

# Political and Security Questions

## CHAPTER I

### DISARMAMENT AND RELATED MATTERS

In 1968, discussions on disarmament centred mainly on the question of preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons.

The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC) reconvened early in January 1968 in Geneva, Switzerland. Pursuant to a General Assembly resolution of 19 December 1967,<sup>1</sup> it continued to give its primary attention to the negotiation of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. On 14 March, the Conference submitted a report to the General Assembly transmitting the text of a draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. (For details, see pp. 4-5.)

The General Assembly considered this draft treaty at its resumed twenty-second session, which began on 24 April 1968. On 12 June, after amending several draft provisions, the Assembly commended the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and requested the Depositary Governments to open the Treaty for signature and ratification at the earliest possible date. (For details, see below, pp. 8-19.) A few days later, the Security Council met (from 17 to 19 June) to consider the question of the nuclear-weapon powers which were Parties to the Treaty giving assurances to the non-nuclear-weapon countries renouncing nuclear weapons in accordance with the Treaty. (For details, see below, pp. 19-22.)

[On 1 July 1968, the Treaty was signed in London, Moscow and Washington.]

On 16 July 1968, the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament met again at Geneva. It devoted most of its meetings at this session to consideration of effective measures for cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date, and to nuclear disarmament. Before adjourning on 28 August 1968, the Committee adopted a new agenda with a view to

facilitating progress in its work. (For details, see pp. 22-31 below.)

On 29 August 1968, the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States convened in Geneva, with the participation of 96 countries. It concluded its work on 28 September and submitted a report to the General Assembly containing not only the recommendations made by the Conference, as contained in a declaration, but also a number of resolutions relating to: (a) measures to assure the security of non-nuclear-weapon States; (b) the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones; (c) measures for the prevention of the further proliferation of nuclear weapons, the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date, and nuclear disarmament; and (d) programmes for co-operation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. (For details, see pp. 40-42.)

At its twenty-third session, which opened on 24 September 1968, the General Assembly reviewed the work of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States. The Assembly also considered several other items on its agenda relating to disarmament.

The Assembly adopted seven resolutions on disarmament matters.

Two of these resolutions dealt with general and complete disarmament, including the question of chemical and bacteriological weapons. (For details, see pp. 40-42.)

One resolution was concerned with the suspension of nuclear tests. (For details, see pp. 46-47.)

Four resolutions related to the recommendations of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States. (For details, see pp. 48-51.)

<sup>1</sup> See Y.U.N., 1967, pp. 11-12, text of resolution 2346 A (XXII).

REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION  
COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT  
ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament reconvened in Geneva, Switzerland, from 18 January to 14 March 1968. In view of the urgency of concluding a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and pursuant to a General Assembly resolution of 19 December 1967,<sup>2</sup> the Conference devoted this period exclusively to the negotiation of the treaty. By the same resolution the General Assembly had also asked the Committee to report on or before 15 March 1968 and had decided it would resume its session at an early date after 15 March to consider the report. As in previous years, all the members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee, except France, participated in the work of the Conference.

At the opening meeting on 18 January, the USSR and the United States submitted identical revised drafts of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, first submitted on 24 August 1967.<sup>3</sup>

The revised text embodied the following main changes.

(1) For the first time an agreed text of an article on safeguards (article III) was included.

(2) The clause providing that the benefits of peaceful nuclear explosions be made available to all parties, and the provision concerning the right of groups of States to conclude nuclear-free zone treaties, previously included in the preamble, became articles V and VII respectively in the new draft.

(3) A new article VI was added calling on all parties to negotiate in good faith on questions of disarmament and to end the nuclear arms race.

(4) Amendments to the treaty were to be applicable only to States accepting them.

(5) The initial duration of the treaty would be 25 years and at the end of this period a conference would decide on subsequent duration by majority vote.

By the terms of article III of the new text, non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the treaty were to negotiate, either individually or together with other States, with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for the applica-

tion of safeguards in accordance with the Agency's statute and safeguards system for the exclusive purpose of verifying the fulfilment of the treaty obligations with the view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to weaponry or other explosive devices. The treaty safeguards were applicable to all

<sup>2</sup> See Y.U.N., 1967, pp. 11-12, text of resolution 2346 A (XXII).

<sup>3</sup> The draft treaty submitted on 24 August 1967 contained a preamble and eight articles.

By the preamble, the parties to the treaty would, among other things, affirm the principle that potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear technology, including nuclear explosive devices, would be available to non-nuclear-weapon States on a non-discriminatory basis. They would declare their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race, and also express their desire to facilitate the cessation of production of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles pursuant to a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. The parties would also note the right of any groups of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.

By the terms of article I of the proposed treaty, each nuclear-weapon State party to the treaty would undertake not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly or indirectly, and not in any way to assist, encourage or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.

By article II, each non-nuclear-weapon State party to the treaty would undertake not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly or indirectly. Each would also undertake not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

Article III was not formulated.

The subsequent articles contained provisions on: the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in the context of non-proliferation (article IV); amendments and review of treaty operation (article V); entry into force and accession (article VI); duration and withdrawal (article VII); and deposit (article VIII).

source and special fissionable material used in peaceful nuclear activities of non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the treaty; the provision by any of the parties of such materials or equipment to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes was prohibited unless said materials and equipment were subject to treaty safeguards; the safeguards should be so implemented as to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the parties or international co-operation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities.

The provisions of article IV of the new text affirmed the legal obligation of the parties to co-operate in contributing, either alone or in co-operation with other States or international organizations, to the further development of the peaceful application of nuclear energy.

Article V of the new text enunciated a formal commitment of the parties to co-operate for the purpose of ensuring that potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosives would be shared with non-nuclear-weapon parties, either bilaterally or through multilateral arrangements, on a non-discriminatory basis and at a nominal cost that would exclude charges for research and development.

By the terms of article VI of the new text, nuclear-weapon States parties to the treaty undertook to pursue negotiations in good faith on ending the nuclear arms race, on disarmament and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. This article, it was pointed out, was designed to assure an acceptable balance of obligations and responsibilities between non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-weapon States parties to the treaty.

Subsequent articles included provisions relating to the right of any group of States to establish nuclear-free zones in their territories (article VII) and provisions concerning amendments, review of treaty operation (article VIII), entry into force and accession (article IX), duration and withdrawal (article X) and Depositary Governments (article XI).

In submitting for consideration by the Committee the full text of a draft treaty on non-proliferation, with amendments based upon proposals by other States, the representatives of

the USSR and the United States stressed that the draft took account, to a large extent, of the positions supported by a majority of the members of the Committee.

The United States said that the revised treaty draft was "a recommendation for discussion and negotiation in this Committee and for the consideration by all Governments." The United States stressed that while the draft was not presented on a take-it or leave-it basis, it believed that the draft would meet the essential concerns expressed in the Committee and outside of it.

While the revised draft treaty was generally considered an improvement on the previous text a number of Committee members did not find it fully satisfactory. Amendments were submitted by Brazil, Italy, Nigeria, Romania, Sweden, the United Arab Republic and the United Kingdom. Spain, which was not a member of the Committee, set forth its views on the draft treaty in a memorandum presented on 8 February 1968 to the Committee Co-chairmen.

Brazil restated its previous objections to the draft treaty and proposed amendments which, inter alia, would: permit non-nuclear-weapon States to possess nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes under safeguards; specify the further measures of disarmament to be negotiated under article VI; provide for the channelling of resources freed by nuclear disarmament to developing countries; recognize the obligations as well as the rights of parties to nuclear-free zone treaties; include circumstances that "may arise" among grounds for withdrawal; and remove the requirement for notification of withdrawal, with a statement of the circumstances invoked, to be sent to the Security Council.

Italy proposed, inter alia, an amendment which would guarantee supplies of nuclear materials for non-nuclear powers; provide for an automatic review conference every five years and limit to 25 years the duration of the treaty, which would be renewed automatically for further periods of 25 years, for parties not giving notice of withdrawal.

Nigeria put forward amendments which would include assurances by nuclear-weapon States parties to the treaty to come to the aid of any non-

nuclear-weapon State party to the treaty which was threatened or attacked with nuclear weapons; would impose an obligation to facilitate the exchange of information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy; would provide for the findings of the review conference to be adopted by majority vote; and would include events likely to jeopardize national interests among the grounds for withdrawal.

Romania submitted amendments relating to article III on safeguards, to article VI on measures of disarmament, as well as to security assurances, to provisions on treaty operation and to withdrawal. The amendments, *inter alia*, would use a more specific language in the safeguards provisions; establish controls through the Security Council to ensure that non-nuclear parties to the treaty having nuclear weapons on their territory did not acquire control over them; impose more specific nuclear disarmament obligations on nuclear powers; and include an undertaking by nuclear powers not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear parties to the treaty.

Sweden submitted an amendment which, *inter alia*, would include a preambular reference to the determination, expressed in the preamble of the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963,<sup>4</sup> to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons and to continue negotiations to that effect; and would strengthen the language of article VI, on further measures of disarmament. Sweden also sought to remove certain distinctions between nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States, without affecting the fundamental provisions, and remove the provisions for bilateral arrangements for peaceful nuclear explosions.

The United Arab Republic proposed the inclusion in the preamble of a special reference to a General Assembly resolution (2028 (XX)) of 19 November 1965 (which called for the early conclusion of a treaty to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons);<sup>5</sup> restated the amendments to articles I and II which it had submitted in 1967;<sup>6</sup> and asked for the deletion in article V of the provision concerning bilateral arrangements for peaceful nuclear explosions.

The United Kingdom introduced an amendment by which the proposed review conference to

review the duration of the treaty after 25 years would consider the implementation of the preamble as well as the provisions of the treaty.

Burma called for definite obligations by the nuclear powers to take tangible steps towards nuclear disarmament.

Ethiopia urged that safeguards should apply to both nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States; it also expressed concern that a monopolistic price mechanism would come into play in respect of peaceful nuclear explosion devices and urged more specific commitments on peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

India deplored the omission of specific measures of further disarmament from the draft treaty. It stressed that the treaty, by banning proliferation of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear-weapon States while permitting further development and deployment of these weapons by all nuclear powers, including the People's Republic of China, had failed to conform to the General Assembly's resolution 2028 (XX) of 19 November 1965. India also criticized article III for not imposing safeguards on the peaceful nuclear activities of the nuclear powers. It opposed the prohibition of the possession of peaceful nuclear explosive devices by non-nuclear-weapon powers and stressed that the 25-year period of initial duration of the treaty removed any hope of general and complete disarmament.

The question of security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States undertaken under the treaty not to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons was a major subject of discussion during the deliberations of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. The importance of this question was generally agreed. No clear consensus emerged on the question during the deliberations, it being noted that a different security situation faced each non-nuclear-weapon State. While some members of the Committee felt that the treaty itself would provide the greatest possible degree of security, others called for a formal undertaking by nuclear-weapon States to be incorporated in the treaty, and sought to amend the draft treaty to that effect.

<sup>4</sup> See Y.U.N., 1963, pp. 124-26 and 137-40.

<sup>5</sup> See Y.U.N., 1965, pp. 72-73, for text of resolution 2028 (XX).

<sup>6</sup> See Y.U.N., 1967, p. 5.

Nigeria proposed to add to article II of the treaty a provision whereby nuclear-weapon States parties to the treaty would undertake, if requested, to come to the aid of non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the treaty, which were threatened or attacked with nuclear weapons. Romania proposed a separate article whereby the nuclear-weapon States parties to the treaty would solemnly undertake never in any circumstances to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States which undertake not to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons.

The USSR, the United States and the United Kingdom stated that they viewed the matter "in the context of action relating to the United Nations, outside the treaty itself but in close conjunction with it."

On 7 March 1968, these three powers submitted the text of a draft resolution on security assurances, which they undertook to introduce for appropriate consideration by the United Nations Security Council in connexion with the non-proliferation treaty. They also informed the Committee of parallel statements they would be prepared to make in the Security Council.

By the draft resolution the Security Council would: (1) recognize that aggression with nuclear weapons, or the threat of such aggression against a non-nuclear-weapon State would create a situation in which the Security Council, and above all its nuclear-weapon State permanent members, would have to act immediately in accordance with their obligations under the Charter; (2) welcome the intention of certain States to provide or support immediate assistance, in accordance with the Charter, to any non-nuclear-weapon State party to the non-proliferation treaty which was a victim of an act or an object of threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons were used; (3) reaffirm in particular the inherent right under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter of individual and collective self-defence if any armed attack occurred against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council had taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. (For text of Article 51, see APPENDIX ii.)

In this connexion, the USSR and the United

States outlined parallel declarations of intention which they would make in conjunction with Security Council action on the draft resolution, provided it was supported by other nuclear powers permanent members of the Security Council, that intended to sign the non-proliferation treaty, and that would make similar declarations. Their declarations would stress, inter alia, their intention as permanent members of the Security Council to seek immediate Council action to provide assistance in accordance with the Charter to any non-nuclear-weapon State party to the treaty which was the victim of an act of aggression in which nuclear weapons were used.

The United Kingdom declared that it was prepared in the context of the draft resolution of the Security Council to make a declaration of its intention similar to those described by the representatives of the United States and the USSR.

On 11 March 1968, the representatives of the USSR and the United States introduced a further revised draft of a non-proliferation treaty, incorporating the following changes. A paragraph was inserted in the preamble recalling the determination of the parties to the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963 to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all nuclear weapon tests and to continue negotiations to this end. Article VI, on further measures of disarmament, was amended to speak of the cessation of the nuclear arms race "at an early date" and to specify "nuclear" disarmament. Provision was added in article VIII for the review conference to consider the "purposes of the preamble" and the provisions of the treaty, and for review conferences to be held at five-year intervals if a majority of the parties so proposed.

On 14 March 1968, the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament adopted a report to the General Assembly and the Disarmament Commission, on the negotiations regarding a draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

On the same day, the Committee decided to recess and to reconvene following the resumed twenty-second session of the United Nations General Assembly, which was scheduled to begin on 24 April 1968.

## DOCUMENTARY REFERENCES

A/7072 (DC/230). Report of Conference of Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (covering period 18 January-14 March 1968).

A/7072 (DC/230)Add.1. Annex IV to report of Conference: Documents attached to report cover-

ing periods 18 January-14 March 1968 and 21 February-14 December 1967.

A/7080. Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Subject index to annex III of report of Conference of Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (A/7072 (DC/230)). Note by Secretariat.

### CONSIDERATION BY GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF TREATY ON NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

As decided by the General Assembly on 19 December 1967,<sup>7</sup> an agenda item entitled "Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons: report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament" was maintained on the agenda of the General Assembly's twenty-second session. This session was resumed on 24 April 1968.

The General Assembly had before it the report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, to which were annexed the text of a draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, submitted on 11 March 1968 by the USSR and the United States—Co-chairmen of the Conference—and other related Conference documents.

The Assembly referred the agenda item to its First Committee which discussed it at meetings held between 26 April and 10 June 1968.

The First Committee had before it a draft resolution sponsored by Afghanistan, Austria, Bulgaria, the Byelorussian SSR, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Iceland, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Lebanon, Mauritius, Mongolia, Morocco, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, the Ukrainian SSR, the USSR, the United Arab Republic, the United Kingdom, the United States and Yemen.

By the terms of this draft proposal, the General Assembly, convinced of the urgency of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, convinced that the non-proliferation treaty would be an effective measure to halt the spread of nuclear weapons, and convinced that an agreement to prevent further proliferation of nuclear weapons must be followed by effective steps on cessation of the nuclear arms race and on nuclear disarmament, and that the treaty would contribute to this aim, would: (1) endorse the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear

weapons, the text of which was annexed to the draft resolution; (2) request the Depositary Governments to open the treaty for signature and ratification at the earliest possible date; (3) express its hope for the widest possible adherence to the treaty; (4) request the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament urgently to pursue negotiations on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, and (5) request the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to report on the progress of its work to the General Assembly at its twenty-third session (scheduled to open on 24 September 1968).

A revision of this draft text was later submitted.

By the new clauses in the preamble of this text, the General Assembly would express its conviction of the urgency of intensifying international co-operation in the development of peaceful applications of atomic energy; and its conviction that, pursuant to the treaty's provisions, all signatories had the right to engage in research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and would be able to acquire source and special fissionable materials, as well as equipment, for the processing, use and production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes. It would also affirm that both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States carried the responsibility of acting in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter that the sovereign equality of all States should be respected, that the threat

<sup>7</sup> See Y.U.N., 1967, pp. 11-12, text of resolution 2346 A (XXII).

or use of force in international relations should be refrained from, and that international disputes should be settled by peaceful means.

The revised preamble did not contain the paragraph by which the General Assembly would have expressed its conviction that the non-proliferation treaty would be an effective measure to halt the spread of nuclear weapons.

The operative paragraphs remained the same except for the following changes: (a) by the first operative paragraph the Assembly would "commend" rather than "endorse" the treaty; (b) by the third, the Assembly would call for the widest possible adherence to the treaty "by both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States"; and (c) by the fourth, the Assembly would request the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament "and the nuclear-weapon States" to pursue disarmament negotiations, rather than the Committee only.

On 31 May, the representatives of the USSR and the United States, the Co-chairmen of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, agreed to certain revisions of the text of the draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, which were accepted by the sponsors of the revised draft resolution.

The revisions concerned, inter alia, provisions of article IV regarding peaceful uses of nuclear energy and article V regarding peaceful applications of nuclear explosions. In the main, they were intended to ensure more precisely access of the non-nuclear-weapon States to the benefits of the peaceful application of the atom and of any peaceful application of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.

The draft resolution was subsequently also sponsored by: Barbados, Belgium, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Italy, Liberia, Mexico, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Paraguay, Peru, the Philippines, Uruguay and Venezuela. This brought the total number of sponsors to 48.

During the debate in the earlier phase of the Assembly's session, the United States, the USSR and the United Kingdom called for an early conclusion of the treaty. Emphasizing its significance, they pointed out that the treaty would increase the security of both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States, would enable all nations to share in the benefits of peaceful

applications of nuclear energy, particularly the developing nations, and would facilitate the cessation of the nuclear arms race, thus helping to achieve not only nuclear disarmament but also general and complete disarmament. In their view, the provisions of the treaty reflected a fair balance of obligations and benefits between nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States.

Though the proposed treaty on the whole received wide support, several Members expressed reservations on the treaty as formulated and some rejected it altogether.

France observed that the only solution to the threat resulting from the existence of nuclear weapons was the cessation of the manufacture and the complete destruction of the stockpile of such weapons. France would not sign the treaty, its representative stated, but it would behave in the future exactly as the States adhering to the treaty.

Brazil felt that the treaty contained no clear commitment by the nuclear powers to press for further disarmament measures and failed to provide for an acceptable balance of obligations and responsibilities between nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States, particularly with regard to peaceful nuclear explosions.

Argentina, Ghana, Malaysia and Pakistan, among others, felt that exemption of the peaceful nuclear activities of the nuclear powers from inspection requirements was against the principle of balance of mutual obligations and responsibilities.

Algeria asserted that there was no assurance by the nuclear powers of genuine disarmament and urged that the treaty should be linked with other measures of disarmament such as a comprehensive test ban and the cessation of the production of fissionable material for military purposes.

India emphasized the need for a balanced treaty to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons by all nuclear powers, including the People's Republic of China. The solution of the problem of proliferation, India maintained, could be found only through the simultaneous preventing of both aspects of the proliferation of nuclear weapons—vertical (i.e., the further development and stockpiling of nuclear weap-

ons) as well as horizontal (i.e., the further spread of nuclear weapons). The only effective way in which that could be done would be to include in the treaty an obligatory provision for a cessation of any further production of nuclear weapons.

Japan held that the treaty would legalize the existing distinction between the five nuclear powers and all other States. South Africa indicated it was not persuaded that the draft treaty took into account the legitimate interests of those non-nuclear-weapon States which had a major economic stake in the development of their own nuclear technology and nuclear resources.

Albania, rejecting the treaty, stated that it was not a disarmament measure nor did it in any way serve that purpose since it permitted the United States and the USSR to increase their arsenals in pursuit of their aims of world hegemony. Cuba felt that the treaty had nothing to do with disarmament and would legalize the gap between the strong and the weak nations.

The United Republic of Tanzania maintained that to accept the treaty as it stood would be tantamount to accepting and sanctioning neo-colonialism. It felt that the treaty attempted to legalize the monopoly of nuclear knowledge by the existing nuclear powers. Zambia considered that the treaty would be neither workable nor effective since it excluded two super-powers—France and the People's Republic of China—and would not be a step toward general and complete disarmament. Zambia stressed the view that the treaty would be neither workable nor effective and would not affect those States which possessed nuclear weapons.

The problem of the "balance of obligations," to be reflected by the treaty, between nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon powers was discussed at length. The United States observed that against the obligation imposed by the treaty on States not possessing nuclear weapons, the States which did possess nuclear weapons assumed the following obligations: not to transfer nuclear weapons, or control over them, to any recipient; to contribute to the development of non-nuclear-weapon States; to provide nuclear explosive services at a price far below

their true cost; and, finally, to pursue negotiations to divest themselves of large arsenals of existing and potential nuclear and other arms.

The USSR stressed its readiness to conclude an international convention banning the use of nuclear weapons and to negotiate a number of collateral measures. Among these it mentioned the cessation of production of nuclear weapons, reduction of nuclear weapon stock-piles and eventually a complete ban and scrapping of nuclear weapons under appropriate international control; limitation and, pursuant to this, reduction of the strategic means of delivery of nuclear weapons; prohibition of the flights of aircraft carrying nuclear weapons beyond national borders; limitation of the zones of navigation of rocket-carrying submarines; banning of underground nuclear weapon tests; banning of chemical and bacteriological warfare; elimination of foreign military bases from foreign countries; the use of the sea-bed and ocean floor exclusively for peaceful purposes; and other practical measures of regional disarmament including the creation of nuclear-free zones in different regions of the world.

While many Members agreed that the principles contained in the General Assembly's resolution of 19 November 1965 (2028(XX))<sup>8</sup>

<sup>8</sup> See Y.U.N., 1965, pp. 72-73, for text of resolution 2028(XX).

By this resolution, the Assembly called upon the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to give urgent consideration to the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and, to that end, to reconvene as early as possible with a view to negotiating an international treaty to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, based on the following main principles:

"(a) The treaty should be void of any loop-holes which might permit nuclear or non-nuclear Powers to proliferate, directly or indirectly, nuclear weapons in any form;

"(b) The treaty should embody an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers;

"(c) The treaty should be a step towards the achievement of general and complete disarmament and, more particularly, nuclear disarmament;

"(d) There should be acceptable and workable provisions to ensure the effectiveness of the treaty;

"(e) Nothing in the treaty should adversely affect the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to ensure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories."



were reflected in the draft treaty, others felt that the draft did not satisfactorily observe them. Among the latter, Algeria and Sudan argued for a stronger link between the treaty and further measures of disarmament. Uganda stated specifically that the draft treaty should provide a stronger link with such measures as a comprehensive test ban, a cut-off in the production of fissile material, a complete cessation of production of nuclear weapons and a freeze and gradual reduction of existing nuclear stockpiles.

The question of effectiveness of the treaty's provisions was referred to by many delegations. The USSR and the United States underlined that articles I and II of the draft treaty (see above, p. 4, footnote 3, for summary of articles I and II) fulfilled the basic criteria of the principles set forth in the Assembly's resolution of 19 November 1965 (2028 (XX)) and effectively closed all loop-holes for proliferation of nuclear weapons, directly or indirectly, in any form whatsoever.

India maintained that there were loop-holes in the draft treaty, in that it prohibited neither the deployment of nuclear weapons on the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States, nor the training in the use of nuclear weapons by the armed personnel belonging to non-nuclear-weapon States. Nor did it prohibit one nuclear-weapon State from assisting another nuclear-weapon State which might not have reached the same degree of sophistication in its nuclear-weapon technology.

France expressed the view that no nuclear-weapon State would ever envisage sharing nuclear weapons with anyone. In this connexion, many Members held the view that nuclear explosives of any kind were synonymous with nuclear weapons and hence were rightly prohibited under articles I and II of the draft treaty. Some delegations, however, disputed this view or had reservations with regard to such an interpretation. Japan held that if and when the distinction between military and peaceful nuclear explosive devices was rendered possible, the restrictions concerning nuclear explosive devices contained in the treaty should no longer be applicable.

Some Members expressed concern whether implementation of the safeguards provisions

under article III would not hinder their peaceful nuclear programmes. South Africa considered article III (see above, p. 4, for summary of article III) vague and demanded guarantees that the control arrangements under that article would not hamper economic and technological development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and that they would not be misused for purposes of industrial espionage. The United Kingdom, on the other hand, felt that such fears were ill-founded as proved by its own and the United States' acceptance of safeguards on their peaceful nuclear activities. The USSR asserted that the control proposed to be exercised by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) would be for the exclusive purpose of verification of non-proliferation. The USSR also felt that it might be important to develop, if possible, automatic means of control to avoid interference in the peaceful nuclear programmes of States and in their internal affairs.

Some Members maintained that nuclear-weapon States should accept IAEA safeguards on their peaceful nuclear activities, as the non-nuclear-weapon States were expected to do. Thus, Ethiopia felt that control provisions based on less than universal application might undermine the purposes of the non-proliferation treaty. India held that it was possible to devise a system of control for the nuclear-weapon States once a cut-off in the production of fissionable material had been agreed to.

Japan and Pakistan were among those who expressed the view that the agreements proposed to be negotiated under article III between non-nuclear signatories of the treaty and IAEA should provide for international safeguards of identical standards, applicable to all non-nuclear-weapon signatories. However, some States, members of the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), disagreed with this view. The Netherlands, stressing the importance of its continued co-operation with EURATOM, suggested that in order to ensure that no nuclear materials were diverted to nuclear weapons or other explosive devices the proposed agreement with IAEA should be based on the principle of verification applied by EURATOM.

The provisions of article IV (see above,

p. 5, for summary of article IV) concerning peaceful uses of nuclear energy, as well as the interpretative statements of the nuclear-weapon States in this respect were commented upon favourably by many Members. Canada believed that the provisions of article IV constituted a kind of charter of rights of the developing countries in the sphere of nuclear science and technology. It asserted that the Canadian experience proved that renunciation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons had no adverse effect on the ability to develop and utilize energy. Other Members, however, India among them, thought that article IV did not provide any binding commitment or a positive juridical obligation on the part of the nuclear-weapon States to grant assistance, since the undertaking was only to "co-operate." In India's view, the treaty would create a juridical discrimination between States and, by making a greater part of the world wholly dependent on a few nuclear-weapon States for the knowledge and the application of nuclear technology, it would tend to widen the technology gap that already existed.

In the debate concerning article V (see above, p. 5, for summary of article V) relating to peaceful nuclear explosions it was generally agreed that until science one day succeeded in identifying a peaceful nuclear explosive—as distinct from a weapon—there was no alternative to the prohibitions of articles I and II applying to all nuclear explosive devices, whatever their purpose. Both the United States and the USSR asserted that denial of the specialized technology involved in peaceful nuclear explosions would in no case retard progress in the application of these explosions. The United States stressed that it would continue research and development in this field and that all benefits would be made available under the treaty's provisions to non-nuclear-weapon States without delay. The USSR said that non-nuclear-weapon States could avail themselves of the benefits of peaceful nuclear explosions to be carried out by nuclear powers on a bilateral basis or through an appropriate international body. In the view of the USSR, preparatory work on a multilateral international agreement could start even before the treaty actually came into effect.

Sweden suggested that an international body administering peaceful nuclear explosions would have three main functions: (1) to decide if a certain project was sound, technically and economically, and therefore eligible for an exception from the total test ban; (2) to observe and control the execution of the project in order to make sure that it would not be contrary to existing international treaties; and (3) to help finance—if the project were to take place in a developing country—the civil engineering work, prospecting and execution necessary for the successful application of the nuclear device, which was the only part promised to be made available at low charge. Sweden believed that while IAEA would be suitable for the first two tasks, the third one should be entrusted to the United Nations Development Programme or the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. However, Sweden was concerned that the terms of article V might impede negotiations on a future treaty banning all underground explosions except those sanctioned by an international body under an agreed international procedure.

Brazil was one of several Members which urged that peaceful nuclear explosions should be exempt from the prohibition under articles I and II of the non-proliferation treaty. In this connexion, Brazil interpreted article 18 of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (signed at Tlatelolco, Mexico, and known as the Treaty of Tlatelolco)<sup>9</sup> as specifically permitting the signatories to carry out nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes under international inspection, either with their own resources or in co-operation with third parties.

Bolivia expressed concern over this interpretation of article 18 of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, fearing it would be a victim of radioactive fall-out if such explosions were carried out, without any legal violation, by various Latin American countries.

The provisions of article VI of the draft treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons which related to further measures of disarmament were also the subject of comments by

<sup>9</sup> See Y.U.N., 1967, pp. 13-14, for summary of various Treaty articles.

Members of the Assembly. (See above, p. 5, for summary of article VI.) While these provisions were considered satisfactory in general by many Members, some non-nuclear-weapon States felt that despite amendments and revisions, the provisions of article VI were weaker than had been hoped for. India, for instance, felt that article VI did not create any definite or enforceable juridical obligation on the part of nuclear-weapon States corresponding to the obligations undertaken under article II by the non-nuclear-weapon States. It was an imperfect obligation with no sanction behind it. In India's view, what was required was something in the nature of a nuclear moratorium, as was suggested in 1965, the essential element of which was that if nuclear disarmament was not achieved within a specified time-limit, the non-nuclear-weapon powers, as an instrument of persuasion and pressure, would reserve to themselves the resumption of their freedom of action. India believed that article VI could be strengthened if the nuclear-weapon powers specifically stated that an underground test ban agreement would be given top priority among the disarmament measures to follow the non-proliferation treaty.

Other collateral measures of disarmament such as a cut-off of production of fissionable materials, a convention on the prohibition of use of nuclear weapons, cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, and elimination of nuclear weapon stockpiles were also given a high priority. Speakers stressed that the non-proliferation treaty must be made a real step towards general and complete disarmament which was the ultimate objective of all disarmament efforts.

Replying to Members that were critical of article VI, the USSR stressed that while it was prepared to pursue negotiations concerning a comprehensive test ban treaty and to exchange views with States concerned on mutual limitations and subsequent reduction of nuclear weapon strategic delivery vehicles as well as on other practical measures of disarmament, it was unrealistic to demand radical solutions of either nuclear disarmament or general and complete disarmament as a pre-condition for the non-proliferation treaty, a measure designed to slow down the nuclear arms race.

The United States stressed that the language of article VI indicated a practical order of disarmament priorities, starting with cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date, and proceeding next to nuclear disarmament and finally, as the ultimate goal, to general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

A number of Members expressed their gratification at the provisions in article VII concerning the right of States, or groups of States, to establish nuclear-free zones in various regions of the world. Poland observed that provisions of this article were a welcome supplement to the disarmament commitment which the nuclear powers undertook in the preceding article. It believed that regional measures could contribute to increasing the regional effectiveness of the non-proliferation commitments made under the treaty, by combining them with other, farther-reaching measures, first of all with denuclearization. In this connexion, Poland stressed its traditional interest in such measures, particularly in Europe.

In the course of the debate, several Members referred to the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, which was to convene in Geneva, Switzerland, on 29 August 1968, suggesting that final action on the draft treaty be postponed until after that Conference. Brazil and a number of African States, such as Algeria, Dahomey, Ghana, Lesotho, Mauritania, Niger, Rwanda, Uganda and Zambia, urged that non-nuclear-weapon States should be given an opportunity to assess their obligations under the treaty, as well as other relevant questions, at the Conference. Pakistan believed that divergent views as to the endorsement of the draft treaty could be reconciled if the nuclear-weapon States indicated that, in the event of endorsement of the treaty at the present Assembly session and its opening for signature, they would be ready to consider additional agreements or improvements that might be recommended by the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States.

Iraq, the USSR and the United Kingdom, however, argued that the non-proliferation treaty should not be delayed on account of the Conference which, in their view, would greatly benefit if the treaty were endorsed and

opened for signature prior to the convening of the Conference.

The question of security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States was another topic discussed during the debate.

The proposed draft resolution concerning security assurances to be submitted to the Security Council by the United States, the USSR and the United Kingdom (see above, page 7) was generally felt to be a significant political development. It was welcomed mostly by those who strongly supported the draft non-proliferation treaty. Other Members, however, expressed misgivings as to the effectiveness of the proposed measure. Thus Afghanistan and Colombia, for example, held that the possibility of the use of the veto in the Security Council by its permanent members deprived the resolution of credibility. In Australia's view, the proposed resolution did not offer watertight guarantees as it depended upon continuing harmony between the three nuclear powers.

Brazil, Spain and the United Republic of Tanzania expressed the opinion of many Members when they stressed that the resolution would create no new commitment on the part of the nuclear powers beyond that already contained in the United Nations Charter. Other delegations, among them Barbados and Kenya, would have preferred that the proposed resolution be incorporated in the non-proliferation treaty. It was also suggested in this connexion that the nuclear powers should offer assurances, incorporated in the treaty, to defend any non-nuclear State that was threatened or attacked and not only States signatories of the non-proliferation treaty; further, some felt that such assurances should apply to any kind of armed attack or threat, not only that involving nuclear weapons.

Albania, Algeria, Nepal and Zambia held the view that the proposed measure might be construed to be aimed against the People's Republic of China. Other Members believed that non-involvement of France and the People's Republic of China in the framing of the security assurances would in effect weaken the guarantees.

Some Members felt that the elimination of nuclear weapons, or a convention banning their

use, would be a better and more reliable solution to the question of security of non-nuclear-weapon States. Other Members reiterated a proposal for "negative assurances" to be included in the treaty whereby nuclear powers would commit themselves never to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. In Canada's view, however, such a non-use clause could not be seriously considered as it was not susceptible of adequate verification arrangements.

The United States maintained that the proposed draft Security Council resolution was the most appropriate and effective solution to the problem of assurances within the context of the United Nations Charter. History had shown, the United States stressed, that where three nuclear nations had joined in support of a proposed action by the Security Council, such action had usually been forthcoming and effective. The USSR stated that the proposed draft resolution would serve as a deterrent to a potential aggressor and that reference to Article 51 of the Charter should allay the doubts of those who wondered what would happen if the Security Council failed to take action. (For text of Article 51 of the Charter, see APPENDIX ii.) The United Kingdom observed that it was of vital self-interest to the nuclear powers themselves that the credibility of their guarantees be sustained.

On 10 June 1968, the First Committee approved the 48-power draft resolution by a roll-call vote of 92 to 4, with 22 abstentions.

On 12 June, the text was adopted at a plenary meeting of the General Assembly by a roll-call vote of 95 to 4, with 21 abstentions, as resolution 2373(XXII).

The Assembly thereby: (1) commended the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; (2) requested that it be opened for signature and ratification at the earliest possible date; (3) expressed the hope for the widest possible adherence to it by both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States; (4) requested the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and the nuclear-weapon States urgently to pursue negotiations on effective measures for cessation of the nuclear arms race, and nuclear and general disarmament; and

(5) called on the Conference to report on progress to the Assembly session scheduled to open in September 1968.

(For text of resolution and voting details, see DOCUMENTARY REFERENCES below.)

In connexion with this question, various communications relating to Germany were addressed to the President of the General Assembly by France, Poland, Romania, the USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States.

Thus, in a letter dated 2 May 1968, Poland referred to a statement by the Government of the German Democratic Republic to the United Nations General Assembly on the draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Poland requested that it be circulated as an official document of the General Assembly. This statement, which favoured the draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, made the following points, *inter alia*: that the draft treaty would be in conformity with efforts to safeguard security in Europe and in the world because it would end the endeavours of the West German Federal Government to attain access to nuclear weapons; and that the West German renunciation in 1954 of nuclear weapons was by no means an obstacle for West Germany to attaining access to nuclear weapons.

On 7 May 1968, the President of the Assembly received a letter from the Permanent Observer of the Federal Republic of Germany maintaining that the Polish communication distorted the Federal Republic's position on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the treaty thereon and urging that the treaty provide for banning threats and political pressures against non-nuclear-weapon powers.

France, the United Kingdom and the United States maintained that the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany was the only German Government freely and legally elected and authorized to speak as a representative of the German people on international affairs.

This point of view was countered by Poland, Romania and the USSR which argued that there were two German States—the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany—each of which performed functions intrinsic to a sovereign State. They disagreed with the contention that the Federal Republic of Germany was the only German Government authorized to speak in the name of the German people. In their view, the German Democratic Republic did have a sovereign existence; it was among the first of the States to sign the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

#### DOCUMENTARY REFERENCES

##### GENERAL ASSEMBLY—22ND SESSION (RESUMED)

First Committee, meetings 1556-1582.

Plenary Meetings 1643, 1672.

A/7072 (DC/230) and Add.I. Report of Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (covering period 18 January—14 March 1968).

A/7080. Subject index to annex III of report (A/7072-DC/230) of Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. Note by Secretariat.

A/7106. Note by Secretary-General (transmitting message from Director-General of IAEA).

A/C.1/959. Letter of 2 May 1968 from Poland.

A/C.1/960. Letter of 2 May 1968 from USSR.

A/C.1/961. Letter of 6 May 1968 from President of General Assembly to Chairman of First Committee.

A/C.1/963. Letter of 7 May 1968 from Federal Republic of Germany.

A/C.1/L.421 and Add.I. Austria, Bulgaria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Iceland, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Lebanon, Mongolia, Morocco, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Somalia,

Syria, USSR, United Kingdom, United States: draft resolution.

A/C.1/L.421/Rev.1 and Add.1-6. Afghanistan, Austria, Bulgaria, Byelorussian SSR, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Iceland, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Lebanon, Mauritius, Mongolia, Morocco, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, United Arab Republic, United Kingdom, United States, Yemen: revised draft resolution.

A/C.1/L.421/Rev.2 and Add.1-6. Afghanistan, Austria, Barbados, Belgium, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Byelorussian SSR, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Finland, Guatemala, Hungary, Iceland, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Lebanon, Liberia, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, United Arab Republic, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen: revised draft resolution, adopted by First Committee on 10 June 1968, meeting 1582,

by roll-call vote of 92 to 4, with 22 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Australia, Austria, Barbados, Belgium, Bolivia, Botswana, Bulgaria, Byelorussian SSR, Canada, Ceylon, Chile, China, Colombia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Dahomey, Denmark, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Finland, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives Islands, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Senegal, Singapore, Somalia, South Africa, Southern Yemen, Sudan, Sweden, Syria, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, United Arab Republic, United Kingdom, United States, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia.

Against: Albania, Cuba, United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia.

Abstaining: Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Burma, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), France, Gabon, Guinea, India, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Portugal, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Spain, Uganda.

A/7016/Add.1. Report of First Committee (Part II).

RESOLUTION 2373(xxxiii), as proposed by First Committee, A/7016/Add.1, adopted by Assembly on 12 June 1968, meeting 1672, by roll-call vote of 95 to 4, with 21 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Australia, Austria, Barbados, Belgium, Bolivia, Botswana, Bulgaria, Byelorussian SSR, Cameroon, Canada, Ceylon, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Dahomey, Denmark, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Finland, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives Islands, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Senegal, Singapore, Somalia, South Africa, Southern Yemen, Sudan, Sweden, Syria, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, United Arab Republic, United Kingdom, United States, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia.

Against: Albania, Cuba, United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia.

Abstaining: Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Burma, Burundi, Central African Republic, Congo (Brazzaville), France, Gabon, Guinea, India, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Portugal, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Spain, Uganda.

ville), France, Gabon, Guinea, India, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Portugal, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Spain, Uganda.

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 2346 A (XXII) of 19 December 1967, 2153 A (XXI) of 17 November 1966, 2149(XXI) of 4 November 1966, 2028(XX) of 19 November 1965 and 1665(XVI) of 4 December 1961,

Convinced of the urgency and great importance of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and of intensifying international co-operation in the development of peaceful applications of atomic energy,

Having considered the report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, dated 14 March 1968, and appreciative of the work of the Committee on the elaboration of the draft non-proliferation treaty, which is attached to that report,

Convinced that, pursuant to the provisions of the treaty, all signatories have the right to engage in research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and will be able to acquire source and special fissionable materials, as well as equipment for the processing, use and production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes,

Convinced further that an agreement to prevent the further proliferation of nuclear weapons must be followed as soon as possible by effective measures on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and on nuclear disarmament, and that the non-proliferation treaty will contribute to this aim,

Affirming that in the interest of international peace and security both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States carry the responsibility of acting in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations that the sovereign equality of all States shall be respected, that the threat or use of force in international relations shall be refrained from and that international disputes shall be settled by peaceful means,

1. Commends the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the text of which is annexed to the present resolution;

2. Requests the Depositary Governments to open the Treaty for signature and ratification at the earliest possible date;

3. Expresses the hope for the widest possible adherence to the Treaty by both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States;

4. Requests the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and the nuclear-weapon States urgently to pursue negotiations on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control;

5. Requests the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to report on the progress of its work to the General Assembly at its twenty-third session.

## ANNEX

TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF  
NUCLEAR WEAPONS

The States concluding this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the "Parties to the Treaty",

Considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples,

Believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war,

In conformity with resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly calling for the conclusion of an agreement on the prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear weapons,

Undertaking to co-operate in facilitating the application of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities,

Expressing their support for research, development and other efforts to further the application, within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system, of the principle of safeguarding effectively the flow of source and special fissionable materials by use of instruments and other techniques at certain strategic points,

Affirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology, including any technological by-products which may be derived by nuclear-weapon States from the development of nuclear explosive devices, should be available for peaceful purposes to all Parties to the Treaty, whether nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear-weapon States,

Convinced that, in furtherance of this principle, all Parties to the Treaty are entitled to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific information for, and to contribute alone or in co-operation with other States to, the further development of the applications of atomic energy for peaceful purposes,

Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament,

Urging the co-operation of all States in the attainment of this objective,

Recalling the determination expressed by the Parties to the 1963 Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water in its Preamble to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this end,

Desiring to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Recalling that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations, and that the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security are to be promoted with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources,

Have agreed as follows:

## Article I

Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.

## Article II

Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

## Article III

1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency's safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Procedures for the safeguards required by this article shall be followed with respect to source or special fissionable material whether it is being produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or is outside any such facility. The safeguards required by this article shall be applied on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere.

2. Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or

special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this article.

3. The safeguards required by this article shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the Parties or international co-operation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the Preamble of the Treaty.

4. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall conclude agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency to meet the requirements of this article either individually or together with other States in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Negotiation of such agreements shall commence within 180 days from the original entry into force of this Treaty. For States depositing their instruments of ratification or accession after the 180-day period, negotiation of such agreements shall commence not later than the date of such deposit. Such agreements shall enter into force not later than eighteen months after the date of initiation of negotiations.

#### Article IV

1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II of this Treaty.

2. All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also co-operate in contributing alone or together with other States or international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.

#### Article V

Each Party to the Treaty undertakes to take appropriate measures to ensure that, in accordance with this Treaty, under appropriate international observation and through appropriate international procedures, potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will be made available to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty on a non-discriminatory basis and that the charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used will be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall be able to obtain such

benefits, pursuant to a special international agreement or agreements, through an appropriate international body with adequate representation of non-nuclear-weapon States. Negotiations on this subject shall commence as soon as possible after the Treaty enters into force. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty so desiring may also obtain such benefits pursuant to bilateral agreements.

#### Article VI

Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

#### Article VII

Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.

#### Article VIII

1. Any Party to the Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary Governments which shall circulate it to all Parties to the Treaty. Thereupon, if requested to do so by one third or more of the Parties to the Treaty, the Depositary Governments shall convene a conference, to which they shall invite all the Parties to the Treaty, to consider such an amendment.

2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the Parties to the Treaty, including the votes of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The amendment shall enter into force for each Party that deposits its instrument of ratification of the amendment upon the deposit of such instruments of ratification by a majority of all the Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Thereafter, it shall enter into force for any other Party upon the deposit of its instrument of ratification of the amendment.

3. Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized. At intervals of five years thereafter, a majority of the Parties to the Treaty may obtain, by submitting a proposal to this effect to the Depositary Governments, the convening of further conferences with the same objective of reviewing the operation of the Treaty.



## Article IX

1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this article may accede to it at any time.

2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America, which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments.

3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by the States, the Governments of which are designated Depositories of the Treaty, and forty other States signatory to this Treaty and the deposit of their instruments of ratification. For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear-weapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967.

4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession, the date of the entry into force of this Treaty, and the date of receipt of any requests for convening a conference or other notices.

6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

## Article X

1. Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject-matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

2. Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference shall be convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. This decision shall be taken by a majority of the Parties to the Treaty.

## Article XI

This Treaty, the Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Treaty.

DONE in... at... this... day of....

## OTHER DOCUMENTS

A/7120. Letter of 17 June 1968 from France, United Kingdom and United States.

A/7138. Letter of 12 July 1968 from Poland.

A/7140. Letter of 19 July 1968 from USSR (also issued under symbol: E/L.1223)

A/7178. Letter of 15 August 1968 from Romania.

## MATTERS PERTAINING TO TREATY ON NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS CONSIDERED BY SECURITY COUNCIL

In a letter dated 12 June 1968, addressed to the President of the Security Council, the USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States requested an early meeting of the Council to consider a draft resolution which they submitted with the letter.

By the preamble- to this draft resolution, the Security Council would: (a) note with appreciation the desire of a large number of States to subscribe to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and thereby to undertake not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly, not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explo-

sive devices and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; (b) take into consideration the concern of certain of these States that, in conjunction with their adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, appropriate measures be undertaken to safeguard their security; and (c) bear in mind that any aggression accompanied by the use of nuclear weapons would endanger the peace and security of all States.

By the operative paragraphs, the Council would: (1) recognize that aggression with nuclear weapons or the threat of such aggression against a non-nuclear-weapon State would create a situation in which the Security Council, and above all its nuclear-weapon State perma-

nent members, would have to act immediately in accordance with their obligations under the United Nations Charter; (2) welcome the intention expressed by certain States that they would provide or support immediate assistance, in accordance with the Charter, to any non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons that was a victim of an act or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons were used; and (3) reaffirm in particular the inherent right, recognized under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, of individual and collective self-defence if an armed attack occurred against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council had taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. (For text of Charter Article 51, see APPENDIX ii.)

In conjunction with the tabling of the draft resolution, the representatives of the USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States also made identical formal declarations on behalf of their Governments. They stated in those declarations that they had noted the concern of certain States that, in conjunction with their adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, appropriate safeguard measures be taken for their security.

They declared, therefore, that aggression with nuclear weapons, or the threat of such aggression, against a non-nuclear-weapon State would create a qualitatively new situation in which the nuclear-weapon States which were permanent members of the United Nations Security Council would have to act immediately through the Security Council to take the measures necessary to counter such aggression or to remove the threat of aggression in accordance with [Article 1 of] the United Nations Charter, which calls for taking "effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace." Therefore, any State which committed aggression accompanied by the use of nuclear weapons or which threatened such aggression must be aware that its actions were to be countered effectively by measures to be taken in accordance with the United Nations Charter to suppress the aggression or remove the threat of aggression.

The USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States also affirmed their intention, as permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, to seek immediate Security Council action to provide assistance, in accordance with the Charter, to any non-nuclear-weapon State which was a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and which was a victim of an act of aggression or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons were used.

They reaffirmed in particular the inherent right, recognized under Article 51 of the Charter, of individual and collective self-defence if an armed attack, including a nuclear attack, occurred against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council had taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security,

The Security Council considered the tripartite draft resolution from 17 to 19 June 1968.

In the course of the debate on the draft resolution, the USSR pointed out that the draft proceeded from the generally recognized fact that any act of aggression accompanied by the use of nuclear weapons would endanger the peace and security of all States. The key provision of the draft resolution—that aggression with nuclear weapons or the threat of such aggression against a non-nuclear-weapon State would create a situation in which the Security Council, and above all its nuclear-weapon State permanent members, would have to act immediately in accordance with their obligations under the United Nations Charter—provided the solution to the question of strengthening the security of the non-nuclear countries within the framework of the Security Council, upon which the United Nations Charter placed the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. The USSR was among those countries which intended to provide or support, if necessary, immediate assistance to the countries concerned. The USSR representative also expressed his Government's intention of continuing efforts to solve the problems of banning the use of nuclear weapons, eliminating nuclear stockpiles and completely banning nuclear weapons, as well as the problem of general and complete disarmament.

The United Kingdom stressed the following points: (1) the assurances were given as a result of representations made by non-nuclear-weapon States; (2) the assurances had deliberately been made without any limitation in time and to meet world-wide diversity of interests; (3) the three sponsors considered it right that the assurances be given in the Security Council and within the framework of the Charter, as to do otherwise would derogate from the authority of the United Nations and from their obligations as Members of the United Nations; and (4) any country contemplating nuclear aggression, or the threat of it, against a non-nuclear signatory of the Treaty would be deterred by the assurances given in common by the most powerful nuclear States in the world. No one could doubt that the determination of East and West to prevent any act or threat of nuclear aggression was a development of the utmost importance in world affairs.

The United States maintained that the three-power draft resolution and the declaration made in conjunction with it would lay a firm political, moral and legal basis for ensuring the security of non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Those assurances, combined with the Non-Proliferation Treaty, would give each State, if not perfect security, more security than it would otherwise enjoy. In that context, the adoption of the draft resolution would be a major contribution to international peace and security.

France declared that its position on the draft resolution was in line with the position it had taken on the resolution concerning the Non-Proliferation Treaty in the General Assembly. France could not join the sponsors of the draft resolution or the declaration, believing that the only solution to the nuclear menace lay in the cessation of the production and the destruction of the stockpiles of nuclear arms. The nations

of the world would not be secure until the nuclear powers agreed upon and achieved nuclear disarmament. France was prepared to accept any initiative towards that end.

Expressing support for the three-power draft resolution, Canada, China, Denmark, Ethiopia, Hungary, Paraguay and Senegal made the point, among other things, that the guarantee formula seemed the best solution obtainable in the prevailing international situation, and that the guarantees were preferable to none at all. Ethiopia believed that the best means to ensure the collective security guarantee for all nations, inherent in the United Nations Charter, was a convention prohibiting the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons and, pending that, a clear undertaking by the nuclear powers not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States.

Criticizing the three-power draft resolution, Algeria, Brazil, India and Pakistan argued, among other things, that the real hope of security for non-nuclear-weapon States lay in nuclear disarmament. Further, they maintained that the draft resolution's guarantees were offered by only three of the five nuclear powers, were only declarations of intent and were uncertain because of the existence of the veto. Also, they were discriminatory because applicable only to Parties to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation, and they did not establish an acceptable balance of obligations since if non-nuclear States foreswore nuclear weapons for defence, the nuclear powers should in return renounce the use or threat of use of such weapons against them. Finally, they fell short of assuring guarantees against all kinds of aggression already contemplated in the Charter.

On 19 June 1968, the draft resolution was adopted by a vote of 10 to 0, with 5 abstentions (Algeria, Brazil, France, India, Pakistan) as resolution 255(1968). (For text of resolution, see DOCUMENTARY REFERENCES **below**.)

#### DOCUMENTARY REFERENCES

Security Council, meetings 1430, 1431, 1433.

S/8630. Letter of 12 June 1968 from USSR, United Kingdom and United States (requesting meeting of Security Council).

S/8631. USSR, United Kingdom, United States: draft resolution.

RESOLUTION 255(1968), as proposed by 3 powers, S/8631, adopted by Council on 19 June 1968, meeting 1433, by 10 votes in favour (Canada, China, Denmark, Ethiopia, Hungary, Paraguay, Senegal, USSR, United Kingdom, United States) to 0, against with 5 abstentions (Algeria, Brazil, France, India, Pakistan).

The Security Council,

Noting with appreciation the desire of a large number of States to subscribe to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and thereby to undertake not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly, not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices,

Taking into consideration the concern of certain of these States that, in conjunction with their adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, appropriate measures be undertaken to safeguard their security,

Bearing in mind that any aggression accompanied by the use of nuclear weapons would endanger the peace and security of all States,

1. Recognizes that aggression with nuclear weapons or the threat of such aggression against a non-

nuclear-weapon State would create a situation in which the Security Council, and above all its nuclear-weapon State permanent members, would have to act immediately in accordance with their obligations under the United Nations Charter;

2. Welcomes the intention expressed by certain States that they will provide or support immediate assistance, in accordance with the Charter, to any non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons that is a victim of an act or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used;

3. Reaffirms in particular the inherent right, recognized under Article 51 of the Charter, of individual and collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.

A/7202. Report of Security Council to General Assembly, Chapter 8.

## REPORT OF CONFERENCE OF EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT TO GENERAL ASSEMBLY'S TWENTY-THIRD SESSION

The Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament reconvened in Geneva on 16 July 1968, following the adoption by the General Assembly on 12 June 1968 of a resolution (2373(XXII)) commending the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (see above, pp. 16-19 for text) and the announcement on 1 July that the United States and the USSR would hold bilateral talks on the limitation and reduction of both offensive strategic nuclear-weapon delivery vehicles and systems of defence against ballistic missiles. The Committee held fourteen plenary meetings before adjourning on 28 August 1968. It reported to the General Assembly that because of the comparative shortness of this session, it had not been able to give comprehensive consideration to the matters before it. It believed, however, that the agenda it had adopted was a step forward which would facilitate progress in its work.

### EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE AGENDA

On 16 July 1968, the USSR presented a Memorandum suggesting that the Eighteen-Nation Committee should give high priority to consideration of the following measures: (1) prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons; (2) measures for stopping the manufacture of nu-

clear weapons and for reducing and destroying stockpiles; (3) limitation and subsequent reduction of means of delivery of strategic weapons; (4) prohibition of flights beyond national borders of bombers carrying nuclear weapons, and limitation of navigation zones for rocket-carrying submarines; (5) ban on underground nuclear weapon tests; (6) prohibition of the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons; (7) elimination of foreign military bases; (8) measures for regional disarmament; (9) peaceful uses of the sea-bed and ocean floor, and (10) general and complete disarmament.

Also on 16 July, the United States presented a message from President Lyndon B. Johnson which proposed that the Committee's top priority should be the problem of halting the strategic arms race. In addition to measures previously discussed in the Committee, the United States suggested that the Committee should consider the issue of arms limitation on the sea-bed and, specifically, should begin to define those factors vital to a workable, verifiable and effective international agreement. The United States also would be prepared to consider reductions of existing systems if progress could be made in limiting strategic delivery systems. The message stressed the importance of halting the non-nuclear arms race and of

achieving regional limitations on conventional armaments.

The United Kingdom welcomed the positive approach of the United States as well as the proposals in the USSR memorandum, and it suggested the following priorities: an underground test ban; nuclear-free zones; regional arrangements for arms control and disarmament; and the international arms sales. The United Kingdom also suggested that the Committee should ask the Secretary-General to prepare a report on the nature and possible effects of chemical weapons and on the implications of their use, and urged the conclusion by the Committee of an instrument on biological Weapons which would go beyond the Geneva Protocol (of 17 June 1925) for Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare.

Canada, Italy, Mexico and Sweden urged that discussion of an underground test ban and the cessation of production of fissile material for weapons be top priorities of the Committee. Sweden suggested that those priorities be followed by discussion of the prohibition of chemical and biological weapons; Mexico favoured the following order: (i) limitation of existing stockpiles and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons, and (ii) general and complete disarmament.

Sweden furthermore urged the nuclear powers to make every effort to implement their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (which called for negotiations on measures to end the nuclear arms race and achieve nuclear disarmament, as well as general and complete disarmament). Particularly, Sweden urged the nuclear powers to: (i) seek an agreement to restrict offensive and defensive nuclear weapon delivery systems; and (ii) maintain the partial test ban (as contained in the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water)<sup>10</sup>, supplement it with an underground test ban, and reach an agreement on regulation, under an international régime, of exemptions from those prohibitions, for peaceful explosions.

Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and Poland sup-

ported the proposals contained in the USSR Memorandum as a basis for the Committee's work. Bulgaria and Poland gave first priority to a convention prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons with a comprehensive test ban as second priority. Czechoslovakia urged that priority be given to an underground test ban and the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. Romania, basically endorsing the collateral measures contained in the USSR Memorandum, accorded first priority to general and complete disarmament and reiterated its call for the simultaneous abolition of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Warsaw Pact alliances, and the withdrawal of foreign troops to within national frontiers.

Brazil proposed the following items: the immediate halting of further nuclear weapon deployment and development; a cut-off of the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes combined with a verification system for the nuclear powers like that for non-nuclear States under the Non-Proliferation Treaty; agreements preventing the further sophistication of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles; an underground test ban; the prohibition of chemical and biological weapons and the reservation of the sea-bed for peaceful uses only.

India gave priority to the discussion of measures in the field of nuclear disarmament, such as a cut-off of production of fissile material and a comprehensive test ban. It also attached importance to the discussion of a convention banning the use of nuclear weapons. Ethiopia and the United Arab Republic accorded first priority to the conclusion of a convention banning the use of nuclear weapons which, in their view, should be followed by discussion of a comprehensive test ban and the cut-off of production of fissile materials for weapons use. Mexico and the United Arab Republic were agreed that while the problems of prohibition of chemical and biological weapons and peaceful uses of the sea-bed and ocean floor were important, they were less urgent. Ethiopia, however, felt that these problems could be considered simultaneously with the measures on nuclear disarmament.

<sup>10</sup> See Y.U.N., 1963, pp. 124-26, 137-40.

The Committee adopted an agenda, as proposed by the Co-chairmen. This set out four groups of items as follows: (i) further effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, to include the cessation of testing, the non-use of nuclear weapons, the cessation of production of fissionable materials for weapons use, the cessation of manufacture of weapons and reduction and subsequent elimination of nuclear stockpiles, nuclear-free zones, etc.; (ii) non-nuclear measures to include the discussion of chemical and biological warfare, regional arms limitations, etc.; (iii) other collateral measures, to include the discussion of prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed, etc.; (iv) general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

The United States observed that the agenda was a compromise and that while it was agreed to grant top priority to nuclear disarmament, no agreement was reached as to priorities among the measures envisaged. In its view, the most important subject was the cessation of the race in the development of strategic delivery systems which would facilitate other measures of nuclear disarmament; it hoped that one or more of such measures would become ripe for agreement during the future work of the Committee. The USSR said that the agenda reflected agreement, with Committee members urging top priority for measures of nuclear disarmament, and it recalled that its own Memorandum placed five measures relating to nuclear disarmament at the top of the list.

In their comments, a number of members welcomed the recognition of the urgency of measures of nuclear disarmament. Others suggested the Co-chairmen should indicate priorities within each of the four groups of topics.

#### FURTHER MEASURES RELATING TO CESSATION OF NUCLEAR ARMS RACE AND DISARMAMENT

The United States announced on 1 July 1968 that it had reached agreement with the USSR to enter in the nearest future into bilateral discussions on the limitation and reduction of both offensive strategic nuclear-weapon delivery systems and systems of defence against ballistic missiles. The United States

said that if progress could be made on halting the arms race in strategic delivery systems, the United States would be prepared to consider reduction of existing systems. The USSR, while confirming that an agreement had been reached with the United States concerning their missile talks, believed that the destruction of the whole arsenal of strategic means of delivery, or at any rate, the reduction of that arsenal to the basic minimum, with permission to retain only temporarily a strictly limited number of such means of delivery, would help avert the threat of nuclear war. The announcement of the forthcoming United States/USSR talks was generally welcomed by the Eighteen-Nation Committee members. It was recognized as an encouraging development, which if successful, would have a favourable impact on negotiation of further disarmament measures and contribute to halting the nuclear arms race. Canada felt that the Committee should have as much information about the subject as could be given without prejudicing progress in the talks. This point was supported by Italy, Brazil, Ethiopia, Mexico, Sweden and the United Arab Republic.

The USSR said that the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons should be examined as the fundamental task of the Committee and that the General Assembly's resolution of 24 November 1961<sup>11</sup> outlawing nuclear weapons should be formalized in an international instrument. It hoped that the Committee would consider such a convention and work out specific recommendations for the forthcoming twenty-third session of the General Assembly. Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and Poland supported the USSR view.

The United Kingdom did not agree that first priority on the Committee's agenda should be given to consideration of a convention prohibiting nuclear weapons. It did not believe the danger of nuclear war could be eliminated by a simple prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. Such a ban would not halt or reverse the nuclear arms race and therefore would not represent a step forward. Canada also questioned the value of a convention as the measure did not affect in any way the stockpiles of

<sup>11</sup> See Y.U.N., 1961, pp. 30-31, text of resolution 1653 (XVI).

nuclear weapons. In its view, there were two precedents to declarations of the nuclear powers not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States (non-use declarations), which were much better than the concept of a convention. One precedent lay in the security assurances given to the non-nuclear powers Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty by the USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States, which were contained in the Security Council's resolution (255) of 19 June 1968; these assurances were tantamount to a promise by the three nuclear powers not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States Parties to the Treaty. (See pp. 21-22 above.) The other precedent was the declaration in Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) by which the nuclear powers promised to respect the objectives of the Treaty.<sup>12</sup> A similar instrument could offer guarantees to African States under the terms of an African nuclear-free zone—a concept which Canada hoped could be revived. A non-use convention would not be credible unless the nuclear powers agreed to halt the production and development of nuclear weapons and embark upon a process for reduction of their arsenals, Canada added, commenting that unless progress were made in the mutual reduction of conventional forces, the halting of the nuclear arms race and the reduction of arsenals, the NATO States would be unable to renounce the possibility of a defensive use of nuclear weapons.

Sweden said experts could not reach agreement on the feasibility of detecting explosions below 20-60 kilotons yield. It circulated to the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee a report to that effect by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). The report also made the point that progress made in seismological identification of explosions should influence the political positions of the main parties.

Sweden then renewed its proposal that the Committee should draft an underground test ban treaty to cover the whole range of underground tests both for weapons and peaceful purposes. It suggested that the first operative article of such a treaty should include, inter

alia, the obligation of parties to prohibit, prevent and refrain from conducting underground tests of nuclear weapons, or—subject to exemptions for peaceful explosions—of other nuclear explosive devices. Additional articles would commit the parties to co-operate to ensure full observance of such a treaty and would specify verification procedures, including verification by challenge (a system whereby a party suspected of underground nuclear weapon testing would find it in its interest to provide all available reassuring information, including possibly an invitation to other parties to inspect.) Sweden noted, however, in this connexion, that the problem of obligatory inspections and procedures for dealing with suspected violations were still debatable. Sweden also felt that technicalities involved, as well as the impossibility of determining the yield of explosions with sufficient accuracy, made the idea of a moratorium impracticable.

Burma thought that the present underground tests carried out with a view to perfecting nuclear weapons were far more dangerous than testing in other environments during the earlier stages of the nuclear arms race. Burma believed that only political will was necessary to ban underground tests. However, it supported the Swedish concept of an agreement exempting peaceful underground explosions.

The United Arab Republic supported the idea of the establishment of a "detection club" (a world-wide network of technologically advanced seismological stations proposed by Sweden in 1965) and data exchange. It proposed that the Swedish conclusion that seismic control was not feasible in fixing a threshold for a ban on underground explosions could be avoided by imposing a moratorium below a fixed threshold in combination with verification by challenge. The United Arab Republic hoped that the idea of a moratorium might now be more acceptable. The revival of the moratorium concept was also supported by Czechoslovakia. Ethiopia believed that the verification problem was not insurmountable. In its view, research on national means of verification and identification had reduced the political risks to a minimum. India urged the immediate

<sup>12</sup> See Y.U.N., 1967, pp. 13-14.

suspension of all tests and resumption of negotiations to resolve the differences with respect to verification. It noted that the Swedish report confirmed the possibility of identification of explosions at a much lower level than had been envisaged previously. While India supported further scientific research and exchanges, it stressed the view that an early agreement on a test ban should not await further scientific progress.

The United Kingdom suggested that an underground test ban treaty should envisage the establishment of a special committee to consider complaints of infringement, assess the evidence and decide on an on-site inspection. This committee would be composed of representatives of the three nuclear powers, three non-aligned States, and a nominee of the Secretary-General or of the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The right of on-site inspection would only be exercised if the committee agreed by a majority of 5-2 that a prima facie case had been made out. The United Kingdom stated it was flexible both on number and composition of the committee, since the main purpose was to provide a means of verification through the right of inspection, circumscribed in such a way as to prevent irresponsible or improper use. It added that any State abiding by treaty provisions would never have on-site inspection.

The United Kingdom also proposed that the implementation of a comprehensive test ban treaty might be made a phased operation providing for an agreed annual quota of permissible underground test explosions on a scale descending to nil over a period of four to five years. Alternatively, the said quotas could be fixed annually by the proposed committee, without writing them into the treaty. The diminishing test quotas would provide a brake on the development of new nuclear weapon systems by fixing the time for a complete ban. The quota system would accommodate peaceful nuclear explosions but they would require international supervision to satisfy the parties to such a treaty, as well as the international committee, that the explosion was conducted for the stated purpose. Alternatively, peaceful explosions could be permitted exclusions from the test ban treaty.

Canada and Italy felt that the proposal for

establishment of a committee deserved the attention of the Eighteen-Nation Committee. Italy observed that a compromise solution for on-site inspection was of primary importance for the negotiation of an underground test ban treaty.

The USSR felt that the proposal for a committee presupposed international inspection; this was contrary to the USSR position that observance of the underground test ban should be carried out by national means of control only. Sweden agreed with the view that the United Kingdom proposal presupposed obligatory on-site inspections as necessary to the control system. Sweden said it was not ready to accept that assumption since its own efforts were aimed at a reduction of inspection and at verification by other more acceptable methods.

Sweden also said that the United Kingdom's "descending scale" proposal was an interesting addition to the United Kingdom concept for a test ban treaty. It asked, however, for clarification on whether the phasing-out period advocated by the United Kingdom would facilitate an agreement on control by envisaging experimentation with the verification-by-challenge idea.

The United Arab Republic felt that the difficulties involved in the proposal for a committee, as well as the decreasing quota of tests, could be avoided by a judicious choice of the date of entry into force of a comprehensive test ban treaty based on the moratorium concept combined with verification by challenge. However, it was not in favour of the decreasing quota proposal.

The USSR maintained that the establishment of test quotas would not facilitate conclusion of an early treaty, but would tend to postpone a ban on underground testing for the said period of four to five years. Czechoslovakia also argued that the United Kingdom concept implied several years of permissible testing and on-site inspection; therefore it would prefer the moratorium idea which envisaged an immediate cessation of underground tests.

The United States observed that full development of nuclear explosive technology for certain excavation projects would require some modification of the Partial Test Ban Treaty.



On 22 August 1968, Italy circulated a working paper which proposed to simplify the issue of underground explosive technology by separating the regulation of military explosions from the regulation of peaceful explosions, and to deal first with an acceptable form of control for peaceful explosions. Italy specifically proposed that: (i) all peaceful explosions should be announced to the United Nations in advance, with information as to the date, location, depth, purpose and power of the explosions, and explosions not so announced would be regarded as being of a military nature; (ii) Governments conducting peaceful explosions should permit experts from the non-nuclear States to be present at the explosion in order to familiarize themselves with the technology of the explosion and its practical results; and (iii) non-nuclear Governments would submit lists of available experts from which the host country could invite observers. Italy stressed that it sought to facilitate a final agreement by offering a partial but realizable measure.

Canada and Sweden agreed that an underground test ban treaty would have to include provision for specific permission for each peaceful nuclear explosion under an international regime for the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy. Canada said that under article V of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (which dealt with measures to provide non-nuclear-weapon States with the potential benefits of explosions), consideration must be given to "appropriate international observation" and "appropriate international procedures" for nuclear explosive services arrangements. It felt that while IAEA would be an appropriate forum to negotiate a basic agreement, it would be better to leave open the question whether such agreement should be negotiated. Canada believed it would be appropriate to have a preliminary examination of this issue in the Eighteen-Nation Committee, followed by referral to IAEA for closer study, working discussion and eventual negotiation. The nuclear powers must assure each other and the world that peaceful nuclear explosion tests were not weapon tests; hence it was necessary to provide for control over both development tests and industrial application explosions within the territories of the nuclear powers. Canada maintained this matter could

best be dealt with under a comprehensive test ban treaty and thus peaceful nuclear explosive services should be made compatible with such a treaty. In respect to peaceful explosions, IAEA should play a central role; its functions would include: (i) collecting and publishing scientific and technical information about peaceful nuclear technology; (ii) when requested, acting as an intermediary in arranging peaceful nuclear explosions by one State on the territory of another; (iii) registering and publishing the intention to conduct nuclear explosions; and (iv) providing observation of peaceful nuclear explosions on the territory of non-nuclear States to prevent transmitting the essential technology or infringing obligations of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and advising on measures protecting human life and property. Canada considered that IAEA's role as an intermediary and an observer for explosions required further study both by experts and by Governments. With regard to the United Kingdom's proposal to request the Board of Governors of IAEA to prepare a study on IAEA's possible role in the implementation of article V of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, Canada preferred that such a request be made by the General Assembly and stated it might raise this matter at the forthcoming twenty-third session of the Assembly (scheduled to open on 24 September 1968).

Burma commented, in this connexion, that it would be tragic if lack of an agreement on an international régime to regulate the issue of peaceful nuclear explosions were to delay the comprehensive test ban. India agreed with Italy's view that the underground test ban was directly linked to the issue of peaceful explosions; the two should be considered together. Total prohibition of nuclear explosions must apply to all States—nuclear and non-nuclear, India said. Peaceful explosions would then be permitted under a separate international régime. India also urged that the development of a nuclear excavation technology must not involve any modification of the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963 (banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water),<sup>13</sup> but be settled through a separately

<sup>13</sup> See Y.U.N., 1963, pp. 124-26, 137-40.

negotiated instrument within the context of a comprehensive test ban.

In connexion with the role of IAEA, Italy felt that since the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States (scheduled to open on 29 August 1968) would be dealing with the question of peaceful nuclear explosions, it would be premature for the Eighteen-Nation Committee to ask IAEA for a study of its role in this field. Mexico suggested that since the questions of peaceful uses of nuclear energy arising from articles IV and V of the Non-Proliferation Treaty were to be considered by the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, the Eighteen-Nation Committee might take them up in the light of conclusions of the Conference. On the same point, the United Kingdom proposed that in dealing with the problem of the implementation of article V of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Committee should take into account the views of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, together with those of IAEA.

On 28 August 1968, Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and the United Arab Republic—the so-called non-aligned members of the Committee—submitted a joint memorandum on a comprehensive test ban treaty, in which they stressed their concern that it had not so far been possible to reach agreement on a comprehensive test ban, that not all countries had so far adhered to the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty and that atmospheric tests had in fact increased, resulting again in widespread radioactive contamination. They also deplored the high frequency and increasing yields of underground testing which they felt was giving a new impetus to the arms race. They further referred to reports that large underground tests had led to radioactive leakages outside the territorial limits of testing States, thus infringing upon the Partial Test Ban Treaty; even if these incidents were not deliberate, they might weaken and endanger the existence of the Partial Test Ban Treaty. In the memorandum these States also noted the heavy costs involved in nuclear weapon testing, and suggested that the economic and technical resources, as well as the personnel involved in further development and sophistication of nuclear weapons, could be diverted to

the needs of co-operation in the peaceful nuclear field if a comprehensive test ban treaty were concluded. In their view, such a step would constitute an earnest declaration of the intentions of the nuclear-weapon powers to implement their commitments under the Partial Test Ban Treaty.

While aware of the differences among the nuclear powers on the question of verification, despite the progress in seismic technology, these eight members of the Committee viewed with apprehension the fact that no serious negotiation had taken place on the various proposals put forward in the Committee. They endorsed an organized international exchange of seismic data, which, they felt, would help provide a better scientific basis for national evaluation of underground events.

In their view, there was a close link between the question of peaceful nuclear explosions and both the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and a comprehensive test ban. This underlined the urgency of a universal and comprehensive solution of the problem of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes within the context of a comprehensive test ban treaty. The memorandum urged renewed efforts to conclude such a comprehensive treaty and suggested that, pending the conclusion of such an agreement, the nuclear-weapon States should take immediate steps for the discontinuance of all nuclear weapon tests.

#### DISARMAMENT MEASURES CONCERNING NON-NUCLEAR WEAPONS

##### CHEMICAL AND BACTERIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

Also discussed in the Eighteen-Nation Committee was a United Kingdom proposal that the Committee request the Secretary-General, with the assistance of experts, to prepare a report on the nature and possible effects of chemical weapons and on the implications of their use. A report that would deal with both bacteriological (biological) and chemical weapons was suggested by Poland and supported by Bulgaria, Burma, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Sweden, the USSR and the United Arab Republic. The United States said it could support the broader study, but such support did

not imply a desire to have the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925 (which prohibited the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons) revised, superseded or supplemented. In India's opinion, the study in question would strengthen the Geneva Protocol and would provide a background for the banning of production and stockpiling of chemical and biological weapons and for their total elimination. The Committee could consider further action after such a study was completed. Sweden suggested that the Secretary-General's study should be followed by a continuous watch and periodic review to ensure that new developments in this weaponry were fully covered.

The United Kingdom agreed, following discussion, that the Secretary-General be requested to prepare the broader study covering both bacteriological and chemical weapons.

The United Kingdom also submitted another proposal which was designed to supplement the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925. Pointing out that the term "bacteriological" used in the Protocol was not sufficiently comprehensive to include the whole range of microbiological agents that might be used in hostilities, the United Kingdom suggested the early conclusion of a new convention for the prohibition of microbiological methods of warfare which would supplement but not supersede the Geneva Protocol. Under the proposed convention, States would (i) declare their belief that the use of microbiological methods of warfare of any kind and in any circumstances should be treated as contrary to international law and a crime against humanity; and (ii) undertake never to engage in such methods of warfare themselves in any circumstances. The proposed convention would also include: (i) a ban on the production of microbiological agents so worded as to take account of the fact that most such agents which could be used in hostilities were also needed for peaceful purposes; (ii) an undertaking to destroy stocks of such agents; and (iii) a ban on research work aimed at production of such agents. As strict processes of verification would not be possible, the United Kingdom noted, it therefore proposed that consideration be given to the establishment, under the auspices of the United

Nations, of a competent body of experts to investigate allegations made by a party to the convention that another party had acted in breach of its obligations. Failure to comply would be reported to the Security Council. Consideration should also be given to incorporating an article under which parties would undertake to support appropriate action in accordance with the United Nations Charter, to counter the use or threatened use of microbiological methods of warfare. Such an article might be endorsed in the same way as the Security Council endorsed the declarations of the USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States in connexion with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Brazil said that while it was not a signatory to the Geneva Protocol, it strictly observed the Protocol's objectives and principles and, unlike some other Committee members, it had never produced chemical and biological weapons. India believed that the Protocol's prohibitions had a continued importance and validity and Sweden thought that universal adherence to the Protocol was essential even though, in Sweden's view, its principles had now become "customary international law" binding on all States. Referring to doubts expressed as to whether the Protocol covered all chemical and biological weapons, Sweden said it favoured the broader interpretation affirming that the prohibition against the use of any of these weapons was valid without exceptions, in order not to undermine the existing prohibitions and to avoid amendments. Bulgaria, Poland and the USSR believed that the Protocol should be strengthened by the accession of all States and the abolition of all reservations made on accession. Czechoslovakia, while supporting the Protocol, declared its readiness to discuss the question of expanding it.

The United Kingdom stressed that it would welcome ratification of the Geneva Protocol by all States. It disputed views that the Protocol had prevented the use of chemical and biological weapons during World War II and believed that restraint in the use of these weapons had stemmed from fear of retaliation. The United Kingdom urged the Committee to record its intention to consider the proposals the

United Kingdom had submitted and to form a working party to study the question of control of chemical and biological weapons.

The United States observed that the proposal to ban the production of microbiological agents and destroy all stocks or ancillary equipment posed serious verification problems. However, if the proposal had wide support in the Committee, the United States would agree to the establishment of a working group to study this and related problems.

The USSR noted that the United Kingdom proposal meant the re-opening of issues which it felt were long solved. In the view of the USSR—and of Bulgaria—the Geneva Protocol was not obsolete and covered all the new methods and agents of chemical and biological warfare which had emerged since then.

Burma recalled that the draft treaties on general and complete disarmament submitted in 1962 by the USSR and the United States had made reference to chemical, bacteriological and radiological weapons.<sup>14</sup> The potential military applications of the last-mentioned might become the "ultimate" weapon one day and should not be now forgotten.

India supported total prohibition of the use of chemical and biological weapons. Mexico favoured the establishment of a sub-committee to consider drafting a treaty on the prohibition of biological and chemical weapons.

Sweden proposed securing universal acceptance and observance of a fully comprehensive ban on all chemical and biological weapons and means of delivery, and outlined requirements for a control system by some joint or collective action.

#### ELIMINATION OF FOREIGN MILITARY BASES

Charging that the foreign military bases of the United States and other countries interfered in domestic affairs and suppressed national liberation movements, the USSR said the elimination of such bases was an important factor in halting the arms race and achieving disarmament.

Romania called for the elimination of foreign military bases and the withdrawal of troops to within national frontiers. It also renewed a suggestion it had made previously for the simul-

taneous dissolution of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact alliances; such a measure would be conducive to achieving a military detente in Europe and the removal of a nuclear threat from the continent, Romania maintained. Sweden expressed the view that while the problem of the elimination of foreign military bases—closely related to unsolved political questions—should remain on the Committee's agenda, its consideration should await an opportune time, that is when the Non-Proliferation Treaty had been generally accepted.

#### OTHER COLLATERAL MEASURES

##### REGIONAL ACTION

The United States expressed the view that regional limitation of armaments was a promising measure of disarmament. It cited in this respect the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco),<sup>15</sup> and said it attached particular importance to the halting of the non-nuclear arms race on a regional scale. It would support any reasonable proposal by the major conventional-weapon-producing countries to make regional agreements more effective.

The United Kingdom also urged a general reduction of non-nuclear armaments and said it was impressed by the effectiveness of small teams of inspectors and their ability to assemble information unobtrusively with little or no cooperation of hosts. The USSR, while supporting the reduction of conventional armaments in various regions, stressed that such reduction in the Middle East would be subject to the liquidation of the consequences of the aggressive war.

Burma thought that the prospects of achieving arms limitation agreements in the field of conventional armaments were inseparably linked with and should await progress in negotiating agreements regarding nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles. Mexico said that the diminishing rivalry between the two superpowers could give new dimensions to regional conventional disarmament. Sweden believed that the question of regional arrangements for a balanced

<sup>14</sup> See Y.U.N., 1962, pp. 6-9.

<sup>15</sup> See footnote 12.

reduction of conventional armaments should not be considered in the Eighteen-Nation Committee until after the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons had been generally accepted.

#### MEASURES TO PREVENT ARMS RACE ON THE SEA-BED

In its memorandum of 16 July 1968 (see p. 22 above) the USSR had proposed that the Committee should start negotiations on the use exclusively for peaceful purposes of the sea-bed. In this connexion, it recalled the precedents of the Antarctic Treaty and the Treaty on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. The USSR proposed that a ban on military use of the sea-bed should include the whole sea-bed and ocean floor, minus territorial waters, and

should embrace any military activity, nuclear or conventional.

The United States advocated only the prohibition of emplacement of weapons of mass destruction. Consequently, it urged the Committee to begin defining factors which were vital to a workable, verifiable and effective international agreement to prevent emplacement of weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed.

Czechoslovakia, Italy and Sweden believed there were hopeful prospects for agreement on this issue. Italy proposed the proclamation of a ban on nuclear weapon explosions under the sea-bed, pending international regulation of issues involved, while India urged adoption of a declaration reserving the sea-bed and ocean floor exclusively for peaceful purposes.

#### DOCUMENTARY REFERENCES

A/7189(DC/231). Report of Conference of Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (covering period 16 July-28 August 1968).

#### CONFERENCE OF NON-NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES

On 17 November 1966, the General Assembly decided to convene a conference of non-nuclear-weapon States to meet not later than July 1968.<sup>16</sup> The Conference was to consider: (a) how the security of non-nuclear States could best be assured, (b) how non-nuclear powers might co-operate among themselves in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and (c) how nuclear devices could be used for exclusively peaceful purposes. Later, the Assembly decided to convene the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States at Geneva, Switzerland, from 29 August to 28 September 1968, and to invite to the Conference Members of the United Nations and members of the specialized agencies and of the International Atomic Energy Agency.<sup>17</sup>

The Conference was convened on 29 August 1968 at the Palais des Nations in Geneva and elected as its President M. Arshad Husain, Minister for External Affairs of Pakistan. The following ninety-six countries participated in the Conference: Afghanistan, Algeria, Argen-

tina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Ceylon, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Czechoslovakia, Dahomey, Denmark, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, the Federal Republic of Germany, Finland, France, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, the Philippines, Poland, Portugal, the Republic of Korea, the Republic of Viet-Nam, Romania, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, South Africa, Southern Yemen, Spain, Sweden,

<sup>16</sup> See Y.U.N., 1966, p. 18, text of resolution 2153 B (XXI).

<sup>17</sup> See Y.U.N., 1967, pp. 12-13, text of resolution 2346 B (XXII).

Switzerland, Syria, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, the USSR, the United Arab Republic, the United Kingdom, the United Republic of Tanzania, the United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia and Zambia. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the International Labour Organisation (ILO) and the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) were represented at the Conference by observers. The Conference held 20 plenary meetings and worked in two committees. Hector Gros Espiell (Uruguay) was elected Chairman of Committee I. Burudi Nabwera (Kenya) was elected Chairman of Committee II.

Committee I considered the following agenda items: (1) Measures to assure the security of non-nuclear-weapon States; (2) Establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones; and (3) Effective measures for the prevention of further proliferation of nuclear weapons, the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and nuclear disarmament: (a) Safeguards against the diversion of source or special fissionable material from peaceful to military uses, and safeguards against industrial espionage; (b) Submission of periodic reports by countries, to an international agency, on the nature of nuclear technical assistance and the nature and extent of special fissionable material supplied by them to non-nuclear-weapon States for peaceful purposes; (c) Conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty; (d) Freeze on production of fissile materials for weapon purposes and the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons.

During discussion of the item entitled "Measures to assure the security of non-nuclear-weapon States," doubts were expressed by Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Iran, Kenya, Libya, South Africa, Spain, Uruguay and Venezuela as to the adequacy of the Security Council's resolution (255) of 19 June 1968 by which the Council, among other things, had recognized that aggression with nuclear weapons or the threat of such aggression against a non-nuclear-weapon State would create a situation in which the Security Council, and above all its nuclear-weapon State permanent members, would have to act immediately in accordance with their

obligations under the United Nation Charter, and had welcomed the intention expressed by certain States that they would provide or support immediate assistance to any non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (for text of Treaty, see pp. 17-19 above) that was a victim of an act or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons were used (for text of Security Council resolution, see pp. 21-22). Others, such as China, Japan, Malta, the Republic of Korea and the United Arab Republic, while sharing these doubts, acknowledged the political significance of that resolution. Still others—Ceylon, Ecuador, Pakistan and Syria, for instance—asked for more specific and juridical commitments, enshrined in a binding treaty or some other international document.

Pakistan was critical of the Security Council's resolution, pointing out that the term "aggression" had not yet been defined, which fact rendered the assurances contained in the resolution dubious; and also, that assurances offered under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter (for text, see APPENDIX ii) could not be depended upon except by those that were members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Warsaw Pact alliances, and those that were beneficiaries of unilateral guarantees outside the United Nations framework.

India said that any linking of security assurances to the signing of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was contrary to the United Nations Charter, which did not make a distinction between countries that had signed a particular treaty and those that had not. It asserted that nuclear States which were members of the Security Council had a responsibility to assist any non-nuclear State threatened with or subjected to nuclear attack, irrespective of whether it was a signatory of the Non-Proliferation Treaty or not.

The majority of delegations favoured assurances of non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States to supplement the assurances offered by the Security Council resolution of 19 June 1968. Many countries also underlined the importance of assurances from nuclear States against conventional attack. Several delegations asserted that the only solution to the

question of security guarantees was the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

In connexion with the item entitled "Measures to assure the security of non-nuclear-weapon States," four draft resolutions were submitted.

The first of these, submitted by Brazil, would have the Conference invite all States to enter into negotiations, at an appropriate forum, not later than 1 May 1969, for the conclusion of a general convention through which the nuclear-weapon States should undertake to give negative and positive guarantees to all non-nuclear-weapon States (i.e., that nuclear-weapon States would undertake never to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States—negative guarantees—and that if, nevertheless, a non-nuclear-weapon State were to be threatened by a nuclear State, the other nuclear powers would come to its support—positive guarantees).

Subsequently, a revised text was submitted by Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela. By the revised draft resolution, the Conference would: (1) recommend that the General Assembly of the United Nations, at its twenty-third (1968) session, in order to achieve a solution to the problem of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States, convene as soon as possible a conference with the participation of all States which were Members of the United Nations, members of its specialized agencies and of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and all nuclear-weapon States, for the purpose of concluding a multilateral instrument whereby the nuclear-weapon States would undertake to adopt the appropriate measures to assure the security of all non-nuclear-weapon States; (2) request the Executive Secretary of the Conference to transmit the text of the resolution and all other documents concerning this agenda item of the Conference to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

Pakistan orally proposed two amendments to this draft resolution—namely, that the words "with the participation" would be deleted from the first operative paragraph and that the following words would be added to it: "bear-

ing in mind the need to reflect an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations between the nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States." The first of these two amendments was accepted by the sponsors of the draft resolution; the second was adopted by 12 votes to 1, with 68 abstentions.

This draft resolution, as amended, was approved by Committee I on 26 September by a roll-call vote of 40 to 17, with 25 abstentions.

The draft resolution was voted on at a plenary meeting of the Conference on 27 September and was not adopted, having failed to obtain the required two-thirds majority, by a roll-call vote of 39 in favour to 20 against, with 25 abstentions.<sup>18</sup>

The second draft resolution was submitted by Uganda, the United Republic of Tanzania and Zambia. It recommended the establishment of a preparatory committee for the convening of a conference to be held not later than 31 August 1969 for the conclusion of a convention or protocol to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons by which the nuclear-weapon States would undertake not to attack non-nuclear-weapon States or one another and by which States parties to the convention would also undertake to come to the aid of any State, nuclear or non-nuclear, attacked by nuclear or conventional weapons.

The sponsors did not press the draft resolution to a vote in the Committee.

A third draft resolution was submitted by Pakistan. By this text, the Conference would: (1) urge the nuclear-weapon States to undertake to refrain from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon State which had renounced the manufacture or acquisition otherwise of nuclear weapons; (2) recommend that the permanent members of the Security Council—which had expressed their intention to seek immediate

<sup>18</sup> On 30 August 1968, the Conference adopted its rules of procedure. Rule 34 called for a two-thirds majority of members present and voting for approval of all matters of substance in plenary meetings. Procedural matters were to be decided by a simple majority. Rule 35 specified that "members present and voting" meant members casting an affirmative or negative vote. Members which abstained from voting were considered as not voting.

Security Council action to provide assistance, in accordance with the United Nations Charter, to any non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons that was a victim of an act of aggression or an object of threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons were used—undertake to provide such immediate assistance, in accordance with the United Nations Charter, to any non-nuclear-weapon State which had renounced the manufacture or acquisition otherwise of nuclear weapons and was the object of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; (3) recommend further to the nuclear-weapon States that they effectively respond, jointly and severally, to a request for immediate assistance, in the exercise of its inherent right of individual and collective self-defence, by a State which had renounced the manufacture or acquisition otherwise of nuclear weapons if a nuclear attack occurred against that State or if it was subjected to a threat of use of nuclear weapons, until the Security Council had taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.

This text was also not pressed to a vote.

A fourth draft resolution, submitted by the Federal Republic of Germany, as revised, would have the Conference: (1) reaffirm (a) the principle, indivisible in its application, of the non-use of force and the prohibition of the threat of force in relations between States by employing nuclear or non-nuclear-weapons, and the belief that all States without exception had an equal and inalienable right to enjoy the protection afforded by this principle, recognized under Article 2 of the United Nations Charter;<sup>19</sup> (b) the right to equality, sovereignty, territorial integrity, non-intervention in internal affairs and self-determination of every State, (c) the inherent right, recognized under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter,<sup>19</sup> of individual or collective self-defence which, apart from measures taken or authorized by the Security Council of the United Nations, was the only legitimate exception to the overriding principle of the non-use of force in relations between States; and (2) request the nuclear-weapon States to reaffirm these principles on their behalf.

The draft resolution was approved by Committee I on 26 September by 50 votes to 5, with 25 abstentions.

The Conference adopted this draft resolution at a plenary meeting on 27 September by 52 votes to 5, with 26 abstentions, as resolution A.

In connexion with the item entitled "Establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones," a draft resolution was submitted by Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Jamaica, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela. By section I of this proposal as subsequently revised, the Conference would: recommend that all non-nuclear-weapon States not comprised in the zone established in the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (the Treaty of Tlatelolco signed at Tlatelolco, Mexico on 14 February 1967), initiate or continue such studies as they might deem opportune concerning the possibility and desirability of establishing by treaty the military neutralization of their respective zones, provided that political and security conditions permitted. By section II of the draft resolution, the Conference would: (1) regret the fact that not all the nuclear-weapon States had yet signed Additional Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco (by which nuclear-weapon powers would undertake to respect the status of denuclearization of Latin America and not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the Parties to the Treaty) and (2) urge the nuclear-weapon powers to comply fully with the Assembly's request of 5 December 1967 that nuclear-weapon powers sign the Protocol.<sup>20</sup> The draft resolution was approved by Committee I on 24 September by a roll-call vote of 63 votes to 0, with 13 abstentions.

The Conference adopted this draft resolution at a plenary meeting on 27 September by 74 votes to 0, with 10 abstentions, as resolution B.

<sup>19</sup> For text of Charter Articles, see APPENDIX ii.

<sup>20</sup> See Y.U.N., 1967, pp. 17-18, text of resolution 2286(XXII), operative paragraph 4.



Under the item entitled "Effective measures for the prevention of further proliferation of nuclear weapons, the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and nuclear disarmament," four draft resolutions were submitted in Committee I.

The first, approved by the Committee on 25 September by 75 votes to 0, with 5 abstentions, and adopted by the Conference on 27 September, as resolution C, by 76 voted to 0, with 8 abstentions, was sponsored by Afghanistan, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Ghana, Guatemala, India, Jamaica, Mexico, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, Venezuela and Yugoslavia. By this resolution, the Conference requested the United Nations General Assembly, at its twenty-third regular session (which had opened on 24 September 1968), to recommend that the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament should begin, not later than March 1969, to undertake negotiations for: (a) the prevention of the further development and improvement of nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles; (b) the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty, as an important step in the field of nuclear disarmament and as a matter of high priority; (c) reaching agreement on the immediate cessation of the production of fissile materials for weapons purposes and the stoppage of the manufacture of nuclear weapons; and (d) the reduction and subsequent elimination of all stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems.

A second draft resolution, submitted by Pakistan and later revised, would have the Conference urge the Governments of the USSR and the United States to enter at an early date into bilateral discussions on the limitation of offensive strategic nuclear-weapon delivery systems and systems of defence against ballistic missiles.

Committee I approved this text on 24 September by 62 votes to 0, with 5 abstentions. It was adopted by the Conference at a plenary meeting on 27 September as resolution D, by 79 votes to 0, with 5 abstentions.

By another draft resolution submitted by Pakistan, as revised by the sponsor and amended

by the Philippines, the Conference would recommend the acceptance of the system of safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), as it might evolve from time to time, by all the non-nuclear-weapon States, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with IAEA in accordance with its safeguards system, which would provide against diversion of source or fissionable material whether it was produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or was outside any such facility established with or without the assistance of IAEA, including those principal nuclear facilities which might have been established in pursuance of any bilateral or multilateral arrangements, as a step towards the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Committee I approved the draft resolution on 25 September by 38 votes to 3, with 35 abstentions. The Conference adopted the text at a plenary meeting on 27 September by 34 votes to 8, with 41 abstentions, as resolution E.

A fourth draft resolution was submitted by Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, Spain and Switzerland. Amendments proposed by the Federal Republic of Germany, Mauritius and the Philippines were accepted by the sponsors. By the text as thus amended, the Conference would: (1) recommend the establishment, within IAEA and under its Board of Governors, of institutional machinery on safeguards of which both countries supplying nuclear materials, and member countries, whether possessing nuclear facilities or not, should form part; (2) recommend to IAEA that, in the process of improving and simplifying the safeguards systems, the following objectives be given appropriate consideration: (a) simplification of the safeguard procedures, in particular with a view to concentrating on the flow of highly enriched uranium and plutonium, the only materials which could be used for military purposes; (b) use of instruments and other technical devices at certain strategic points as soon as possible; (c) simplification of safeguards in respect of fissionable materials in small quantities for use in scientific research; (d) incorporation in the agreements of the rules laid down against

industrial risks, including industrial espionage, by the statute of IAEA, the decisions of the Board of Governors and directives of the Director-General of the Agency, particularly with regard to the possibility of challenging inspections; and (e) regulation of access by inspectors to certain strategic points; (3) urge the nuclear-weapon powers to conclude with IAEA safeguard agreements consistent with the relevant rules; (4) consider it essential that rules should be drawn up to avoid duplication of safeguard procedures and consequent commercial discrimination; (5) invite the Secretary-General of the United Nations to communicate this resolution to IAEA together with the records of the discussion thereon and other relevant documents.

The principal change effected by these amendments was to revise the proposal on the establishment of institutional machinery so that it would include all IAEA members whether they possessed nuclear facilities or not, rather than only IAEA members possessing nuclear facilities or supplying nuclear materials. This change was made on the proposal of Mauritius.

The text as finally approved in Committee I also incorporated amendments proposed by Japan, including one on simplifying safeguards procedures by the use of instruments and other technical devices at certain strategic points of the flow of nuclear materials, with a view to restricting the safeguarding operations to the necessary minimum.

The draft resolution, as amended, was approved by the Committee by a roll-call vote of 35 to 5, with 43 abstentions.

By the final draft text, the Conference would: (1) recommend the establishment, within IAEA and under its Board of Governors, of institutional machinery on safeguards of which both countries supplying nuclear materials, and member countries, whether possessing nuclear facilities or not should form part; (2) recommend to IAEA that, in the process of improving and simplifying the safeguards system, inter alia, the following objectives be given appropriate consideration: (a) safeguards procedures should be simplified by the use of instruments and other technical devices at certain strategic points of the flow of nuclear materials, with a view to restricting the safeguarding operations to

the necessary minimum, (b) simplification of safeguards in respect of fissionable materials in small quantities for use in scientific research, (c) incorporation in the agreements of the rules laid down against industrial risks, including industrial espionage, by the statute of the IAEA, the decisions of the Board of Governors and the directives of the Director General of IAEA, particularly with regard to the possibility of challenging inspectors; (3) urge the nuclear-weapon powers to conclude with IAEA safeguard agreements consistent with the relevant rules; (4) consider it essential that rules be drawn up to avoid duplication of safeguard procedures and consequent commercial discrimination; and (5) invite the Secretary-General of the United Nations to communicate this resolution to IAEA, together with the records of the discussions thereon and other relevant documents.

The Conference adopted the text, as resolution F, at a plenary meeting on 27 September by a vote of 34 to 5, with 45 abstentions.

The agenda item allocated to Committee II was as follows: Programmes for co-operation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy: (a) Access to and exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy among non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-weapon States; (b) Assistance and co-operation in the development of the application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, in the territories of the non-nuclear-weapon States, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world; (c) The question of nuclear explosions for peaceful uses; (d) Benefits from peaceful applications of nuclear explosions to non-nuclear-weapon States which have renounced the production, acquisition and use of nuclear weapons pursuant to special international agreement or agreements through an appropriate international body or through bilateral arrangements.

Nine draft resolutions were submitted in Committee II.

One—a six-part draft resolution—was sponsored by Austria, Denmark, Finland, Japan, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland. By the first part of this text, as revised, the Conference would: (1) call upon IAEA to continue its

utmost efforts for the compilation and dissemination of public information concerning the peaceful uses of nuclear energy; (2) recommend that the Agency study international arrangements to facilitate exchange of scientific and technical information of commercial or industrial value, which was not publicly available, so as to enable interested parties to negotiate for the acquisition thereof; (3) invite the nuclear-weapon States to advise the Agency at regular intervals as to the possibility of their declassifying scientific and technical information essential for the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

By the second part, the Conference would recommend that the Agency study further the ways and means of increasing the funds available for technical assistance.

By the third part, the Conference would: (1) recommend that the Agency study the most effective means of ensuring access to special fissionable materials on a commercial basis; (2) urge the nuclear-weapon States to facilitate the availability of fissionable materials for the peaceful nuclear programmes of non-nuclear-weapon States under the safeguards envisaged in article III of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (see above, pp. 17-19 for text of Treaty).

By the fourth part, the Conference would recommend that the Agency initiate necessary studies regarding its possible functions in the field of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.

By the fifth part, the Conference would express its assumption that the Agency would examine adaptation of its procedures and arrangements, as well as the composition of the Board of Governors, in the light of its new responsibilities.

By the sixth and final part, the Conference would: (1) request the United Nations Secretary-General to bring this resolution to the attention of the Agency; and (2) invite the Agency to bear the present resolution in mind in preparing its annual reports for the General Assembly.

The draft resolution was approved by Committee II on 25 September by 70 votes to 2, with 8 abstentions. At the plenary meeting of the Conference on 26 September, an amendment was submitted to the third part of this

draft resolution by Argentina, Austria, Brazil, the Federal Republic of Germany and India, by which the phrase concerning the application of the safeguards envisaged in article III of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons would be replaced by a phrase specifying "either the application of existing safeguards or other appropriate safeguards as envisaged in article III of the Treaty". The vote on the amendment was 37 in favour to 35 against, with 6 abstentions, and the amendment was therefore not carried as the required two-thirds majority was not obtained. The draft resolution was then adopted by 51 in favour to 15 against, with 10 abstentions, as resolution H.

A second draft resolution, submitted by Pakistan and revised by the sponsor, would have the Conference: (1) request all nuclear-weapon States and those non-nuclear-weapon States which were in a position to do so, to provide access for students and scientists on a non-discriminatory basis to their scientific institutions and nuclear establishments engaged in research and development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy; (2) urge all those States not to provide (a) source or fissionable material, or (b) equipment and material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State, unless the latter had accepted safeguards to be established in accordance with the statute and safeguards system of IAEA; and (3) urge further that in cases where nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States were parties to a regional multilateral treaty providing for co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the safeguards provision of such a treaty should continue to apply until such time as negotiations relating to safeguards, between the parties to such a treaty and the Agency on an individual or collective basis, were considered conducive to the conclusion of an agreement.

The operative paragraphs of this text were voted on separately by Committee II on 25 September. The operative paragraphs numbered 2 and 3 (see above) were rejected and the draft resolution without these two paragraphs was then approved by 18 votes to 3, with 43 abstentions.

By the text as thus approved, the Conference

would request nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States able to do so, to provide access for students and scientists, on a non-discriminatory basis, to their scientific institutions and nuclear establishments engaged in research and development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

The Conference adopted the text at a plenary meeting on 26 September, by 37 votes in favour to 0 against, with 43 abstentions, as resolution M.

Another draft resolution was also submitted by Pakistan and revised by the sponsor.

By the operative paragraph of this draft text, the Conference would recommend that IAEA should undertake to examine the basis on which arrangements could be made by the Agency to secure finances from international sources for the creation of a "Special Nuclear Fund" (SNF) to be made available in the form of grants and low-interest-bearing loans, repayable over long periods of time, for financing the nuclear projects which had been found by the Agency to be technically feasible and economically viable in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States which were members of the Agency, particularly those in the developing areas of the world, and which might make requests to the Agency under the provisions of article XI B of the Agency's statute.

The draft resolution was approved by Committee II on 25 September by 76 votes to 1, with 4 abstentions. The Conference adopted the draft resolution at a plenary meeting on 26 September by 70 votes in favour to 0 against, with 4 abstentions, as resolution I.

A fourth draft resolution was sponsored by Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Jamaica, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela. By the operative part of this text, as revised, the Conference would (1) request the Secretary-General of the United Nations to appoint a group of experts, chosen on a personal basis, to prepare a full report on all possible contributions of nuclear technology to the economic and scientific advancement of the developing countries; (2) recommend that the Secretary-General draw the attention of the group of experts to the desirability of taking advantage

of the experience of IAEA in preparing the report; and (3) request the Secretary-General to transmit the report to States Members of the United Nations, its specialized agencies and IAEA in time to permit its consideration at the twenty-fourth regular session (1969) of the General Assembly.

This draft resolution was approved by Committee II on 25 September by 75 votes to 0, with 3 abstentions. The Conference adopted it on 26 September by 69 in favour to 0 against, with 1 abstention, as resolution G.

A fifth draft resolution—dealing in three parts with technical aid for nuclear research and development—was sponsored in Committee II by Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Jamaica, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela.

By the first operative part of this three-part draft resolution, the Conference would: (1) request the General Assembly to consider at its twenty-third regular session (which opened on 24 September 1968) the establishment, within the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), of a nuclear technology research and development programme, with the co-operation of IAEA, for the benefit of the developing countries; (2) request the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development to consider the establishment for the benefit of the developing countries of a programme for the use of nuclear energy in economic development projects under which finance would be granted on the most favourable terms; (3) invite the nuclear-weapon States to assume the main responsibility for financing the two programmes.

By the second operative part of the draft text, the Conference would (1) request the General Conference of IAEA to consider the establishment of a fund of special fissionable materials for the benefit of non-nuclear-weapon States and in particular of developing countries; (2) invite the nuclear-weapon States to give a firm undertaking regarding the supply of such materials to that fund at reasonable prices and in adequate quantities.

By the third operative part of the draft text, the Conference would also recommend that the

nuclear-weapon States, independently of the contributions provided for in the sections above, channel into the proposed programme and fund a substantial share of such financial resources and special fissionable materials as might be released in the future as a result of the adoption of nuclear disarmament measures.

The draft resolution was approved by Committee II on 25 September 1968 by 57 votes to 5, with 17 abstentions. The Conference adopted the text at a plenary meeting on 26 September by 57 votes to 0, with 22 abstentions, as resolution J.

A sixth draft resolution dealt with broadening the representation of the Board of Governors of IAEA. This text, sponsored by Cameroon, Dahomey, the Ivory Coast, Kenya, Uganda, the United Republic of Tanzania, and Zambia, would have the Conference recommend to IAEA that representation on its Board of Governors be broadened so as to reflect equitable geographical distribution and the views of a broad spectrum of the developing countries.

The text was approved by Committee II on 25 September 1968 by 51 votes to 4, with 23 abstentions. The Conference adopted the resolution at a plenary meeting on 26 September by 47 votes to 0, with 29 abstentions as resolution K.

A seventh draft resolution was proposed by Italy in Committee II but was not pressed to the vote. By this draft the Conference would have: (1) recommended that the General Assembly at its twenty-third (1968) session convene, every (.....) years, a conference of non-nuclear-weapon States and set up a special committee for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for the purpose of studying how best to ensure the implementation of the conclusions of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States and to make recommendations thereon, and report to the General Assembly on its activities; and (2) requested the Secretary-General to call the first session of the Special Committee at Geneva, Switzerland, before (.....) 1969.

An eighth draft resolution submitted by Sweden, later also sponsored by Nigeria, called for the Conference to note the joint memorandum on a comprehensive test ban treaty presented

on 26 August 1968 to the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament by Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and the United Arab Republic (see above, p. 28), and to endorse the opinion expressed in that document that the question of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes was also closely linked with a comprehensive test ban, this aspect of the matter underlining the urgency of a universal and comprehensive solution of the problem of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes compatible with a comprehensive test ban treaty.

Committee II approved the draft resolution on 25 September 1968 by 70 votes to 0, with 8 abstentions. The Conference adopted the text at a plenary meeting on 26 September by 61 votes to 0, with 16 abstentions, as resolution L.

The ninth draft resolution was submitted by Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela. By this, the Conference would: declare that it was highly important that a special draft international agreement should be prepared as soon as possible for the establishment in due course, within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency, of an international service for nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, whereby the nuclear-weapon States would undertake to provide States which had renounced nuclear weapons with services required for specific projects, on a non-discriminatory basis and at a fair price excluding charges for nuclear device development costs; and request the Secretary-General of the United Nations to include in the agenda of the twenty-third regular (1968) session of the General Assembly an item to this effect.

The draft resolution to this effect was approved by Committee II on 25 September by a roll-call vote of 28 to 13, with 40 abstentions. The text was considered by the Conference at a plenary meeting on 26 September but was not adopted, having failed to obtain the required two-thirds majority. The result of the vote was 30 in favour to 21 against, with 27 abstentions.

The final resolution of the Conference of the Non-Nuclear-Weapon States was adopted on 27

September 1968 by 75 votes to 0, as resolution N. It contained a Declaration summarizing the views of the Conference and inviting the twenty-third session of the General Assembly (which had opened on 24 September 1968) to consider

the implementation of the Conference's decisions and the continuity of its work, and, at a subsequent session, the question of convening a second conference of non-nuclear-weapon States.

#### DOCUMENTARY REFERENCES

A/7277 and Corr.1,2. Final document of Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States (held at Geneva, 29 August-28 September 1968). (For list of documents issued by Conference, see Annex VI.)

### CONSIDERATION OF DISARMAMENT MATTERS AT GENERAL ASSEMBLY'S TWENTY-THIRD SESSION

Five items relating to disarmament were on the agenda of the twenty-third session of the General Assembly which opened on 24 September 1968. Three items were included by virtue of resolutions adopted by the Assembly in 1967 at its twenty-second session: These were: the question of general and complete disarmament;<sup>21</sup> the urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests;<sup>22</sup> and the elimination of foreign military bases in Asia, Africa and Latin America.<sup>23</sup> A fourth item, placed on the agenda at the request of the Secretary-General, dealt with the Final Document of, and the proposals approved by, the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States. Another item, consideration of a USSR Memorandum of 1 July 1968 concerning urgent measures to stop the arms race and achieve disarmament, was added to the agenda at the request of the USSR.

The General Assembly had before it: the report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament covering its session held from 16 July to 28 August 1968; the

Final Document of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States held from 29 August to 28 September 1968; and the USSR Memorandum, concerning urgent measures to stop the arms race and achieve disarmament.

These five agenda items were discussed in the General Assembly's First Committee in debates held between 12 and 22 November, between 27 November and 10 December and on 17 December 1968. Seven resolutions were adopted by the General Assembly on 20 December 1968: two on general and complete disarmament, including one on the question of chemical, bacteriological and other biological weapons; one on the suspension of nuclear tests; and four relating to the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States. (For details, see below.)

<sup>21</sup> See Y.U.N., 1967, p. 26, text of resolution 2342 B (XXII).

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 20, text of resolution 2343 (XXII).

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 24-25, text of resolution 2344 (XXII).

### General and Complete Disarmament

The General Assembly's First Committee had before it five draft resolutions dealing with general and complete disarmament, two of which were also considered in connexion with the item concerning the USSR Memorandum on measures to stop the arms race (see p. 44 below) and the item concerning the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States (see p. 48 below.)

#### GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT AND COLLATERAL MEASURES

By one draft resolution, as revised and sponsored by 10 Members (Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Romania, Sweden, and the United Arab Republic), the General Assembly would: (1) request the Con-

ference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to make renewed efforts towards reaching an agreement on general and complete disarmament under effective international control, and to analyse all plans for progress in the field of nuclear disarmament and to continue efforts to negotiate collateral measures; (2) refer to the Conference all documents and records of the meetings of the First Committee covering all matters related to disarmament; and (3) request the Conference to resume its work as early as possible and report to the General Assembly, as appropriate.

A second draft resolution—sponsored by Denmark, Ireland, Malta and Norway—was submitted to the First Committee by which the General Assembly would request the Secretary-General: (1) to ascertain the position of Member Governments on their attitude towards a system of registration of all trade in conventional arms; and (2) to report to the General Assembly on the results of this inquiry. The sponsors of this resolution agreed not to press for a vote, on the understanding that this matter was covered in a general way in the 10-power draft resolution (above) referring the matter of general and complete disarmament to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee.

On 10 December 1968, the 10-power draft resolution on general and complete disarmament was approved by the First Committee by 109 votes to 0, with 4 abstentions. It was adopted by the General Assembly at a plenary meeting on 20 December by the same vote—109 to 0, with 4 abstentions—as resolution 2454 B (XXIII). (For text of resolution, see DOCUMENTARY REFERENCES below.)

During the First Committee's debate, the majority of Members—including the United States and the USSR—holding general and complete disarmament to be the final goal, continued to express confidence in the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee towards that goal. Some Members, however—for example, Brazil, Chad, Chile, India, Pakistan and Sweden—were critical of the Eighteen-Nation Committee's slow progress, particularly towards nuclear disarmament. The USSR urged that the Eighteen-Nation Committee pursue its efforts with greater urgency and along the lines of the USSR Memorandum on urgent measures

to stop the arms race and achieve disarmament. (See following section for summary of measures proposed in USSR Memorandum.)

Support for the early conclusion of a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing, and for bilateral talks between the USSR and the United States on limiting the deployment of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, was widely expressed.

Many Members, among them India, Madagascar, Pakistan, the USSR, the United Arab Republic and Yugoslavia, also favoured a ban on the use of nuclear weapons. In the discussion on collateral measures, support was expressed for a cessation of production of nuclear weapons as well as of fissile materials for weapon purposes; for nuclear-free zones in various areas of the world; for the exclusively peaceful use of the sea-bed and ocean floor; for regional arms control and the control of trade in conventional arms; and for an expert study on the subject of chemical, bacteriological and other biological weapons.

#### CHEMICAL, BACTERIOLOGICAL AND OTHER BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

On 18 November, a draft resolution on the question of chemical and bacteriological weapons was submitted to the First Committee, and was eventually sponsored by the following 21 Members: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Denmark, Ethiopia, Finland, Ghana, Hungary, India, Iran, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, the Netherlands, Pakistan, Poland, Sweden, the United Arab Republic and the United Kingdom. By this text, the General Assembly, after noting the special interest of many Governments, of the Eighteen-Nation Committee and of the Secretary-General in a report on the various aspects of the problem, would: (1) request the Secretary-General to prepare a report in accordance with his own suggestions contained in the Introduction to his Annual Report on the work of the Organization for 1967-68 and in accordance with a recommendation of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee on the subject contained in its most recent report; (2) recommend that the Secretary-General's report be prepared with the assistance of consultants appointed by the Secre-

tary-General, and with the co-operation of all Governments; (3) request that the report be widely distributed to Governments and submitted to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, the Security Council, and the General Assembly, if possible by 1 July 1969, in time to permit its consideration at the twenty-fourth (1969) session of the General Assembly; and (4) reiterate its previous call for strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925 for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare.

Amendments to this resolution, designed to stress the danger of the weapons in question, were submitted jointly by Malta and Trinidad and Tobago but were not pressed to a vote.

The First Committee approved the draft resolution on 10 December 1968 by 112 votes to 0, with 1 abstention; and the General Assembly adopted the text on 20 December by

107 votes to 0, with 2 abstentions, as resolution 2454 A (XXIII). (For text of resolution, see DOCUMENTARY REFERENCES below.)

In the debate, the draft resolution was widely supported. The USSR and several other Eastern European Members emphasized the continued validity and universal applicability of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 prohibiting the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons and cautioned against the use of the proposed expert report to weaken or revise that Protocol. Many other Members, while also supporting the Protocol's adequacy with regard to banning the use of such weapons, maintained that an expert study would provide the background for banning their production and stockpiling. On the other hand, most of the Western European Members, as well as the United States, supported the view that the Geneva Protocol did not ban use of the entire range of modern weapons of these types and should therefore be supplemented by additional agreements.

#### DOCUMENTARY REFERENCES

##### GENERAL ASSEMBLY—23RD SESSION

First Committee, meetings 1606-1617, 1623-1635, 1643.

Fifth Committee, meeting 1291.

Plenary meeting 1750.

A/7189 (DC/231). Report of Conference of Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (covering period 16 July to 28 August 1968).

A/7201 and Add.1. Annual report of Secretary-General, 16 June 1967-15 June 1968, Chapter III A and Introduction to Report.

##### GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT AND COLLATERAL MEASURES

A/C.1/L.443. USSR: draft resolution.

A/C.1/L.446. Denmark, Iceland, Malta, Norway: draft resolution.

A/C.1/L.448. Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden, United Arab Republic: draft resolution.

A/C.1/L.448/Rev.1. Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Romania, Sweden, United Arab Republic: revised draft resolution.

A/C.1/L.448/Rev.2. Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Romania, Sweden,

United Arab Republic: revised draft resolution, adopted by First Committee on 10 December 1968, meeting 1635, by 109 votes to 0, with 4 abstentions.

A/C.1/L.449 and Rev.1. Cyprus: draft resolution and revision.

A/7441. Report of First Committee, draft resolution B.

RESOLUTION 2454B (xxin), as recommended by First Committee, A/7441, adopted by Assembly on 20 December 1968, meeting 1750, by 109 votes to 0, with 4 abstentions.

The General Assembly,

Considering that one of the main purposes of the United Nations is to save mankind from the scourge of war,

Convinced that the armaments race, in particular the nuclear arms race, constitutes a threat to peace,

Believing that it is imperative to exert further efforts towards reaching agreement on general and complete disarmament under effective international control,

Noting with satisfaction the agreement of the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and of the United States of America to enter into bilateral discussions on the limitation and reduction of both offensive strategic nuclear-weapon delivery systems and systems of defence against ballistic missiles,



Having received the report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, to which are annexed documents presented by the delegations of the eight non-aligned members of the Committee and by Italy, Sweden, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America,

Noting the memorandum of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics dated 1 July 1968 concerning urgent measures to stop the arms race and achieve disarmament and other proposals for collateral measures which have been submitted at the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament,

Recalling its resolutions 1767(XVII) of 21 November 1962, 1908(XVIII) of 27 November 1963, 2031(XX) of 3 December 1965, 2162 C (XXI) of 5 December 1966 and 2344(XXII) and 2342 B (XXII) of 19 December 1967,

1. Requests the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to make renewed efforts towards achieving substantial progress in reaching agreement on the question of general and complete disarmament under effective international control, and urgently to analyse the plans already under consideration and others that might be put forward to see how in particular rapid progress could be made in the field of nuclear disarmament;

2. Further requests the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to continue its urgent efforts to negotiate collateral measures of disarmament;

3. Decides to refer to the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament all documents and records of the meetings of the First Committee concerning all matters related to the disarmament question;

4. Requests the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to resume its work as early as possible and to report to the General Assembly, as appropriate, on the progress achieved.

#### CHEMICAL, BACTERIOLOGICAL AND OTHER BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

A/C.1/L.444 and Add.1-9 and Rev.1. Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Denmark, Ethiopia, Finland, Ghana, Hungary, India, Iran, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Netherlands, Pakistan, Poland, Sweden, United Arab Republic, United Kingdom: draft resolution and revision, adopted by First Committee on 10 December 1963, meeting 1635, by 112 votes to 0, with 1 abstention.

A/C.1/L.445 and Add.1. Malta and Trinidad and Tobago, amendments to 21-power draft resolution, A/C.1/L.444.

A/C.1/L.457 and Corr.1, A/C.5/1218, A/7461. Administrative and financial implications of draft

resolution, A/C.1/L.444/Rev.1. Statements by Secretary-General and report of Fifth Committee. A/7441. Report of First Committee, draft resolution A.

RESOLUTION 2454 A (xxiii), as proposed by First Committee, A/7441, adopted by Assembly on 20 December 1968, meeting 1750, by 107 votes to 0, with 2 abstentions.

The General Assembly,

Reaffirming the recommendations contained in its resolution 2162 B (XXI) of 5 December 1966 calling for strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, condemning all actions contrary to those objectives and inviting all States to accede to that Protocol,

Considering that the possibility of the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons constitutes a serious threat to mankind,

Believing that the people of the world should be made aware of the consequences of the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons,

Having considered the report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament which recommended that the Secretary-General should appoint a group of experts to study the effects of the possible use of such weapons,

Noting the interest in a report on various aspects of the problem of chemical, bacteriological and other biological weapons which has been expressed by many Governments and the welcome given to the recommendation of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament by the Secretary-General in the introduction to his annual report on the work of the Organization submitted to the General Assembly at its twenty-third session,

Believing that such a study would provide a valuable contribution to the consideration by the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament of the problems connected with chemical and bacteriological weapons,

Recalling the value of the report of the Secretary-General on the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons,

1. Requests the Secretary-General to prepare a concise report in accordance with the proposal contained in paragraph 32 of the introduction to his annual report on the work of the Organization submitted to the General Assembly at its twenty-third session and in accordance with the recommendation of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament contained in paragraph 26 of its report;

2. Recommends that the report should be based on accessible material and prepared with the assistance of qualified consultant experts appointed by the

Secretary-General, taking into account the views expressed and the suggestions made during the discussion of this item at the twenty-third session of the General Assembly;

3. Calls upon Governments, national and international scientific institutions and organizations to cooperate with the Secretary-General in the preparation of the report;

4. Requests that the report be transmitted to the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, the Security Council and the General Assembly at an early date, if possible by 1 July 1969, and to the Governments of Member States in time

to permit its consideration at the twenty-fourth session of the General Assembly;

5. Recommends that Governments should give the report wide distribution in their respective languages, through various media of communication, so as to acquaint public opinion with its contents;

6. Reiterates its call for strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, and invites all States to accede to that Protocol.

### Urgent Measures to Stop the Arms Race

The USSR Memorandum of 1 July 1968 on urgent measures to stop the arms race, sent to the Secretary-General on 5 July 1968, and also submitted to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, proposed action in connexion with the following: (1) prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons; (2) stopping the manufacture of nuclear weapons and reducing and destroying stockpiles; (3) limitation and subsequent reduction of means of delivery of strategic weapons; (4) prohibition of flights beyond national borders of bombers carrying nuclear weapons, and limitation of navigation zones for rocket-carrying submarines; (5) banning underground nuclear weapons tests; (6) prohibition of the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons; (7) elimination of foreign military bases; (8) regional disarmament; (9) peaceful use of the sea-bed and ocean floor; and (10) general and complete disarmament.

The Memorandum was added to the agenda of the twenty-third session of the General Assembly at the request of the USSR and was discussed in the Assembly's First Committee.

The First Committee had before it a draft resolution submitted by the USSR under this item as well as under the item on general and complete disarmament. By this draft resolution, the General Assembly would: (1) attach great importance to the USSR Memorandum of 1 July 1968 on urgent measures to stop the arms race and to achieve disarmament; (2) request the Secretary-General of the United Nations to transmit the Memorandum and the record of discussions in the First Committee relevant to it to the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation

Committee on Disarmament; and (3) request the Eighteen-Nation Committee to undertake urgent negotiations on the measures suggested and report to the General Assembly at its next (1969) session.

The USSR and several other Eastern European Members stressed the importance of all the measures proposed in the USSR Memorandum. Many Members, including Austria, Chile, Ghana, Syria and the United Arab Republic, expressed general support for most of the measures. Another group of Members—including, for example, Argentina, Belgium and the Netherlands—noted that the Memorandum had already been submitted to and taken into account by the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee at its session beginning 16 July 1968 and also that several of the measures proposed therein were being dealt with in resolutions submitted under other General Assembly agenda items.

On 6 December, the Chairman of the First Committee announced that the USSR would not insist on a vote on its resolution, inasmuch as the importance of the Memorandum had been widely noted in the debate and the revised draft resolution on general and complete disarmament (adopted by the Assembly on 20 December 1968 as resolution 2454 B (XXIII)—see above, p. 42, for text) also took note of the Memorandum and transmitted all the records of the First Committee on disarmament matters to the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee.

In connexion with this question, various communications relating to Germany were ad-

dressed to the President of the General Assembly or to the Secretary-General by the following United Nations Member States: Bulgaria, France, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, the United Kingdom and the United States.

In a letter dated 18 November 1968, Hungary referred to a communication from the German Democratic Republic to the Assembly President transmitting a statement on the USSR Memorandum on urgent measures to stop the arms race and achieve disarmament. Hungary requested that the communication and the statement be circulated as an official document of the General Assembly. The statement, *inter alia*, supported the proposals in the USSR Memorandum. All measures for limiting atomic armaments were described as particularly urgent, especially for Europe, where, the statement declared, the Federal Republic of Germany had as its avowed aim to use control of atomic weapons as a means of changing the status quo in Europe, revising existing borders, annexing territory and achieving hegemony in western and northern Europe.

Technological requirements for the indigenous production of nuclear weapons had been created in the German Federal Republic, the statement added. The establishment of denuclearized zones would be a significant step towards détente and the German Democratic Republic shared the view of many European States that the West German Federal Republic's signature to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons would facilitate the creation of denuclearized zones and implementation of regional disarmament measures in Europe.

Writing to the President of the General Assembly on 10 December 1968, the Permanent Observer of the Federal Republic of Germany said that the Hungarian letter contained a distorted presentation of its policy on the non-

use of force, its position concerning the questions of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, as well as its aims as a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The principle of the non-use of force determined the foreign policy of the Federal Government; that Government maintained that the unequivocal and non-selective application of this principle was the most important prerequisite for successful efforts in the field of arms control and disarmament, the Federal Government of Germany's Observer continued. As for the questions of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the peaceful uses of atomic energy, the Federal Government had consistently endeavoured to make the non-proliferation treaty universally acceptable; the Treaty should not impede access to and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, but rather promote peaceful activities. The Federal Government's policy aimed also at the lessening of tension and the gradual reduction of armed forces in Europe.

France, the United Kingdom and the United States maintained that the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany was the only German Government freely and lawfully elected and authorized to speak as a representative of the German people on international affairs.

This point of view was countered by Bulgaria, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland and Romania, which stated that the German Democratic Republic did have a sovereign existence which could not be affected by statements of non-recognition. It was further argued that there were two German States—the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany—each of which performed functions intrinsic to a sovereign State. These Member States disagreed with the contention that the Federal Republic of Germany was the only German Government authorized to speak in the name of the German people.

#### DOCUMENTARY REFERENCES

##### GENERAL ASSEMBLY—23RD SESSION

First Committee, meetings 1606-1617, 1623-1632.  
Plenary Meeting 1750.

A/7134. Letter of 5 July 1968 from USSR with attached Memorandum of USSR Government concerning urgent measures to stop arms race and

achieve disarmament.

A/7223. Letter of 16 September 1968 from USSR requesting inclusion in agenda of item entitled: "Memorandum of the Government of the USSR concerning urgent measures to stop the arms race and achieve disarmament."

A/C.1/L.443. USSR: draft resolution.

A/7444. Report of First Committee.  
 A/7218. Resolutions adopted by General Assembly during its 23rd session, 24 September-21 December 1968, p. 18.

## OTHER DOCUMENTS

A/C.1/974. Letter of 18 November 1968 from Hungary transmitting letter of 8 November 1968 from German Democratic Republic.  
 A/C.1/980. Letter of 10 December 1968 from Federal Republic of Germany.

A/7481. Letter of 21 December 1968 from France, United Kingdom and United States.

A/7485. Note verbale of 16 January 1969 from Poland.

A/7487. Note verbale of 22 January 1969 from **Hungary.**

A/7488. Letter of 22 January 1969 from Bulgaria.

A/7489. Note verbale of 30 January 1969 from Mongolia.

A/7494. Letter of 12 March 1969 from Romania.

### Elimination of Foreign Military Bases from Asia, Africa and Latin America

The question of eliminating foreign military bases from Asia, Africa and Latin America, referred by the General Assembly to its First Committee, was discussed during that Committee's debate on disarmament questions. It was among the measures cited in the USSR Memorandum on urgent measures to end the arms race, another item before the First Committee (see immediately above), and in this connexion, was supported by a number of Members. Thus, India and the United Arab Republic, for instance, expressed general opposition to foreign bases. Burma drew a distinction between bases which had been established against the expressed will of the people and those which had not. China called attention to the fact that Eastern Europe was not mentioned in the title of the agenda item.

No draft resolution concerning this question was submitted and on 13 December the Chairman of the First Committee stated that, inasmuch as the resolution which the First Committee approved on 10 December 1968 on the subject of general and complete disarmament recalled a previous General Assembly resolution on the elimination of foreign military bases in Asia, Africa and Latin America,<sup>24</sup> the item could be considered covered by the adoption of the resolution on general and complete disarmament (see above, p. 40 and also p. 42, for text of resolution 2454 B (XXIII)). At a plenary meeting on 20 December, the General Assembly took note of this.

<sup>24</sup> See Y.U.N., 1967, pp. 24-25, text of resolution 2344(XXII).

## DOCUMENTARY REFERENCES

## GENERAL ASSEMBLY—23RD SESSION

First Committee, meetings 1606-1617, 1623-1640.  
 Plenary Meeting 1750.

A/C.1/L.448/Rev.1. Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Romania, Sweden, United Arab Republic: revised draft resolution.

A/C.1/L.448/Rev.2. Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Romania, Sweden, United Arab Republic: revised draft resolution, adopted by First Committee on 10 December 1968, plenary meeting 1635, by 109 votes to 0, with 4 abstentions.

A/7441. Report of First Committee, draft resolution B.

A/7443. Report of First Committee.

RESOLUTION 2454 B (xxiii), as recommended by First Committee, A/7441, adopted by Assembly on 20 December 1968, meeting 1750, by 109 votes to 0, with 4 abstentions. (For text, see p. 42.)

A/7218. Resolutions adopted by General Assembly during its 23rd session, 24 September-21 December 1968, p. 17.

### Urgent Need for Suspension of Nuclear and Thermonuclear Tests

Under the agenda item concerning the urgent need to suspend nuclear and thermonuclear tests, a draft resolution was submitted to the

First Committee by the following 13 Members: Brazil, Burma, Chile, Denmark, Ethiopia, Finland, India, Libya, Mexico, New Zealand, Ni-

geria, Sweden and the United Arab Republic. By this text the Assembly would: (1) urge all States to adhere without further delay to the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty (banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water);<sup>25</sup> (2) call upon all nuclear-weapon States to suspend nuclear weapon tests in all environments; (3) express the hope that States would contribute to an effective international exchange of seismic data; and (4) request the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to take up as a matter of urgency the elaboration of a treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests and to report to the General Assembly at its twenty-fourth session in 1969.

In the discussion in the First Committee, many Members attached a high priority to the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty. They noted what they considered the direct link between such a measure and the new Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which in its Article VI committed all Parties to pursue negotiations on effective measures relating to a cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date.

Several Members, including Australia, India, and Kenya, deplored the continued testing in the atmosphere. India, as well as Australia and New Zealand, expressed specific regret that France and the People's Republic of China continued such tests. Guinea, Iran and Pakistan were among several Members that urged greater efforts to obtain the participation of France and the People's Republic of China in the United Nations disarmament proceedings.

The USSR continued to maintain, as it had in previous years, that national means of detection made it impossible for any country to conduct nuclear explosions in secret. Sweden argued that developments in seismic detection made it increasingly difficult to point to inadequacies in this field as a reason for holding up agreement on an underground test ban. Many Members—including, for example, Austria, Burma, Ghana, India, Madagascar, Sweden and

the United Arab Republic—supported this general view.

The United States, on the other hand, continued to hold the position that sizable man-made explosions could not be identified as such, despite considerable progress in the verification field. Stressing the need for further progress, the United States offered to announce some of its nuclear explosions in advance to facilitate an international exchange of identification data and subsequent analysis.

While a number of Members placed their principal hope for a closing of the so-called "verification gap" on further progress along the lines of studies recently conducted by the International Peace and Conflict Research Institute of Stockholm (SIPRI) and reported to the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, some stressed other possible solutions that had already been put forward in the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee and discussed in previous years in the General Assembly. These included the development of a "detection club" (whereby countries would co-operate in exchange of seismological observations in a world-wide network of technologically advanced seismological stations); agreement on a system of "verification by challenge" (i.e., a system whereby a party suspected of underground nuclear weapon testing would find it in its interest to provide all available reassuring information, including possibly an invitation of other parties to inspect); agreement on a "quota" of permitted annual on-site inspections, perhaps to be phased out as detection capabilities improved; or a ban on tests below a specified "threshold" with or without a moratorium on all tests.

On 10 December, the First Committee approved the 13-power draft resolution by 108 votes to 0, with 6 abstentions. On 20 December, the General Assembly adopted the text by 108 votes to 0, with 5 abstentions, as resolution 2455 (XXIII). (For text of resolution, see DOCUMENTARY REFERENCES below.)

<sup>25</sup> See Y.U.N., 1963, pp. 137-40.

#### DOCUMENTARY REFERENCES

GENERAL ASSEMBLY—23RD SESSION  
First Committee, meetings 1606-1617, 1623-1635.  
Plenary Meeting 1750.

A/7189(DC/231). Report of Conference of Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (covering period 16 July-28 August 1968).

A/C.1/L.447 and Add.1-5. Brazil, Burma, Chile, Denmark, Ethiopia, Finland, India, Libya, Mexico, New Zealand, Nigeria, Sweden, United Arab Republic: draft resolution, adopted by First Committee on 10 December 1968, meeting 1635, by 108 votes to 0, with 6 abstentions.

A/7442. Report of First Committee.

RESOLUTION 2455 (xxiii), as proposed by First Committee, A/7442, adopted by Assembly on 20 December 1968, meeting 1750, by 109 votes to 0, with 5 abstentions.

The General Assembly,

Having considered the question of the urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests and the report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament,

Recalling its resolutions 1762 (XVII) of 6 November 1962, 1910 (XVIII) of 27 November 1963, 2032 (XX) of 3 December 1965, 2163 (XXI) of 5 December 1966 and 2343 (XXII) of 19 December 1967,

Recalling further the joint memorandum on a comprehensive test ban treaty submitted on 26 August 1968 by Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and the United Arab Republic and annexed to the report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament,

Noting with regret the fact that all States have not yet adhered to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water, signed in Moscow on 5 August 1963,

Noting with increasing concern that nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere and underground are continuing,

Taking into account the existing possibilities of establishing, through international co-operation, a voluntary exchange of seismic data so as to create a better scientific basis for a national evaluation of seismic events,

Recognizing the importance of seismology in the verification of the observance of a treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests,

Noting in this connexion that experts from various countries, including four nuclear-weapon States, have recently met unofficially to exchange views and hold discussions in regard to the adequacy of seismic methods for monitoring underground explosions, and the hope expressed that such discussions would be continued,

1. Urges all States which have not done so to adhere without further delay to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water;

2. Calls upon all nuclear-weapon States to suspend nuclear weapon tests in all environments;

3. Expresses the hope that States will contribute to an effective international exchange of seismic data;

4. Requests the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to take up as a matter of urgency the elaboration of a treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests and to report to the General Assembly on this matter at its twenty-fourth session.

## Questions Pertaining to the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States

The item "Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States: Final Document of the Conference" was placed on the agenda of the twenty-third session of the General Assembly, following receipt of a request from the President of the Conference inviting the General Assembly to consider the means for implementation of the decisions taken by the Conference. The item was considered by the Assembly's First Committee together with other items from 12 to 22 November, again from 27 November to 10 December, and finally on 17 December 1968.

In the initial phase of the discussions bearing on the matter, the First Committee had before it four draft resolutions.

One text, submitted by Cyprus on 2 December 1968 under this agenda item, as well as under the agenda item on general and complete disarmament, called for an expert report on the inter-related problems of disarmament, security

and economic development, with subsequent consideration of the report by the Disarmament Commission. The text was later revised to request the Disarmament Commission to consider only the problem of disarmament in its relation to international security, with a view to an integrated solution. This draft resolution was not pressed to a vote by its sponsor.

### IMPLEMENTATION OF CONFERENCE DECISIONS

The other three draft resolutions were concerned with the question of implementation of the decisions of the Conference.

By one of these draft texts, the General Assembly would: (1) endorse the Declaration of the Conference, note its resolutions, and request the Secretary-General to transmit these documents to Member States and to international bodies concerned; (2) invite the specialized

agencies, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and other international bodies concerned to give careful consideration to the recommendations of the Conference addressed to them and to report on the action taken thereon; (3) request the Secretary-General (a) to submit a comprehensive report to the next (twenty-fourth) General Assembly session based on the information so supplied; (b) to place the question of implementation of the Conference results, including the convening of a meeting of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, on the agenda of the Assembly's next (twenty-fourth) session; (c) to choose a group of experts to prepare a report on all possible contributions of nuclear technology to the economic and scientific advancement of the developing countries, taking advantage of the experience of IAEA; and (d) to transmit the report to Governments in time for consideration at the Assembly's twenty-fourth (1969) session.

This text was sponsored by six Members: Australia, Austria, Canada, Finland, Japan and the Netherlands.

By a second draft resolution the General Assembly would: (1) endorse the Conference Declaration, as well as the various Conference resolutions which recommended that the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament undertake negotiations on certain specific measures of nuclear disarmament, that the Governments of the USSR and the United States enter into bilateral discussion on the limitation of nuclear weapon delivery systems and that all non-nuclear-weapon States in areas other than Latin America initiate studies on establishing denuclearization of their respective zones by treaty; (2) request the prompt attention of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to the means for implementing Conference recommendations concerning the establishment of a nuclear research and development programme within the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), as well as a fund of fissionable materials for the benefit of non-nuclear-weapon States; (3) request the Secretary-General (a) to prepare a report to the next session of the General Assembly based on information supplied by Member States and

international bodies in response to Conference decisions concerning them; (b) to appoint a group of experts to prepare a report on all possible contributions of nuclear technology to the advancement of the developing countries, to be transmitted to Governments, specialized agencies and IAEA in time to permit its consideration at the General Assembly's next session; and (c) to prepare reports on the establishment of a "Nuclear Research and Development Programme" within UNDP, and on setting up an international service, within IAEA, for nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, these to be transmitted to Governments in time for consideration at the next Assembly session; (4) decide to convene the United Nations Disarmament Commission, either before July 1969 or after the Assembly's twenty-fourth (1969) session and before March 1970, to consider new measures in disarmament and security assurances, as well as further international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy; and (5) recommend that the Disarmament Commission ensure continuous efforts in these fields and submit a report on its work to the subsequent session of the Assembly.

This text was sponsored by another six Members: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Italy, Pakistan and Yugoslavia.

By the third draft resolution—proposed by Bulgaria and Hungary—dealing with implementation of the decisions of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, the General Assembly would: (1) request the Secretary-General to transmit the recommendations of the Conference to Member States and to international organizations concerned; (2) request the international bodies concerned to give careful consideration to the recommendations and to include information on the results of that consideration in their annual reports to the General Assembly; (3) request the Secretary-General to appoint a group of experts to prepare a report on all possible contributions of nuclear technology to the advancement of the developing countries, making full use of the experience of IAEA, and to transmit this report to Member States and the international organizations concerned, as well as to submit it to the General Assembly at its next session; and (4) further request the Secretary-General to submit to the

Assembly, at the same session, a report on the results of the consideration of the Conference recommendations by all the international bodies concerned.

The sponsors of the first draft resolution described above (i.e., that proposed by Australia, Austria, Canada, Finland, Japan and the Netherlands), supported by the United States and the United Kingdom, accepted the possibility of a meeting of the United Nations Disarmament Commission at some time following the twenty-fourth (1969) session of the General Assembly to consider disarmament and security questions. They held, however, that it was premature to fix a date for the Commission's meeting until time had been allowed for the various international bodies concerned to begin implementation of Conference recommendations and until the various reports had been studied.

The Members supporting the second resolution described above (i.e., the text proposed by Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Italy, Pakistan and Yugoslavia) took the general position that the continuity of the work of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States must be assured and, to this end, at first proposed that it would be preferable to establish new machinery, such as a special ad hoc committee of the General Assembly. Brazil, Chile, Italy, Spain and Yugoslavia maintained that such a committee would not duplicate the work of other international bodies, particularly that of IAEA, since this new committee would have no operative tasks but would play a purely political role. The creation of new organizational machinery was widely opposed during Committee debate, however, and these Members consequently suggested that the United Nations Disarmament Commission be given responsibility for supervising the continuity of the Conference's work in the fields of disarmament, security assurances, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy in a single context; to this end, they advocated a meeting of the Disarmament Commission by March 1970 at the latest.

Other Members, supporting the resolution submitted by Bulgaria and Hungary, were opposed to the convening of the Disarmament Commission for the purposes declared in the other two resolutions, in particular to supervise

the implementation of the Conference's decisions, which the USSR maintained were completely outside of the Commission's purview. This group stressed the view that IAEA was not only the appropriate organization to carry out such functions but was fully competent to do so. In this context, the USSR expressed its disapproval of any division of the world into nuclear and non-nuclear States, which, it maintained, could lead to an undermining of the United Nations. The USSR observed that the decisions of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States might be used by the opponents of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to delay the entry into effect of that Treaty.

Canada, Ireland and the United Kingdom also noted, during the course of the debate in the First Committee, that many of the proposals of the Conference did not make adequate reference to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which, they said, had been the basis of the Conference's considerations.

On 13 December, a new draft resolution was submitted by 14 Members. These were the sponsors of the first and second six-power draft resolutions described above, with the exception of Yugoslavia, and with the addition of Dahomey, Mexico, and Peru. The two previously submitted draft resolutions were withdrawn by their sponsors.

By the terms of the new draft text, the General Assembly would: (1) endorse the Conference Declaration, take note of its resolutions, and request the Secretary-General to transmit all these documents to Member States and to the international bodies concerned, for careful consideration; (2) invite the international bodies to report to the Secretary-General on the action taken by them on the respective resolutions; (3) invite the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and IAEA to continue to study the recommendations of the Conference concerning the establishment of a nuclear research and development programme within UNDP, as well as the establishment of a fund of special fissionable materials, for the benefit of developing countries; (4) request the Secretary-General (a) to submit a comprehensive report on the progress achieved in



the implementation of the resolution; (6) to place the question of implementation of the results of the Conference on the agenda of the twenty-fourth (1969) session of the Assembly, including the question of convening a meeting of the United Nations Disarmament Commission early in 1970 to consider disarmament, international security and the question of further co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy; (c) to appoint a group of experts to prepare a report on all possible contributions of nuclear technology to the advancement of the developing countries, and to transmit this report to Governments in time to permit its consideration at the twenty-fourth (1969) session of the Assembly.

The USSR opposed the 14-power resolution. Among its arguments were the following: (i) The Declaration of the Conference, which the resolution endorsed, tended to direct the United Nations towards another conference of the same type and to side-track it from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, (ii) Approval of this text would be tantamount to a call for mandatory implementation of all the decisions of the Conference, whereas only the "constructive" decisions of the Conference should be given early consideration. (iii) The draft still proposed using the United Nations Disarmament Commission for carrying out the Conference's decisions. (iv) The draft resolution still contained a discriminatory approach toward certain States, particularly the German Democratic Republic, which had already signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

The United States, while supporting the 14-power draft resolution as a whole, declared that a number of statements contained in the Declaration of the Conference were not consistent with its views. The United States therefore requested a separate vote on the paragraph of the text endorsing the Declaration, on which it would abstain.

The United Kingdom observed that, although it would vote for the draft as a whole, it could not support all the wording of the Conference Declaration.

As a co-sponsor of one of the earlier drafts, Yugoslavia commented that it would support the new draft resolution, even though it

represented less than the desired minimum necessary for Yugoslavia to continue being a sponsor.

Canada held that the draft resolution of Bulgaria and Hungary, which was still before the Committee, was contradictory to the 14-power draft in that it dealt with the same subject in a different way; Canada would, therefore, have to vote against it.

On 17 November 1968, before the 2-power and the 14-power texts were put to a vote, Pakistan requested priority consideration for the 14-power resolution on the grounds that it represented a very carefully elaborated compromise and that the 2-power resolution failed to request that the questions of convening the Disarmament Commission and of further international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy be placed on the agenda of the twenty-fourth session of the Assembly (due to open on 16 September 1969). Hungary and the USSR opposed the Pakistani proposal which was then put to the vote. The Committee approved it by a vote of 54 to 9, with 34 abstentions.

The First Committee then voted on the operative paragraph of the 14-power text which endorsed the Declaration of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States. It approved this paragraph by a vote of 84 to 8, with 10 abstentions. It then approved the text as a whole by a roll-call vote of 87 to 8, with 6 abstentions. After the vote, Bulgaria and Hungary announced that they would not insist on putting their draft resolution to a vote.

On 20 December, the text of the 14-power draft resolution was adopted at a plenary meeting of the General Assembly by a recorded vote of 103 to 7, with 5 abstentions, as resolution 2456 A (XXIII). (For text, see DOCUMENTARY REFERENCES below.)

On 13 December 1968, three additional draft resolutions were submitted to the First Committee covering points that had been dealt with in the two six-power draft resolutions but that had not been included in the 14-power compromise text approved by the First Committee on 17 November. These three additional draft texts were adopted by the General Assembly as resolutions 2456 B (XXIII), 2456 C (XXIII) and 2456 D (XXIII) and are described below.

#### ESTABLISHMENT OF NUCLEAR-FREE ZONES

By the operative terms of resolution 2456 B (XXIII), the General Assembly: (1) reiterated the recommendation of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States that all non-nuclear-weapon States not comprised in the zone of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) study the desirability of denuclearizing their respective zones by treaty; and (2) urge all nuclear-weapon powers to comply fully with a General Assembly resolution of 5 December 1967 (2286(XXII))<sup>26</sup> inviting them to sign and ratify Protocol II of the Treaty, which committed the nuclear powers not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the Contracting Parties to the Treaty.

This text was sponsored in the First Committee by 27 Members, namely: Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Mexico, the Netherlands, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela.

In the debate, most Member States approved of the principle of nuclear-free zones. Poland affirmed the continued validity of proposals it had put forward since 1957 regarding denuclearization of Central Europe. Bulgaria and Romania supported denuclearization of the Balkan area. Nigeria and Ghana supported the denuclearization of Africa but specified that such action should follow agreement on a comprehensive test ban.

The First Committee approved the 27-power text on 17 December 1968 by a vote of 83 to 0, with 13 abstentions. On 20 December, the General Assembly adopted it by a recorded vote of 98 to 0, with 16 abstentions, as resolution 2456 B (XXIII). (For text of resolution, see DOCUMENTARY REFERENCES below.)

#### NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES

By the second of the three additional proposals—adopted as resolution 2456 C (XXIII)—the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General: (1) to prepare, in consultation with

Members of the United Nations and members of the specialized agencies and of IAEA, and with the co-operation of the latter and other pertinent agencies, a report on the establishment within IAEA of an international service for nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, under appropriate international control, and: (2) to transmit the report to Governments in time for its consideration at the next session of the Assembly in 1969.

This resolution was sponsored in the First Committee by the following 24 Members: Austria, Barbados, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Iran, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela.

Mexico, introducing this proposal, stressed the importance of initiating promptly the preparatory work for establishing procedures to assure the availability of the important potential benefits of nuclear explosions to non-nuclear-weapon States. The sponsors of the resolution maintained that the Secretary-General of the United Nations should prepare the initial report since some important aspects of the problem, such as the relationship between peaceful nuclear explosions and the banning of nuclear tests, fell clearly within the jurisdiction of the General Assembly; they expressed confidence that IAEA, as a member of the United Nations family, would co-operate fully on this work of common interest.

The USSR, opposing this view, said that IAEA had already begun a study of the question and could, by itself, find the best way of providing such a service; moreover, it would be improper for the Secretary-General to prepare a report on the establishment of a service by an independent international organization.

The United Kingdom also opposed the proposal. Australia, Belgium, Canada, France and the United States indicated they had serious reservations, saying they would abstain in the vote.

India stressed the link between peaceful nuclear explosions and a comprehensive test ban, which arose because of the need to provide for

<sup>26</sup> See Y.U.N., 1967, pp. 17-18, text of resolution 2286 (XXII).

peaceful explosions. India maintained that a test ban treaty should provide a special régime for such explosions, and that the service should be provided without discrimination. Canada and Pakistan, however, held that the eligibility for such a service should be limited to signatories of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons or to those that had renounced nuclear weapons by a binding multilateral agreement.

On 17 December 1958, the First Committee adopted the draft resolution by a roll-call vote of 59 to 9, with 35 abstentions; on 20 December, the General Assembly approved it by a recorded vote of 75 to 9, with 30 abstentions, as resolution 2456 C (XXIII). (For text of resolution, see DOCUMENTARY REFERENCES below.)

#### DELIVERY SYSTEMS AND MISSILE DEFENCES

By the third text—adopted as resolution 2456 D (XXIII)—the General Assembly urged the Governments of the USSR and the United States to enter at an early date into bilateral discussions on the limitation of offensive strategic nuclear-weapon delivery systems and systems of defence against ballistic missiles.

This resolution was sponsored in the First Committee by the following 14 Members: Australia, Austria, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Finland, Iran, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, Pakistan and Peru.

During the debate on this topic, the majority of Members welcomed the announcement made

in July 1968 that agreement had been reached between the USSR and the United States to enter into discussions on this subject. The USSR reaffirmed its readiness to undertake such an exchange of views with the States concerned. The United States also confirmed that the understanding still stood, even though intervening events had forced postponement of the talks. Many Members—including, for example, Argentina, Austria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Madagascar and the United Arab Republic—specifically urged an early beginning of these talks despite all difficulties. Canada believed that such talks were most likely to have practical results in the near future. Finland, Ireland and Sweden shared the view that halting missile development and deployment was the most urgent task and would probably enhance the possibility of a comprehensive test ban. The many Members attaching first priority to the negotiation of a full test ban expressed the view that talks on the two subjects should proceed simultaneously. Burma, Canada and the United Kingdom maintained that progress on such talks would be a measure of the will of the major nuclear powers to fulfil their obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

On 17 December 1968, the First Committee adopted the 14-power text by a vote of 97 to 0, with 5 abstentions. The General Assembly approved it on 20 December by a recorded vote of 108 to 0, with 7 abstentions, as resolution 2456 D (XXIII). (For text of resolution, see DOCUMENTARY REFERENCES below.)

#### DOCUMENTARY REFERENCES

##### GENERAL ASSEMBLY—23RD SESSION

First Committee, meetings 1606-1617, 1623-1635, 1643.

Fifth Committee, meeting 1294.

Plenary Meeting 1750.

A/7224. Note by Secretary-General, dated 14 October 1968, requesting inclusion of item entitled: "Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States: Final Document of the Conference."

A/7224/Add.1. Letter of 28 September 1968 from President of Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, transmitting Final Document of Conference.

A/7277 and Corr.1,2. Final Document of Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, 29 August-

28 September 1968, Geneva. (For list of documents of Conference, see Annex VI.)

A/7327. Note by Secretary-General, dated 14 November 1968 (attaching exchange of letters between Secretary-General and President of International Bank for Reconstruction and Development).

A/7364. Note by Secretary-General, dated 29 November 1968 (attaching exchange of letters between Secretary-General and Administrator of United Nations Development Programme).

A/C.1/976. Letter of 25 November 1968 from Mexico (transmitting "Working Paper on an international programme of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, for the benefit of States which have renounced nuclear weapons" submitted by Mexico to Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States).

IMPLEMENTATION OF  
CONFERENCE DECISIONS

A/C.1/L.449 and Rev.1. Cyprus: draft resolution and revision.

A/C.1/L.450. Australia, Austria, Canada, Finland, Japan, Netherlands: draft resolution.

A/C.1/L.451. Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Italy, Pakistan, Yugoslavia: draft resolution.

A/C.1/L.452. Bulgaria, Hungary: draft resolution.

A/C.1/L.456. Statement by Secretary-General on administrative and financial implications of draft resolutions, A/C.1/L.450, A/C.1/L.451 and A/C.1/L.452.

A/C.1/L.458 and Add.1. Argentina, Australia, Austria, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Dahomey, Finland, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, Pakistan, Peru: draft resolution, adopted by First Committee on 17 December 1968, meeting 1643, by roll-call vote of 87 to 8, with 6 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Burma, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Ceylon, Chile, China, Colombia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Dahomey, Denmark, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives Islands, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Philippines, Portugal, Romania, Rwanda, Senegal, Singapore, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sudan, Swaziland, Sweden, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Republic, United Kingdom, United Republic of Tanzania, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yugoslavia.

Against: Bulgaria, Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Ukrainian SSR, USSR.

Abstaining: Central African Republic, Cuba, Guinea, Mauritania, Sierra Leone, Syria.

A/C.5/1226, A/7463. Administrative and financial implications of draft resolution, A/C.1/L.458. Reports of Secretary-General and Fifth Committee. A/7445. Report of First Committee, draft resolution A.

RESOLUTION 2456A(xxiii), as proposed by First Committee, A/7445, adopted by Assembly on 20 December 1968, meeting 1750, by recorded vote of 103 to 7, with 5 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Barbados, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Ceylon, Chad, Chile, China, Congo (Brazzaville), Democratic Republic of Congo, Cyprus, Dahomey, Denmark, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica,

Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives Islands, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia,\* Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Romania, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, South Africa, Southern Yemen, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Republic, United Kingdom, United Republic of Tanzania, United States, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia.

Against: Bulgaria, Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Ukrainian SSR, USSR.

Abstaining: Cuba, Guinea, Malawi, Mauritania, Syria.

\* Subsequently the delegation of Mongolia informed the Secretariat that it had intended to abstain.

The General Assembly,

Noting that pursuant to its resolution 2346 B (XXII) of 19 December 1967 the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States was held at Geneva from 29 August to 28 September 1968 and attended by ninety-two non-nuclear-weapon States and four nuclear-weapon States: France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America,

Having examined the Final Document of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States,

Appreciating the importance of the consideration given by the participants in the Conference to the problems of achieving a universal peace and, in particular, the security of non-nuclear-weapon States, the cessation of the nuclear arms race, general and complete disarmament and the harnessing of nuclear energy exclusively for peaceful purposes,

Noting that the Conference had adopted the Declaration of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States and fourteen resolutions containing various recommendations,

Welcoming the constructive proposals adopted by the Conference,

Considering that in order to fulfil the aims of the Conference it is necessary to ensure the implementation of these proposals, which will require appropriate action by the international bodies and Governments concerned,

Noting in particular the decision of the Conference inviting the General Assembly at its twenty-third session to consider the best ways and means of implementing its decisions and continuing the work that has been undertaken,

1. Endorses the Declaration of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States;

2. Takes note of the resolutions adopted by the Conference;

3. Requests the Secretary-General to transmit the resolutions and the Declaration to the Governments of States Members of the United Nations and mem-

bers of the specialized agencies and of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and to the international bodies concerned, for their careful consideration;

4. Invites the specialized agencies, the International Atomic Energy Agency and other international bodies concerned to report to the Secretary-General on the action taken by them in connexion with the recommendations contained in the respective resolutions of the Conference;

5. Invites the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the United Nations Development Programme and the International Atomic Energy Agency to continue, in consultation with their member States, the study of the recommendations of concern to those organizations, contained in resolution J of the Conference;

6. Requests the Secretary-General to submit a comprehensive report based on the information supplied by those concerned on the progress achieved in the implementation of the present resolution for consideration by the General Assembly at its twenty-fourth session;

7. Further requests the Secretary-General to place on the provisional agenda of the twenty-fourth session of the General Assembly the question of the implementation, taking into account the reports of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and the International Atomic Energy Agency, of the results of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, including:

(a) The question of convening early in 1970 a meeting of the United Nations Disarmament Commission to consider disarmament and the related question of the security of nations;

(b) The question of further international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy with particular regard to the special needs and interests of developing countries;

8. Further requests the Secretary-General, in accordance with resolution G of the Conference, to appoint a group of experts, chosen on a personal basis, to prepare a full report on all possible contributions of nuclear technology to the economic and scientific advancement of the developing countries;

9. Endorses the recommendation that the Secretary-General should draw the attention of the group of experts to the desirability of taking advantage of the experience of the International Atomic Energy Agency in preparing the report;

10. Requests the Secretary-General to transmit the report to the Governments of States Members of the United Nations and members of the specialized agencies and of the International Atomic Energy Agency in time to permit its consideration by the General Assembly at its twenty-fourth session.

#### ESTABLISHMENT OF NUCLEAR-FREE ZONES

A/C.1/L.459. Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil,

Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Italy, Jamaica, Mexico, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, Venezuela: draft resolution.

A/C.1/L.459/Rev.1 and Add.1. Revised draft resolution sponsored by 26 powers listed above and, in addition, by Ireland, adopted by First Committee on 17 December 1968, meeting 1643, by 83 votes to 0, with 13 abstentions.

A/7445. Report of First Committee, draft resolution B.

RESOLUTION 2456 B (xxiii), as proposed by First Committee, A/7445, adopted by Assembly on 20 December 1968, meeting 1750, by recorded vote of 98 to 0, with 16 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Barbados, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Ceylon, Chad, Chile, China, Congo (Brazzaville), Democratic Republic of Congo, Cyprus, Dahomey, Denmark, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives Islands, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, South Africa, Southern Yemen, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Syria, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Republic, United Kingdom, United Republic of Tanzania, United States, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia.

Against: None.

Abstaining: Bulgaria, Byelorussian SSR, Central African Republic, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, France, Guinea, Hungary, Malawi, Mauritania, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, Somalia, Ukrainian SSR, USSR.

The General Assembly,

Having examined the Final Document of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States,

Considering that the establishment of zones free from nuclear weapons, on the initiative of the States situated within each zone concerned, is one of the measures which can contribute most effectively to halting the proliferation of those instruments of mass destruction and to promoting progress towards nuclear disarmament,

Observing that the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, opened for signature on 14 February 1967, has already established a nuclear-weapon-free zone comprising territories densely populated by man,

Reiterates the recommendation contained in resolu-

tion B of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, concerning the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, and especially the urgent appeal for full compliance by the nuclear-weapon Powers with paragraph 4 of General Assembly resolution 2286(XXII) of 5 December 1967, in which the Assembly invited Powers possessing nuclear weapons to sign and ratify as soon as possible Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America.

#### NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES

A/C.1/L.460 and Add.1. Austria, Barbados, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Iran, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, Venezuela: draft resolution, adopted by First Committee on 17 December 1968, meeting 1643, by roll-call vote of 59 to 9, with 35 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Argentina, Austria, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Ceylon, Chile, Colombia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Dahomey, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Finland, Ghana, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, India, Iran, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives Islands, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Nepal, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Portugal, Romania, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yugoslavia.

Against: Bulgaria, Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, United Kingdom.

Abstaining: Algeria, Australia, Belgium, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, China, Cuba, Denmark, France, Greece, Guinea, Iceland, Indonesia, Iraq, Israel, Ivory Coast, Jordan, Kenya, Luxembourg, Mauritania, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Philippines, Rwanda, Somalia, South Africa, Swaziland, Syria, Uganda, United Arab Republic, United States.

A/C.5/1225. Administrative and financial implications of draft resolution, A/C.1/L.460. Report of Secretary-General.

A/7445. Report of First Committee, draft resolution C.

RESOLUTION 2456 c (xxiii), as proposed by First Committee, A/7445, adopted by Assembly on 20 December 1968, meeting 1750, by recorded vote of 75 to 9, with 30 abstentions as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Argentina, Austria, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Burundi, Ceylon, Chad, Colombia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Cyprus, Dahomey, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Finland, Gabon, Ghana, Guatemala,

Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives Islands, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Portugal, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Southern Yemen, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, United Republic of Tanzania, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zambia.

Against: Bulgaria, Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, United Kingdom.

Abstaining: Algeria, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Central African Republic, China, Congo (Brazzaville), Cuba, Denmark, France, Gambia, Greece, Guinea, Iraq, Israel, Ivory Coast, Jordan, Malawi, Mauritania, New Zealand, Niger, Norway, Philippines, Rwanda, South Africa, Syria, Uganda, United Arab Republic, United States, Yemen.

The General Assembly,

Having considered the Final Document of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States,

Observing that the use of explosive nuclear devices for peaceful purposes will have an extraordinary importance in the light of the technical documents prepared for the Conference at the request of the Secretary-General of the United Nations,

Recalling the statements made at the 1577th meeting of the First Committee by the representatives of the Co-Chairmen of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to the effect that it will be convenient to initiate promptly the preparatory work for the determination of what appropriate principles and international procedures could be adopted in order that the potential benefits of any peaceful application of nuclear explosions might be made available, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world,

1. Requests the Secretary-General to prepare, in consultation with the States Members of the United Nations and members of the specialized agencies and of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and with the co-operation of the latter and of those specialized agencies that he may consider pertinent, a report on the establishment, within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency, of an international service for nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, under appropriate international control;

2. Further requests the Secretary-General to transmit the report to the Governments of the States mentioned in paragraph 1 above in time to permit its consideration by the General Assembly at its twenty-fourth session.

#### DELIVERY SYSTEMS AND MISSILE DEFENCES

A/C.1/L.462 and Add.1,2. Australia, Austria, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Finland, Iran, Ireland, Italy, Japan,

Mexico, Netherlands, Pakistan, Peru: draft resolution, adopted by First Committee on 17 December 1968, meeting 1643, by 97 votes to 0, with 5 abstentions.

A/7445. Report of First Committee, draft resolution D.

RESOLUTION 2456 D (xxiii), as proposed by First Committee, A/7445, adopted by Assembly on 20 December 1968, meeting 1750, by recorded vote of 108 to 0, with 7 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Barbados, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian SSR, Cameroon, Canada, Ceylon, Chad, China, Colombia, Congo (Brazzaville), Democratic Republic of Congo, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Dahomey, Denmark, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives Islands, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, South Africa,

Southern Yemen, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Syria, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, United Arab Republic, United Kingdom, United States, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia.

Against: None.

Abstaining: Central African Republic, Cuba, France, Guinea, Malawi, Mauritania, United Republic of Tanzania.

The General Assembly,

Noting the recommendation contained in resolution D of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States,

Considering that, pursuant to the agreement reached in July 1968 by the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America to enter into bilateral discussions on the limitation of both offensive strategic nuclear-weapon delivery systems and systems of defence against ballistic missiles, such discussions could lead to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to the achievement of nuclear disarmament and relaxation of tensions,

Urges the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America to enter at an early date into bilateral discussions on the limitation of offensive strategic nuclear-weapon delivery systems and systems of defence against ballistic missiles.