People's Democratic Republic of Korea charged that United States aircraft had dropped bombs containing poison gas on localities in the People's Republic.

With a letter dated 29 August (S/2317), the representative of the USSR transmitted a letter from the Women's International Democratic Federation requesting that this communication (S/2296) be transmitted to the General Assembly for consideration and that a delegation of the Federation should be admitted to the Assembly during the discussion of that question.

In a letter dated 24 November (S/2418), the representative of the United States charged that a United Nations bomber, which had not returned from a weather reconnaissance flight over the Sea of Japan on 6 November, had been intercepted and attacked by Soviet fighter planes without warning while over international waters.

In a letter, dated 4 December 1951 (S/2430), the representative of the USSR denied those charges, stating that the bomber had violated the USSR frontier and had opened fire on two Soviet Fighter aircraft which had attempted to compel it to land on a Soviet airfield. The fighters had returned the fire and the bomber had flown towards the sea and disappeared.

These communications were not discussed by the Council during 1951.

## 4. Report of UNCURK

The United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK), which had been established at the Assembly's fifth session (resolution 376(V)), submitted a report<sup>32</sup> (A/1881) to the Assembly's sixth session.

The report, covering the period from 7 October 1950-5 September 1951, stated, inter alia, that the large-scale intervention of the Chinese Communists in Korea had prevented it from carrying out the fundamental objectives of the Assembly's resolution and had narrowed down the scope of its immediate activities. The Commission had therefore decided to study problems related to its ultimate aims of unification and rehabilitation; to follow current developments in the political and economic life of the country, to consult with the Government of South Korea and with United Nations authorities; and, generally, to support United Nations action in Korea.

Referring to the truce talks at Kaesong,<sup>33</sup> the Commission observed that they had been received with "apprehension" and "widespread disappoint-

ment" by the Government of Korea and that the President and other members of the Government were opposed to any cease-fire without unification and assurance against further aggression. The report referred to a communication received in this connexion from the Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs which enumerated the following points as a basis for a cease-fire:

- (1) Withdrawal of Chinese Communist forces into Manchuria;
  - (2) disarming of North Korean Communists;
- (3) United Nations agreement on preventing any third Power from giving any assistance to North Korea;
- (4) full participation of the Republic of Korea in any international conference related to Korea and no consideration of any plan or programme which conflicted with the sovereignty or territorial integrity of Korea.

These points, it was stated, were transmitted to the relevant United Nations organs and to the Secretary-General.

The report stated that, from information gathered by the Commission, it appeared that opinion in the North generally favoured joining the Republic of Korea, but the Commission emphasized that any extension of the Republic's sovereignty should not be an arbitrary act, but should take place with the participation of the people of the North. The report stressed that the Commission would not favour United Nations administration of any territory north of the 38th parallel for any prolonged period.

While regretting that military events had prevented the realization of the United Nations objectives of a unified independent and democratic government in the sovereign State of Korea, it expressed the hope that those aims might be realized in the future.

The Commission found that the Republic had withstood the strain of war remarkably well, that the administrative machinery had not disintegrated, despite difficulties, and that democratic institutions were likely to develop with the cesation of hostilities. Although, it was said, the President was still responsible for the development of executive policies, the influence of the Prime Minister was growing since the appointment to that office of John M. Chang.

The report then dealt with consultations with the Government of South Korea on such matters as treatment of civilian prisoners, police administration and cases of corruption. In those matters the Commission reported many signs of progress and remedy. In the "Kuchang case", in which a

 $<sup>^{\</sup>scriptscriptstyle{32}}$  For consideration of the report by the Assembly, see section 6 of this chapter.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>33</sup> See pp. 241-47.