

had taken place in Gaza resulting in casualties, but that tranquillity had been restored and civilian services, including relief activities, were functioning normally. The Secretary-General accepted an invitation to send a personal representative to Gaza to report on the situation.

Before the Assembly began its discussion of the problem on 23 November, the Secretary-General had, on the basis of his conversations in Cairo, submitted three reports on problems connected with UNEF and on arrangements for clearing the Suez Canal. These reports are discussed below.

The Assembly had before it on 23 November a draft resolution sponsored by 21 Asian-African Powers under which, having received the Secretary-General's report on compliance with the resolutions of 2 and 7 November (A/3384), the Assembly would: (1) note with grave concern that its repeated resolutions calling for withdrawal had not been complied with; and (2) reiterate its call for compliance forthwith. A revision was introduced on 24 November on behalf of the same sponsors except Egypt, in which the original first operative paragraph was replaced by one whereby the Assembly would note with regret that two-thirds of the French forces remained in Egyptian territory, that all the United Kingdom forces remained, although arrangements were being made for the withdrawal of one battalion, and that no Israel forces had been withdrawn behind the Armistice Lines though a considerable time had elapsed.

After a Belgian amendment had been rejected, the Assembly adopted the revised 20-Power draft resolution the same day by 63 votes to 5, with 10 abstentions, as resolution 1120 (XI).

During the discussion, many representatives emphasized the possibly serious consequences of any delay in the withdrawal and declared that it could not be made dependent on conditions, such as linking it with the competence of UNEF. Clearing the Suez Canal was an urgent necessity and withdrawal was a prerequisite to clearance operations, and indeed to the solution of other basic problems. Some did not believe that the beginning of the clearing process must await completion of the withdrawals which, in their understanding, would be phased with the arrival of UNEF.

The representative of Egypt demanded im-

mediate unconditional withdrawal within a very few days and declared it was impossible to conceive of any Canal clearance so long as the invading Powers remained in Egypt. He said that the Government of Egypt would, with the assistance of the United Nations, assume the clearance work in pursuance of Assembly resolution 1121(ES-I) of 24 November and of the agreements which would be concluded between the Secretary-General and the Government of Egypt. Commenting on the importance of the precedent being created by UNEF, he declared his Government's understanding that UNEF could operate in Egypt only with Egypt's consent. The Force was in Egypt to put an end to the aggression and to the presence of invading forces in Egyptian territory; it was not there as an occupation force, nor to clear the Canal of obstructions, nor to resolve any question or settle any problem, be it in relation to the Suez Canal, to Palestine or to any other matter.

The United Kingdom representative declared that the principal reason for the British action on 29 and 30 October had been the failure of the United Nations to keep the peace or to secure compliance with its resolutions or to pave the way for final settlement as far as the Middle East was concerned. The Anglo-French intervention was of a temporary character designed to prevent the spread of hostilities. British forces would withdraw as soon as possible, as UNEF became effective and competent to discharge its functions. British withdrawal had begun; it seemed reasonable that the clearance of the Canal should also begin.

The representative of Israel declared his Government had found no reason to revise its view that its action on 29 October was the only alternative to early destruction by the concerted aggressive action of Egypt and its neighbours. His Government stood on its undertaking on 8 November to withdraw its forces from Egypt but the process should be integrated with the plans for UNEF, and carried out in a way to avoid a return to the status quo of belligerency and to prevent a recurrence of the conflict and give a chance of peace.

DEVELOPMENT OF UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCE

Immediately after the adoption of resolutions 1000(ES-I) and 1001(ES-I) of 5 and 7 Novem-