 abstentions.

An Albanian procedural motion requesting separate votes on the operative paragraphs of the 17-power draft was rejected by a vote of 83 to 12, with 22 abstentions.

The 17-power draft resolution, on a roll-call vote, received 53 votes in favour to 46 against,

with 20 abstentions, and was not adopted, having failed to obtain the required two-thirds majority.

The USSR draft resolution (see above, p. 193) was then voted upon, in parts, by roll-call. The first operative paragraph was rejected by 57 votes against to 36 in favour, with 23 abstentions; the second operative paragraph was rejected by 48 votes to 45, with 22 abstentions; the third operative paragraph was rejected by 54 votes to 34, with 28 abstentions; and the fourth operative paragraph was rejected by 54 votes to 36, with 26 abstentions. The preambular paragraphs were rejected by 57 votes to 36, with 24 abstentions. Since all the parts had been rejected, no vote was taken on the draft as a whole.

After stating that he had been informed that the United States was not pressing for a vote on the draft resolution it had submitted (see page 194), the President of the General Assembly put to a vote the Albanian draft resolution (see page 202). This was rejected by a roll-call vote of 71 against to 22 in favour, with 27 abstentions.

The 20-power draft resolution (see above, p. 208) was also voted upon by roll-call. It received 57 votes in favour to 43 against, with 20 abstentions, and, having failed to obtain the required two-thirds majority, was not adopted.

STATUS OF JERUSALEM AND THE HOLY PLACES

Noting the special importance of Jerusalem as recognized in such General Assembly resolutions as 181(II) of 29 November 1947, 194 (III) of 11 December 1948¹⁶ and 303(IV) of 9 December 1949,¹⁷ Pakistan, in a letter of 16 June 1967, demanded action calling upon Israel to cease and desist from its contemplated action, according to press reports, of making the Holy City a part of Israel forever.

During the General Assembly's fifth emergency special session, the question of the status of Jerusalem and its Holy Places was discussed not only in connexion with general principles for a peaceful settlement but also as a separate problem, particularly after certain measures relating to Jerusalem were taken by Israel on 28 June 1967. Among the delegations expressing concern, in addition to Israel and Jordan, were

those of Afghanistan, Argentina, Canada, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Kuwait, Malaysia, Malta, Morocco, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Sudan, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States, Uruguay and Venezuela.

On 21 June 1967, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom called upon Israel not to take any steps relating to Jerusalem which would conflict with the principle that war should not lead to territorial aggrandizement and warned that if Israel purported to annex the Old City or legislate for its annexation, Israel would isolate itself from world opinion.

The Foreign Minister of Israel replied that Jordan was the only Government in recorded history which, since its annexation of the Holy City in 1948, had done these two things: made Jerusalem a battlefield and denied to all religions universal access to the Holy Places. Israel's policy was the preservation of the unity of Jerusalem, the elevation of its material and cultural life, free access to the Holy Places to all faiths and perfect respect for religious interests. Later he said that Christian and Moslem life in Jerusalem was active and secure. He charged, however, that during its régime, Jordan had not only denied access to Judaism's holiest shrine, the Western Wall, but had razed all but one of the 35 synagogues in the Old City.

On 29 June 1967, replying to charges that legislation of the previous day amounted to the annexation of Old Jerusalem, Israel's Foreign Minister stated that the administrative legislation contained no new political statement but was concerned exclusively with the urgent necessities of repairing the ravages and dislocations arising from the previous division of the city and the hostilities, and assuring all inhabitants equal municipal services. Israel's views on the need to separate the sacred from the secular aspects of the City's life were well known. Israel, he added, remained willing to discuss arrangements for the safeguarding of the Holy Places with those concerned both in and beyond Israel.

¹⁶ See Y.U.N., 1948-49, pp. 174-76, text of resolution 194(III).

¹⁷ Ibid., pp. 196-97, text of resolution 303(IV).

The Foreign Minister of Jordan charged that the "euphemisms" of the spokesman for Israel could not hide the fact that Israel had carried out an act of military and political annexation, another political fait accompli based on naked violence. The din of bulldozers razing Arab quarters could not be muffled, nor could the talk of Arabs sightseeing in the Israel part of the city beguile the starving and beleaguered inhabitants of Arab Jerusalem. To Moslems, the most shockingly slanderous implication of the Israel representative's statement was that the Arabs had desecrated the Holy Places of Judaism, since it was a simple fact that the Holy Places of Judaism and Christianity were doctrinally and theologically holy to Islam. If the Wailing Wall still stood in Jerusalem, it was as a monument to the tolerance and reverence of 1,300 years of Islamic guardianship. Unfortunately, the reverse position did not obtain; in Jerusalem the dust had hardly settled on the ancient Moroccan Quarter before priceless architectural gems were brutally bulldozed into non-existence in one afternoon. The strategic position of Jerusalem was the key to the strangulation of the entire West Bank of Jordan, and that was the real purpose of the recent Israel legislation.

The Prime Minister of Sudan was among those who stressed the holiness of Jerusalem to the world of Islam. For centuries, he said, Arabs had guarded the Holy Places for Moslems, Christians and Jews in the City of Jerusalem, until the Zionists in 1948 expelled both Moslems and Christians and seized half of the City. Now they had usurped the rest of it and declared it their capital.

The representative of Morocco, referring to the problem of the protection of the Holy Places—which, he said, had already begun to be desecrated—declared that no Moslem in the world could agree to Israel's carrying out its plan to annex the Holy Places.

The representative of Saudi Arabia said that Moslems would never accept the occupation of Jerusalem.

Among those who outlined general principles required for any enduring settlement was the Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada. He declared that international concern for the preservation of the special spiritual and

religious interests in Jerusalem of Christians, Jews and Moslems must be recognized, perhaps by giving the United Nations an international supervisory responsibility for the protection of those interests. Nor, he added, should there be any precipitate action which might prejudice them.

The representative of Norway considered that the solution of the problem of Jerusalem depended on collaboration not only among nations but also among religions, so that the Holy Places could be protected and administered for the benefit of the faithful of the great religions which meet in the Holy City.

The representative of the United States maintained that safeguarding of the Holy Places, and freedom of access to them, should be internationally guaranteed, and that the status of Jerusalem in relation to them should be decided not unilaterally but in consultation with all concerned. The United States Government did not recognize the unilateral administrative action taken by Israel.

The Prime Minister of Italy said that the Holy Places had long awaited a special status which would guarantee access to them.

The representative of Nigeria considered that an international commission should be established for the Holy Places, with a United Nations guarantee of free access to them by all who so desired.

Representatives of Spain and Latin American States made more specific suggestions. Argentina, Brazil and Spain called for the placing of Jerusalem under permanent international administration, with special guarantees for the protection of the Holy Places with a corpus separatum, in accordance with the spirit of General Assembly resolution 181(II) of 29 November 1947.¹⁸ Uruguay and Venezuela also wanted Jerusalem to be the subject of an international régime. The latter stressed that annexation by Israel of the portion of the city and its environs which were beyond Israel's borders was inadmissible in any form and was neither more nor less than an effort of final annexation by Israel. Recalling Assembly resolutions on the internationalization of Jerusalem, the representative of Ecuador felt that the problem of Jerusalem

¹⁸ See footnote 15 above.

might better be discussed outside the context of the immediate peace negotiations, perhaps as a separate item on the agenda of the next regular session of the General Assembly. While expressing appreciation of Israel's search for what was sometimes called "functional internationalization" to protect the Holy Places, he thought that negotiations to that end might not be as juridically valid as territorial internationalization would be, if established in direct relationship with the United Nations as representative of the international community within the terms defined by His Holiness the Pope.

Attention was also drawn during the discussion to the proposal of Latin American Members that the General Assembly reaffirm, as in previous recommendations, the desirability of establishing an international régime for the City of Jerusalem, to be considered at the General Assembly's regular twenty-second session (due to open in September 1967). A provision to that effect was contained in the draft resolution proposed on 30 June by 20 Latin American Member States (see page 208). Considering that this provision in the 20-power text would have the effect of permitting Israel to consolidate its illegal annexation, Pakistan, on 4 July, introduced a draft resolution which was also sponsored by Guinea, Iran, Mali and Turkey.

By this text, the Assembly, deeply concerned at the situation prevailing in Jerusalem as a result of the measures taken by Israel to change the status of the city, would: (1) declare that these measures were invalid; (2) call upon Israel to rescind all measures already taken and to desist forthwith from taking any action which would alter the status of Jerusalem; and (3) request the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly and the Security Council on the situation and the implementation of this resolution not later than one week from its adoption. Subsequently, this text was revised so that the Assembly would "consider" rather than "declare" that Israel's measures to change the status of Jerusalem were invalid. This text was co-sponsored by six Members, the additional co-sponsor being Niger.

Before the vote, in which Israel did not participate, its representative declared that Israel had conscientious objection to allowing Jerusalem to fall under divided jurisdiction. Since

the draft resolution sought to violate Jerusalem's unity and to advocate return to religious discrimination, it could not be accepted.

On 4 July 1967, the Assembly approved the revised six-power proposal by a roll-call vote of 99 to 0, with 20 abstentions, as resolution 2253 (ES-V). (For text, see DOCUMENTARY REFERENCES below.)

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND REFUGEES

REPORTS BY COMMISSIONER-GENERAL OF UNRWA AND STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT OF GENERAL ASSEMBLY

On 19 June 1967, the Secretary-General submitted a report to the General Assembly on the existing situation with regard to humanitarian assistance to refugees in the Middle East from the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA).¹⁹

The Commissioner-General stated that, following a request from Israel, arrangements had been agreed upon by 15 June 1967 with Israel enabling UNRWA to resume its vital humanitarian task without any commitment by the Agency with regard to the status of the areas in question. The report outlined the situation and UNRWA's problems in the areas in which major hostilities had occurred. The Commissioner-General thought that in Gaza casualties among the civilian population had been higher than elsewhere, but that the civilian population had virtually all remained there, where the Agency's camps were more or less intact and medical supplies were adequate for immediate needs.

While no Agency staff had been able to enter southern Syria, initial reports indicated that some 50,000 people had moved into the Damascus and Deraa areas, of whom only 8,000 were UNRWA-registered refugees. On the West Bank of the Jordan, damage in the Old City of Jerusalem, while widespread, did not amount to devastation in any areas inspected. However, there was a highly provisional figure of 100,000 persons who had moved eastwards from the West Bank of the Jordan Valley. In Jericho, the UNRWA camps were almost empty. The

¹⁹ For fuller information, see below, pp. 260-61.

Commissioner-General said he had been encouraged by the rapid recovery of UNRWA's organization and capacity in these areas to provide services, except for southern Syria. Immediate problems were dispersal of locally recruited staff, restrictions on freedom of movement, heavy loss of vehicles, some loss from stocks and stores and difficulties of communication. The authorities had promised full co-operation in removing those difficulties, and supplies for UNRWA-registered refugees were generally good for one month.

The Commissioner-General said he had authorized distribution of some supplies to other Arab civilians on an emergency basis, but any indefinite increase in UNRWA's beneficiaries would require additional financial support and a change in its mandate.

As for the areas in which no major hostilities had occurred, the Commissioner-General reported that the major problem was to cope with the 100,000 or more newly displaced persons on the East Bank in Jordan. He had made clear that the Agency could best cope with their needs if they returned to their previous camps. The Jordanian Government was co-operating in setting up emergency camps for which facilities were badly needed. While the Agency's additional expenses could not yet be assessed, they would be considerable. The Agency was working in close liaison with Governments, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the Red Cross and other organizations.

On 26 June 1967, the President of the General Assembly stated that the situation of the civilian and refugee population in the Middle East was so purely a humanitarian issue that their care and relief represented a most immediate and direct obligation upon all United Nations Member States. The Commissioner-General had personally confirmed to him that there were 100,000 or more newly displaced persons in Jordan in immediate need of all the essentials of life. While everything possible was being done through the United Nations and other humanitarian agencies, with the assistance of many Governments, it was evident that the funds and resources available were in no way sufficient to meet the needs. He therefore appealed to all Members, both as signatories of the Charter and as morally obligated human

beings, to make whatever contribution they could, however slender their resources, to ease the suffering of those men, women and children.

In a second report, circulated on 4 July, the Commissioner-General brought his earlier report up to date. Among other things, the report noted with regard to the movement eastward of the civilian population that in Syria the total might be on the order of 80,000 persons, of whom approximately 16,800 were Palestinians. As for Jordan, the best estimate was that at least 150,000 persons had now left the West Bank, of whom 80,000 to 100,000 might be former UNRWA-registered refugees. A "second wave" had begun about 20 June, and in the preceding 10 days perhaps 30,000 persons had crossed the Jordan. Co-operation with the Jordanian Government in dealing with the influx of displaced persons had reached a fairly advanced stage. The principal concern remained food supplies, as shipping had been disrupted by the closure of the Suez Canal. After mid-July, however, the port of Ashdod would receive new supplies through arrangements made with the Government of Israel.

With regard to the prospects for the return of refugees who had fled with the outbreak of hostilities—which return the Security Council had, on 14 June 1967,²⁰ called upon Israel to facilitate—the Commissioner-General had twice discussed with the Israel Government the question of allowing the displaced persons to return and had emphasized that the Agency could best serve their needs in the established camps in Gaza and on the West Bank. After the Israel announcement of 2 July 1967 that, under conditions to be specified, the return of refugees to the West Bank would be permitted until 10 August 1967, the Commissioner-General had issued an appeal that further flight should stop and that those who had already fled should return; the Agency had announced its readiness to do all in its power to assist.

The majority of speakers in the Assembly's general discussion on the matter referred to the urgent necessity of taking measures to assist the innocent victims of the most recent hostilities in the Middle East.

²⁰ See pp. 190-91 above, text of Security Council resolution 237(1967).

In addition, spokesmen for the parties directly concerned were involved in charges and denials of acts of terrorism and deliberate harassment.

The representatives of Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Syria and the United Arab Republic, among others, complained on many occasions that Israel was committing atrocities in the territories it had invaded. The United Arab Republic, for instance, charged Israel with bombarding hospitals in Sinai and the Gaza Strip, killing wounded and young men, looting storehouses and leaving wounded stranded in the desert without food or water, stripped of their clothes, to travel on foot some 250 miles.

The Foreign Minister of Jordan asserted that the West Bank of Jordan, under Israel occupation, was being subjected to a plan to obliterate its demographic structure in order that the occupied areas might be more easily incorporated into the State of Israel. Villages were being wiped out and the Jordanian population was being forcibly uprooted and evicted, left without shelter and deliberately starved. The increasing numbers of West Bank Jordanians who were fleeing to the East Bank for refuge were creating a fearfully acute problem for Jordan.

Speaking at a later meeting of the General Assembly, King Hussein of Jordan stated that the Israel army was as vicious in its treatment of Jordanian soldiers and civilians as any barbarian invaders. Specifically, he charged it with widespread use of napalm and fragmentation bombs, with inhuman treatment of prisoners of war, with looting and destroying Arab towns and villages and driving the inhabitants from their homes, and with adding to the refugee problem by acts of vandalism, terror and confusion. Unless the General Assembly acted speedily and effectively, he said, the plight of the refugees would double in regard to extent, sorrow, misery and death, as not only were thousands of older refugees fleeing from the camps that had been their lot for 19 years, but thousands more new refugees were being created by Israel's actions.

The representative of Syria also presented a list of charges of atrocities carried out by Israelis against young and old in the occupied parts of Syria; and, further, charged Israelis with looting, destroying crops and driving away cattle.

The Foreign Minister of Iraq said that the policy of terror and intimidation pursued by Israel in the occupied territories was substantially the same as the brutally effective tactics of 1948: massive violence against chosen civilian targets, cunning psychological warfare to exploit the fears produced thereby and, finally, limited violence to keep the trek of refugees in motion.

Israel rejected as worthless such atrocity stories of the spokesmen for Arab countries which Israel claimed were figments of their imagination. On the contrary, Israel stated, while the fighting was in progress, the Israel army took extreme care to spare the civilian population from all undue suffering, and as soon as the fighting was over, every effort had been made by the Israel authorities to restore conditions of normal civilian life. On the West Bank, a civilian administration was operating, with services, food supplies and factory and farm work being carried out. An agreement had been signed between the Government of Israel and UNRWA for the continuation of the Agency's work in refugee camps. While granting that there was traffic of people from the West Bank eastward, the Israel Government repeated that there were no expulsions nor pressure to induce anyone to leave. There was, however, a strong economic pull drawing people across the river. Refugees who had lived in the camps in Jericho had fled because they wished to receive their rations in Jordan and feared loss of the financial support of their relatives in Kuwait. Others crossing eastward included many Jordanian Government officials with their families, and soldiers who had discarded their uniforms. In the Gaza area, where refugees under Egyptian rule had been in what he termed concentration camps, the people were now permitted to move and visit their relatives on the West Bank. Israelis were not being allowed to settle in the West Bank area and Arab inhabitants had not been moved from their homes with the exception of those who had lived in the synagogues of the Old City. Moreover, the Israel representative stated, families who wished to migrate from East Jordan to the West Bank would be permitted to do so. Every effort would be made to ensure normal and humane conditions throughout the cease-fire area.

Czechoslovakia—expressing opinions which were also shared by the Byelorussian SSR, Romania and Yugoslavia, among others—stressed Israel's responsibility for the forcible expulsion of Arab inhabitants to swell the ranks of the refugees and emphasized the need for an opportunity for their return; it further stressed Israel's responsibility for damage inflicted upon the Arab States and their citizens, victims of its aggression, and endorsed the urgency expressed in the USSR's draft resolution (see p. 193) of compelling the Government of Israel to make full compensation within the shortest possible time and to return to the Arab States and their citizens all seized property and other material assets. Czechoslovakia joined the Byelorussian SSR and the USSR in charging Israel with crimes against the indigenous population in the territories it had seized.

The representative of Mali agreed that in strict point of law, the question of reparations should be immediately settled by Israel for all the consequences of its aggression.

The spokesmen for Burundi, Cyprus, Indonesia, Romania and the United Republic of Tanzania were among those who shared the view of Arab States that the Palestine refugee problem had been too long aggravated by failure to implement the General Assembly's resolutions—reiterated annually since 1948—on repatriation or compensation of the refugees.

The United Kingdom stressed that it was imperative that the Arab communities whose lands had been overrun should be allowed to stay where they were or to return if they had fled and wished to go back. They could not be allowed to suffer further. What had happened to them must not result in a further escalation of the already intractable refugee problem.

France noted the urgency of the problem of the refugees, both the new ones and those whose precarious 18-year status was again in jeopardy, and said that it imposed new obligations not only on the Government responsible but on the international community as a whole, which should take effective measures.

Canada suggested that the problem of securing justice for the Palestine refugees was of such magnitude that only a combination of

methods could produce a solution. It would be illusory to believe that it could be solved simply on the basis of their return to Israel, or to expect the Arab States to shoulder alone the burden of resettling and integrating those so choosing. United Nations Members had an obligation to consider an international effort in a United Nations context directed at regional economic development, related to resettlement, in the Middle East.

Similarly, Nigeria, noting the urgency of relief measures, also considered that the great powers should lead in the provision of funds for indemnification and resettlement of the refugees, that Israel should provide homes and opportunities for such as might return to Israel, and that for the others, the great powers and Israel should provide the funds, the Arab States the land, and the United Nations the technical assistance for resettlement.

Ireland urged that Israel and the great powers provide the necessary funds to settle the refugee problem, recalling its suggestion in 1958 that restoration of their lands, or full compensation and an opportunity to settle elsewhere with capital amounting to \$1,000 per person, should be offered to the refugees.

The representative of Colombia believed that the problem should be tackled not simply as a Red Cross operation but through an economic and social campaign bringing about a complete economic transformation in the area.

Many other speakers in the general discussion stressed the urgency of providing humanitarian assistance to the victims of the fighting and considered that a just solution to the refugee problem should be given highest priority in the eventual negotiations on the over-all problems. It was suggested that a special United Nations representative or commissioner might be entrusted with refugee problems among his other tasks. All stressed the significance of the continuing refugee question in contributing to the maintenance of tension and hostility in the area.

On 3 July, the representative of Sweden introduced a draft resolution concerning humanitarian assistance which was sponsored by Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Denmark, Ethiopia, Finland, Iceland,

India, Iran, Ireland, Japan, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Rwanda, Singapore, Sweden and Yugoslavia. Subsequently, Afghanistan, Italy, Liberia, Niger and Turkey joined as co-sponsors.

By the operative paragraphs of this text, the Assembly would, *inter alia*: (1) welcome with great satisfaction Security Council resolution 237(1967) of 14 June 1967; (2) endorse the appeal made by the President of the General Assembly on 26 June 1967 (see p. 212); (3) note with gratification the work of the International Committee of the Red Cross, the League of Red Cross Societies, the United Nations Children's Fund and other voluntary organizations to provide humanitarian assistance; (4) commend the Commissioner-General of UNRWA for his efforts to continue the Agency's activities with respect to all persons coming within his mandate; (5) endorse the Commissioner-General's efforts to provide humanitarian assistance, as far as practicable, on an emergency basis and as a temporary measure, to other persons in the area presently displaced and in serious need of immediate assistance as a result of the recent hostilities; (6) call upon all Members concerned to facilitate the transport of supplies to all areas in which assistance was being rendered; (7) appeal to all Governments, as well as organizations and individuals, to make special contributions for the above purposes to UNRWA and to the other inter-governmental and non-governmental organizations concerned; and (8) request the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Commissioner-General, to report urgently to the Assembly on the needs arising under the terms of the resolution, and to follow its effective implementation and report thereon to the Assembly.

This 26-power draft resolution on humanitarian assistance was adopted by the Assembly on 4 July 1967 by a roll-call vote of 116 to 0, with 2 abstentions, as resolution 2252 (ES-V). (For text, see DOCUMENTARY REFERENCES below.)

STATEMENT ON 5 JULY BY
PRESIDENT OF GENERAL ASSEMBLY

On 5 July 1967, the President of the General Assembly made a statement which, he explained,

was not an expression of a consensus of the Assembly, but was a part of his duty to let the peoples of the world know clearly that the emergency special session had not been in vain. He pointed to important contributions which had been made to the cause of peace in the Middle East, through the virtual unanimity with which Heads of State, Heads of Government, Foreign Ministers and Permanent Representatives had agreed that the crisis merited the attention and full participation of all Members in the earnest labours to achieve results. Important contributions had been made to a proper diagnosis of the illness, in that they had agreed that the time had come when peace in the Middle East must be made finally and for all time, instead of hoping that time alone would heal. He stated there had been a broad consensus that the effort to achieve that final peace could be hoped for only within the framework of the United Nations.

Finally, he said, there was virtual unanimity in upholding the principle that conquest of territory by war was inadmissible in our time and under the Charter. Virtually all statements had affirmed that principle, and virtually all had laid down the corollary that withdrawal of forces to their original position was expected. What had not been agreed upon was a procedure and the sequence by which that principle should be implemented. In addition, there was a broad consensus that the political sovereignty and territorial integrity of States allowed them a rightful freedom from the threat of belligerency. If, on the basis of the common denominators he had outlined, new efforts were made to find a programme of action, the small differences could be resolved and the broad agreements expanded.

At the close of the meeting, the President noted that some representatives had expressed a desire for further consultations in the interest of the work of the Assembly. After consultations, a majority were in favour of the principle of allowing time for such consultations, although there were differences of view concerning the amount of time to be allowed. He therefore proposed a week's recess until 12 July, which was agreed to after a brief discussion.

CONSIDERATION AT SECOND PART OF
FIFTH EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION
(12-21 JULY 1967)

STATUS OF CITY OF JERUSALEM
AND HOLY PLACES

Pursuant to the request made to him by the General Assembly in its resolution 2253 (ES-V) of 4 July 1967 (see p. 211) to report not later than one week from the adoption of the resolution on the implementation of the resolution concerning measures taken by Israel to change the status of the City of Jerusalem, the Secretary-General submitted a report to the General Assembly and the Security Council on 10 July 1967.

On 5 July, the Secretary-General said, he had drawn the resolution to the attention of the Government of Israel as a matter of urgency, through a letter addressed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

The Secretary-General's report reproduced the reply received on 10 July 1967 by the Secretary-General. In this reply, the Foreign Minister of Israel charged that since 1948 the section of Jerusalem in which the Holy Places were concentrated had been governed by a régime which had refused to give due acknowledgement to universal religious concerns, and which had refused to agree to any special arrangements for the Holy Places as proposed in United Nations bodies in 1949 and 1950. Despite Israel's appeals to Jordan to abstain from hostilities, Jordanian forces on 5 June 1967 had launched a destructive and unprovoked armed assault on the part of Jerusalem outside the walls, which resulted in civilian casualties and material destruction through firing directed from positions in and near the Holy Places themselves. Since 7 June 1967, the entire city had experienced peace and unity, and the Holy Places of all faiths were open to access by those who held them sacred. The term "annexation" used by supporters of the General Assembly's resolution of 4 July was out of place since, he stated, the measures adopted related to the integration of Jerusalem in the administrative and municipal spheres and furnished a legal basis for the protection of the Holy Places. The measures adopted by the Israel Parliament on 27 June 1967 provided for the protection of the Holy

Places, for civic co-operation between Arabs and Jews in free and constant association, for ensuring a continuous supply of water in the Old City and for equalizing welfare rights, operating hospitals and clinics and establishing health services in schools and stations for mother and child care, and for preparing for the school year and ensuring compulsory education in all parts of the city. The letter added that the Government of Israel had embarked on a constructive and detailed dialogue with representatives of universal religious interests which, it was hoped, would give effective expression to the universal character of the Holy Places.

The Foreign Minister of Israel said that the changes which had affected Jerusalem's life and destiny as a result of the measures adopted were that where there had been hostile separation, there was now harmonious civic union; where there had been a constant threat of violence, there was now peace; where there had been an assertion of unilateral control over the Holy Places exercised in sacrilegious discrimination, there was now a willingness to work out arrangements with the world's religious bodies of three faiths which would ensure the universal religious character of the Holy Places.

When the General Assembly reconvened on 12 July, the President stated that he had not been formally advised of the result of the consultations which had been in progress during the adjournment, and which he thought were still going on. He urged all engaged in those consultations to inform the Assembly as soon as possible about the result of their efforts, in view of the emergency nature of the session.

The representative of Pakistan—noting Israel's response to Assembly resolution 2253 (ES-V) of 4 July 1967 on the status of the City of Jerusalem, which had called upon Israel to rescind and desist forthwith from any measures that would alter the status of Jerusalem—concluded that it constituted a refusal to comply with that resolution which the Assembly had adopted by an overwhelming vote and without dissent. The letter from Israel's Foreign Minister had served only to deepen Pakistan's worst apprehensions about Israel's intentions and indicated non-recognition of the Assembly. He denied that any representative of the universal Islamic interest had entered into a dia-

logue with Israel, as implied in the Israel Foreign Minister's letter to the Secretary-General. He considered it necessary for the Assembly to take measures to reassert its authority and overcome Israel's defiance and he therefore submitted a draft resolution, stating that anything less than its provisions would mean abdication of the Assembly's power and position on a matter crucial to world peace.

By the draft resolution, as originally submitted, the Assembly would: (1) deplore the failure of Israel to implement General Assembly resolution 2253 (ES-V) of 4 July 1967; (2) reiterate its call to Israel in that resolution of 4 July 1967 to rescind all measures already taken and to desist forthwith from taking any action which would alter the status of Jerusalem; (3) request the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council and the General Assembly on the situation and on the implementation of the resolution; and (4) request the Security Council to take the necessary measures to ensure its implementation.

The following day a revised text of the draft resolution was submitted, eventually co-sponsored by Afghanistan, Guinea, Iran, Malaysia, Mali, Pakistan, Somalia and Turkey, in which the fourth operative paragraph was reworded to have the Assembly ask the Security Council to "ensure the implementation" of the resolution (rather than "take the necessary measures to ensure the implementation" of the resolution).

The discussion in the Assembly, in the course of five meetings held between 12 and 14 July, dealt mainly with charges that Israel had failed to comply with Assembly resolution 2253 (ES-V) of 4 July 1967. Those making statements included representatives of Afghanistan, Belgium, Bulgaria, the Byelorussian SSR, Canada, Czechoslovakia, France, Hungary, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Mongolia, Nepal, Pakistan, Poland, Syria, the Ukrainian SSR, the USSR, the United Arab Republic, the United Kingdom and Venezuela.

Among the arguments advanced during the debate by some representatives were the following: Israel's defiance of the Assembly's resolution was provocative; its assertion that the administrative measures were not of a political nature but only related to "the integration of Jerusalem in the administrative and municipal

spheres" and to furnishing "a legal basis for the protection of the Holy Places" was nothing but an attempt to conceal the fact of annexation; the alleged consequence of annexation—unification, pacification and compassionate humanitarianism—was the logic of imperialism; the arguments put forward in defence of the administrative measures were false, demagogic and based on sophistry; Israel's contempt for the United Nations arose from the support it received in its collusion with imperialist powers; and the authority of the United Nations would be undermined unless firm measures were taken to assure Israel's withdrawal not only from Jerusalem but from the other Arab territories which it was occupying and trying to absorb in order to present the world with another fait accompli.

The representative of Jordan said that the Holy Places of Judaism and Christianity were theologically holy to Islam. Jordan's guardianship had been true to that faith. Although the same attitude had never been displayed by Israel towards Islamic and Christian shrines and Holy Sites, never had any desecration of any Holy Site taken place in Jordan.

Other representatives stated that they could not recognize measures which were untimely, unlawful and which tended to aggravate tension, and urged that pending the achievement of a balanced permanent settlement no unilateral measures should be taken which would prejudice the eventual decision concerning the status of Jerusalem and measures to secure protection of and freedom of access to the Holy Places.

In statements of reply, the representative of Israel said that the administrative measures added up to one thing alone—namely, that Jerusalem's citizens should live together in peace instead of living apart in hostility. These measures did not prejudice his Government's readiness and intention to work towards the goal of safeguarding universal, spiritual interests and it had in fact recently pursued an intensive dialogue over a wide field in an effort to give effective expression to universal concerns. It went without saying that custody of the Moslem Holy Places in Jerusalem should be in the hands of authoritative representatives of Islam, with free access to all Moslems assured. Because of the

universal reverence for Jerusalem, Israel proposed to replace the assertion of exclusive and unilateral control of the Holy Places by arrangements giving effective expression to that universal interest, and this was a positive innovation which he considered the Pakistan draft resolution ignored.

On 14 July, the representative of Pakistan announced, on behalf of the co-sponsors of the draft resolution, that they had agreed, following consultations and in the light of objections of a constitutional nature which had been raised, that the draft resolution should be put to the vote without the operative paragraph whereby the Assembly would ask the Security Council to ensure the implementation of the resolution.

On the same day, the Assembly adopted their text by a roll-call vote of 99 to 0, with 18 abstentions, as resolution 2254(ES-V). Israel did not participate in the vote. (For text, see DOCUMENTARY REFERENCES below.)

In explanation of his delegation's abstention, the representative of the United States recalled his statement of 3 July 1967 that the safeguarding of the Holy Places and freedom of access to them should be internationally guaranteed, and the status of Jerusalem in relation to them should be decided not unilaterally but in consultation with all concerned. His Government did not accept or recognize Israel's administrative measures as altering the status of Jerusalem. Since resolution 2254(ES-V) built on resolution 2253(ES-V), his delegation had again abstained because the resolution appeared to accept, by calling for their rescission, that the measures taken constituted annexation of Jerusalem, and because the problem of Jerusalem could not be realistically solved apart from other related aspects of the Jerusalem and Middle Eastern situations.

ADJOURNMENT OF ASSEMBLY'S FIFTH EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION

On 17 July, at the first of four further meetings of the Assembly, the more general situation in the Middle East was discussed. The President of the Assembly noted that while Members were united in the conviction that a solution must be found in full accord with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, the consultations in search of ways and

means by which that joint conviction could become a reality had not ended; there was a prospect, however slight, of reaching agreement. In order that the consultations might end as soon as possible, and since if there was no agreement the Assembly should not continue indefinitely, he proposed that the Assembly should consider the consultations concluded by the morning of 20 July 1967. That suggestion was agreed upon. On the proposal of the representative of Finland, the Assembly further agreed, on 20 July, to defer action until the following afternoon.

On 21 July, Sweden introduced a draft resolution, co-sponsored by Austria and Finland, whereby the Assembly, having considered the grave situation in the Middle East and bearing in mind the resolutions adopted and proposals considered during its fifth emergency special session, would: (1) recommend to the Security Council to resume its consideration of the tense situation in the Middle East as a matter of urgency; (2) request the Secretary-General to forward the records of the Assembly's fifth emergency special session to the Security Council; and (3) decide to adjourn the fifth emergency special session temporarily and to authorize the President of the General Assembly to reconvene the session as and when necessary.

In introducing this proposal, the representative of Sweden said that while it had become clear that there was in fact broad agreement on many basic purposes and principles, it had not been possible to formulate them in such a manner as to command the support required for the adoption of a resolution establishing the basis for peace in the area. The sponsors had therefore concluded, after wide consultations, that it would be advisable to adjourn the session temporarily, without meaning to suspend efforts to reach peaceful solutions through the United Nations.

The representatives of Albania, Algeria, Guinea, Iraq, Kuwait, Mali, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan and the United Republic of Tanzania criticized the draft resolution and deplored the failure of the General Assembly to live up to its responsibilities. Subsequently, the Assembly agreed, by 36 votes to 34, with 40 abstentions, to recess briefly to consider the draft resolution before proceeding to a vote.

Upon resumption of the meeting on the evening of 21 July, the representative of Finland introduced a revised text on behalf of the co-sponsors. By this text, the Assembly, considering that the Security Council continued to be seized of the problem (this was an addition to the previous text), would: (1) ask the Secretary-General to forward to the Council the records of the General Assembly's fifth emergency special session to facilitate the Council's resumption, as a matter of urgency, of its consideration of the tense situation in the Middle East; and (2) decide to adjourn the fifth emergency special session of the Assembly temporarily and to authorize the President of the Assembly to reconvene the session as and when necessary.

The first paragraph, voted on separately at the request of Sudan, was adopted by a roll-call vote of 62 to 27, with 27 abstentions. Thereafter, the text of the resolution as a whole was adopted by a roll-call vote of 63 to 26, with 27 abstentions, as resolution 2256 (ES-V) of 21 July 1967. (For text of resolution, see DOCUMENTARY REFERENCES below.)

Statements, explaining votes and assessing responsibility for the inability of the Assembly to achieve a substantive resolution, were made by the representatives of the Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, France, Iraq, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Trinidad and Tobago, the Ukrainian SSR, the USSR, the United Arab Republic and the United States.

The President of the Assembly pointed out that the Assembly still faced the major crisis for which it had been convened. It was generally felt that Members should continue by consultations their search for a solution. The Security Council should also, with a sense of urgency, continue its efforts on this question which had never been a Council case or an Assembly case

but the problem of the United Nations as a whole.

By a letter dated 21 July, the Secretary-General transmitted to the President of the Security Council the text of resolution 2256(ES-V) and forwarded the records, documents, draft resolutions and adopted resolutions of the fifth emergency special session of the General Assembly.

REFERRAL OF QUESTION TO GENERAL ASSEMBLY'S TWENTY-SECOND REGULAR SESSION

The General Assembly's fifth emergency special session reconvened for the last time on 18 September 1967. A draft resolution was submitted by Austria, Finland and Sweden whereby the Assembly, having considered the grave situation in the Middle East and expressing its utmost concern about that situation, would decide to place on the agenda of its twenty-second regular session, as a matter of high priority, the question considered by the fifth emergency special session.

This proposal was adopted by 93 votes to 0, with 3 abstentions, as resolution 2257(ES-V). (For text of resolution, see DOCUMENTARY REFERENCES below.)

On 19 December 1967, at the closing meeting of the first part of the twenty-second regular session of the General Assembly, the President noted that the item on its agenda concerning the situation in the Middle East had not been discussed, and that it therefore remained on the agenda. Frequent references to the situation in the Middle East were made, however, in the course of the General Debate in the opening phases of the Assembly's twenty-second session and also in the course of discussions on assistance to refugees in the Middle East.

DOCUMENTARY REFERENCES

CONSIDERATION AT FIRST PART OF 5TH EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION (17 JUNE-5 JULY 1967)

GENERAL ASSEMBLY—5TH EMERGENCY SPECIAL
SESSION
Plenary Meetings 1525-1549.

A/6717. Letter of 13 June 1967 from USSR (request for convening of emergency special session of Gen-

eral Assembly "to consider the question of liquidating the consequences of Israel's aggression against the Arab States and the immediate withdrawal of Israel troops behind the Armistice Lines."

A/6718. Letter of 15 June 1967 from United States. A/6719. Note verbale of 15 June 1967 from USSR.

A/6728. Letter of 22 June 1967 from Hungary (transmitting statement by Government of German Democratic Republic).

A/6730 (A/6669) and Add. 1-3, Add.S/Corr.I. Report

of Secretary-General on withdrawal of United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) dated 26 June 1967.

A/6732. Letter of 28 June 1967 from Israel.

A/6737. Letter of 29 June 1967 from Federal Republic of Germany.

A/6740. Letter of 29 June 1967 from Jordan.

A/6741 (S/8025). Letter of 1 July 1967 from United Arab Republic.

PROPOSALS ON THE MORE GENERAL ASPECTS OF THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

A/L.519. USSR: draft resolution, rejected by Assembly on 4 July 1967, meeting 1548, by separate votes on individual paragraphs. (For voting details, see p. 209.)

A/L.520. United States: draft resolution.

A/L.521. Albania: draft resolution, rejected by Assembly on 4 July 1967, meeting 1548, by roll-call vote of 71 to 22, with 27 abstentions, as follows: In favour: Albania, Algeria, Bulgaria, Byelorussian SSR, Cambodia, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Mauritania, Mongolia, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, United Arab Republic, Yemen.

Against: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Barbados, Belgium, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Dahomey, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Finland, Gambia, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Lesotho, Liberia, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Malta, Mexico, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Uganda, United Kingdom, United States, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela.

Abstaining: Afghanistan, Burma, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Ceylon, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), France, Gabon, Guinea, Kenya, Laos, Libya, Mali, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Romania, Senegal, Singapore, Somalia, South Africa, Tunisia, United Republic of Tanzania, Yugoslavia, Zambia.

A/L.522 and Add.1. Afghanistan, Burundi, Ceylon, Congo (Brazzaville), Cyprus, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mali, Pakistan, Somalia, United Republic of Tanzania, Yugoslavia, Zambia: draft resolution.

A/L.522/Rev.1 and Add.1, and Rev.2. Revised draft resolutions sponsored by above powers and, in addition, by Kenya and Senegal.

A/L.522/Rev.3 and Corr.1. Afghanistan, Burundi, Cambodia, Ceylon, Congo (Brazzaville), Cyprus, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mali, Pakistan, Senegal, Somalia, United Republic of Tanzania, Yugoslavia, Zambia: revised draft resolution, rejected by Assembly on 4 July 1967, meeting 1548,

by roll-call vote of 53 to 46, with 20 abstentions (failed to obtain required two-thirds majority). Vote was as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian SSR, Cambodia, Cameroon, Ceylon, Congo (Brazzaville), Democratic Republic of Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, France, Gabon, Greece, Guinea, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mongolia, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Poland, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Somalia, Spain, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, United Arab Republic, United Republic of Tanzania, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia.

Against: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Barbados, Belgium, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Gambia, Ghana, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Lesotho, Liberia, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela.

Abstaining: Central African Republic, Chad, China, Dahomey, Ethiopia, Finland, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Laos, Malta, Nepal, Niger, Portugal, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Singapore, South Africa, Sweden, Thailand, Upper Volta.

A/L.523 and Add.1, 2: A/L.523/Rev.1. Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Trinidad, and Tobago, Venezuela: draft resolution and revision, rejected by Assembly on 4 July 1967, meeting 1548, by roll-call vote of 57 to 43, with 20 abstentions (failed to obtain required two-thirds majority.) Vote was as follows:

In favour: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Barbados, Belgium, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Costa Rica, Dahomey, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Lesotho, Liberia, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Sierra Leone, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, United Kingdom, United States, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela.

Against: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Bulgaria, Burundi, Byelorussian SSR, Ceylon, Congo (Brazzaville), Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Finland, Guinea, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mongolia, Morocco, Pakistan, Poland, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian SSR, USSR,

United Arab Republic, United Republic of Tanzania, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia.

Abstaining: Burma, Cambodia, France, Gabon, Greece, Iran, Israel, Kenya, Laos, Malta, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Portugal, Rwanda, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Turkey.

A/L.524. Albania: amendment to 17-power revised draft resolution A/L.522/Rev.I.

A/L.525. Cuba: amendments to 17-power revised draft resolution, A/L.522/Rev.I.

OTHER DOCUMENTS

A/6746. Letter of 5 July 1967 from Jordan.

A/6754. Letter of 11 July 1967 from Nepal.

A/6760 (S/8065). Letter of 17 July 1967 from Israel.

A/6765 (S/8075). Letter of 18 July 1967 from Jordan.

A/6770 (S/8087). Letter of 19 July 1967 from Israel.

A/6771 (S/8090). Letter of 24 July 1967 from USSR.

A/6775 (S/8094). Letter of 25 July 1967 from Syria.

STATUS OF JERUSALEM AND THE HOLY PLACES

A/6722 (S/7994). Letter of 16 June 1967 from Pakistan.

A/6732. Letter of 28 June 1967 from Israel.

A/6743. Letter of 29 June 1967 from Saudi Arabia.

A/6744. (S/8030). Letter of 4 July 1967 from Israel.

A/L.527 and Add.I. Guinea, Iran, Mali, Pakistan, Turkey: draft resolution.

A/L.527/Rev.I. Guinea, Iran, Mali, Niger, Pakistan, Turkey: revised draft resolution.

RESOLUTION 2253(ES-V), as proposed by 6 powers, A/L.527/Rev.I, adopted by Assembly on 4 July 1967, meeting 1548, by roll-call vote of 99 to 0, with 20 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian SSR, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Ceylon, Chad, China, Congo (Brazzaville), Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Gambia, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Ivory Coast, Japan, Jordan, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Syria, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, United Arab Republic, United Kingdom, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia.

Against: None.

Abstaining: Australia, Barbados, Bolivia, Central African Republic, Colombia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Dahomey, Gabon, Iceland, Italy, Jamaica,

Kenya, Liberia, Malawi, Malta, Portugal, Rwanda, South Africa, United States, Uruguay.

"The General Assembly,

"Deeply concerned at the situation prevailing in Jerusalem as a result of the measures taken by Israel to change the status of the City,

"1. Considers that these measures are invalid;

"2. Calls upon Israel to rescind all measures already taken and to desist forthwith from taking any action which would alter the status of Jerusalem;

"3. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly and the Security Council on the situation and on the implementation of the present resolution not later than one week from its adoption."

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND REFUGEES

A/6723 (S/8001) and Corr.1, Add.1, Add.1/Corr.1. Note by Secretary-General, submitting reports (dated 19 June and 4 July 1967) of Commissioner General of United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in Near East (UNRWA).

A/6725 (S/8004). Letter of 21 June 1967 from Jordan.

A/6726 (S/8007). Telegram of 21 June 1967 from United Arab Republic.

A/6727 (S/8010). Letter of 21 June 1967 from Greece.

A/6728. Letter of 22 June 1967 from Hungary (transmitting statement by German Democratic Republic).

A/6729 (S/8013). Letter of 23 June 1967 from Israel.

A/6731 (S/8016) and Add.1. Letters of 27 June and 3 July 1967 from Syria.

A/6732. Letter of 28 June 1967 from Israel.

A/6733 (S/8017). Letter of 28 June 1967 from United Arab Republic.

A/6734 (S/8019). Letter of 27 June 1967 from Israel.

A/6735. Letter of 29 June 1967 from Canada.

A/6736. Letter of 29 June 1967 from United States.

A/6737. Letter of 29 June 1967 from Federal Republic of Germany.

A/6738 and Add.1. Letters of 30 June and 4 July 1967 from Bulgaria.

A/6739. Letter of 30 June 1967 from Democratic Republic of Congo.

A/6744 (S/8030). Letter of 4 July 1967 from Israel.

A/L.526 and Add.1-3. Afghanistan, Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Denmark, Ethiopia, Finland, Iceland, India, Iran, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Liberia, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Rwanda, Singapore, Sweden, Turkey, Yugoslavia: draft resolution.

RESOLUTION 2252(ES-V), as proposed by 26 powers, A/L.526, adopted by Assembly on 4 July 1967, meeting 1548, by roll-call vote of 116 to 0, with 2 abstentions as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Barbados, Belgium, Bolivia, Bots-

wana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian SSR, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Ceylon, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo (Brazzaville), Democratic Republic of Congo, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Dahomey, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, United Arab Republic, United Kingdom, United Republic of Tanzania, United States, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia.

Against: None.

Abstaining: Cuba, Syria.

"The General Assembly,

"Considering the urgent need to alleviate the suffering inflicted on civilians and on prisoners of war as a result of the recent hostilities in the Middle East,

"1. Welcomes with great satisfaction Security Council resolution 237(1967) of 14 June 1967, whereby the Council:

"(a) Considered the urgent need to spare the civil populations and the prisoners of war in the area of conflict in the Middle East additional sufferings;

"(b) Considered that essential and inalienable human rights should be respected even during the vicissitudes of war;

"(c) Considered that all the obligations of the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of 12 August 1949 should be complied with by the parties involved in the conflict;

"(d) Called upon the Government of Israel to ensure the safety, welfare and security of the inhabitants of the areas where military operations had taken place and to facilitate the return of those inhabitants who had fled the areas since the outbreak of hostilities;

"(e) Recommended to the Governments concerned the scrupulous respect of the humanitarian principles governing the treatment of prisoners of war and the protection of civilian persons in time of war, contained in the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949,

"(f) Requested the Secretary-General to follow the effective implementation of the resolution and to report to the Security Council;

"2. Notes with gratitude and satisfaction and endorses the appeal made by the President of the General Assembly on 26 June 1967;

"3. Notes with gratification the work undertaken by the International Committee of the Red Cross, the League of Red Cross Societies and other voluntary

organizations to provide humanitarian assistance to civilians;

"4. Notes further with gratification the assistance which the United Nations Children's Fund is providing to women and children in the area;

"5. Commends the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East for his efforts to continue the activities of the Agency in the present situation with respect to all persons coming within his mandate;

"6. Endorses, bearing in mind the objectives of the above-mentioned Security Council resolution, the efforts of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East to provide humanitarian assistance, as far as practicable, on an emergency basis and as a temporary measure, to other persons in the area who are at present displaced and are in serious need of immediate assistance as a result of the recent hostilities;

"7. Welcomes the close co-operation of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, and of the other organizations concerned, for the purpose of co-ordinating assistance:

"8. Calls upon all the Member States concerned to facilitate the transport of supplies to all areas in which assistance is being rendered;

"9. Appeals to all Governments, as well as organizations and individuals, to make special contributions for the above purposes to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East and also to the other inter-governmental and non-governmental organizations concerned;

"10. Requests the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, to report urgently to the General Assembly on the needs arising under paragraphs 5 and 6 above;

"11. Further requests the Secretary-General to follow the effective implementation of the present resolution and to report thereon to the General Assembly."

CONSIDERATION AT SECOND PART OF 5TH EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION (12 JULY-18 SEPTEMBER 1967)

GENERAL ASSEMBLY—5TH EMERGENCY SPECIAL
SESSION

Plenary Meetings 1550-1554.

STATUS OF JERUSALEM AND THE HOLY PLACES

A/6753 (S/8052). Measures taken by Israel to change status of City of Jerusalem. Report of Secretary-General dated 10 July 1967.

A/L.528. Pakistan: draft resolution.

A/L.528/Rev.1. Afghanistan, Guinea, Iran, Mali, Pakistan, Somalia, Turkey: revised draft resolution.

A/L.528/Rev.2. Afghanistan, Guinea, Iran, Malaysia, Mali, Pakistan, Somalia, Turkey: revised draft resolution.

RESOLUTION 2254(ES-V), as proposed by 8 powers, A/L.528/Rev.2, adopted by Assembly on 14 July 1967, meeting 1554, by roll-call vote of 99 to 0, with 18 abstentions, as follows:*

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian SSR, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Ceylon, Chad, Chile, China, Congo (Brazzaville), Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Dahomey, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Ivory Coast, Japan, Jordan, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libya, Luxembourg, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Syria, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, United Arab Republic, United Kingdom, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia. Against: None.

Abstaining: Australia, Barbados, Bolivia, Central African Republic, Colombia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Iceland, Jamaica, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Malta, Portugal, Rwanda, South Africa, United States, Uruguay.

* At the same meeting, the representative of Malaysia stated that had he been present at the time of voting, his delegation would have voted in favour of the draft resolution.

"The General Assembly,

"Recalling its resolution 2253(ES-V) of 4 July 1967,

Having received the report submitted by the Secretary-General,

"Taking note with the deepest regret and concern of the non-compliance by Israel with resolution 2253 (ES-V),

"1. Deplores the failure of Israel to implement General Assembly resolution 2253(ES-V) ;

"2. Reiterates its call to Israel in that resolution to rescind all measures already taken and to desist forthwith from taking any action which would alter the status of Jerusalem;

"3. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council and the General Assembly on the situation and on the implementation of the present resolution."

OTHER DOCUMENTS

A/6774 (S/8093) and Corr.1. Letter of 25 July 1967 from Syria.

A/6780 (S/8107), A/6782 (S/8109). Letters of 2 and 3 August 1967 from Jordan.

A/6785 (S/8121) and Corr.1. Note by Secretary-General dated 14 August 1967.

A/6793 (S/8146). Report of Secretary-General under General Assembly resolution 2254(ES-V) dated 12 September 1967.

ADJOURNMENT OF ASSEMBLY'S 5TH EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION

GENERAL ASSEMBLY—5TH EMERGENCY SPECIAL
SESSION

Plenary meetings 1555-1558

A/L.529 and Rev.1. Austria, Finland, Sweden: draft resolution and revision.

RESOLUTION 2256(ES-V), as proposed by 3 powers, A/L.529/Rev.1, adopted by Assembly on 21 July 1967, meeting 1558, by a roll-call vote of 63 to 26, with 27 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Barbados, Belgium, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Byelorussian SSR, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Czechoslovakia, Dahomey, Denmark, Ethiopia, Finland, Gabon, Ghana, Hungary, Iceland, India, Ireland, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Laos, Liberia, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Mexico, Mongolia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Norway, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Sweden, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, United Kingdom, United States, Upper Volta, Uruguay.

Against: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Cuba, Guinea, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Republic, United Republic of Tanzania, Yemen, Zambia.

Abstaining: Cameroon, Ceylon, Congo (Brazzaville), Cyprus, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, France, Greece, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Kenya, Malta, Nigeria, Panama, Portugal, Senegal, South Africa, Spain, Turkey, Uganda, Venezuela, Yugoslavia.

"The General Assembly,

"Having considered the grave situation in the Middle East,

"Considering that the Security Council continues to be seized of the problem,

"Bearing in mind the resolutions adopted and the proposals considered during the fifth emergency special session of the General Assembly,

"1. Requests the Secretary-General to forward the records of the fifth emergency special session of the General Assembly to the Security Council in order to facilitate the resumption by the Council, as a matter of urgency, of its consideration of the tense situation in the Middle East;

"2. Decides to adjourn the fifth emergency special session temporarily and to authorize the President of the General Assembly to reconvene the session as and when necessary."

OTHER DOCUMENTS

S/8088. Letter of 21 July 1967 from Secretary-General (transmitting to Security Council Assembly resolution 2256(ES-V) of 21 July 1967).
S/8090 (A/6771). Letter of 24 July 1967 from USSR.

OTHER COMMUNICATIONS AND
REPORTS TO GENERAL ASSEMBLY
(JULY-SEPTEMBER 1967)COMMUNICATIONS RELATING TO TREATMENT
OF CIVILIAN POPULATION, PRISONERS OF WAR,
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND RELATED MATTERS

A/6745 (S/8032), A/6747 (S/8033). Letters of 5 July 1967 from Jordan.
A/6748 (S/8034). Letters of 5 July 1967 from Israel.
A/6749 (S/8037), A/6750 (S/8040). Letters of 6 and 7 July 1967 from Syria.
A/6751 (S/8041), A/6752 (S/8042). Letters of 7 July 1967 from Israel.
A/6755. Letter of 7 July 1967 from France.
A/6756 and Rev.1 (S/8055 and Rev.1). Letter of 12 July 1967 from Israel.
A/6757 (S/8056). Letter of 13 July 1967 from Jordan.
A/6758 (S/8058). Letter of 14 July 1967 from Israel.
A/6759 (S/8064). Letter of 17 July 1967 from United Arab Republic.
A/6762 (S/8069), A/6763 (S/8073). Letters of 17 and 11 July 1967 from Israel.
A/6767 (S/8077). Letter of 19 July 1967 from Syria.
A/6768 (S/8082). Letter of 19 July 1967 from Israel.
A/6769 (S/8086). Letter of 16 July 1967 from United Arab Republic.
A/6772. Letter of 24 July 1967 from USSR.
A/6773 (S/8092). Letter of 24 July 1967 from Israel.
A/6776. Note verbale of 25 July 1967 from Poland.
A/6777 (S/8101). Letter of 27 July 1967 from Jordan.
A/6778 (S/8104), A/6779 (S/8105), A/6781 (S/8108). Letters of 1, 2 and 3 August 1967 from Israel.
A/6783 (S/8115), A/6784 (S/8117) and Corr.1. Letters of 8 and 10 August 1967 from Jordan.
A/6786 (S/8123). Letter of 16 August 1967 from Israel.
A/6788 (S/8125). Letter of 18 August 1967 from Syria.
A/6790 (S/8134). Letter of 25 August 1967 from Israel.
A/6791 (S/8138). Letter of 1 September 1967 from Syria.
A/6794 (S/8147). Letter of 8 September 1967 from Israel.

REPORTS OF SECRETARY-GENERAL

A/6787 (S/8124) and Corr.1. Report of Secretary-General, dated 18 August 1967, under General Assembly resolution 2252(ES-V) and Security Council resolution 237(1967).
A/6789 (S/8133). Note by Secretary-General dated 25 August 1967.

A/6792 and Add.1. Report of Secretary-General, dated 6 and 15 September 1967, on implementation of paragraphs 8 and 9 of General Assembly resolution 2252 (ES-V).
A/6795 (S/8153). Note by Secretary-General dated 12 September 1967.
A/6796 (S/8155). Note by Secretary-General (on report A/6797).
A/6797 (S/8158). Report of Secretary-General, dated 15 September 1967, under General Assembly resolution 2252(ES-V) and Security Council resolution 237(1967).

COMMUNICATIONS RELATING TO VIOLATIONS
OF CEASE-FIRE (JULY-AUGUST 1967)

A/6757 (S/8056). Letter of 13 July 1967 from Jordan.
A/6761 (S/8068). Letter of 17 July 1967 from Israel.
A/6764 (S/8071) and Corr.1. Letter of 17 July 1967 from USSR.
A/6766 (S/8076). Letter of 19 July 1967 from Israel.
A/6784 (S/8117) and Corr.1. Letter of 10 August 1967 from Jordan.
A/6786 (S/8123). Letter of 16 August 1967 from Israel.

REFERRAL OF QUESTION TO
GENERAL ASSEMBLY'S
TWENTY-SECOND REGULAR SESSIONGENERAL ASSEMBLY—5TH EMERGENCY SPECIAL
SESSION

Plenary Meeting 1559.

A/L.530. Austria, Finland, Sweden: draft resolution. RESOLUTION 2257(ES-V), as proposed by 3 powers, A/L.530, adopted by Assembly on 18 September 1967, meeting 1559, by 93 votes to 0, with 3 abstentions.

"The General Assembly,

"Having considered the grave situation in the Middle East,

"Expressing its utmost concern about that situation,

"1. Decides to place on the agenda of its twenty-second regular session, as a matter of high priority, the question on the agenda of its fifth emergency special session;

"2. Refers to its twenty-second regular session, for consideration, the records of the meetings and the documents of its fifth emergency special session."

GENERAL ASSEMBLY—22ND SESSION

General Committee, meeting 166.

Plenary Meeting 1642.

A/6702 and Corr.1. Report of Security Council to General Assembly, 16 July 1966-15 July 1967, Chapters 1 and 2.
A/6847 and Add.1-5. Implementation of paragraphs

8 and 9 of General Assembly resolution 2252 (ES-V). Report of Secretary-General, 4 October-12 December 1967.
A/6863, A/6956 (S/8290). Letters of 16 October and 8 December 1967 from Jordan.

A/6980 (S/8295). Letter of 12 December 1967 from Israel.
A/7031 (S/8311). Letter of 22 December 1967 from Jordan.
A/7033 (S/8322). Letter of 2 January 1968 from Israel.

COMMUNICATIONS AND REPORTS CONCERNING MIDDLE EAST SITUATION AND CONSIDERATION BY SECURITY COUNCIL AFTER ADOPTION OF COUNCIL'S CEASE-FIRE RESOLUTIONS IN JUNE 1967 AND RESOLUTIONS OF GENERAL ASSEMBLY'S EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION

STATUS OF CEASE-FIRE IN ISRAEL-SYRIA SECTOR (JUNE-OCTOBER 1967)

On 1 July 1967, the Secretary-General reported to the Security Council, in pursuance of its resolutions 235(1967) and 236(1967) of 9 and 11 June 1967 respectively,²¹ on the demarcation of the limits of the Forward Defended Localities occupied by the respective armed forces at the time of the cease-fire. That demarcation had been completed on the Israel side on 15 June 1967 and on the Syrian side on 26 June 1967. Those limits would constitute the cease-fire line on each side across which the respective armed forces would not fire or move forward. The Syrian representative, the report continued, had stressed that the cease-fire line thus established was a purely practical arrangement for facilitating observation of the cease-fire and should not prejudice the claims and positions of the Syrian Government; he also asserted that when both Syria and Israel had accepted the cease-fire on 9 June 1967, the Israelis were not at any point beyond the Armistice Line established by the Armistice Agreement of 1949. The report stated that as of 27 June 1967 observation of the cease-fire was being carried out by 110 United Nations military observers (UNMO's), deployed on both sides, and manning and patrolling from a total of 16 observation posts.

In a letter of 5 July 1967, Syria listed numerous Israel ground and air violations of the cease-fire between 18 and 30 June which had been the subject of complaints to the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO).

Replying on 10 July 1967, Israel stated that

there were no grounds for the Syrian allegations and charged numerous violations by the Syrian forces since the cease-fire took effect, mainly crossings of the Syrian cease-fire line and opening of fire at Israel forces. All had been reported to General Odd Bull (the Chief of Staff of UNTSO) and effective steps had apparently been taken, as the number of violations had decreased.

In reports submitted at intervals between 11 June and 24 July 1967, the Secretary-General transmitted information from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO on minor incidents and complaints from both sides, including movement of armed personnel and vehicles and aircraft across the Forward Defended Localities and exchanges of small-arms fire. In further reports between 13 July and 28 August, the Secretary-General reported that since 7 July the situation in general had remained quiet in the Israel-Syria sector.

In two communications dated 27 September and 3 October 1967, Syria rejected as being false the accusations by Israel attributing to Syria responsibility for local resistance on the West Bank in Jordan against the Israel occupation. Syria, one letter said, could not be held responsible for national resistance by the Palestine people. Syria also claimed that the destruction by Israel of the villages of Kafr El Ma and El-Hurriah in occupied Syrian territory was linked to Israel expansionist plans for moving new settlers and colonies into that area.

In its reply of 4 October 1967, Israel declared that Syrian incitement to and involvement in

²¹ For text of Security Council resolution 235(1967), see page 190. For text of Security Council resolution 236(1967), see page 190.

subversive activities against Israel had continued since the cease-fire. Such attacks had recently increased. Interrogation of captured participants had revealed that Syrian military officers were conducting the training of saboteurs who were then sent into Israel. These actions in violation of the cease-fire resolutions were part of the Syrian policy of encouraging the so-called "popular war" against Israel.

STATUS OF THE CEASE-FIRE IN SUEZ CANAL SECTOR

CONSIDERATION BY SECURITY COUNCIL OF COMPLAINTS OF 8 JULY 1967 FROM UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC AND ISRAEL ABOUT VIOLATION OF THE CEASE-FIRE

On 8 and 9 July 1967, the Security Council again considered the situation in the Middle East, after deciding on 8 July, to take up two complaints of violations of the cease-fire contained in letters of 8 July from the United Arab Republic and Israel.

In its letter, the United Arab Republic stated that Israel's armed forces had again, at 1015 hours that morning, violated the cease-fire order by launching an attack against armed forces of the United Arab Republic stationed south of Port Fouad on the eastern bank of the Suez Canal, had by air raid destroyed United Arab Republic control stations in El Tina, Ras El Ish and El Kap in the Suez Canal area and had also bombarded heavily populated areas in Port Said.

Israel, in its letter, complained of further serious breaches of the cease-fire by the armed forces of the United Arab Republic on 8 July, at 0925 hours, when fire had been opened on troops stationed in the area of Ras-El-Ish some 15 kilometres south of Port Said. In order to repel the attack, the letter stated, Israel planes had taken action against the Egyptian gun positions outside Port Said.

At the Security Council's meeting of 8 July, the Secretary-General expressed regret that he was unable to provide verified information on the reported hostilities on 8 July, just as he had similarly been unable to report on alleged fighting in the area on 1 July. As he had reported on 4 July, there were no United Nations observers stationed in the Suez Canal area. Unlike

the two resolutions relating exclusively to the cease-fire between Israel and Syria (Security Council resolution 235(1967) of 9 June, and Security Council resolution 236(1967) of 11 June 1967) which explicitly invoked the assistance of such observers, the Security Council's cease-fire resolutions 233(1967) and 234(1967) of 6 and 7 June 1967 respectively,²² which were applicable to the cease-fire between Israel and the United Arab Republic, requested the Secretary-General to keep the Council informed about the situation, but made no provision for any assistance with regard to the implementation of the cease-fire. Realizing that he could not discharge his reporting responsibility under the latter resolutions without any means of obtaining reliable information, the Secretary-General said he had taken the initiative on 4 July 1967 towards a possible alleviation of this situation by undertaking separate exploratory talks with the United Arab Republic and Israel. He had inquired what the reactions of their Governments would be to a suggestion from him that United Nations military observers might be stationed in the sector of the Suez Canal where there was now confrontation between the armed forces of the United Arab Republic and those of Israel. Such observers, of course, would have to be stationed on both sides, as had been done in the sector where the forces of Israel and Syria were in confrontation. He had, as yet, had no word about the reaction of either Government to that suggestion. If it should be agreed that United Nations observers should proceed to Sinai and the Suez sector, that could be done quickly, according to information from the Chief of Staff, within his present observer strength, but it would be necessary to increase the number of observers available to him at a very early date thereafter.

The representative of the United Arab Republic stated that Israel had committed a serious additional act of unprovoked aggression in violation of the Security Council resolutions, including use not only of artillery but also of air bombardment against heavily populated areas on the western bank of the Canal. The Council could not and should not condone such

²² Tor text of Security Council resolution 233(1967), see p. 189. For text of Security Council resolution 234(1967), see p. 189.

violations of its decisions. The United Nations had to take decisive action against the aggressor, who, because of his ruthless behaviour and the support of certain Western powers, above all the United States, was endangering the very existence of the world Organization as an effective instrument for maintaining international order.

In reply, the representative of Israel stated that the policy of his Government was not only to preserve the cease-fire but to do its best to see it reinforced. The Israel forces had gone into action only in response to armed attacks by the United Arab Republic forces and after their cease-fire positions and safety had been threatened. There had been no alternative to limited use of aircraft against specified United Arab Republic gun positions.

At the Security Council's meeting on 9 July 1967, the representative of the USSR said that so long as the armed forces of Israel occupied the lands of the Arab countries, the flames of war could again break out at any time and give rise to a new, large-scale armed conflict. That was why the most important and urgent problem was the immediate withdrawal of Israel troops and the liquidation of the aftermath of the aggression committed by Israel. Accordingly, should Israel further ignore the decisions of the Security Council, it would be essential to apply sanctions against Israel as an aggressor under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter (for text, see APPENDIX II). The USSR Government had indicated that it would be an irremediable mistake to become accustomed to the thought that aggression could go unpunished. A policy of condoning acts of aggression created the most dangerous situation and encouraged aggression in other parts of the world.

The representative of the United Kingdom said that the first action of the Council when the conflict started had been to call for and establish a cease-fire. It must condemn any and every breach of it. Wide agreement had now been reached on the need for the withdrawal of forces from occupied territory, on the need not only to preserve the cease-fire but to make sure that firing never started again, and on the need to give freedom of worship to all religions in the Holy City of Jerusalem and to secure freedom of passage on international waterways. The

Secretary-General should be authorized to send observers to Sinai and to the Suez Canal without any delay and without reservations, and also, he hoped, to send a special representative to make progress in dealing with all aspects of the situation.

The representative of the United States said that because of the lack of objective information he welcomed the Secretary-General's proposals for acceptance by the United Arab Republic and Israel of United Nations observers to report on compliance with the Security Council's cease-fire orders. The withdrawal of forces was, of course, an important and essential part of any over-all peaceful solution of the problem of the area. But, as the discussions which had taken place the previous month in the Security Council and as, more recently, the debates and the voting in the General Assembly had shown, a substantial body of world opinion supported the idea that withdrawal must be accompanied at the very least by a termination of any state of war and of any claims to the exercise of belligerent rights.

The representatives of India and Mali maintained that the call for cease-fire orders by the Security Council must be followed up by the immediate withdrawal of Israel troops back to the positions they had occupied on 4 June 1967. The representative of Mali declared that there could not be belligerency on the part of an occupied country trying to throw out the occupier. Its population had to defend itself against the occupier. He also commented on the discouragement among Afro-Asian and Latin American Members of the United Nations because of the inability of the Security Council to defend justice. The Indian representative favoured steps by the Security Council to strengthen United Nations machinery in the area with a view to securing the withdrawal of Israel forces and observance of the Armistice Agreements. He also favoured designation by the Secretary-General of a special representative to go to the area for these purposes and to help bring about a reduction in tension and restoration of peaceful conditions and to report to the Security Council. He stressed that the solution of the Middle East problem should be based on principles recognized by the overwhelming majority of Member States, namely, that no dis-

pute should be settled through the use of force, and that Member States had an obligation to respect the territorial integrity and political independence of other States.

The Secretary-General stated that the UNTSO Chief of Staff had now informed him that, for observation of the cease-fire in the Suez sector, an estimated additional 25 observers would be needed as soon as possible. Pending their arrival, the Chief of Staff, if called upon to do so, could dispatch to the Suez Canal area a small team of observers now on his staff. They could institute patrols on both the United Arab Republic and Israel sides of the front. There had been 700 United Nations observers serving in the Near East in 1948, as against the present 133. The Secretary-General stated that the established practice continued of having the approval of the Governments directly concerned regarding the countries from which observers for a particular operation might be drawn.

The representative of Syria emphasized that every inch of Syrian territory occupied by Israel forces had been occupied after Syria's acceptance of the cease-fire of 9 June 1967. He rejected Israel's unilateral statement of 29 June 1967 that the sole function of the Chief of Staff was with the Council's cease-fire resolutions and no longer with the General Armistice Agreements. In his view, the United Nations machinery in the area was still functioning in accordance with the appropriate resolutions of the Security Council concerning the Armistice régime. He also drew the attention of the Council to a statement by the Israel Defence Minister regarding Israel decisions to annex parts of the occupied territories.

The representative of Israel said that his Government proposed that local Israel and United Arab Republic commanders in the area of the incidents should meet and agree upon appropriate arrangements to avoid breaches of the cease-fire in the future. He declared that the United Nations had rejected the USSR's basic premise that Israel was an aggressor. He also stressed that the fundamental change in the situation would come about not through the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Israel forces from the territory where they stood as a result of Arab belligerence and as a protection against renewal of hostilities, but

only by Arab withdrawal from the policy of hostility and belligerence.

The Security Council's meeting of 9 July 1967 concluded with acceptance by the Council of the following consensus of members' views read by the President:

Recalling Security Council resolutions 233 (1967) of 6 June, 234 (1967) of 7 June, 235 (1967) of 9 June and 236(1967) of 11 June 1967, and emphasizing the need for all parties to observe scrupulously the provisions of these resolutions, having heard the statements made by the Secretary-General and the suggestions that he has addressed to the parties concerned, I believe that I am reflecting the view of the Council that the Secretary-General should proceed, as he has suggested in his statements before the Council on 8 and 9 July 1967, to request the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine, General Odd Bull, to work out with the Governments of the United Arab Republic and Israel, as speedily as possible, the necessary arrangements to station United Nations military observers in the Suez Canal sector under the Chief of Staff of UNTSO.

In a report dated 11 July 1967, the Secretary-General informed the Council that the Governments of the United Arab Republic and Israel had informed him of their acceptance of the proposed stationing of United Nations military observers in the Suez Canal sector and that he was recruiting the needed 25 additional observers.

COMMUNICATIONS AND REPORTS BETWEEN 13 JULY AND 13 OCTOBER 1967

On 13 July, the Secretary-General informed the Council that necessary consultations were being carried on by the Chief of Staff of UNTSO for stationing United Nations observers in the Suez Canal area.

In four communications dated 12, 13, 14 and 15 July 1967, the United Arab Republic charged that Israel had undertaken exceptional concentrations of its armed forces on the eastern bank of the Suez Canal and had at various times, in violation of the cease-fire order, opened fire on United Arab Republic positions and civilian-populated areas, as a result of which 26 people had been killed and 36 wounded on 14 July 1967. Another communication, dated 17 July 1967, stated that persistence by Israel in attempting to launch boats

in the Suez Canal would force the United Arab Republic forces to open fire.

In four letters dated 14, 15, 17 and 18 July 1967, Israel charged that United Arab Republic violations of the cease-fire since 8 July 1967 had culminated on 14 and 15 July 1967 in the opening of heavy fire on Israel positions east of the Canal and on an Israel patrol boat in the Canal. Aircraft had also been used. Israel casualties on 14 July 1967 included seven killed and 20 wounded. The United Arab Republic's effort to justify opening fire was based on a unilateral interpretation of the cease-fire resolutions. Israel had ultimately deployed its aircraft against United Arab Republic gun emplacements. Israel also drew attention to press reports that Algerian troops had participated in these violations of the cease-fire and urged a further effort by the Secretary-General to obtain acceptance by Algeria of the cease-fire resolutions of the Council.

On 17 July 1967, the Secretary-General reported in connexion with the heavy fighting between Israel and United Arab Republic forces on 15 July 1967, that both sides had accepted a cease-fire proposal by the UNTSO Chief of Staff, General Odd Bull. He also reported that advance parties of the United Nations military observers would begin observation operations on both sides of the Suez sector on 17 July.

In a letter addressed to the Security Council dated 17 July 1967, referring to the United Arab Republic's letters of 13, 14 and 15 July 1967, the USSR declared that to prevent further violations of the cease-fire by Israel, the United Nations should seek to obtain immediate withdrawal of Israel forces from occupied Arab territory.

Replying on 19 July 1967, Israel denied the charge of Israel aggression and declared that the Security Council and the General Assembly had rejected the one-sided view of the USSR that Israel should withdraw its forces from the cease-fire line without any simultaneous and parallel action by the Arab States to establish a situation of peace with Israel.

On 10 August 1967, the Secretary-General reported on the arrangements made for the UNTSO cease-fire observation operation in the Suez sector which had begun on 17 July 1967. United Nations military observers had, by

5 August 1967, been increased to 16 on each side of the Canal, with three observation posts on the United Arab Republic side and four on the Israel side. On the basis of revised estimates calling for a total of 46 temporary observers in the sector, the Secretary-General proposed to secure 21 additional observers on the same basis as the original 25 observers.

The Secretary-General also reported an arrangement proposed by the Chief of Staff of UNTSO and agreed to by the parties, under which all military activity in the Suez Canal, including the movement in or into the Canal of boats, should be stopped for a period of one month starting on 27 July 1967, it being understood that the boats of the Suez Canal Authority would continue to revictual and ensure the safety of the ships stranded in the Canal. On 28 August 1967, the Secretary-General further reported that both Israel and the United Arab Republic had agreed that the arrangement of 27 July 1967 should continue in effect until otherwise agreed by the two parties.

In a letter dated 6 September 1967, the United Arab Republic charged that on 4 September 1967 three Israel naval units, in violation of the above-mentioned agreement and the cease-fire, had attempted, despite warnings, to enter the Canal at Suez, had opened fire on positions at Port Tawfiq and later shelled the city of Suez. As a result, 42 civilians had been killed and 161 wounded, several buildings had been destroyed and vessels had been sunk.

Israel denied the charges in a letter dated 8 September 1967, and countercharged that United Arab Republic forces had opened fire on Israel boats and positions on 4 September and again on 5 and 6 September 1967. One Israel soldier had been killed, another wounded. Israel charged the United Arab Republic with responsibility for the regrettable civilian casualties because it located military positions in populated areas.

On 4 and 7 September 1967, the Secretary-General communicated reports from United Nations military observers indicating that the heavy exchange of fire on 4 September 1967 had been started by a United Arab Republic shot directed at Israel boats in Suez Bay and that the United Arab Republic had again

initiated firing on 6 September in the Ismailia area. Observers had eventually obtained effective cease-fires.

On 22 September 1967, the United Arab Republic charged violations of the cease-fire by Israel on seven dates between 5 and 21 September, which had resulted in nine persons being killed, 21 wounded and much property being destroyed.

On 26 September 1967, Israel denied these charges, stating that the United Arab Republic had opened fire in each case, killing altogether four Israel soldiers and wounding six. Israel claimed further that, on four occasions between 22 and 25 September 1967, United Arab Republic forces had again opened fire.

The Secretary-General reported on exchanges of fire on 12, 20, 21, 22 and 25 September 1967, stating that reports of United Nations military observers indicated that the firing on 12 and 20 September had been initiated by the United Arab Republic and that the firing on 21 September 1967 had been initiated by Israel. He reported further exchanges of fire on 27 September 1967 along the whole area from Kantara to Suez and appealed to both parties to exercise utmost restraint in the Suez Canal sector, observe strictly the agreed arrangements, and use the United Nations cease-fire machinery.

The exchanges of fire on 27 September 1967 were also reported by Israel in a letter dated 29 September 1967 charging numerous violations of the cease-fire, initiated by United Arab Republic forces, and resulting in 14 military and civilians being killed and 11 wounded in the Sinai area.

In a letter of 6 October 1967, the United Arab Republic charged that previously reported Israel shelling had been systematically designed to damage Suez Canal Authority installations and boats and that Israel should be held liable for indemnities. Replying on 10 October 1967, Israel denied any policy of "selective shelling" and rejected responsibility for damage to nearby buildings when returning fire, in self-defence, at United Arab Republic gun emplacements.

On 13 October 1967, the Secretary-General informed the Council that the situation in the Suez Canal sector was generally quiet as of that date.

COMMUNICATIONS TO SECURITY COUNCIL
BETWEEN 21 AND 25 OCTOBER 1967
AND CONSIDERATION BY COUNCIL
ON 24 AND 25 OCTOBER 1967

In letters to the Security Council, dated 21 and 22 October 1967, Israel charged the United Arab Republic with a premeditated and unprovoked attack at 1730 hours on 21 October 1967 on the Israel destroyer Eilat, at position 31° 20.5' North, 32° 8' East on the high seas to the north of the Sinai peninsula, while it was on a routine patrol which had been known to the United Arab Republic for several months. The first surface-to-surface missiles launched from within Port Said harbour, approximately 14 nautical miles distant, had immobilized the ship which dropped anchor. Two more missiles fired at 1930 hours at the helpless vessel had forced abandonment of the sinking Eilat at 2030 hours. Casualties included 15 killed, 36 missing and 48 wounded, eight of them seriously. Israel denied that the ship had opened fire on Port Said at 1755 hours, as alleged by the United Arab Republic authorities. It charged that this aggressive act was the culmination of a series of violations of the cease-fire resolutions and an outrageous violation of the international law of the sea.

On 22 October 1967, the Secretary-General reported, on the basis of information submitted by the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, that the Senior United Arab Republic Liaison Officer reported that at 1750 hours one Israel boat had entered territorial waters, that it had opened fire at 1755 hours and that fire had been returned and the destroyer sunk at 1817 hours. At 2045 hours, the Israel Liaison Officer had confirmed that the Israel destroyer had been attacked and presumably sunk. He believed the ship was approximately 13 miles east of Port Said and approximately 10 miles off shore. In response to a message from the UNTSO Chief of Staff that he expected no interference with any rescue operations, the Senior United Arab Republic Liaison Officer had replied that the local commander had been forbidden to shoot. The Chief of Staff had no verified information about the nature of the attack as the United Nations military observers in the Suez Canal sector had no means of observing such incidents at sea. On 24 October

1967, the UNTSO Chief of Staff had been informed that the destroyer had been shot by a guided missile from a United Arab Republic torpedo-boat outside Port Said when it was 11 nautical miles north-east of Port Said.

In a letter dated 22 October 1967, the United Arab Republic informed the Security Council that at 1730 hours, 21 October, an Israel destroyer was seen speeding in its territorial waters off Port Said shores and that the naval units in Port Said were compelled to act in self-defence to stop the advance of the Israel vessel. The subsequent exchange of fire which took place resulted in the sinking of the destroyer. This latest aggressive violation of the cease-fire followed the series of attacks on populated cities in the Suez Canal sector which had prompted the United Arab Republic to evacuate over 300,000 of that sector's inhabitants.

In a further letter, dated 24 October 1967, the United Arab Republic charged Israel forces with unprovoked premeditated flagrant aggression at 1430 hours on 24 October 1967 when they started a continuous shelling of the city of Suez resulting in extensive human losses and severe damage to property. The Israel forces had also systematically shelled and completely or severely damaged industrial installations including the petroleum refineries in Suez, the Nasr plants for fertilizer, and installations in the Suez harbour. Those military operations could not be justified as a retaliatory measure against the sinking of the Israel destroyer in territorial waters because they were conducted against civilian and industrial installations, not military targets. The Israel forces had not responded to the cease-fire requests of United Nations military observers until their planned aggression had been implemented. An urgent meeting of the Security Council was requested.

Also on 24 October 1967, Israel charged in a letter that United Arab Republic forces had opened fire from the cities of Port Ibrahim and Suez on the west bank of the Suez Canal on Israel forces on the east bank north of Port Tawfiq at 1430 hours on that day. The artillery fire had been returned. Because of the location of the Egyptian artillery some oil refineries were believed to have been hit. A cease-fire proposed by United Nations military observers for 1730 hours had been accepted by both parties and

had taken effect. The representative of Israel requested an urgent meeting of the Council to deal with the open aggression and violations of the cease-fire resolutions by the United Arab Republic.

On 24 and 25 October 1967, the Secretary-General transmitted reports from the UNTSO Chief of Staff. According to reports submitted by United Nations military observers, the firing had taken place in the Geneifa area, south of Little Bitter Lake, but the observers had not been able to ascertain the initiator of the firing. At 1431 hours, Israel forces had initiated artillery fire at the oil refinery south-west of Port Suez. A heavy exchange of fire had developed at 1435 hours in the Port Tawfiq-Suez area. At 1445 hours, United Nations military observers had proposed a cease-fire for 1530 hours. The United Arab Republic had accepted at 1550 hours. At 1525 hours, Israel had stated it would agree to a cease-fire at 1730 hours. After vain efforts by United Nations military observers to obtain acceptance by Israel for an earlier cease-fire, the UNTSO Chief of Staff had finally, at 1635 hours, proposed one for 1730 hours, which had been accepted by the United Arab Republic at 1645 and by Israel at 1713 hours. Heavy to sporadic firing had continued until the cease-fire time.

The letters of 24 October 1967 from the United Arab Republic and Israel were placed on the Security Council's agenda and considered at three meetings of the Council on 24 and 25 October 1967. The representatives of Israel, Jordan, Syria and the United Arab Republic were invited to participate in the discussion without the right to vote.

The representative of the United Arab Republic charged that Israel's act of war on 24 October 1967 was the most violent since its aggression of 5 June 1967 and was carried out against the entire civilian and industrial life in the Suez area, one of the most vital industrial sites in his country. The reports of the UNTSO Chief of Staff had made it clear that Israel had rejected the first cease-fire proposal because two more hours were needed to implement Israel's plan of aggression and destruction. That aggression was totally unprovoked and premeditated. It followed the sinking of the Israel destroyer on 21 October 1967 in self-

defence by the United Arab Republic Government's forces as a result of the destroyer's violation of the territorial waters of the United Arab Republic and its attempt to carry out aggression against Port Said. That destroyer had sunk two United Arab Republic boats in the territorial waters of Port Said on 12 July 1967. The United Arab Republic representative called upon the Council to condemn the Israel aggression and to apply enforcement measures under the provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter. (For text of Chapter VII of the Charter, see APPENDIX II.)

The representative of Israel charged that the destroyer Eilat had been attacked by United Arab Republic naval craft equipped with USSR Komar missiles while on routine patrol outside United Arab Republic territorial waters. The later renewal of the attack and sinking of the helpless vessel showed its premeditated nature. The United Arab Republic had been preparing for the situation by evacuating the Suez area population and creating tension by radio and press announcements that renewal of fighting was imminent. The incidents of 24 October 1967: were the culmination of a long series of provocative Egyptian violations of the cease-fire by shelling Israel forces from gun emplacements near built-up areas. If there was no reciprocity in regard to the cessation of fire, he declared, then the whole system collapsed. Israel was ready now to meet representatives of the United Arab Republic and of any other Arab State to discuss measures to lay the basis for a peaceful future.

With regard to the argument that Israel had been at fault in not agreeing to the first cease-fire proposal, the representative of Israel stated that the delay in effecting the cease-fire was due to the fact that an Israel communications centre had been hit at the beginning of the incidents. Israel was prepared to co-operate in an investigation to determine the position of the Eilat when it was sunk and was confident that such an investigation would corroborate that the ship was sunk on the high seas.

The representative of the United Kingdom considered that the Security Council should have met and acted earlier. The whole weight of the Council should be applied to a demand that the cease-fire be observed and that bel-

ligerence from both sides be abandoned. The United Kingdom had repeatedly urged the appointment of a United Nations special representative. The proposals of the United Kingdom Government had been absolutely clear. It could not be accused of delay, or of opposition to United Nations action when the 1967 war broke out. It was delay which had led to conflict, then to deadlock and currently to more death and destruction. The Security Council should take urgent action towards a fair and balanced resolution appointing a United Nations special representative to deal with the situation on the spot.

The representative of Canada said that, as the delegations of Canada, India and the United Kingdom had advocated since early June, the Secretary-General should be immediately authorized to send a special representative to the Middle East to start the process towards restoring peace on the basis of a "fair and balanced" resolution. He proposed that the Secretary-General submit a report on what additional resources the Chief of Staff might need to carry out his task under the consensus of the Council of 9 July 1967 (cited on p. 228).

The representatives of Denmark and Ethiopia stated that observance of the cease-fire was only a first step towards the Council's duty to strive for a just and durable peace. The representative of Denmark suggested that the Council should formulate, in a fair and balanced way, the principles that should guide a lasting settlement. The representative of Ethiopia supported the suggestion to dispatch a special representative who should make contacts with the Governments concerned and operate within the context of general and comprehensive guidelines set out by the Council. Both Denmark and Ethiopia were prepared to consider a request from the Secretary-General to strengthen the cease-fire machinery in the area.

The representative of the USSR condemned the premeditated shelling of inhabited areas and industrial targets by Israel forces which had opened fire and had disregarded appeals by United Nations military observers for an immediate cease-fire. This action followed the provocative sending of an Israel destroyer into territorial waters of the United Arab Republic

which had had to take measures in legitimate self-defence. Israel had not answered the main question why it had shelled Suez. Peace could not be restored in the Near East until the illegal occupation of Arab lands by Israel was ended.

The representative of the USSR then introduced a draft resolution by which the Council would: (1) strongly condemn Israel for the act of aggression committed by it in the area of the city of Suez; (2) demand that Israel compensate the United Arab Republic for the damage caused by that act; and (3) call upon Israel strictly to observe the Council's cease-fire resolutions of 6 and 7 June (resolutions 233(1967) and 234(1967)).

The representatives of Bulgaria and Mali, supporting the USSR draft resolution, also condemned Israel for its premeditated attack on Suez and for its continued occupation of Arab territory. They urged the Council to take immediate steps to find a solution to the situation created by Israel's aggression in June.

The representative of the United States emphasized that the first step towards peace was a complete cease-fire. The United States would co-operate in giving the United Nations machinery in the area a strength commensurate with its tasks. The events of the last days underscored the need to move towards a just settlement of all the questions outstanding between the parties.

The United States representative introduced a draft resolution by which the Council would: (1) condemn any and all cease-fire violations; (2) insist that the United Nations Member States concerned respect the cease-fire as contained in Council resolutions 233, 234, 235 and 236 (of 6, 7, 9 and 11 June 1967, respectively) and in the Council's consensus (of 9 July) and co-operate fully with the Chief of Staff of UNTSO and the United Nations military observers; and (3) call on these Governments to issue categorical instructions to all military forces to refrain from firing.

The representative of India declared that the deliberate nature of the attack by Israel on the Suez area was proved by Israel's refusal to accept UNTSO's first cease-fire proposal. Israel's policy of retaliation was impermissible. In view of the conflicting statements by Israel

and the United Arab Republic concerning the destroyer Eilat, he suggested that the Secretary-General should order further investigation to determine whether the Eilat was in territorial waters or on the high seas when sunk. This suggestion was supported by Ethiopia. The representative of India added that there could be no reduction of tensions in the area unless Israel forces first withdrew from the occupied territories. He agreed on the need for a fair and balanced resolution—which should be based on certain fundamental guidelines.

The representative of France regretted that there had once again been a resort to force which could only reopen the cycle of reprisals and counter-reprisals. Without more information he did not wish to pass judgment on responsibility for the incidents, but stressed that only on the basis of strict observance of the cease-fire by both parties could the wider task of re-establishing normal conditions in the whole area be undertaken.

Brazil said that the regrettable military action could only postpone the date of a lasting settlement. Strict observance of the cease-fire was the necessary first step.

The representative of Argentina said further information was needed to decide on the responsibilities of each of the parties. The Council should find a formula which would establish a clear-cut balance of interests and obligations on the part of the parties concerned and set up a constructive dialogue among the parties.

The representatives of Jordan and Syria condemned the premeditated Israel attack on the Suez area as but one link in a chain of continued aggression since 5 June 1967. So far nothing had been done, said the representative of Jordan, to suppress aggression and remove its consequences—the occupation of Arab territories. The reason was that United Nations organs, notably the Security Council, were shrinking from the responsibility of an effective stand because of the attitude of some major powers which served to encourage Israel to persist in its defiance.

When the Security Council met on 25 October 1967, the representative of Nigeria said that if it were proved that the Israel destroyer had been sunk in circumstances in which it should not have been attacked and if there were con-

elusive evidence that the Israel action against Suez was a reprisal action, he would join in condemning both actions. Commenting on the draft resolutions of the USSR and the United States, he considered it would be reckless to vote upon them since a resolution not having the general support of the Council did not have the effect it should.

The Council accepted his appeal for adjournment of the meeting to allow, as the representative of Nigeria said, consultations on a compromise draft resolution which would not damage the position of the two major powers but produce an effective decision as a necessary step towards continuing efforts to deal with the Arab-Israel question as a whole.

The President of the Council opened the next meeting on 25 October by announcing that as a result of consultations, agreement had been reached on a draft resolution by which the Security Council, gravely concerned over recent military activities in the Middle East in violation of the Council's cease-fire resolutions, would: (1) condemn the violations of the cease-fire; (2) regret the resulting casualties and property damage; (3) reaffirm the necessity of strict observance of the resolutions; and (4) demand that the Member States concerned cease immediately all prohibited military activities in the area and co-operate with UNTSO.

The text was adopted unanimously at the same meeting as resolution 240(1967). (For full text, see DOCUMENTARY REFERENCES below.)

The representative of the USSR declared that though the USSR draft resolution was completely justified and Israel's sole responsibility clear, he had not opposed the resolution presented by the President because of the desire of some members for unanimity. In the circumstances there was no need to put the USSR draft resolution to a vote. Consultations must be speeded to work out a decision leading to a political settlement in the Near East.

The representative of the United States observed that the Council had refused to take a one-sided view of the situation and had dealt with the incidents in a balanced manner. As a result there was no need to vote on his draft resolution.

The representatives of China and Japan

stated that the resolution was the essential first step to pave the way for the Security Council to find a formula which, acceptable to the parties, would establish a durable and just peace in the Middle East.

After adoption of the resolution of 25 October 1967, the Secretary-General stated to the Council that the need to strengthen the observer operation established in the Suez Canal sector following the Council's consensus of 9 July 1967, had become increasingly apparent. Consultation with the Chief of Staff of UNTSO on means to make the operation more fully effective in maintaining the cease-fire had made apparent the necessity of steps along the following lines: (1) increasing the number of observers from the present 43 to 90; (2) doubling the number of observation posts from 9 to 18; (3) using, possibly, four small craft to patrol the waters of the Canal and adjacent waters; (4) acquiring and making use of four small helicopters to increase observer mobility and for air observation, two on each side of the Canal. All such measures would relate exclusively to the Council's cease-fire resolutions and its consensus, but they would require a substantial increase in the cost of operations in the Suez sector. The estimated financial implications would be submitted to the Council as soon as possible. The Secretary-General also reminded the Council that there was only token observer representation in the Israel-Jordan and Israel-Lebanon sectors and therefore no machinery to assist in implementing the Council's resolutions of 6 and 7 June 1967, which applied to all sectors.

The representatives of Canada and the United States welcomed the statement of the Secretary-General. The United States regarded the steps proposed by the Secretary-General to be in accord with his responsibilities and his authority under the Charter and established practices of the United Nations.

The representative of the USSR stated that he was ready to examine the arguments of the Secretary-General and the details yet to be transmitted. He underlined that the question of increased observers must be examined by the Security Council in accordance with its competence under the Charter.

FURTHER COMMUNICATIONS AND REPORTS
ON UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER
OPERATION IN SUEZ CANAL SECTOR

On 31 October 1967, the Secretary-General, after further consultation with the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, reported more specifically on the requirements and details for the possible strengthening of the military observer operation suggested in his statement on 25 October 1967 to the Council. The report outlined the tentative deployment plan for the additional observance, including the observation posts to be established in consultation with the parties, the need for further consultations with the parties about the nationalities of the observers, the areas of operation of the proposed patrol craft and helicopters, and other communications and logistic problems. The Secretary-General emphasized that these measures would not suffice to maintain the cease-fire unless the parties exercised the utmost restraint and, therefore, renewed his appeal of 27 September 1967 that in cases of alleged violations of the cease-fire both parties make use of the United Nations observation system instead of continuing the practice of resorting directly to violent measures.

On 10 November 1967, the USSR submitted a draft resolution whereby the Security Council would authorize the Secretary-General to increase the number of observers in the Suez Canal sector to 90 and to take the measures proposed in his report to the Security Council of 31 October 1967 concerning the provision of additional technical facilities and means of transport for the United Nations observer group.

In a further report of 1 December 1967, the Secretary-General stated that he had been recruiting 47 additional observers from the following countries which were mutually acceptable to the parties: Argentina, Austria, Chile, Finland, France, Ireland and Sweden. The first new observers would be arriving early in December 1967. In another report of the same date, he informed the Council that the total additional expenditure for observers through 31 December 1967 was estimated at \$US315,820²³. Continuance through 1968 of the Suez Canal sector observer operation would cost \$US873,000. Cost estimates of other measures to strengthen the operation would be reported when figures were available.

On 6 December 1967, the representative of the USSR requested an urgent meeting of the Council to consider the draft resolution submitted by the USSR on 10 November 1967.

On 8 December 1967, the President of the Council, following consultations with representatives, circulated a statement which reflected the views of the Council members. Referring to the Secretary-General's report of 31 October 1967, the statement said that the members, recalling their consensus of 9 July 1967, recognized the necessity of the enlargement by the Secretary-General of the number of observers in the Suez Canal zone and the provision of additional technical material and means of transportation.

STATUS OF THE CEASE-FIRE IN
THE ISRAEL-JORDAN SECTOR
(JULY-DECEMBER 1967)

With reference to an Israel assertion and a Jordanian denial made to the fifth emergency special session of the General Assembly, Israel, by a letter of 17 July to the Security Council, transmitted photographs of seized Jordanian operational orders which were said to contain instructions to wipe out the civilian inhabitants of Israel population centres. In a reply of 18 July 1967, Jordan called the order a forgery and reaffirmed that no such orders had ever been issued. In a further letter, of 21 July 1967, Israel transmitted an English translation of a Jordanian order dated 7 June 1967 calling for an attack on and the killing of all persons in Motza village, and offered the original for inspection. Israel stated that its contents proved the extreme seriousness of the situation which Israel had faced.

In letters to the Council dated 13 and 17 July 1967, Jordan charged that on 10 and 15 July, Israel armed forces had violated the cease-fire resolutions opening fire five times on Jordanian forces and once on the civilian population on the eastern bank of the Jordan River to intimidate refugees awaiting return to their

²³ On 4 October 1967, the Secretary-General had reported to the Council that the estimated cost for 46 temporary observers in the Canal sector, arrangement for which he had made following the consensus of the Council on 9 July, was \$US295,300.

homes in accordance with Security Council resolution 237(1967)²⁴ of 14 June 1967.

In a reply of 19 July 1967, Israel countercharged that it was Jordanian troops on the eastern bank of the Jordan that had opened fire on Israel patrols on 15 July before Israel forces returned fire.

On 15 October, Israel charged eight violations of the cease-fire between 1 and 15 October by marauders who had laid landmines or opened fire inside Israel before withdrawing across the Jordan River.

On 16 and 18 October 1967, Jordan denied responsibility for these incidents allegedly committed on the Israel side of the Armistice Demarcation Line. Jordan countercharged that Israel occupation forces had opened tank fire on 14 October 1967 from the western bank of the Jordan on a Jordanian village and Jordanian troops. Jordan also cited five incidents between 25 August and 3 September 1967 during which Israel gun-fire killed six Arabs crossing the Jordan River and destroyed village houses on the pretext of finding arms there, as part of a campaign of terror to force the inhabitants of the western bank, Christians and Moslems, to abandon their homes in order to make room for new Jewish settlers.

In a reply of 20 October 1967, Israel charged Jordan with the responsibility for armed violence perpetrated by terrorists coming from Jordanian territory. Since August, Jordanian forces were said to have been assisting marauders crossing the Jordan River and providing covering fire. Israel further charged that the Iraqi command battalion stationed in Jordan also supported the marauders whom, in addition, Jordan, allowed to go to Syria for training and to return to carry out subversive activities in Israel.

In letters of 5 and 21 November 1967, Israel charged that on eight occasions between 24 October and 5 November and on further occasions between 18 and 21 November, terrorist activities had been perpetrated by armed marauders coming from Jordan with the encouragement of the Jordan authorities, and that Jordan military forces had provided covering fire for such marauders and had also opened fire from the West Bank of Jordan on Israel forces. As a result of the exchanges of fire, four

Israel soldiers had been killed and eight wounded while three of the marauders had been killed. If Jordan would comply with its obligations under the cease-fire resolution, there would be no incidents, as it was Israel's policy to observe the cease-fire on the basis of complete reciprocity.

In a letter dated 22 November 1967, Jordan charged Israel with violating the cease-fire on 21 November 1967 by firing and by using aircraft on Jordanian forces on the East Bank of Jordan without provocation. On four other occasions, between 9 October and 2 November 1967, Israel forces had opened fire on Jordanian citizens trying to cross the Jordan River. The letter also recalled that the representative of Jordan had informed the Security Council on 20 November 1967 of the unprovoked shelling of the Jordanian refugee camp at El-Karama, resulting in 13 killed and 28 wounded.

In connexion with the incident of 21 November 1967, a report of the Secretary-General stated that because there was no United Nations observation operation in the Israel-Jordan sector, the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) could determine neither the origin nor the scope of the firing. However, a cease-fire proposal by the UNTSO Chief of Staff had been accepted by both parties and had taken effect.

In another letter dated 8 December 1967, Jordan complained that, on 5 and 6 December 1967, Israel had expelled 294 members of the Nuwaseirat tribe and forced them to cross the Jordan River to the East Bank in violation of the Council's resolution 237(1967) of 14 June 1967.

In a letter of 12 December 1967, Israel denied the charge, stating that for security reasons it had been necessary to proclaim the area of the nomadic tribe a restricted area and that some of the tribesmen had voluntarily elected to cross the Jordan River. The letter also denied the charge of Israel aggression on 20 November 1967, stating that Jordanian forces had opened fire on an Israel patrol from positions in the village of El-Karama. Fire had been returned to silence the assault.

²⁴ For text of Security Council resolution 237(1967), see p. 190.

OTHER COMMUNICATIONS ON
STATUS OF THE CEASE-FIRE

On 15 June 1967, the representative of Iraq informed the Secretary-General, by letter, that the position of the Iraqi Government with regard to the Council's cease-fire resolutions of 6 and 7 June (233(1967) and 234(1967))²⁵ was that the Iraqi forces were under the joint command in Jordan which had already declared its position together with the Governments of Jordan and the United Arab Republic.

On 31 July, Lebanon informed the Secretary-General that it accepted the Security Council's resolutions 233(1967) and 234(1967) of 6 and 7 June, respectively.

In a note dated 29 November 1967, Israel requested the Secretary-General to circulate its inquiry of 15 November 1967 and his reply of 24 November 1967 concerning the status of acceptances of the cease-fire resolutions by Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Tunisia and Yemen, States to which the Secretary-General had sent the resolution texts. The Secretary-General's reply had stated that no communications in reply had been received from these States.

COMMUNICATIONS ON RETURN OF
GOVERNMENT HOUSE TO UNTSO

On 4 July 1967, the Secretary-General reported on his efforts to obtain restoration of Government House (the site of the headquarters of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO)) in Jerusalem to UNTSO, as the Security Council had requested on 11 June 1967.²⁶ His report included an exchange of messages between the Permanent Representative of Israel and himself by which UNTSO and its Chief of Staff would be enabled to regain their headquarters for their exclusive use without delay. In conveying his Government's agreement in that connexion, the Permanent Representative of Israel stated that in the Government's view the sole function and concern of the UNTSO Chief of Staff, General Bull, and his staff was with the Council's cease-fire resolutions and no longer with the General Armistice Agreements and the now obsolete arrangements of the past. The Secretary-General's report pointed out that in his reply the Secretary-General had noted the specific views of the

Israel Government with regard to the functions and status of UNTSO without any appraisal or expression of opinion on them.

Following a further report on 11 August 1967 explaining Israel's proposal to return Government House and one-third of its grounds, the Secretary-General, in a third report dated 22 August 1967, stated that he had authorized return to the area offered because of urgent need of the facilities and as a practical step only. That action was without prejudice to the claim he had maintained that the United Nations was entitled to the return and exclusive occupancy and possession of the whole Government House compound. UNTSO resumed occupancy of Government House on 23 August 1967.

COMMUNICATIONS AND REPORTS ON
TREATMENT OF CIVILIAN
POPULATIONS AND WAR PRISONERSCOMMUNICATIONS FROM ISRAEL, JORDAN,
SYRIA AND THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

In the month following the Security Council's adoption of its resolution of 14 June 1967 concerning the treatment of civil populations and prisoners of war in the area of conflict (resolution 237(1967)),²⁷ letters from Jordan, Syria and the United Arab Republic made various charges against Israel of maltreatment of prisoners of war and civilians, destruction of Qalqiliya, and expulsion of Palestinians from Jordan and the Gaza Strip and of Syrians from the occupied area in Syria.

In its replies, Israel denied charges of maltreatment of prisoners and civilians, stating that representatives of the International Red Cross had enjoyed the full co-operation of the Israel authorities, and it expressed concern over Israel prisoners of war and civilians held by Syria and the United Arab Republic. Israel also denied the expulsion of any Syrians, stated that the transfer of any Palestinians among the prisoners of war was being carried out with the

²⁵ For texts of Security Council resolutions 233 (1967) and 234(1967), see page 189.

²⁶ See above, page 185, and also paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 236(1967), p. 190.

²⁷ For text of Security Council resolution 237(1967), see page 190.

co-operation of the Egyptian authorities and further stated that Qalqiliya had been damaged because Jordan had attacked Israel from that town.

Meanwhile, the Secretary-General had on 29 June 1967 reported to the Council, pursuant to Council resolution 237(1967) of 14 June 1967. He transmitted to the Council Israel notes concerning steps taken by the Israel authorities to restore normal civilian life in occupied areas and the exchange of prisoners of war with Jordan on 27 June 1967. The Secretary-General also reported his intention to send a representative to obtain on-the-spot information required for discharging his responsibilities under that resolution.

In a letter of 17 July 1967, the United Arab Republic requested the Secretary-General to secure observance by Israel of its obligations under the Geneva Conventions of 1949, Security Council resolution 237(1967) of 14 June 1967 and General Assembly resolution 2252 (ES-V) of 4 July 1967.²⁸ An attached note to the International Committee of the Red Cross listed various inhuman acts against the captive, wounded and civilian victims of the war. In a letter of 19 July 1967, Syria requested investigation of atrocities which, it stated, Israel forces had committed against non-combatant civilians in the occupied territory.

In letters of 19 and 24 July and 2 August 1967, Israel denied these allegations. Israel cited examples of measures which it had taken between 20 June and 7 July 1967 to alleviate the suffering of civilian populations caused by the United Arab Republic aggression, and also cited examples of its treatment of prisoners of war. Israel countercharged that an Israeli had been kidnapped by Syrian soldiers in 1966 and his detention had been denied until the discovery of documents found at Kuneitra which led to the return of his body during the exchange of prisoners of war with Syria on 17 July 1967.

In a letter of 11 July 1967, Israel referred to Syria's two letters of 27 June and 3 July 1967, complaining of the treatment of the Syrian Consul and Vice-Consul detained in Jerusalem by Israel. Israel stated that the two men had been visited alone by representatives

of the International Red Cross and had made no complaint concerning their treatment.

In letters of 27 July and 8 and 10 August 1967, Jordan charged mistreatment of prisoners of war by Israel, looting, expulsions of Jordanians, bulldozing of border villages in the Latrun area and elsewhere, and the killing in the Jordan River of seven Jordanians who had been ordered to swim to its East Bank.

In replies of 3 and 16 August 1967, Israel denied the charges of Jordan. Reports of the International Committee of the Red Cross were cited as proof of correct treatment of Jordanian prisoners of war. The border villages had been heavily damaged during the hostilities. The allegations were part of a campaign of incitement by Jordan designed to frustrate the Israel policy of permitting the return of refugees to their homes.

In two letters dated 18 August and 1 September 1967, Syria charged Israel with terrorism against Syrian refugees, whose number was said to have risen from 107,000 on 4 July 1967 to 110,000 as of 1 September 1967. Syria also stated that efforts by the International Red Cross to help Syrian refugees to return to their homes had been defeated by Israel's rejection of the Red Cross request.

In replies of 25 August and 8 September 1967, Israel, rejecting Syria's charges, stated that of the estimated 90,000 civilians on the Syrian heights the great majority had withdrawn ahead of the Syrian forces and only 6,404 remained after the cease-fire became effective. As for the return of the evacuees, Israel considered that it was a matter for direct arrangements between the Governments concerned, such as those Israel had made with Jordan.

REPORTS OF SECRETARY-GENERAL

On 6 July 1967, the Secretary-General appointed Nils Göran Gussing as his Special Representative to obtain for him on the spot the information required for the discharge of his responsibilities under Security Council resolution 237(1967) of 14 June 1967. After an in-

²⁸ For text of General Assembly resolution 2252 (ES-V), see pp. 221-22.

terim report in August, the Secretary-General submitted, on 15 September 1967, a final report based on information obtained by his Special Representative on the situation of the population in areas now under Israel control, the measures taken to shelter and to facilitate the return of those who had fled, the treatment of prisoners of war and the protection of civilians.

The Secretary-General indicated that the Special Representative had received excellent co-operation at all levels in the countries visited and had been allowed full freedom of movement; however, he had met spokesmen of the civilian population, displaced persons, prisoners of war and local authorities only in the company of government representatives. The view that talks without witnesses, particularly in the occupied areas, would have provided franker exchanges had been conveyed to Israel representatives without result.

Reporting on the safety, welfare and security of the population in areas under Israel control, which had been placed under Israel military administration, the Secretary-General stated that in the Syrian area the entire population had left except for some 6,000 Druses, who had not wanted to leave and were living peacefully, and some 250 other civilians, mainly in Kuneitra.

Syrian complaints regarding alleged violation by Israel of humanitarian principles, to which the Special Representative could not give the required individual on-the-spot investigation, had not therefore been verified. Israel had rejected the allegations. The Special Representative, however, had looked into selected issues which were the subject of continuing Syrian complaints: namely, the alleged systematic efforts to expel the entire original population from the area, the alleged looting, and the demolition of entire villages after the cessation of hostilities.

Regarding the movement of population, Mr. Gussing had reported that while there were strong indications that the majority of the population had left before the end of hostilities, he had found it difficult, in view of conflicting reports on subsequent events, to determine the line between physical and psychological pressure. At the local level it seemed clear that cer-

tain actions allowed by local commanders had been an important cause of flight. He had never been informed of any action taken by the Israel authorities to reassure the population. As for looting, the Special Representative felt reasonably sure that responsibility for the extensive looting in Kuneitra lay to a great extent with the Israel forces.

Syria, Mr. Gussing had reported, had also complained of "excavations" and "international robbery" of historic treasures at an archaeological site near Banias; he could find no trace of any recent digging in those parts of the site shown to him. [The Syrian complaints, contained in letters of 7 July and 18 August had been termed without foundation by Israel in its replies of 14 July and 25 August 1967. In these letters and in a further letter from the United Arab Republic of 16 July, reference was made by all parties to the need to assure respect for the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict.]

On the question of demolition of villages, Mr. Gussing felt that the vast destruction observed in three of four villages mentioned in Syrian complaints could largely be attributed to military operations.

Concerning the occupied West Bank area of Jordan, the Special Representative reported that 200,000 of its population of 1.1 million, including 430,000 refugees registered with the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) had left for the East Bank of the Jordan River during and after the fighting and that an additional substantial number had been displaced. As to Jordan's complaints relevant to the civilian population on the West Bank—which Israel had rejected as unfounded or had commented on—these could not all be investigated in detail or verified by the Special Representative.

As to complaints of Israel's attempts to create another Arab exodus to the East Bank of the Jordan River, Mr. Gussing stated that the truth seemed to lie somewhere between an Israel statement that "no encouragement" was given to the population to flee, and the allegations about the use of brutal force and intimidation

made by refugees. The impact of hostilities and military occupation, particularly when no measures of reassurance had been taken, had clearly been a main factor in the exodus.

Regarding persons displaced by Israel demolition of certain villages—the subject of Jordanian complaints—the Special Representative had provided more specific details. In the border town of Qalqiliya, 850 of 2,000 dwellings had been demolished. Israel claimed the destruction had been caused by actual fighting; the Arab mayor stated that only 15 to 20 houses had been destroyed during the fighting and before the population had been advised to leave by the Israel commander. The population had been allowed to return three weeks later. Three villages in the Latrun area had been destroyed; in that connexion an Israel liaison officer stated the destruction took place mostly during the fighting; the Israel Minister of Defence had explained that the damaged villages had been destroyed for strategic and security reasons. These displaced villagers had not been allowed to return. In the Hebron area two villages had been demolished. The reason given by Israel was that they were "El Fatah" terrorist bases; the mukhtars (local government officers) claimed that El Fatah members only passed through them and that the inhabitants had never co-operated.

As for Jordanian complaints about alleged looting "of everything" found in banks by Israel occupying forces, the report indicated that Israel had rejected the allegations. Its spokesmen said Israel had removed the bank books and money against signed receipts solely to check on the situation of the banks. [Jordan had complained, in a letter of 5 July 1967, of looting of banks in the West Bank area of Jordan. Israel had replied on 12 July stating that resumption of normal activities by West Bank banks was conditioned upon return of deposits which had been transferred to Amman.] The Special Representative said he had found it difficult to form a firm opinion regarding reports of looting of private property by military personnel since it took place two months before his arrival. Israel authorities stated measures had been taken to prevent looting and to stop it when it occurred.

Views on the economic and social conditions

of the civilian population on the West Bank, the Special Representative remarked, had been conflicting. Observation of four main towns indicated that as a result of hostilities the general economy had come to a standstill. The Israel Government had assured the Special Representative that it had taken initial measures to restart that economy. Delay in resumption of normal life, the Special Representative stated, would require continued provision of food relief for persons not at present under UNRWA's care.

The Gaza Strip and Sinai, occupied by Israel, consisted, respectively, of an area densely populated by about 455,000 persons, of whom 315,000 were UNRWA-registered refugees, and of a vast peninsula with most of its 45,000 to 55,000 inhabitants in the two towns of El-Arish and East Kantara. The report sketched the post-hostilities economic and social conditions, which were characterized by unemployment and hardship.

Regarding the movement of population, the Special Representative said that Israel had made arrangements to enable residents of the Gaza area to visit relatives on the West Bank of Jordan. Six large buses were said to leave daily: but it was not known whether six busloads of people also returned every day. In that connexion, the military governor of the area had stated that the population had been informed that those who wanted to go and work on the West Bank could do so.

Commenting on a charge by the United Arab Republic alleging a shortage of food in El-Arish, the Special Representative reported that, according to Israel, Arab and neutral spokesmen, there was no immediate food problem, but there was a scarcity of money to buy food.

After describing the difficult position of the 1,000 civil servants of United Arab Republic origin and their families in El-Arish totalling about 5,000 persons, the Special Representative stated that transfer of these persons to the West Bank of the Suez Canal had started, by agreement, but he had later been informed that the United Arab Republic no longer wished them to cross but to stay so that their presence might bolster the morale of the population. That Government objected, however, to the Israel de-

tention of some 290 civil servants who had been stationed in Gaza and requested they be allowed to rejoin their families who had been allowed to cross the Suez Canal.

Concerning the complaint of shortage of water in East Kantara, Mr. Gussing had suggested that the United Arab Republic resume pumping enough water across the Canal for the remaining civilian population. That Government's authorities did not respond favorably, feeling it was the responsibility of the Israel authorities to provide for the population in occupied areas. Of the original population of 15,000, only 1,116 persons had remained. Most wished to cross the Canal; Israel had no objection but the United Arab Republic wished them to stay in East Kantara.

Turning to the situation of persons who had fled from areas under Israel occupation and the question of their return, the report described the emergency assistance provided and current pressing needs. The persons involved were 200,000 who had moved from the West Bank to the East Bank of the Jordan; 110,000 persons according to Syria, 85,000 according to Israel, who had moved out of the south-western corner of Syria; and 35,000 who had moved across the Canal from the Gaza Strip or Sinai. The number of UNRWA-registered refugees included in the three groups were, respectively, 93,000, 17,000 and 3,000.

Recalling that by its resolution 237(1967) of 14 June 1967, the Security Council had called upon Israel to facilitate the return of these displaced persons, the report detailed information obtained by the Special Representative on the three groups.

Regarding the occupied area in Syria, Mr. Gussing reported that the Syrian Government strongly desired the return of the displaced persons through intervention by the United Nations, but it was not willing to enter into direct negotiations with Israel. The Israel Government's attitude on this question, was that Israel and Jordan had reached an agreement and that, when talks were initiated with Syria and the United Arab Republic, it would be prepared to discuss any outstanding issues, including the return of the displaced civilians.

In this connexion, the report indicated that, in early July, Israel had announced its inten-

tion of authorizing the return of displaced persons to the West Bank on certain conditions; it had set 10 August as the deadline for the return. A dispute over the form of applications required by Israel was not resolved until 6 August at a meeting between representatives of Israel, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the Jordanian Red Crescent. The distribution of applications began on 12 August and Israel extended the deadline to 31 August. According to the Jordanian Government, Israel had approved by 28 August only 4,763 applications covering 16,266 persons out of the 40,000 applications, involving 170,000 persons, which had been transmitted through ICRC. On 9 September 1967, Jordan stated that the total number who had returned was 14,150 (14,056, according to Israel). Israel and Jordan had offered various conflicting reasons why the return operation had not functioned smoothly.

Jordan charged that Israel approvals of applications had excluded UNRWA-registered refugees, displaced persons in East Bank camps as well as those from the areas of Jerusalem, Bethlehem and Jericho. Israel charged that a Jordan campaign against Israel of vituperation and of direct incitement of both the prospective returnees and West Bank inhabitants had seriously impeded the return of the displaced persons.

The Special Representative pointed out that only 35,000 persons could have returned by 31 August 1967 at the potential daily rate mentioned by Israel. He had been able to assure Israel that Jordan wished to proceed with the return operation in an atmosphere of restraint. In response to a request by the Secretary-General on 24 August 1967 for an extension of the deadline, Israel had informed him that displaced persons who had been unable to use previously issued permits would be allowed to return within a fixed period of time and that further individual and reunion-of-family applications would be considered.

The report also indicated that all the displaced persons met by the Special Representative in the United Arab Republic had expressed their desire to return to their homes. The Israel attitude to their return was the same as that set forth above in the case of Syrian displaced

persons. The United Arab Republic held the view that the Special Representative should initiate discussions regarding the return, while ICRC might assume responsibility for implementing any agreement reached.

Regarding the correct treatment of prisoners of war referred to by the Security Council in its resolution 237(1967) of 14 June 1967,²⁹ Mr. Gussing stated that on the whole ICRC had been able to play in the area of conflict its important role as agent and neutral intermediary. Jordan, Syria and the United Arab Republic had accused Israel of maltreatment of, and also executions of, prisoners of war. Israel had denied these allegations and expressed concern over the treatment of Israel prisoners of war in Arab countries, alleging murder of some Israel pilots by the United Arab Republic and Syria. The Special Representative had not been in a position to investigate these accusations but in visits to prisoner-of-war camps had gathered the impression that treatment was correct on both sides. He noted that an exchange of prisoners had been successfully concluded through the ICRC between Israel on the one side and Jordan, Lebanon and Syria on the other. Negotiations between Israel and the United Arab Republic through the ICRC had not yet led to any agreements.

Regarding the treatment of Jewish minorities, particularly in certain Arab States, about which Israel had expressed concern, the Secretary-General had informed Mr. Gussing that the provisions of the Security Council's resolution 237(1967) of 14 June 1967 might properly be interpreted as having application to the treatment, at the time of the recent war and as a result of that war, of both Arab and Jewish persons in the States which were directly concerned because of their participation in that war. In response to the Special Representative's inquiry, Israel had replied that except for the now discontinued security measures, there had been no discrimination against Arab citizens. The United Arab Republic had expressed to Mr. Gussing its firm opinion that the Security Council's resolution 237(1967) of 14 June 1967 did not apply to the Jewish minority and requested clarification of that interpretation. Jews of Egyptian nationality were, it maintained, solely the responsibility of the Government of

the United Arab Republic. The Special Representative indicated that there were persistent allegations that 500 to 600 men of the estimated Jewish minority of 2,500 in the United Arab Republic had been kept in detention since the beginning of the war. In reply to Mr. Gussing's inquiry, the Syrian Government stated that the Jewish minority in Syria, about 4,000 persons, was treated in exactly the same way as other Syrian citizens. Like Christians and Moslems suspected of anti-Government activities, certain Jews were restricted in their movements for security reasons.

In concluding his report, the Secretary-General noted the efforts of Governments and international organizations to help the people affected by the war. He expressed appreciation for the voluntary contributions made to relieve their distress and appealed to all to continue to contribute to the humanitarian task facing the international community in the Middle East. He hoped that all parties concerned would divorce the purely humanitarian aspects of the situation from the political and military aspects so that measures to relieve the suffering of the innocent civilians involved could be taken with humanitarian considerations mainly in mind.

On 6 September and 4 October 1967, the Secretary-General reported on the implementation of those paragraphs in the General Assembly's resolution 2252(ES-V) of 4 July 1967,³⁰ by which the Assembly, among other things, called on Member States concerned to facilitate the transport of supplies to all areas in which aid was being rendered and appealed to all Governments, as well as organizations and individuals, to make special contributions to alleviate the suffering inflicted on civilians and on prisoners of war as a result of the recent hostilities in the Middle East. In response to the Secretary-General's notes drawing these paragraphs to the attention of both United Nations

²⁹ By this resolution, the Security Council, *inter alia*, recommended "to the Governments concerned the scrupulous respect of the humanitarian principles governing the treatment of prisoners of war and the protection of civilian persons in time of war, contained in the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949."

³⁰ For text of General Assembly resolution 2252 (ES-V), see pp. 221-22, especially operative paragraphs 8 and 9 thereof.

Member States and non-member States which were members of the specialized agencies, the Secretary-General received replies from the following 42 Member States: Afghanistan, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Canada, Ceylon, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ecuador, Finland, France, Ghana, Hungary, Iceland, India, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Laos, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Poland, Romania, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, the USSR, the United Kingdom, the United States and Yugoslavia. Replies were also received from the following six non-member States: the Federal Republic of Germany, the Holy See, the Republic of Viet-Nam, San Marino, Switzerland and Western Samoa. The report included the substance of the replies from 44 Governments indicating their contributions in the form of money, transport, supplies or other facilities. Four Governments expressed regret at not being able to contribute.

COMMUNICATIONS AND REPORTS ON THE JERUSALEM QUESTION

COMMUNICATIONS

In four letters dated 19 July, 2, 3 and 4 August 1967, Jordan requested a report on the implementation of the General Assembly's resolution 2254(ES-V) of 14 July 1967³¹ calling on Israel to rescind measures already taken and to desist from further action which would alter the status of Jerusalem. Jordan charged Israel with oppressing national civic and Islamic leaders in Arab Jerusalem who had declared their rejection of the Israel annexation of Arab Jerusalem, protested interference by Israel authorities in Moslem religious affairs and the demolition of two mosques, and who had openly affirmed their adherence to Jordanian unity. In particular, Jordan reported the plight of four leaders in Arab Jerusalem, including the Governor of Jerusalem, who had been detained and later banished to various parts of the Israel-occupied areas.

In a letter dated 25 July 1967, Syria transmitted the text of a cable from representatives of all Islamic and Christian religious communities in Syria protesting the annexation and domination of Jerusalem and its Holy Places.

In a letter of 18 August 1967, the Arab group of States at the United Nations charged Israel with political intimidation of, and economic pressure against, the population of the occupied areas and persecution of Jerusalem Arab leaders who rejected Israel's annexation of Jerusalem. In a reply dated 28 August 1967, Israel rejected the charges of the Arab group as being unfounded and unsubstantiated.

REPORTS OF SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Secretary-General, in a note dated 14 August 1967, informed the Security Council of his appointment of Ambassador Ernesto A. Thalmann of Switzerland as his Personal Representative in Jerusalem. His mission would be solely to obtain information as a basis for the Secretary-General's report requested by the General Assembly's resolution 2254(ES-V) of 14 July 1967; it would not entail any negotiations relating to the implementation of that resolution.

On 12 September, the Secretary-General submitted a two-part report on the situation in Jerusalem, the first part based on information gathered by his Personal Representative during his two-week mission and the second part containing information submitted by Israel.

Dealing first with Jerusalem's geography and population, the Personal Representative had stated that as a result of Israel's assumption of authority over east Jerusalem, the municipal area of west Jerusalem had been expanded by over 60 square kilometres to a total exceeding 100 square kilometres. A post-occupation Israel census showed approximately 70,000 persons in east Jerusalem (81 per cent Moslems); the population of west Jerusalem was about 200,000. According to the International Committee of the Red Cross, some 7,000 refugees had left the Jerusalem area. The Municipal Council of west Jerusalem (all Israelis) had superseded that of the Old City, whose members had refused the opportunity offered to apply for positions in the Israel administration. The municipality functioned according to Israel law but, according to Israel, practically all east Jerusalem municipal employees had been absorbed into the Israel municipality.

³¹ For text of General Assembly resolution 2254 (ES-V), see page 223.

Israel leaders had made clear to the Personal Representative beyond any doubt that Israel was taking every step to place under its sovereignty those parts of the city not controlled before June 1967. For practical reasons, not all Israel laws and regulations were yet being enforced but the declared objective was to equalize the legal and administrative status of residents of all parts of the city. The Israel authorities had stated unequivocally that the process of integration was irreversible and not negotiable. Measures of municipal integration, based on Israel sources and discussed in the report, included opening of access roads, destruction of barriers and buildings in an area outside the Temple Wall (the inhabitants being provided with alternative housing), connexion of the water supply system of west Jerusalem to that of east Jerusalem, transfer of the entire Sanitation Department to the Old City Municipal Building and opening of a Welfare Bureau to the public in east Jerusalem.

Ambassador Thalmann reported that while admitting serious economic problems of adjustment in east Jerusalem, Israel authorities maintained that in many respects the economy was in a prosperous state due to the constant flow of Israel shoppers and sightseers and that the adverse effects of the cessation of tourism should not be unduly protracted. The Ministry of Tourism maintained that any possible loss from tourists in transit to other Arab countries was likely to be balanced by the opening of east Jerusalem to tourists to and from Israel. The authorities also mentioned the economic shock caused by the "under-developed" economy of the eastern sector coming into contact with a more developed economy. Everything was being done not to cut off east Jerusalem from its West Bank source of supply, especially of agricultural produce. The Israel system of excise and customs duties, income tax, municipal taxes and vehicle licence fees were being applied in east Jerusalem, all being higher than those previously paid there. The question of the increased cost of living was being studied and the pay of salaried officials had been increased but not up to the Israel scale. Serious obstacles to economic recovery had been caused by monetary problems, including the closure of west Jerusalem banks and the question of the rate

of exchange of the Jordan dinar for the Israel pound. Measures concerning the judiciary had included moving the High Rabbinical Court to east Jerusalem. Moslem courts, according to the Israel authorities, were functioning in the same manner as in the past. As for education, it was intended to introduce as soon as possible in east Jerusalem all the educational laws and regulations applicable in Israel to Arab children, using the existing curriculum and textbooks and maintaining Arabic as the basic language of instruction. All previously employed teachers had been invited to continue their work. Information from other sources made the Personal Representative doubtful whether the teachers would be prepared to co-operate with the Israel authorities in reopening the schools.

As to the situation in Jerusalem as described by Arab personalities, the Personal Representative explained that the lesser amount of information was due partly to his investigations being carried out in an Israel-controlled area. Israel representatives had stated that the Arab personalities interviewed were, with few exceptions, members of the Palestine Liberation Organization and did not truly represent the population. The Personal Representative noted that Arab-provided documents were signed by a wide range of personalities, including many officials of the previous Jordanian administration and recognized religious leaders.

The report described the most important Arab complaints against the Israel authorities. Most Arabs stated the Moslem population was shocked by Israel desecration of Moslem Holy Places: for example, the conduct of prayers by the Chief Rabbi of the Israel army in the area, of the Haram Al-Sharif. (The Israel Government had put a stop to further praying by members of the Jewish faith in this area.) The bulldozing of 135 Arab-owned houses in the Maghribi Quarter (in front of the Wailing Wall) and expulsion of their inhabitants had aroused strong feelings, as had the eviction of 3,000 residents from the so-called Jewish Quarter. The application of Israel civil law was unacceptable to the Arabs as was the Israel claim of jurisdiction over the Moslem religious courts and control over sermons from the Aksa Mosque. The dissolution of the elected Municipal Council of east Jerusalem was a violation

of international law. Action taken by Arab notables to establish a public administration in accordance with Jordanian law had not been recognized by the Israel authorities. Measures by Israel with respect to taxes, customs duties, licences, absentee properties and other economic matters were considered oppressive and there was a growing feeling of economic strangulation. There was pronounced aversion to efforts by the Israel authorities to apply their own educational system to Arab schools.

The Personal Representative was told by the Arab personalities he had met that the Arabs were ready to co-operate with a military occupation régime on questions of administration and public welfare but were opposed to civil incorporation by force into the Israel State system, an act regarded as a violation of international law which prohibited an occupying power from changing the legal and administrative structure. All representatives of the religious communities met by the Personal Representative agreed that the Holy Places needed special protection and that their believers should have free access to those places. Reassuring statements made in this connexion by Israel authorities were favourably received. Apart from the Moslems, essentially only the Catholic Church adopted a systematically divergent attitude: the Holy See was convinced that the only solution offering sufficient guarantee for the protection of Jerusalem and its Holy Places was to place that city and its vicinity under an international régime in the form of a *corpus separatum*. Various religious leaders hoped that their links with the outside world, including the Arab countries, would remain open. The Personal Representative was assured by Israel that a liberal practice would be pursued; so far as entry from Arab countries was concerned, it was for those countries to issue the relevant permits.

Another part of the report set forth the response of Israel dated 11 September to the Secretary-General's letter of 15 July 1967 transmitting the General Assembly's resolution 2254 (ES-V) of 14 July 1967 on the status of Jerusalem. The Israel Foreign Minister stated that it was necessary to ensure equal rights and opportunities to all residents of the city. No international or other interest would be served by the institution of divisions and barriers. It

was his Government's policy to secure appropriate expression of the special interest of the three great religions in Jerusalem, in co-operation with the universal interests concerned, by ensuring that the Moslem Holy Places—as well as the Christian and Jewish Holy Places—should be scrupulously respected and revered, and the Moslem Holy Places should be placed under the responsibility of a recognized Moslem authority.

In a letter of 22 December 1967, Jordan informed the Secretary-General of the deportation by Israel of two prominent Arab leaders on 20 December 1967 because of their refusal to co-operate with the Israel authorities. The letter charged that most of the leaders who had signed a memorandum rejecting the annexation of Jerusalem by Israel had been either arrested, exiled or deported, in violation of the Security Council's resolution 237(1967) of 14 June 1967.³²

FURTHER SECURITY COUNCIL CONSIDERATION OF SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND RESOLUTION OF 22 NOVEMBER 1967

In a letter dated 7 November 1967, the United Arab Republic requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider the dangerous situation prevailing in the Middle East as a result of the persistence of Israel not to withdraw its armed forces from all the territories which it occupied as a result of its aggression committed on 5 June 1967 against Jordan, Syria and the United Arab Republic.

The Security Council considered the United Arab Republic complaint at seven meetings between 9 and 22 November 1967. The representatives of Israel, Jordan, Syria and the United Arab Republic were invited to participate in the discussion without the right to vote.

Before the Council were two draft resolutions.

By the first, submitted by India, Mali and Nigeria on 7 November, the Security Council would affirm that peace in the Middle East must be achieved within the framework of the

³² For text of Security Council resolution 237(1967), see pp. 190-91.

United Nations Charter and more particularly of the following principles: (i) occupation or acquisition of territory by military conquest was inadmissible and consequently Israel's armed forces should withdraw from all the territories occupied as a result of the recent conflict; (ii) every State had the right to live in peace and complete security free from threats or acts of war and consequently all States in the area should terminate the state or claim of belligerency and settle their international disputes by peaceful means; and (iii) every State had the right to be secure within its borders and it was obligatory on all Member States of the area to respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of one another. In addition, the Council would affirm that: (i) there should be a just settlement of the question of Palestine refugees; and (ii) there should be a guarantee of freedom of navigation, in accordance with international law, through international waterways in the area. Further, the Council would request the Secretary-General to dispatch a special representative to the area who would contact the States concerned in order to co-ordinate efforts to achieve the purposes of this resolution and to submit a report to the Council within 30 days.

By the second draft resolution, submitted on the same day by the United States, the Security Council would: (1) affirm that the fulfillment of Charter principles required the achievement of a state of just and lasting peace in the Middle East embracing withdrawal of armed forces from occupied territories, termination of claims or states of belligerence, and mutual recognition of, and respect for, the right of every State in the area to sovereign existence, territorial integrity, political independence, secure and recognized boundaries, and freedom from the threat or use of force; (2) affirm further the necessity: (a) for guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area; (b) for achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem; (c) for guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones; (d) for achieving a limitation of the wasteful and destructive arms race in the area; (3) request the Secretary-General to designate

a special representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned with a view to assisting them in working out solutions in accordance with the purposes of this resolution; and (4) request the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the efforts of the special representative as soon as possible.

Opening the discussion on 9 November 1967, the Foreign Minister of the United Arab Republic stated that the latest aggression of Israel on 24 October 1967 had left no doubt as to the gravity of the present situation in the area. Since the aggression of Israel on 5 June 1967 the Council had failed to do its clear duty: to condemn the aggression, order Israel to withdraw its forces to the positions held on 4 June 1967, and determine Israel's responsibility for the damages and losses inflicted on the Arab countries. The fifth emergency special session of the General Assembly had been unable to translate into a resolution its unanimous commitment to the principle that military occupation of any part of the territory of one State by another was totally inadmissible. The failure of the United Nations to act had encouraged Israel to defy the resolutions of the emergency special session on Jerusalem and on the return of the refugees, and to embark upon further acts of aggression in the Suez Canal sector. That policy of terror had resulted in heavy civilian casualties there and had led his Government to evacuate more than 300,000 inhabitants.

Referring to the "summit meeting" of leaders of Arab States held in Khartoum, the Sudan from 21 August to 1 September 1967, he said that the decision of the meeting was for peace but not surrender, for a political solution the corner-stone of which was the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Israel forces to the positions at the period prior to 5 June 1967. The central issue in the Middle East situation was the expulsion by force of the people of Palestine from their homes. The United Nations, the successor of the League of Nations, was the only valid framework for enabling that people to exercise their right to self-determination.

Continuing, the Foreign Minister of the United Arab Republic said that Israel's aggres-

sion of 5 June must be considered to be of grave dimensions. Israel's obligations under the United Nations Charter and under the General Armistice Agreements, the binding nature of which was stated in their provisions, were inescapable. He urged that military, political and economic assistance to Israel be withheld until Israel had complied with its Charter obligations and withdrawn its forces from all the territories it had occupied as a result of its aggression. The situation, he said, fell into the category of breaches of the peace which required the Council to apply the Charter provisions. He concluded that a minimum measure to be taken by the Council would be a demand for immediate withdrawal to the positions of 4 June. Should Israel refuse to withdraw, the Council must apply enforcement measures.

The representative of India, introducing the three-power draft resolution, said that the Afro-Asian and Latin American members of the Council had intensively examined all the proposals, formal and informal, put forward during the Assembly's fifth emergency special session and had taken into account the views of other members of the Council and the parties concerned in order to try to produce a fair and balanced formulation. The draft resolution closely paralleled the 20-power Latin American draft which had been before the General Assembly's fifth emergency special session (see p. 208). Although some of its provisions were not in accordance with the wishes of the parties and there were differences within the Council, the co-sponsors had tried to narrow the differences so as to initiate a peaceful settlement.

The representative of Nigeria stated that his Government's objective was not merely to restore the status quo as it was prior to 5 June 1967 but to create a climate in which all in the area could live in peace. He considered the three-power draft a definite improvement upon the Latin American draft resolution and emphasized that it was submitted for decision under Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter (for text of Chapter VI, see APPENDIX II). He had not been able to persuade either the Arabs or the Israelis that what they sought was unobtainable—namely, no negotiations until after unconditional withdrawal of the Israel forces and no withdrawal except as a result of bilateral

negotiations. However, he recommended the three-power draft as the most balanced one and declared the Council must tell both parties that unless they changed their positions they could not have peace in the Middle East.

The representative of Mali said that the first task of the Council was to ensure implementation of the provisions of the Charter—namely, withdrawal of the Israel forces to positions occupied prior to the aggression. It would be a serious error to link that withdrawal to any other element of the crisis in the Middle East. He also emphasized the natural right of the Arab people of Palestine to return to their homes. Non-compliance with that sacred right had led to the incessant crises of the last 20 years. Breaking the vicious circle of reprisals and counter-reprisals must begin with a political and human solution to the problems of the Arab refugees.

Supporting the three-power draft, the representative of Ethiopia emphasized the need for the work of the special representative to have the united support of all members of the Council.

The representative of the USSR declared that withdrawal of Israel forces from the occupied Arab territories was the prerequisite for a Near East settlement. Yet Israel was taking measures to consolidate its occupation by colonization and talk of a greater Israel, and by attempts to annex Jerusalem in defiance of international law and United Nations resolutions. He charged that not only had the aggression by Israel blocked the Suez Canal in violation of international agreements but the presence of Israel troops along the Suez Canal had also prevented the United Arab Republic from reopening the Canal to navigation. The expansionist designs of Israel continued to achieve connivance from powerful supporters—above all the United States. Although some of its provisions did not take fully into account the position of the USSR, his delegation would support the three-power draft if the Arab countries did not oppose it. The United States draft resolution, on the other hand, was designed to support the claims of the aggressor to Arab lands. A new formula in that draft for the withdrawal of troops was a step backwards as compared with that provided in the 20-power Latin American

draft which had been before the General Assembly in July and was intermingled with references to "secure and recognized boundaries."

The United States text, the USSR representative said, admitted that Israel troops would not necessarily be withdrawn from all conquered Arab land and contained no provision regarding the inadmissibility of acquisition of territory by conquest.

The representative of the United Kingdom recommended that the Secretary-General be authorized to send a special representative to the area, that there must be withdrawal from occupied territories and an end to belligerency, that secure frontiers could not be settled by conquest, and that nothing should be done in Jerusalem or elsewhere to prejudice the final outcome of the desired settlement. The United Kingdom was concerned that there should be freedom of navigation through international waterways. It had urged an imaginative and comprehensive policy on the problems of the refugees. There was no change in its position.

The representative of the United States said that the terms of the United States draft resolution were founded on the conviction that a durable peace must embrace the five policy principles set forth by President Johnson on 19 June 1967—namely, the recognized right of national life, justice for the refugees, innocent maritime passage, limits on the wasteful and destructive arms race, and political independence and territorial integrity for all. The principal parties on both sides had accepted those principles as the framework for a just peace. How the objectives of the United States draft resolution could be achieved in practice could only be worked out in consultations with the parties which the special representative must undertake. Peace depended primarily upon the parties to the conflict; it was not for the Council to seek to impose the exact terms of a settlement. The draft resolution's mandate could not be stated in terms entirely satisfactory either to the Arab States or Israel. The guidelines, in his opinion, took into account, and in no way prejudiced, the positions or the vital interests of the States involved.

In a further explanation on 15 November 1967, the representative of the United States emphasized that the interdependence of the

principles of the first operative paragraph of the United States text (i.e. that paragraph affirming what was required in the fulfillment of Charter principles) was inherent in the nature of the situation and the history of the conflict. To seek withdrawal without secure and recognized boundaries, for example, would be just as fruitless as to seek secure and recognized boundaries without withdrawal. Agreement by the parties on both points was an absolute essential to a just and lasting peace. The timing of steps to be taken by the parties would need careful working out with the assistance of the special representative; it was not his Government's conception that any one step should be relegated to the end of the process. The provisions of the second operative paragraph of the United States text (see p. 246) he added, were no less vital to a durable peace settlement. The key provision in the entire United States text was that on the appointment of the special representative: the crucial role of the latter would be to foster on both sides the pragmatic will to peace which could overcome the undeniable difficulties in defining mutually acceptable terms.

The United States representative renewed his Government's pledge to exert, under the terms of the United States draft, its full diplomatic and political influence in support of efforts by the United Nations representatives to achieve a fair and equitable settlement.

In reply to the United States, the USSR representative stated on 15 November 1967 that the absence in the United States draft resolution of a clear-cut provision concerning the withdrawal of troops from all territories could not be divorced from that draft's concept of "secure and recognized" boundaries, which would make it possible for Israel arbitrarily to fix new boundaries and to withdraw only to lines convenient to it. The withdrawal provision must be so clear-cut as to allow no one to give his own interpretation of it. He hoped for a clear United States statement in favour of withdrawal from all occupied territories.

Canada and Denmark maintained that although the problem of withdrawal of troops was crucial to a settlement, it could not be envisaged as a step isolated from other sensitive problems. In formulating guidelines for a

political solution under Chapter VI of the Charter, and not for an imposed solution, the co-operation of both parties to the conflict was essential; therefore the mandate given to the special representative required an equitable balance of obligations on all parties. The representative of Canada stated his preference for the United States draft resolution because it more fully met the criteria of such an equilibrium.

France stated that only a political solution of the Middle East crisis could possibly be envisaged. It would consequently be unrealistic to say that direct negotiations should be undertaken between Israel and the Arab Governments, which had refused such negotiations for 20 years. It fell to the Security Council to find a solution, but agreement among the great powers was essential. Withdrawal of Israel troops from the occupied territories was necessary to create conditions conducive to a peaceful solution, it being understood that each of the States concerned had the right to exist and to see its security assured. France agreed with the proposal to send a special representative, but felt the latter would not be able to carry out useful work unless the principles guiding his task were set out clearly by the Council.

The representative of Japan felt that neither of the draft resolutions adequately reflected a consensus of the Council. He hoped further consultations might lead to a compromise and the unanimous consensus which was so important.

Argentina stated that the Security Council must find a solution to the problem by peaceful means. No one should be asked to renounce his legitimate interests, but at the same time there must be a clear balance of mutual concessions within a framework in which no one would negotiate under the threat of pressure. Withdrawal of troops should be accompanied by a cessation of the state of belligerency. Argentina still believed that the Latin American draft resolution of three months ago would be an adequate solution today.

At the Security Council meeting held on 13 November, the Foreign Minister of Israel³³ declared, in reply to the accusations of the United Arab Republic, that that Government, heavy with responsibility for 19 years of pur-

poseful aggression, had been unmistakably responsible for its aggressive attempt in June to destroy the State of Israel. After citing actions taken and statements made in May and June, for that purpose, by the United Arab Republic and other Arab States, he said that it was his Government's supreme national purpose never to return to the danger and vulnerability from which Israel had emerged. He denounced the charge of Israel "aggression" as a violent untruth. Israel's defensive action had been taken when the choice was to live or to perish. His Government's thinking was based on the premise that, having repelled aggression and being threatened with its renewal, no new assault should succeed.

As for the suggestion of the USSR and the Arab States that the way to peace was to restore the situation as at 4 June 1967 through the withdrawal of the Israel forces, the Foreign Minister of Israel declared that many statements had expounded its folly and injustice before the fifth emergency special session of the General Assembly earlier in the year. His Government's policy was to respect the Security Council's cease-fire until that was replaced by peace treaties, concluded by direct negotiation between Israel and the Arab States, ending the state of war, determining the agreed national frontiers of States, and ensuring a mutually guaranteed security. There could be no return to the shattered Armistice régime, which Egypt had converted into a formula for belligerency, a blockade and an alibi for refusal to make peace. The armistice lines must be superseded by agreed and secure national boundaries; such permanent boundaries were the central issue to be negotiated in a peace settlement. A negotiated boundary meant stability, a demarcation line meant the maintenance of reciprocal territorial claims. The only alternative to the cease-fire was now formal peace; any other

³³ Although inscribed on the list of speakers, Israel did not speak in the Security Council on 9 November 1967. At the beginning of its meeting that day, the Council had rejected, by 8 votes in favour to 0 against, with 7 abstentions, a United States motion that the parties to the dispute who had asked to speak, that is, the United Arab Republic and Israel, be invited to speak prior to the members of the Council.

course would be a prelude to the next explosion. Against the Khartoum policy of no recognition, no negotiation and no peace, Israel presented its policy: recognition, negotiation, peace. As for the statement of the representative of France that it would be unrealistic to have negotiations without withdrawal, Israel's spokesman said it was unrealistic to believe that there could be withdrawal without negotiation.

The Foreign Minister of Israel drew attention to the fact that the representative of the United Arab Republic had promised nothing in return for what he had asked and had indicated no change in the previous Egyptian policies on the Suez Canal, the Gulf of Aqaba, the Arab economic boycott, and on territorial claims beyond the point of withdrawal to the position as at 4 June 1967.

Rejecting unreservedly the three-power draft because, among other things, it prejudiced the territorial and security problems by asking for withdrawal without a final peace treaty, the Foreign Minister of Israel stated that Israel would give constructive consideration to any proposal based on a negotiated peace, in accordance with Chapter VI of the Charter, which did not prejudice its substantive interests in advance. A United Nations representative, he said, could play a useful role in bringing the parties together only if his directive did not prejudice Israel's negotiating position in advance. At a peace negotiation Israel would make constructive proposals conducive to the interest and the national honour of all negotiating States.

In reply to the remarks of the Foreign Minister of Israel on the three-power draft resolution, the representative of India stated, *inter alia*, that the aim of that draft was to provide a framework of principles and guidelines within which the special representative could contact the parties concerned in order to co-ordinate efforts towards initiating the process of peaceful settlement.

The representative of Bulgaria stressed that the Western powers which had voted for the 20-power Latin American draft resolution at the Assembly's fifth emergency special session, when they were sure it had little chance of being adopted because of the then prevailing situation in the Near East, did not now agree with

the principles of that 20-power draft which were now embodied in the three-power draft resolution. The formula in the United States draft resolution was intended to allow the aggressor to decide when to withdraw from occupation of Arab territories. The return of that aggressor to the positions of 4 June 1967 was the fundamental step that must precede any political solution of the other outstanding problems; otherwise, the aggressor could act from a position of strength and use the usurped territories as bargaining counters.

The representative of Jordan said that if the United Nations did not do its duty and effect Israel's withdrawal from occupied territories, the pre-condition for peace in the area, Arab representatives would have to explain to their peoples that they had no other course but to use their own resources to liquidate Israel aggression, no matter what the price. The main threat to peace and security in the area had been Israel's systematic expansionist policy based on aggression and denial of justice to the Palestine refugees.

The representative of Syria declared that no draft resolutions before the Council were acceptable to his Government because they subjected withdrawal to conditions. The Council was faced with one basic issue only—namely, that of a premeditated war of aggression by Israel against the Arab world. The only draft resolution in harmony with the Charter was that submitted at the Assembly's fifth emergency special session by the USSR (see p. 193) calling for condemnation of Israel aggression, withdrawal, and compensation to the Arabs.

On 16 November 1967, the representative of the United Kingdom introduced a draft resolution, stating his conviction that it was balanced and just. Its provisions were drawn from the work undertaken and the proposals put forward by other members of the Council and represented a sincere attempt to meet the just claims of both sides and also to discharge the urgent responsibility of the Council for effective action.

By the United Kingdom draft resolution, the Security Council would: (1) affirm that the fulfilment of Charter principles required the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the applica-

tion of both the following principles: (i) withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict; (ii) termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force; (2) affirm further the necessity (a) for guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area; (b) for achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem; (c) for guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones; (3) request the Secretary-General to designate a special representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution; and (4) request the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the efforts of the special representative as soon as possible.

On 20 November 1967, the representative of the USSR declared that it was indisputable that only the withdrawal of the aggressor's troops from all of the territories conquered by him could pave the way to a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. In the present situation his Government considered it to be its duty to make new efforts towards a political settlement and had instructed him to submit a new draft resolution. This new text, he said, contained all the key elements of a political settlement on the need of which the views of the overwhelming majority of Member States of the United Nations converged.

By the new USSR draft resolution the Security Council would: (1) declare that peace and final solutions to the Middle East problem could be achieved within the framework of the Charter of the United Nations; (2) urge that the following steps should be taken: (a) the parties to the conflict should immediately withdraw their forces to the positions they held before 5 June 1967 in accordance with the principle that the seizure of territories as a result of war

is inadmissible; (b) all States Members of the United Nations in the area should immediately recognize that each of them has the right to exist as an independent national State and to live in peace and security, and should renounce all claims and desist from all acts inconsistent with the foregoing; (3) deem it necessary in this connexion to continue its consideration of the situation in the Middle East, collaborating directly with the parties concerned and making use of the presence of the United Nations, with a view to achieving an appropriate and just solution of all aspects of the problem on the basis of the following principles: (a) the use or threat of force in relations between States is incompatible with the Charter of the United Nations; (b) every State must respect the political independence and territorial integrity of all other States in the area; (c) there must be a just settlement of the question of the Palestine refugees; (d) innocent passage through international waterways in the area in accordance with international agreements; and (4) consider that, in harmony with the steps to be taken along the lines indicated above, all States in the area should put an end to the state of belligerency, take measures to limit the useless and destructive arms race, and discharge the obligations assumed by them under the Charter of the United Nations and international agreements.

The representative of the United Kingdom expressed surprise that there was no reference in the USSR draft resolution to the appointment of a United Nations special representative, the one main matter on which he had understood all to be fully agreed. His delegation had always had in mind two stages. The first was the statement of principles, set forth in the United Kingdom draft resolution, and the appointment of the special representative. The second stage was the work in the Middle East of that representative, guided by those principles but not restricted as to his working methods. It would be wrong to endeavour to do his work before his appointment by trying to specify exactly how those principles were to be applied. He remained convinced that the balanced formulation of the United Kingdom draft resolution offered the only basis on which the practical co-operation of both sides could be won.

The representative of the United States said that his delegation, although adhering to the views expressed in its own draft resolution, would vote in favour of the United Kingdom draft resolution because it commanded a substantial consensus in the Council and was non-prejudicial to the vital interests of all parties so that they should be able to co-operate with the special representative. The USSR draft resolution was not an even-handed, non-prejudicial draft; it did not meet the test of exact balance, acquiescence by the parties and workability.

Speaking on 22 November 1967, the representative of Ethiopia declared that his delegation's position on the proposals before the Council would be determined by three main considerations. First any proposal should be based on the United Nations Charter and its relevant principles. Second, it should be balanced in the affirmation of principles and in the recognition of the problems involved. His delegation considered it essential that due emphasis should be placed on the inadmissibility of acquisition of territory by war, and hence on the requirement that all Israel forces be withdrawn from the territories occupied as a result of military conflict, as well as on the need to ensure conditions of permanent peace in which all States in the area could live in security. That meant termination of all claims or states of belligerency. Moreover, there must be a just and final solution of the problem of refugees. There must also be a guarantee of freedom of navigation through international waterways for all nations. The third consideration was that the agreed guidelines for the special representative would have to be such as, on the one hand, not to depart from the basic principles of the Charter while, on the other hand, to allow the special representative sufficient discretion in his delicate task of contacts and search for a negotiated settlement. In conclusion, the Ethiopian representative stressed that the success of the United Nations presence in the area depended on the co-operation and support of all members of the Council, particularly the major powers, and of the parties directly concerned.

Stating the position of the co-sponsors of the three-power draft resolution (India, Mali and

Nigeria), the Indian representative said this draft gave equal validity to the principles of withdrawal, non-belligerency and secure borders — principles which provided the context within which the problem of the Palestine refugees and that of freedom of navigation in international waterways could be solved. The principle of the inadmissibility of territorial acquisition by force was absolutely essential. No decision could be acquiesced in or accepted that left out territories occupied by military conquest from the provision of withdrawal: The vote to be cast by the sponsors of the three-power draft on the United Kingdom draft text was determined by their clear understanding that the United Kingdom draft resolution, studied in the light of policy statements of the British Foreign Secretary, upholding the above-mentioned principle, committed the Council to the application of the principle of total withdrawal of Israel forces from all the territories occupied by Israel as a result of the June conflict. That being so, Israel could not use the words "secure and recognized boundaries" to retain any occupied territory. The Indian representative said that the delegations of Mali and Nigeria concurred in that position and had authorized him to state that they would not press the three-power draft resolution to a vote.

In reply, the representative of the United Kingdom welcomed the Indian representative's statement as opening the way to agreement and action. The draft resolution, he said, was not a British text but one to which every Council member had contributed in the search for common ground. It was a balanced whole: to add to it or to detract from it would destroy that balance and destroy the wide measure of agreement achieved. He was sure that all would recognize that it was only the resolution that would bind all. He regarded its wording as clear. All delegations, no doubt, had their own views and interpretations and understandings. On such matters each delegation rightly spoke only for itself.

After the President had announced that the sponsors of the three-power and the United States draft resolutions had stated that they would not press their draft resolutions to the vote, the United Kingdom draft resolution was put to the vote and adopted unanimously by

the Council as resolution 242(1967) of 22 November 1967. (For full text, see DOCUMENTARY REFERENCES below.)

The representative of the USSR then stated that at the present stage of the Council's consideration of the Middle East situation his delegation would not insist on a vote on its draft resolution.

Statements in explanation of their attitudes towards various draft resolutions and on the voting were made by members of the Council as well as by Israel, Jordan, Syria and the United Arab Republic.

The representative of Nigeria said that he had supported the resolution because, taken as a whole, he thought it could promote peace in the Middle East.

Mali expressed the view that the just solution of the refugee problem lay in the implementation of the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council with a view to restoring the inalienable rights of the people of Palestine.

The representative of the United States declared that his delegation had voted for the resolution because it found it entirely consistent with its Government's policy on the Middle East, the five principles of President Johnson and his own statements before the Council. Had not the United Kingdom draft been so delicately balanced, the United States would have offered an amendment so that the Council could endorse the need to achieve limitation of the arms race in the Middle East. He had been encouraged by a provision to that effect in the USSR draft resolution of 20 November 1967. He did not conceive that the mandate of the special representative excluded his exploring that urgent requirement of peace. The United States would support the efforts of the special representative to achieve a fair settlement.

The representatives of Canada and Denmark stated that their approach to all proposals had been determined by the extent to which they would help get under way diplomatic processes for a peaceful settlement. The resolution adopted took into account the essential interests of both sides and represented a fair, balanced and non-prejudicial basis for the dispatch to the Middle East of a special representative of the Secretary-General.

The representative of France stated that his delegation had felt that to be really useful, draft resolutions should leave no room for ambiguity and that the special representative must be given very precise principles on which to act. In his view, the three-power draft would have had significant advantages. His delegation would have preferred the United Kingdom resolution to be more explicit on certain points, including the mandate of the special representative. However, on the essential question of the withdrawal of the forces of occupation, the French text of the adopted resolution, which was equally authentic with the English text, left no room for ambiguity since it spoke of withdrawal "des territoires occupés," thus giving a precise interpretation to the expression "territories occupied." He had heard with satisfaction the representative of the United Kingdom stress the link between that paragraph and the principle of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territories by force. His delegation had voted for the resolution, finding in it the general principles necessary for a solution to the problem. However, the adoption of the resolution was only a first step.

The USSR representative said that in voting for the United Kingdom draft resolution, he fully shared the interpretation of the representative of India that the provision regarding withdrawal meant withdrawal of Israel forces from all conquered territories of the Arab States. That was confirmed by the fact that the preamble to the resolution emphasized the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war. Consequently the provision regarding secure and recognized boundaries could not serve as a pretext for the maintenance of Israel forces on any part of those Arab territories.

The representative of Bulgaria said that the resolution had proved the only possible compromise which did not jeopardize the interests of the victims of aggression and might open the way to a peaceful settlement, if strictly and judiciously applied. The adopted resolution was an adequate reply to the question of withdrawal of Israel forces from all the territories occupied since 4 June 1967 and adequately defined the terms of reference of the special representative.

The representative of Brazil regretted the in-

ability of the non-permanent members of the Council to draw up a draft text acceptable to all and based on the principles of the Latin American proposal. While the principle that occupation or acquisition of territories by the threat or use of force could not be recognized was incontestable, acceptance of that principle did not imply that border lines could not be rectified as a result of an agreement freely concluded among the interested States. Although the resolution did not give full satisfaction, Brazil had voted for it because its principles reflected most of those in the Latin American proposal and because its implementation seemed to be viable.

Argentina said it had supported the resolution because it was generally acceptable and based on the 20-power Latin American proposal, but would have preferred the clearer formula for withdrawal in the 20-power proposal, namely—"Israel to withdraw all its forces from all the territories occupied by it as a result of the recent conflict." The acquisition or occupation of territories by force could not be accepted.

The representative of China expressed satisfaction that the resolution had commanded the unanimous support of the Council and hoped that the parties would not allow the intensity of their feelings to impair the prospects for constructive steps towards peace in the Middle East.

Japan thought that the adopted resolution stated in clear and simple terms the principles and objectives on which peace in the Middle East must be based. The success of the special representative's mission demanded the utmost support of the Council and, above all, the co-operation of the parties concerned.

The Foreign Minister of Israel stated that Israel's position remained unchanged. It was now understood as axiomatic that movement from the cease-fire lines could be envisaged only in the framework of a just and lasting peace. The central affirmation of the adopted resolution was the need for such a peace based on secure and recognized boundaries. There was a clear understanding that it was only within the establishment of permanent peace with secure and recognized boundaries, mutually agreed upon by the parties, that the other principles

could be given effect. Israel did not believe that Member States had the right to refuse direct negotiations with those to whom they addressed their claims. The only possible peace that could be established in the Middle East was one that the Governments there built together; it could not be imposed.

The Israel Foreign Minister said that the Indian representative had sought to interpret the resolution in the image of his own wishes. Establishment of a peace settlement, including secure and recognized boundaries, was quite different from withdrawal, without final peace, to demarcation lines. For Israel, the resolution said what it said. It did not say what it had specifically and consciously avoided saying. He would communicate to his Government for its consideration nothing except the original English text of the draft resolution as presented on 16 November 1967.

The representative of Syria rejected the United Kingdom resolution because, among other things, the central issue of withdrawal was made subject to concessions to be imposed on the Arab countries, because it was silent on the systematic violations of the cease-fire resolutions and the rejection by Israel of resolutions concerning the status of Jerusalem and the return of the new refugees since 5 June, and because it ignored the various resolutions on the Palestine question and the right of the Palestine people to self-determination.

The representative of the United Arab Republic reaffirmed his Government's position that the first step towards peace was the full withdrawal of the Israel forces from all the territories occupied in the June conflict and that the inalienable rights of the people of Palestine, which had been recognized and repeatedly affirmed by United Nations resolutions, should not be allowed to fall by the wayside.

The representative of Jordan also reaffirmed that the essential step towards peace was the immediate and complete withdrawal of Israel forces from all the territories occupied in the recent conflict.

REPORTS OF SECRETARY-GENERAL

In reports dated 23 November and 22 December 1967, the Secretary-General informed the Security Council that Ambassador Gunnar V.

Jarring of Sweden had accepted designation as his Special Representative to the Middle East, in accordance with operative paragraph 3 of the Council's resolution 242 of 22 November 1967. After consultations with the parties, the

Special Representative had set up the headquarters of the mission in Cyprus on 10 December 1967 and by 20 December 1967 had completed a first round of visits to the Governments concerned.

DOCUMENTARY REFERENCES

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ISRAEL-SYRIA SECTOR

S/7930/Add.18, 19, 21, 22, 24-26, 28, 30, 31. Supplemental information received by Secretary-General dated 1 July-28 August 1967.

S/8035. Letter of 5 July 1967 from Syria.

S/8049. Letter of 10 July 1967 from Israel.

S/8171 (A/6844), S/8178 (A/6849). Letters of 27 September and 3 October 1967 from Syria.

S/8181 (A/6856). Letter of 4 October 1967 from Israel.

S/8187 (A/6857). Letter of 10 October 1967 from Syria.

S/8192 (A/6859). Letter of 13 October 1967 from Israel.

STATUS OF THE CEASE-FIRE
IN THE SUEZ CANAL AREACONSIDERATION BY SECURITY COUNCIL OF
COMPLAINTS OF 8 JULY 1967 FROM
UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC AND ISRAEL
ABOUT VIOLATION OF THE CEASE-FIRE

SECURITY COUNCIL, meetings 1365, 1366.

S/7930/Add.8-21. Supplemental information received by Secretary-General, dated 15 June-7 July 1967.

S/8025 (A/6741). Letter of 1 July 1967 from United Arab Republic.

S/8026. Letter of 1 July 1967 from Israel.

S/8043. Letter of 8 July 1967 from United Arab Republic (requesting convening of Council).

S/8044. Letter of 8 July 1967 from Israel (request for meeting of Council).

S/8045. Request from Algeria of 8 July 1967 to participate in Council's discussion.

S/8046. Statements by Secretary-General on 8 and 9 July 1967, meetings 1365 and 1366 of Security Council.

S/8047. Consensus expressed by President and approved by Security Council on 9 July 1967, meeting 1366. (For text, see narrative above, page 228.)

S/8053 and Add.1,2. Report of 11 July 1967 by Secretary-General, and addenda of 10 and 28 August, on stationing of United Nations military observers in Suez Canal area.

COMMUNICATIONS AND REPORTS BETWEEN
13 JULY AND 13 OCTOBER 1967

S/8054, S/8057. Letters of 12 and 14 July 1967 from United Arab Republic.

S/8059, S/8060. Letters of 14 and 15 July 1967 from Israel.

S/8061, S/8062. Letters of 13 and 15 July 1967 from United Arab Republic.

S/8068 (A/6761). Letter of 17 July 1967 from Israel.

S/8070. Letter of 17 July 1967 from United Arab Republic.

S/8071. Letter of 17 July 1967 from USSR.

S/8074, S/8076 (A/6766). Letters of 18 and 19 July 1967 from Israel.

S/8140. Letter of 6 September 1967 from United Arab Republic.

S/8145. Letter of 8 September 1967 from Israel.

S/8163. Letter of 22 September 1967 from United Arab Republic.

S/8169, S/8173 and Corr.1. Letters of 26 and 29 September 1967 from Israel.

S/8183. Letter of 6 October 1967 from United Arab Republic.

S/8188. Letter of 10 October 1967 from Israel.

COMMUNICATIONS TO SECURITY COUNCIL
BETWEEN 21 AND 25 OCTOBER 1967
AND CONSIDERATION BY COUNCIL
ON 24 AND 25 OCTOBER 1967

SECURITY COUNCIL, meetings 1369-1371.

S/7930/Add.43-49. Supplemental information received by Secretary-General, dated 22-25 October 1967.

S/8203, S/8204. Letters of 21 and 22 October 1967 from Israel.

S/8205. Letter of 22 October 1967 from United Arab Republic.

S/8207. Letter of 24 October 1967 from United Arab Republic (request for convening of Council).

S/8208. Letter of 24 October 1967 from Israel (request to convene Council).

S/8209, S/8210, S/8211, S/8214. Requests by Israel, Jordan, and Syria to participate in Council's discussion.

S/8212. USSR: draft resolution.

S/8213. United States: draft resolution.

RESOLUTION 240(1967), as proposed by Council members, adopted unanimously by Council on 25 October 1967, meeting 1371.

"The Security Council,

"Gravely concerned over recent military activities in the Middle East carried out in spite of the Security Council resolutions ordering a cease-fire,

"Having heard and considered the statements made by the parties concerned,

"Taking into consideration the information on the said activities provided by the Secretary-General in documents S/7930/Add.43, Add.44, Add.45, Add.46, Add.47, Add.48 and Add.49,

- "1. Condemns the violations of the cease-fire;
- "2. Regrets the casualties and loss of property resulting from the violations;
- "3. Reaffirms the necessity of the strict observance of the cease-fire resolutions;
- "4. Demands of the Member States concerned to cease immediately all prohibited military activities in the area, and to co-operate fully and promptly with the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization."

FURTHER COMMUNICATIONS AND REPORTS

ON UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER OPERATION IN SUEZ CANAL SECTOR

- S/8053/Add.3 and Corr.1; Add.4 and Corr.1. Addenda to report of Secretary-General on observation of cease-fire in Suez Canal sector dated 31 October and 1 December 1967.
- S/8182 and Add.1. Reports of Secretary-General, dated 4 October and 1 December 1967, on financial implications in regard to stationing of additional observers to observe cease-fire in Suez Canal sector.
- S/8236. USSR: draft resolution (dated 10 November 1967).
- S/8287. Letter of 6 December 1967 from USSR (request for meeting of Security Council).
- S/8289. Statement by President of Security Council dated 8 December 1967.

STATUS OF CEASE-FIRE IN THE ISRAEL-JORDAN SECTOR (JULY-DECEMBER 1967)

- S/8056 (A/6757). Letter of 13 July 1967 from Jordan.
- S/8065 (A/6760). Letter of 17 July 1967 from Israel.
- S/8067, S/8075 (A/6765). Letters of 17 and 18 July from Jordan.
- S/8079, S/8087 (A/6770). Letters of 19 July 1967 from Israel.
- S/8117 (A/6784). Letter of 10 August 1967 from Jordan.
- S/8123 (A/6786), S/8194. Letters of 16 August and 15 October 1967 from Israel.
- S/8195, S/8198. Letters of 16 and 18 October 1967 from Jordan.
- S/8202 (A/6871). Letter of 20 October 1967 from Israel.
- S/8222, S/8254. Letters of 5 and 21 November 1967 from Israel.
- S/8258. Letter of 22 November 1967 from Jordan.
- S/8290 (A/6956). Letter of 8 December 1967 from Jordan.
- S/8295 (A/6980). Letter of 12 December 1967 from Israel.
- S/8311 (A/7031). Letter of 22 December 1967 from Jordan.
- S/8322 (A/7033). Letter of 2 January 1968 from Israel.

REPORTS OF SECRETARY-GENERAL (NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 1967)

S/7930/Add.56-61. Supplemental information received by Secretary-General, 23 November-22 December 1967.

OTHER COMMUNICATIONS ON STATUS OF THE CEASE-FIRE

- S/7990. Letter of 15 June 1967 from Iraq.
- S/8106. Letter of 31 July 1967 from Lebanon.
- S/8279. Note verbale of 29 November 1967 from Israel.

COMMUNICATIONS ON RETURN OF GOVERNMENT HOUSE TO UNTSO

- S/7930/Add.20, 27, 29, 31. Supplemental information received by Secretary-General dated 4 July, 11, 22 and 28 August 1967.
- S/8094 (A/6775). Letter of 25 July 1967 from Syria.

COMMUNICATIONS AND REPORTS ON TREATMENT OF CIVILIAN POPULATIONS AND WAR PRISONERS

- COMMUNICATIONS FROM ISRAEL, JORDAN,
SYRIA AND UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC
- S/7975. Letter of 12 June 1967 from Jordan.
- S/7988, S/7993. Letters of 15 June 1967 from United Arab Republic.
- S/7991. Letter of 15 June 1967 from Syria.
- S/8003. Letter of 20 June 1967 from Israel.
- S/8004 (A/6725). Letter of 21 June 1967 from Jordan.
- S/8007 (A/6726). Telegram of 21 June 1967 from United Arab Republic.
- S/8012, S/8013 (A/6729). Letters of 23 June 1967 from Israel.
- S/8016 (A/6731) and Add.1. Letters of 27 June 1967 and 3 July 1967 from Syria.
- S/8017 (A/6733). Letter of 28 June 1967 from United Arab Republic.
- S/8019 (A/6734), S/8030 (A/6744). Letters of 27 June and 4 July 1967 from Israel.
- S/8032 (A/6745), S/8033 (A/6747). Letters of 5 July 1967 from Jordan.
- S/8034 (A/6748). Letter of 5 July 1967 from Israel.
- S/8037 (A/6749), S/8040 (A/6750). Letters of 6 and 7 July 1967 from Syria.
- S/8041 (A/6751), S/8042 (A/6752). Letters of 7 July 1967 from Israel.
- S/8055/Rev.1 (A/6756/Rev.1), S/8058 (A/6758), S/8069 (A/6762), S/8073 (A/6763). Letters of 12, 14, 17 and 11 July 1967 from Israel.
- S/8064 (A/6759), S/8086 (A/6769). Letters of 17 and 16 July 1967 from United Arab Republic.
- S/8077 (A/6767). Letter of 19 July 1967 from Syria.
- S/8082 (A/6768), S/8092 (A/6773). Letters of 19 and 24 July 1967 from Israel.
- S/8101 (A/6777). Letter of 27 July 1967 from Jordan.
- S/8104 (A/6778), S/8105 (A/6779), S/8108

(A/6781). Letters of 1, 2 and 3 August 1967 from Israel.
 S/8110, S/8115 (A/6783), S/8117 (A/6784). Letters of 4, 8 and 10 August 1967 from Jordan.
 S/8123 (A/6786). Letter of 16 August 1967 from Israel.
 S/8125 (A/6788). Letter of 18 August 1967 from Syria.
 S/8127. Letter of 18 August 1967 from Arab group of States.
 S/8134 (A/6790), S/8137. Letters of 25 and 28 August 1967 from Israel.
 S/8138 (A/6791). Letter of 1 September 1967 from Syria.
 S/8147 (A/6794). Letter of 8 September 1967 from Israel.
 S/8178 (A/6849), S/8187 (A/6857). Letters of 3 and 10 October 1967 from Syria.
 S/8192 (A/6859). Letter of 13 October 1967 from Israel.

OTHER COMMUNICATIONS

S/7974. Letter of 12 June 1967 from Tunisia.
 S/8010. Letter of 23 June 1967 from Greece.

REPORTS OF SECRETARY-GENERAL

S/8001 (A/6723) and Corr.1, 2; Add.1; Add.1/Corr.1. Notes by Secretary-General, dated 20 June and 4 July 1967, submitting reports of Commissioner-General of United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in Near East (UNRWA).
 S/8021 and Corr.1. Reports by Secretary-General to Security Council, dated 29 June 1967, in pursuance of operative paragraph 3 of Council's resolution of 14 June 1967 (S/RES/237(1967)).
 S/8124 (A/6787) and Corr.1. Report of Secretary-General dated 18 August 1967, under General Assembly resolution 2252(ES-V) and Security Council resolution 237(1967).
 S/8124 (A/6787) and Corr.1. Note by Secretary-General, dated 25 August 1967, under General Assembly resolution 2252(ES-V) and Security Council resolution 237(1967).
 S/8153 (A/6795). Note by Secretary-General dated 12 September 1967.
 S/8155 (A/6796). Report of Secretary-General under General Assembly resolution 2252(ES-V) and Security Council resolution 237(1967). (Note dated 15 September 1967 on document S/8158—see below).
 S/8158. Report of Secretary-General, dated 2 October 1967, under General Assembly resolution 2252(ES-V) and Security Council resolution 237(1967). (Also issued as document A/6797, dated 15 September 1967.)

COMMUNICATIONS AND REPORTS ON THE JERUSALEM QUESTION

S/7956. Telegram of 8 June 1967 from Haiti.
 S/7959. Letter of 7 June 1967 from Philippines.
 S/7965. Letter of 8 June 1967 from Portugal.
 S/7994. Letter of 16 June 1967 from Pakistan.

S/8052 (A/6753). Report of Secretary-General, dated 10 July 1967, on measures taken by Israel to change status of City of Jerusalem.
 S/8078. Letter of 19 July 1967 from Jordan.
 S/8093 (A/6774) and Corr.1. Letter of 25 July 1967 from Syria.
 S/8107 (A/6780), S/8109 (A/6782), S/8110, S/8117 (A/6784). Letters of 2, 3, 4 and 10 August 1967 from Jordan.
 S/8121 (A/6785) and Corr.1. Note by Secretary-General dated 14 August 1967.
 S/8127. Letter of 18 August 1967 from Chairman of Arab group of States.
 S/8137. Letter of 28 August 1967 from Israel.
 S/8146 (A/6793). Report of Secretary-General, dated 12 September 1967, under General Assembly resolution 2254(ES-V) relating to Jerusalem.

FURTHER SECURITY COUNCIL CONSIDERATION OF SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND RESOLUTION OF 22 NOVEMBER 1967

SECURITY COUNCIL, meetings 1373, 1375, 1377, 1379-1382.

S/7930/Add.50-55. Supplemental information received by Secretary-General dated 26 October-21 November 1967.
 S/8226. Letter of 7 November 1967 from United Arab Republic (request to convene Council).
 S/8227. India, Mali, Nigeria: draft resolution.
 S/8229. United States: draft resolution.
 S/8232, S/8234, S/8237. Requests by Israel, Jordan and Syria to participate in Council's discussion.
 S/8235. Revised draft resolution submitted to fifth emergency special session of General Assembly on 4 July 1967 by Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Trinidad and Tobago, and Venezuela (circulated as Security Council document in accordance with request by India on 9 November 1967, Council meeting 1373).
 S/8247. United Kingdom: draft resolution.
 S/8253. USSR: draft resolution.

RESOLUTION 242(1967), as proposed by United Kingdom, S/8247, adopted unanimously by Council on 22 November 1967, meeting 1382.

"The Security Council,
 "Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East,
 "Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security,
 "Emphasizing further that all Member States in their acceptance of the Charter of the United Nations

have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter,

"1. Affirms that the fulfilment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles:

- "(i) Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict;
- "(ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force;

"2. Affirms further the necessity

"(a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area;

"(b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;

"(c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability

and political independence of every State in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones;

"3. Requests the Secretary-General to designate a special representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution;

"4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the efforts of the special representative as soon as possible."

REPORTS OF SECRETARY-GENERAL

S/8259. Note by Secretary-General dated 23 November 1967.

S/8309 and Add.1. Report by Secretary-General on progress of efforts of Special Representative to Middle East, dated 22 December 1967 and 17 January 1968.

THE UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCE

A report on the organisation and functioning of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) in the Middle East was submitted by the Secretary-General to the twenty-second regular session of the General Assembly which opened on 19 September 1967. The report, which was the final one in a series of annual reports on UNEF, covered the developments from 1 August 1966 until the withdrawal of UNEF in mid-June 1967 (see pp. 162-74).

The report contained some general views on United Nations peace-keeping activities and some observations relating to the general nature of, and arrangements for, peace-keeping forces and the limitations and difficulties likely to be inherent in those arrangements. It pointed out that UNEF had been successful as a peace-keeping operation but also costly by United Nations standards. During its existence it had suffered 89 fatal casualties and many wounded and injured. Its total cost in its 10½ years of deployment had been approximately \$213 million. Its peak strength had been 6,073 in March 1967 and it had been reduced to 3,378 at the time of its withdrawal.

The observations dealt also with the achievements of UNEF as well as its limitations and stressed the essentially ad hoc nature of this and other emergency United Nations peace-

keeping operations. The report also touched on the organization and command of the United Nations force and the difference between the United Nations concept of soldiering and normal national military service. It also dealt with the administrative problems of a peace-keeping force and concluded by paying tribute to the Governments which had provided contingents for UNEF—Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, Finland, India, Indonesia, Norway, Sweden and Yugoslavia, as well as to the many thousands of officers and men from those countries whose discipline, understanding and exemplary bearing had made UNEF's success possible.

The report went on to say that UNEF had functioned much as in previous years until 19 May 1967, when the Force ceased its operational activities and was ordered to concentrate in non-operational areas prior to its eventual withdrawal. The withdrawal of UNEF was a result of a request, received on 18 May through the Permanent Representative of the United Arab Republic to the United Nations from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Republic, that the necessary steps be taken for the withdrawal of the Force as soon as possible. The events leading up to the withdrawal of UNEF had been described in detail in a special

report by the Secretary-General on 18 May 1967.

Further reports on the decision to withdraw the Force and on the details of its evacuation were also submitted in May and June. (For further information, see pp. 162-65 and 198.)

Subsequent to the withdrawal of all observation posts along the Armistice Demarcation Line and the International Frontier, the UNEF Command had ordered the concentration of all contingents in preparation for their final withdrawal from the area. All detachments had been concentrated by 24 May 1967, the last to be withdrawn being the detachment at Sharm-El-Sheikh, which was withdrawn on 23 May. It was intended that the withdrawal of UNEF should be orderly, deliberate and dignified and spaced over a period of some weeks, the troops being withdrawn by air and by sea from Port Said. The withdrawal plan envisaged that the last personnel of UNEF would leave the area on 30 June 1967.

On the morning of 27 May, the Secretary-General received a communication from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Republic urging the complete withdrawal and departure of the Canadian contingent not later than 48 hours from that date, on grounds of the attitude adopted by the Government of Canada in connexion with UNEF and the United Arab Republic Government's request for its withdrawal, and "to prevent any probable reaction from the people of the United Arab Republic against the Canadian Forces in UNEF." After consultation with the Permanent Representative of Canada, the withdrawal of the Canadian contingent was accelerated and was completed on 31 May, with the effect that

UNEF was left without its logistics and air support components.

The hostilities which broke out on 5 June 1967 necessitated a complete change in the withdrawal plans for UNEF and led to casualties being suffered by UNEF contingents as follows:

Brazil: 1 killed and 1 wounded.

India: 14 killed and 20 wounded.

The emergency evacuation of UNEF contingents now had to be organized by sea and, owing to the difficult situation in the Gaza area, the Force was evacuated by sea through the Israel port of Ashdod; the evacuation was completed on 17 June. A Secretariat working team remained behind, under the supervision of a representative of United Nations Headquarters and the UNEF Chief Administrative Officer, to dispose of stores, accommodations, transport and so forth.

In his report, the Secretary-General pointed out that only 45 Member States had paid part or all of their original 1967 UNEF assessments—the total representing less than one half the amount of the revised estimates, and he urged all Members to pay in full.

On 13 December 1967, the General Assembly, without discussion, took note of the report of the Secretary-General on UNEF. On 13 December, the General Assembly adopted a resolution whereby, among other things, it made provisions for authorizing the Secretary-General to meet any necessary expenditures after 31 December 1967 that might arise in connexion with the termination of UNEF's operations.

(For further information, see pp. 162-74 and 814.)

DOCUMENTARY REFERENCES

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Plenary Meeting 1629.

A/6669 and Add.1, 2. Special report of Secretary-General.

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A/6716. Resolutions adopted by General Assembly

during its 22nd session, Vol. I, 19 September-19 December 1967, p. 8.

OTHER DOCUMENTS

Withdrawal of United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF). Report of Secretary-General. United Nations Office of Public Information. Reprinted from UN Monthly Chronicle, Vol. IV, No. 7, July 1967. (See also pp. 174 and 814.)

ASSISTANCE TO REFUGEES IN THE NEAR EAST

REPORT OF COMMISSIONER-GENERAL

The annual report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) to the twenty-second (1967) session of the General Assembly described not only activities under the "normal" programme of UNRWA, as it functioned prior to June 1967, but also efforts to provide emergency aid both to already registered refugees and to other needy persons displaced as a result of the hostilities which had occurred during 1967 in the Middle East.

Until June 1967, the Commissioner-General stated, there had been no change in the trends apparent in recent years and no solution was in sight for UNRWA's basic dilemma—the ever-widening gap between the need to provide essential services for an ever-increasing refugee community and the Agency's resources based on voluntary contributions.

Because UNRWA's financial predicament, involving deficits for four successive years, had become still more acute as an immediate result of the recent conflict, the Commissioner-General again appealed for action to put UNRWA on a sound financial basis and to ensure adequate funds. In this connexion, he recalled suggestions advanced in the General Assembly in 1966 either for enabling the refugees to benefit from the property they left behind in 1948 or for transferring the UNRWA budget, in whole or only as regards its administrative expenses, to the assessed budget of the United Nations.

The Commissioner-General also outlined the main developments in the humanitarian field during the three months after the outbreak of hostilities in June 1967. UNRWA had quickly resumed its services to the refugees, he said, and had distributed certain supplies on an emergency and temporary basis to needy persons not registered with UNRWA, a decision endorsed by the General Assembly on 4 July 1967, by its resolution 2252 (ES-V). (See pp. 221-22 for further details.)

Following a request from Israel, arrangements based upon an exchange of letters dated 14 June 1967 had enabled the Agency to resume its services to refugees in the West Bank area of

Jordan and the Gaza Strip. Co-operation between the Government of Israel and the Agency had been effective in that area. Until the end of August 1967, he said, no UNRWA staff had been able to enter the other area of major hostilities, south-western Syria.

The Commissioner-General's report went on to say that UNRWA had faced the greatest demand for emergency aid in east Jordan when; 200,000 persons, including some 100,000 UNRWA-registered refugees, had fled from the West Bank during the summer. In co-operation with Jordan's own emergency measures the Agency had established new tented camps. The announcement by Israel on 2 July 1967 that it was prepared to allow the return to the West Bank of those who had fled as a result of the hostilities had led the Commissioner-General to urge return to the West Bank, where UNRWA's facilities offered far greater capacity to assist those persons: However, only some 14,000 of the applicants for return—150,000 applicants as reported by Jordan and 100,000 applicants as reported by Israel—had been permitted to return, including only 3,000 out of 93,000 UNRWA-registered refugees. Thus the hope for return of the bulk of the displaced persons in pursuance of the Security Council's resolution 237(1967) of 14 June 1967³⁴ had not been realized.

In Syria, the Agency's emergency help had been limited to the 16,000 registered Palestinian refugees among the 115,000 persons who had moved from the area occupied by Israel. No aid had yet been requested for the Syrian displaced persons.

Some 35,000 people, the Commissioner-General's report continued, had reportedly moved from the Sinai Peninsula to the United Arab Republic. In addition, between three and four thousand among the registered refugees had been forced to leave the Gaza Strip because the Israel authorities believed them members of the Palestine Liberation Army. This group was being cared for at the request of and in agreement with the United Arab Republic.

³⁴ For text of Security Council resolution 237(1967), see pp. 190-91.

The emergency assistance for Arab refugees in the Middle East in mid-1967 had been a combined operation to which the Governments concerned, other donor Governments, the Red Cross and the Red Crescent, UNRWA, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the specialized agencies and other organizations and individuals had all made essential contributions. Donations to the value of \$6.4 million, had been pledged as at the end of August 1967.

Commenting on the longer-term prospects, the Commissioner-General wrote that the political issues underlying the Palestine refugee problem could not be ignored. Referring to paragraph 11 of the General Assembly's resolution 194(III) of 11 December 1948, providing for repatriation or compensation of the Palestine refugees,³⁵ he stated that after 19 years the refugees had still had neither an opportunity for returning to their homes nor compensation for their property. Since the two issues of repatriation and compensation had been linked together as alternatives in the resolution, the continuing deadlock over repatriation had had the result of denying the refugees any benefit from property left behind in 1948. It would hardly seem, he said, that this could have been the Assembly's intention in adopting the resolution of 11 December 1948.

Nonetheless, the Commissioner-General continued, under the surface of the political deadlock, a slow but steady process of rehabilitation had made an evident impact in improving the economic and social condition of the refugees. This hopeful process had, for the time being at least, been halted and indeed reversed as a result of recent events.

Pointing out that in the present circumstances preparation of the 1968 budget had involved many assumptions, the Commissioner-General said in his report that the estimate of \$45.8 million budgeted for continuation of the Agency's pre-hostilities programme had included \$5.7 million for emergency programmes arising from the hostilities.

CONSIDERATION BY GENERAL ASSEMBLY

The report of the Commissioner-General of UNRWA was referred by the General Assembly at its twenty-second session (which opened on

19 September 1967) to the Assembly's Special Political Committee, where it was discussed at 11 meetings held between 11 and 16 December 1967.

Presenting his report, the Commissioner-General said that since the last (1966) session of the General Assembly, the number of refugees had increased by about 350,000-400,000, as a result of the Middle East conflict. To the 332,000 UNRWA refugees in East Jordan before 1 June there had been added 125,000 refugees from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and 120,000 other displaced West Bank residents. Many of these new refugees were dependent upon Governments or on UNRWA or other organizations for food, clothing, medical care and schooling for their children. However, only two thirds of the registered refugees received rations, and there were now 284,000 children whose claims had been deferred because of ration ceilings. Since the preparation of the budget for 1968, UNRWA had been faced with new demands, especially in the case of newly displaced persons, which would require greater expenditures. The Commissioner-General estimated a budgetary shortfall of some \$7 million. He expressed the hope that the General Assembly would authorize UNRWA to maintain its existing pre-hostilities services and to continue in 1968 to give help on a temporary emergency basis to new groups of needy persons; he also hoped that the Assembly would find a way to assure adequate funds for the future.

Requests were made to the Special Political Committee by Afghanistan, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia that it hear a statement by the "Palestine Arab Delegation." Requests were also made by 12 Arab States—Algeria, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, the Sudan, Syria, the United Arab Republic and Yemen—that it hear a statement by the delegation of the "Palestine Liberation Organiza-

³⁵ Paragraph 11 of resolution 194(III) provided, *inter alia*, that "the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property. . . ." For full text of resolution 194(III), see Y.U.N., 1948-49, pp. 174-76.

tion." On 12 December, the Special Political Committee decided to authorize persons constituting these delegations to speak in the Committee without such authorization implying recognition of the organizations.

During the Special Political Committee's discussions, there was a general expression of appreciation for the devotion with which the Commissioner-General and his staff had carried out their tasks.

Several representatives, commenting on what was described as a scandalous conspiracy against the Arabs, said that the partition of Palestine and the expulsion of its people, the latest Israel aggression and the occupation of Arab territories were all phases of the long-term plan of expansion drawn up by international Zionism. Israel had completely ignored the provisions of the United Nations resolutions calling for the repatriation of the refugees. Israel, they said, would not have dared to defy the international community if it had not had the support of the imperialist Western powers, particularly the United States. The failure of the United Nations to react to Israel's defiance of its resolutions had clearly encouraged Israel to commit oppressive acts against the Arab people of Palestine. Israel had adamantly refused to allow the inhabitants of the occupied areas to return to their homes.

Libya, for instance, maintained that it was therefore questionable whether Israel had the right to remain a Member of the United Nations. The United Nations could certainly invoke Article 6³⁶ of the United Nations Charter to expel Israel. It could also, under Article 41 of the Charter,³⁷ impose economic sanctions or ask the International Court of Justice to make a decision on that question.

The representative of the United Arab Republic declared that the increasing number of refugees following Israel's aggression in June 1967 had considerably aggravated the problem. Those refugees were not merely victims of the war who had the opportunity of returning home, as the Israel representative had argued, but rather were the victims of a meticulously planned racist policy to promote the expansion of international Zionism. It was the duty of the world community to extend all possible assistance to oppressed people in their fight for

survival. It would be wrong to believe that the refugees wished to remain a charge on the international community. More than ever they wanted to return to their homes and earn their own living.

These and other speakers felt that the General Assembly should reaffirm resolutions adopted by the Assembly and the Security Council and ignored by Israel, especially Security Council resolution 237(1967) of 14 June 1967 (see above, p. 190) calling upon Israel to facilitate the return of those who had fled since the outbreak of hostilities, and the General Assembly resolution (194(III)) of 11 December 1948³⁷ calling for the repatriation of the refugees. The one unalterable fact was the refusal of the people of Palestine to disappear as a national entity. They could not be denied their right to self-determination and freedom, nor could they be asked to resign themselves to the status of second-class citizens in their own country.

The representatives of Jordan and Syria said that after the June hostilities Israel had resorted to terror tactics to reduce the Arab population in the occupied areas and had urged increased Jewish immigration.

The United Nations, the representative of Jordan declared, had in recent times heard too much about peace and too little about justice. That had been the tragedy of the Palestine problem over the past 20 years. Peace imposed by conquerors on their enemies was only a sham peace, which led to even more disastrous conflagrations. Those who talked of peace should ask themselves which party to the conflict was conquering and expanding. As long as Israel forces remained in occupation of Arab territory in violation of the Armistice Agreements and of the rights of the local people, Israel was clearly not interested in peace, Jordan argued.

The appointment of a property custodian to administer Arab property in Israel and to receive income derived therefrom on behalf of its owners was proposed by representatives of Arab States and supported by several other members. Indonesia, for instance, believed that the proposed custodian would be the right in-

³⁶ For texts of Articles 6 and 41 of the United Nations Charter, see APPENDIX II.

³⁷ See footnote 35.

terim instrument to oversee those properties until such a time as they could be disposed of on the basis of lawful ownership and legal as well as humane justice. With the income from those properties, the refugees would not be a financial burden to the United Nations any more, for that income would be sufficient to finance the activities of UNRWA as indicated in the Commissioner-General's report.

Regarding the Israel proposal for a five-year plan for the refugees, representatives of Arab States maintained that the refugee problem was not negotiable, and that it must be settled according to the wishes of the refugees themselves. If the Israel Government wished to discuss the implementation of the refugees' right to repatriation, it could do so forthwith in an existing body which had a very clear mandate—namely, the Palestine Conciliation Commission.

A member of the "Palestine Arab Delegation" declared that the Palestinian Arabs who were the principal party to the Palestine problem would continue their struggle by all means to liberate their homeland. They rejected the General Assembly's Palestine partition resolution of 29 November 1947³⁸ and all recommendations and subsequent decisions as a violation of the United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,³⁹ the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,⁴⁰ and the right to self-determination and stated that they were the outcome of collusion between the Western powers and world Zionism.

A member of the "Palestine Liberation Organization," rejecting in particular the Assembly's Palestine partition resolution of 29 November 1947 and the Security Council's resolution 242(1967) of 22 November 1967 (see p. 257), stated that nobody could deprive the Palestinian people of their national right to return to their home and their country. No Israel aggression would deter that people from fighting for and achieving the liberation of their homeland.

The representative of Israel said that the bitter fruit of the three wars caused by Arab attempts to destroy Israel had been death, damage and displacement for both sides. The prospect of peace would transform the refugee problem in the area, old and new. It was his Government's deepest desire to open a new

chapter in its relations with the Arab world, based on reconciliation, mutual respect and mutual interest. Israel had thus welcomed the Security Council's resolution 242(1967) of 22 November 1967 which placed a solution of the refugee problem in the broad context of peace.

Since June 1967, his Government had been working on detailed and practical proposals on the refugee question. It was clear that Israel had neither the duty nor the capacity to solve the problem by itself, but it would participate fully in an international and regional plan to that end.

Israel formally proposed that consultations should immediately be initiated between Israel and the Arab host countries, together with the main contributing countries, to negotiate a five-year plan for the rehabilitation of the refugees and the final integration into the economic life of the region. Israel had already suggested the establishment of a reintegration and compensation fund to provide the financial means for a solution of the refugee problem in all its aspects. Israel's representative reaffirmed his Government's commitment to give financial support to such a fund.

While assistance should be given to those affected by the recent war who were in need, he said, the nature of population movements should be understood if solutions were to be found. The General Assembly, in adopting its resolution 2252(ES-V) on 4 July 1967 (see page 221), made a distinction between persons coming under UNRWA's mandate and "other persons in the area at present displaced and in serious need of immediate assistance as a result of the hostilities." The resolution, Israel's spokesman said, was careful not to refer to the latter as refugees, and most of them were probably not refugees in the normal sense of that term. Most of the figures given by the UNRWA Commissioner-General, he went on to say, had been supplied by the Arab Governments concerned and were, in his delegation's opinion, inflated. The Syrian and Jordanian displaced persons, he stated, had not been ex-

³⁸ See Y.U.N., 1947-48, pp. 247-56, text of General Assembly resolution 181(II) A.

³⁹ See Y.U.N., 1948-49, pp. 535-37.

⁴⁰ See Y.U.N., 1960, pp. 49-50, text of General Assembly resolution 1514(XV).

pelled. The problems of those Jordanians were the direct fruit of the war deliberately launched by Jordan against Israel and their displacement could best be adjusted in the context of an honourable accommodation with Israel.

In all Israel-held areas, he stressed, adequate supplies of food-stuffs had been issued from the outset. Economic activity had at least been restored to pre-war levels and steady progress was being made. The high degree of co-operation developed was remarkable considering that the Arab population was being incited to revolt and that there was organized terrorist activity from Syria and Jordan. It would have been neither truthful nor convincing to suggest that there were no problems. Resentment and suspicion survived; there were difficulties in adjusting to the present and anxiety about the future. Nevertheless, conditions were in every way better than anyone would have dared to expect some months previously.

The representative of Israel rejected the proposal for the appointment of a custodian, maintaining that property claims were an integral part of the refugee problem. The General Assembly had no competence to intervene in the regulation of property matters in any sovereign Member state, and had never attempted to do so. It was wrong, he said, to suggest that Israel's sovereignty and statehood was limited or restricted by some provision which did not apply to the other 122 Member States, since Article 2, paragraph 1, of the United Nations Charter stated categorically that "the Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members." Israel also rejected the suggestion that the income derived from Arab property in Israel should be paid to UNRWA.

The representative of the United States observed that the past year had brought additional destruction and human misery to the Middle East. He hoped that out of the latest conflict there might at least emerge the necessary political will for providing new hope and security for the refugees. The Security Council resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967 (see above, pp. 257-58) might offer a better chance for putting an end to conflict and suffering in the Middle East than any decision adopted for many years past. The resolution

contained a set of agreed principles for establishing a stable peace. As an initial step, it had set in motion a process of peace-making in which both sides could and should co-operate; Moreover, the Security Council resolution 237 (1967) of 14 June 1967 (see above, pp. 190-91) calling for the return of the new refugees to their homes should be implemented to the fullest extent possible. From the Commissioner-General's report, it appeared that up to the time of the recent hostilities slow but steady progress had been made in rehabilitating the refugees of earlier conflicts. His Government hoped that the process of rehabilitation could now be resumed and even accelerated.

The United States was against the proposal to appoint a property custodian which would jeopardize a realistic solution of the refugee problem. The United States representative maintained that the United Nations had no right under the Charter or existing international law to appoint a custodian to administer property within any sovereign State against the will of that State, much less to appropriate income from the properties. Proposals regarding income from Arab property in Israel should be considered within the framework of the general question of compensation. The United States representative suggested that work done by the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine on that question could be made available to the parties in any negotiations.

The view that the Palestine refugee question was purely political and could not be dealt with mainly from the standpoint of humanitarian considerations was rejected by the representative of the United Kingdom. He stressed the urgent need for the authorities concerned to enable those Arabs who had been displaced during and since the June hostilities to return to their homes, and in particular for the UNRWA refugees to return to empty West Bank camps. The United Kingdom urged a greater number of Governments to contribute, or to increase their contributions, in order to provide UNRWA with the support required for maintaining both its pre-hostilities services and providing emergency aid to "new" refugees in urgent need. If available funds required reduction of Agency services, the United Kingdom favoured maintaining the educational, voca-

tional and health services which made the greatest contributions to the integration of the refugees into the economic life of the region.

The representative of France said that the difficulties which UNRWA had to face were primarily financial. Although the General Assembly resolution of 15 December 1965⁴¹ approving UNRWA's proposal to review its operations and improve the distribution of relief had been unevenly implemented, it seemed from the report of the Commissioner-General that the situation was now satisfactory in Lebanon and that the operation was pursuing its normal course in Gaza. While sympathetic to the Commissioner-General's request for effective measures to put the Agency on a sound financial basis, France could not support his proposal that the whole of the UNRWA budget should be transferred to the assessed budget of the United Nations, because that proposal conflicted with the Assembly's resolution of 8 December 1949⁴² providing for financing of the Agency solely from voluntary contributions.

The USSR spokesman said that the old problem of the Palestine refugees, engendered by Israel's policy of aggression and expansion, had been aggravated by the June 1967 aggression. The United Nations must force Israel to allow the newly displaced Arab refugees to return to their homes without delay. The acts committed by the Israel army against the Arab population of the occupied territory were closely linked to Israel territorial claims, he argued. The USSR would continue to give the Arab States the aid needed in their struggle to restore their lawful rights and to eliminate the consequences of Israel's aggression. The settlement of the conflict and the restoration of peace in the Near East were linked to the solution of the Palestine refugee problem. Israel continued to refuse to implement the General Assembly resolution (194(III)) of 11 December 1948⁴³, relating to the refugees' right to return to their homes and the Security Council resolution (242 (1967)) of 22 November 1967 (see pp. 257-58) calling for the immediate withdrawal of Israel armed forces from occupied Arab territory. The basic reason, he said, was support from certain imperialist circles, especially in the United States. Peace could not exist in the Near East and the refugee problem

could not be justly settled without, first of all, withdrawal by Israel from the occupied territories.

Ceylon declared that Members of the United Nations who had voted for the creation of Israel had a moral obligation to support all measures directed towards redressing the grievous wrong done to the Palestinians.

The representative of Ireland said that a just settlement of the refugee problem was impossible unless UNRWA or a United Nations resettlement commissioner were provided with adequate funds in addition to those required for UNRWA's normal operations. The General Assembly should therefore indicate that, as its contribution to a definitive settlement of the refugee problem as an essential part of a negotiated peace treaty, it would be willing to raise sufficient funds to give generous resettlement grants to the Arab families who were not restored to their homes and property in Israel.

GENERAL ASSEMBLY DECISIONS

Three draft resolutions were submitted to the Special Political Committee.

The first draft resolution, introduced by the United States on 14 December 1967, provided that the General Assembly, after recalling a series of past resolutions on the subject and noting the Annual Report of the Commissioner-General would: (1) note with deep regret that repatriation or compensation of the refugees as provided for in paragraph 11 of the General Assembly resolution (194(III)) of 11 December 1948⁴⁴ had not been effected, that no substantial progress had been made in the programme endorsed in paragraph 2 of the Assembly's resolution of 26 January 1952 (513(VI))⁴⁵ for the reintegration of refugees either by repatriation or resettlement and that, therefore, the situation of the refugees continued to be a matter of serious concern; (2) express thanks to the Commissioner-General and his

⁴¹ See Y.U.N., 1965, pp. 226-27, for text of resolution 2052(XX).

⁴² See Y.U.N., 1948-49, pp. 211-12, for text of resolution 302(IV).

⁴³ See footnote 35.

⁴⁴ See footnote 35.

⁴⁵ See Y.U.N., 1951, pp. 315-16 for text of resolution 513(VI).

staff for their continued faithful efforts to provide essential services for the Palestine refugees, and to the specialized agencies and private organizations for their valuable work in assisting the refugees; (3) direct the Commissioner-General of UNRWA to continue his efforts in taking such measures, including rectification of the relief rolls, as to assure, in co-operation with the Governments concerned, the most equitable distribution of relief based on need; (4) note with regret that the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine had been unable to find a means to achieve progress on the implementation of paragraph 11 of the General Assembly resolution (194(III)) of 11 December 1948 and request it to exert continued efforts towards the implementation thereof; (5) direct attention to the continuing critical financial position of UNRWA; (6) note with concern that, despite the efforts of the Commissioner-General to collect additional contributions to help relieve the serious budget deficit of the past year, contributions to UNRWA continued to fall short of the funds needed to cover essential budget requirements; and (7) call upon all Governments as a matter of urgency to make the most generous efforts possible to meet the anticipated needs of UNRWA, and therefore, urge non-contributing Governments to contribute and contributing Governments to consider increasing their contributions.

Another draft resolution was submitted by 19 Members—Afghanistan, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Ethiopia, Finland, Iceland, India, Iran, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Nigeria, Norway, Sweden, Turkey and Yugoslavia. By this text, the General Assembly would: (1) reaffirm its resolution (2252 (ES-V)) of 4 July 1967 (see above, page 221) calling for humanitarian assistance to the refugees; (2) endorse the efforts of the Commissioner-General of UNRWA to provide humanitarian assistance, as far as practicable, on an emergency basis and as a temporary measure, to other persons in the area who were at present displaced and were in need of immediate assistance as a result of the recent hostilities; and (3) appeal to all Governments and to organizations and individuals to make special contributions for the above purposes to UNRWA and to the other

inter-governmental and non-governmental organizations concerned.

Afghanistan, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan and Somalia also submitted a draft resolution, by the terms of which the Assembly would: (1) request the Secretary-General to take all appropriate steps to have a custodian appointed to protect and administer Arab property, assets and property rights in Israel and to receive income derived therefrom on behalf of the rightful owners; (2) call upon the Governments concerned to render all facilities and assistance to the Secretary-General to make the task and functioning of the custodian effective; and (3) request the custodian to report to the General Assembly in 1968 on the fulfilment of his tasks.

On 16 December 1967, the Special Political Committee approved the United States draft resolution by a roll-call vote of 99 to 0, with 2 abstentions. On 19 December 1967, it was adopted at a plenary meeting of the Assembly by 98 votes to 0, with 3 abstentions, as resolution 2341 A (XXII). (For text, see DOCUMENTARY REFERENCES below.)

The 19-power draft resolution was approved by the Special Political Committee on 16 December 1967 by 102 votes to 0, with 1 abstention. On 19 December 1967, it was adopted at a plenary meeting of the Assembly by 105 votes to 0, with 2 abstentions, as resolution 2341 B (XXII). For text, see DOCUMENTARY REFERENCES below.)

The Special Political Committee also approved the five-power draft resolution on 16 December 1967. It did so by a roll-call vote of 42 to 38, with 24 abstentions. At a plenary meeting on 19 December 1967, the Assembly, acting on a proposal by Nigeria, decided not to put this text to the vote.

REPORT OF CONCILIATION COMMISSION FOR PALESTINE

A report for the year ending 30 September 1967 submitted by the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine to the General Assembly stated that the Commission had continued to examine how it might intensify its efforts so as to advance implementation of the provisions of paragraph 11 of the General Assembly's resolution 194(III) of 11 De-

cember 1948⁴⁶ concerning repatriation or compensation of the Palestine refugees. All of the possible means previously envisaged had presupposed substantial changes in the situation, the Conciliation Commission pointed out. No

evidence of any such changes had been discerned; in fact, after June 1967 developments had further complicated an already complex problem.

⁴⁶ See footnote 35.

DOCUMENTARY REFERENCES

GENERAL ASSEMBLY—22ND SESSION

Special Political Committee, meetings 584-594.

Fifth Committee, meeting 1229.

Ad Hoc Committee of General Assembly for Announcement of Voluntary Contributions to UNRWA, meeting 1.

Plenary Meeting 1640.

A/6713. Report of Commissioner-General of United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in Near East (UNRWA), 1 July 1966-30 June 1967.

A/SPC/119. Letter of 8 December 1967 from Afghanistan, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia requesting hearing for "Palestine Arab Delegation."

A/SPC/120. Letter of 11 December 1967 from Algeria, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, United Arab Republic and Yemen requesting hearing for delegation of Palestine Liberation Organization.

A/SPC/121. Statement by Commissioner-General of UNRWA on 11 December 1967, meeting 584.

A/SPC/L.155. United States: draft resolution, adopted by Special Political Committee on 16 December 1967, meeting 594, by roll-call vote of 99 to 0, with 2 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burundi, Byelorussian SSR, Canada, Central African Republic, Ceylon, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Dahomey, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Gabon, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives Islands, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Southern Yemen, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Syria, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, United Arab Republic, United Kingdom, United Republic of Tanzania, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia. Against: None.

Abstaining: Congo (Brazzaville), Israel.

A/7004. Report of Special Political Committee, draft resolution A.

RESOLUTION 2341 A (xxii), as recommended by Special Political Committee, A/7004, adopted by

Assembly on 19 December 1967, meeting 1640, by 98 votes to 0, with 3 abstentions.

"The General Assembly,

"Recalling its resolutions 194(III) of 11 December 1948, 302(IV) of 8 December 1949, 393(V) and 394(V) of 2 and 14 December 1950, 512(VI) and 513(VI) of 26 January 1952, 614(VII) of 6 November 1952, 720(VIII) of 27 November 1953, 818(IX) of 4 December 1954, 916(X) of 3 December 1955, 1018(XI) of 28 February 1957, 1191(XII) of 12 December 1957, 1315(XIII) of 12 December 1958, 1456(XIV) of 9 December 1959, 1604(XV) of 21 April 1961, 1725(XVI) of 20 December 1961, 1856(XVII) of 20 December 1962, 1912(XVIII) of 3 December 1963, 2002(XIX) of 10 February 1965, 2052(XX) of 15 December 1965 and 2154(XXI) of 17 November 1966,

"Noting the annual report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, covering the period from 1 July 1966 to 30 June 1967,

"1. Notes with deep regret that repatriation or compensation of the refugees as provided for in paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194(III) has not been effected, that no substantial progress has been made in the programme endorsed in paragraph 2 of resolution 513(VI) for the reintegration of refugees either by repatriation or resettlement and that, therefore, the situation of the refugees continues to be a matter of serious concern;

"2. Expresses its thanks to the Commissioner-General and the staff of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East for their continued faithful efforts to provide essential services for the Palestine refugees, and to the specialized agencies and private organizations for their valuable work in assisting the refugees;

"3. Directs the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East to continue his efforts in taking such measures, including rectification of the relief rolls, as to assure, in co-operation with the Governments concerned, the most equitable distribution of relief based on need;

"4. Notes with regret that the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine was unable to find a means to achieve progress in the implementation of paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194(III), and requests the Commission to exert continued efforts towards the implementation thereof;

"5. Directs attention to the continuing critical financial position of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near

East, as outlined in the Commissioner-General's report;

"6. Notes with concern that, despite the commendable and successful efforts of the Commissioner-General to collect additional contributions to help relieve the serious budget deficit of the past year, contributions to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East continue to fall short of the funds needed to cover essential budget requirements;

"7. Calls upon all Governments as a matter of urgency to make the most generous efforts possible to meet the anticipated needs of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, particularly in the light of the budgetary deficit projected in the Commissioner-General's report, and, therefore, urges non-contributing Governments, to contribute and contributing Governments to consider increasing their contributions."

A/SPC/L.156 and Add.1, Afghanistan, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Ethiopia, Finland, Iceland, India, Iran, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Nigeria, Norway, Sweden, Turkey, Yugoslavia: draft resolution, adopted by Special Political Committee on 16 December 1967, meeting 594, by vote of 102 to 0, with 1 abstention.

A/7004. Report of Special Political Committee, draft resolution B.

RESOLUTION 2341 B (xxii), as recommended by Special Political Committee, A/7004, adopted by Assembly on 19 December 1967, meeting 1640, by 105 votes to 0, with 2 abstentions.

"The General Assembly,

"Recalling its resolution 2252(ES-V) of 4 July 1967,

"Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations of 15 September 1967,

"Taking note also of the report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, covering the period from 1 July 1966 to 30 June 1967,

"Concerned about the continued human suffering as a result of the recent hostilities in the Middle East,

"1. Reaffirms its resolution 2252(ES-V) ;

"2. Endorses, bearing in mind the objectives of that resolution, the efforts of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East to provide humanitarian assistance, as far as practicable, on an emergency basis and as a temporary measure, to other persons in the area who are at present displaced and in serious need of immediate assistance as a result of the recent hostilities;

"3. Appeals to all Governments and to organizations and individuals to make special contributions for the above purposes to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East and to the other inter-governmental and non-governmental organizations concerned."

A/SPC/L.157. Afghanistan, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Somalia: draft resolution, adopted by Special Political Committee on 16 December 1967, meeting 594, by roll-call vote of 42 to 38, with 24 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Bulgaria, Burundi, Byelorussian SSR, Ceylon, China, Congo (Brazzaville), Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Ghana, Guinea, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Maldives Islands, Mali, Mauritania, Mongolia, Morocco, Pakistan, Philippines, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Southern Yemen, Spain, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, United Arab Republic, Yemen, Yugoslavia.*

Against: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dahomey, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Finland, France, Gambia, Haiti, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Lesotho, Liberia, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Norway, Rwanda, Sweden, Togo, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay.

Abstaining: Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Gabon, Greece, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Japan, Kenya, Mexico, Nigeria, Panama, Romania, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Thailand, Turkey, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Venezuela, Zambia.

* The representative of Cyprus stated that had he been present during the voting, he would have voted in favour of the draft resolution.

A/C.5/1162, A/7024. Financial implications of draft resolution C approved by Special Political Committee, A/7004. Statement by Secretary-General and report of Fifth Committee.

A/7004. Report of Special Political Committee, draft resolution C [not voted on, as decided by Assembly, at suggestion of Nigeria, on 19 December 1967, meeting 1640].

REPORT OF CONCILIATION COMMISSION FOR PALESTINE

A/6846. Report of United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine, covering period 1 October 1966-30 September 1967.