

Political and Security Questions

CHAPTER I

DISARMAMENT AND RELATED MATTERS

Disarmament and related questions—particularly that of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons—continued to be intensively discussed during 1967, both in the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and in the General Assembly.

The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament reconvened in Geneva, Switzerland, in February 1967 in pursuance of various resolutions adopted by the General Assembly on 17 November 1966¹ and 5 December 1966.²

As requested by the General Assembly, the Committee gave high priority to the question of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and undertook intensive consideration of a draft non-proliferation treaty. Although the Committee did not complete its work on a final draft by the end of the year, it stated, among other things, in reporting to the General Assembly and the Disarmament Commission on 7 December 1967, that it had made substantial progress in that direction. (For further details, see below, section immediately following these introductory paragraphs.)

Since the Committee devoted its attention mainly to the question of non-proliferation, it reported that it had been unable to give equal consideration to other disarmament problems, such as the elimination of foreign military bases in Asia, Africa and Latin America and questions of general and complete disarmament. It had, however, held a "valuable" discussion on the urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests.

Later in 1967, at its twenty-second session, the General Assembly discussed the questions which had been referred to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, as well as two other matters, namely, the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the conclusion of a convention to ban the use of nuclear weapons. Eight resolutions were adopted following the debate.

Two of these resolutions dealt with the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. (See pp. 9-13 for details.)

One of the resolutions on general and complete disarmament was concerned with the effects and implications of nuclear weapons (see pp. 7-9), the other with the question in general (see pp. 25-26).

Other resolutions dealt with the questions of suspending nuclear tests (see pp. 18-20) and of concluding a convention on banning the use of nuclear weapons (see pp. 20-23).

The Assembly also adopted resolutions dealing with the treaty for banning nuclear weapons in Latin America (see pp. 13-18) and with the elimination of foreign military bases (see pp. 23-25).

A number of these questions were referred by the Assembly to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament for its consideration.

¹ See Y.U.N., 1966, p. 17, text of resolution 2153 A (XXI).

² Ibid., p. 20, text of resolution 2163(XXI), pp. 27-28, text of resolution 2162 C (XXI), and p. 32, text of resolution 2165(XXI).

THE CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT

During 1967, the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament held two sessions at Geneva, Switzerland, the first from 21 February to 23 March and the second from 18 May to 14 December. As in previous years, all the members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee, except France, participated in the work of the Conference.

In conformity with a General Assembly request of 17 November 1966,³ the Committee gave high priority to the question of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Committee was unable, however, to complete its work on a draft non-proliferation treaty before it adjourned. In an interim report, dated 7 December 1967, to the General Assembly and to the Disarmament Commission, the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament said that during the period under review it had undertaken intensive consideration of a draft treaty on non-proliferation, and that although a final draft had not been achieved, the Committee had made substantial progress towards that objective.

The Committee also reported that, since it had concentrated its major efforts on the elaboration of a non-proliferation treaty, it had not been able to devote sufficient time either to the consideration of the question of general and complete disarmament or to the problem of the elimination of foreign military bases in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, as had been requested by the General Assembly. With respect to the problem of the urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests, which the Assembly in 1966 had also asked it to take up, the Committee reported that it had held a "valuable discussion" of the matter, with several delegations making "important contributions."

NON-PROLIFERATION
OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

The Committee's discussions in 1967 centred mainly on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The positions of nuclear and non-nuclear powers attending the Conference were stated on all the main aspects of non-prolifera-

tion, such as civilian uses of nuclear energy in the context of non-proliferation, balance of mutual obligations, safeguards and security guarantees.

On 24 August 1967, identical but separate drafts of a non-proliferation treaty were submitted, by the USSR and the United States, respectively. These identical drafts superseded the earlier United States and USSR drafts.⁴

The new draft treaty contained a preamble and eight articles.

By the preamble, the parties to the treaty would, among other things, affirm the principle that potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear technology, including nuclear explosive devices, would be available to non-nuclear-weapon States on a non-discriminatory basis. They would declare their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race, and also express their desire to facilitate the cessation of production of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles pursuant to a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. The parties would also note the right of any groups of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.

By the terms of article I of the proposed treaty, each nuclear-weapon State party to the treaty would undertake not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly or indirectly, and not in any way to assist, encourage or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.

By article II, each non-nuclear-weapon State party to the treaty would undertake not to

³ See Y.U.N., 1966, p. 17, text of resolution 2153 A (XXI).

⁴ See Y.U.N., 1965, pp. 50 and 66-67 and Y.U.N., 1966, pp. 4-5.

receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly or indirectly. Each would also undertake not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

Article III, relating to an international control system, was not formulated, as the United States and the USSR did not reach agreement on an acceptable formula.

The subsequent articles contained provisions on: the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in the context of non-proliferation (article IV); amendments and review of treaty operation (article V); entry into force and accession (article VI); duration and withdrawal (article VII); and deposit (article VIII).

The new draft treaty, the United States said, should be regarded as a step towards the achievement of arms limitation measures. It urged the Eighteen-Nation Committee to expedite and facilitate the conclusion of the treaty and avoid actions which would delay and jeopardize what it called a "realistic agreement."

The USSR considered that all countries, nuclear and non-nuclear alike, would stand to gain, as the conclusion of the treaty would be an important step towards reversing the arms race and ensuring, on the basis of disarmament, reliable security for all.

While the submission of the draft treaty was unanimously welcomed in the Committee, its provisions did not receive full support from all Committee members. Some members submitted formal suggestions for amendments or additions to the draft treaty.

Thus, Sweden proposed a formula for article III which envisaged the adoption of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards system and its application, not only to the non-nuclear-weapon States but also, gradually, to the peaceful nuclear activities of the nuclear powers.

Mexico suggested, among other things, that the declarations of intention of the nuclear powers regarding peaceful uses of nuclear energy and continuing negotiations of specific disarma-

ment measures be transferred from the preamble to the operative part of the treaty.

The United Arab Republic proposed, among other things, that the draft treaty preclude transfers of nuclear weapons in any form whatsoever, including gifts and partial ownership, and that the nuclear powers offer security guarantees to non-nuclear signatories.

Among the suggestions put forward by Romania was one to the effect that the nuclear powers commit themselves, in a separate article, to adopt specific measures with a view to halting the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the reduction of stocks and the final destruction of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles. Romania also proposed security guarantees in the form of a commitment by the nuclear powers never to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against signatory States undertaking never to acquire such weapons.

Italy submitted a proposal which provided that the treaty would have a duration of X years (the exact duration was not specified when the proposal was submitted, being left open for a later decision) and would be renewed automatically for any party not giving notice six months before the expiry date of its intention to cease to be a party. Brazil proposed, among other things that the treaty recognize the right of all parties to develop nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes and that it include a firm undertaking of the nuclear powers to halt the nuclear arms race.

Nigeria had proposals on the sharing of scientific and technological information pertaining to peaceful nuclear explosions, on security guarantees and on other matters.

The United Kingdom suggested that the objective of a review conference five years after entry into force of the treaty should be to assure that the purposes espoused in the preamble and the provisions of the treaty were being realized.

Canada, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and Poland supported without reservations the text of the draft treaty submitted by the USSR and the United States. Burma and Ethiopia made some suggestions for improving the treaty text. India insisted that the treaty must not only prevent the acquisition of nuclear weapons by non-nuclear-weapon States, but also stop the manufacture of nuclear weapons by the nu-

clear-weapon powers. India also advanced specific requests about the security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States and supported Brazil's espousal of the right of non-nuclear-weapon States to develop their own peaceful nuclear explosive devices.

COMPREHENSIVE TEST-BAN TREATY

The basic differences of previous years between members of the Committee with regard to a comprehensive test-ban to extend the obligations of the Partial Test-Ban Treaty of 1963⁵ to underground tests, remained unchanged.

Thus, the USSR reiterated its previously-stated position favouring the conclusion of an immediate agreement based on national means of verification, and opposing any on-site inspection.

The United States maintained that some on-site inspections would still be required effectively to control a ban on underground tests.

Sweden considered that scientific developments in detection and identification had made it possible to agree on verification without on-site inspections, and maintained that the latest procedures provided a statistical probability of mistaking earthquakes for underground tests only once in 15 or more years. In support of its thesis, Sweden submitted a paper entitled "Memorandum on the Control of an Under-

ground Test-Ban Treaty." The United States questioned the validity of various conclusions contained in the Swedish memorandum and statements, and reiterated its position.

The United States position on inspection was supported by the United Kingdom and Canada, which felt that the problem of verification still existed despite deployment of large-range seismometers and other improvements in the state of the art of detection.

The United Kingdom urged the expansion of the "detection club" idea (a world-wide network of technologically advanced seismological stations, proposed by Sweden at the twentieth session of the General Assembly in 1965⁶). It also called for technical discussions between scientists of nuclear States and hoped that the USSR would change its attitude on such discussions.

Nigeria urged the nuclear powers to exercise some restraint on nuclear testing "in all environments"; it was convinced that an underground test ban could be achieved by: (a) banning underground tests of magnitudes detectable by national means; (b) a one-year moratorium on lower magnitude tests which would be automatically extended every year unless violations were suspected; and (c) the creation of a "detection club."

⁵ See Y.U.N., 1963, pp. 124-26.

⁶ See Y.U.N., 1965, p. 55.

DOCUMENTARY REFERENCES

A/6951 (DC/229). Interim Report of Conference of Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament for period 21 February to 7 December 1967.

CONSIDERATION OF DISARMAMENT QUESTIONS BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Six items relating to disarmament were placed on the agenda of the twenty-second session of the General Assembly which opened on 19 September 1967. Four of them were included in the agenda by virtue of previous decisions of the General Assembly. These items were: the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons;⁷ general and complete disarmament;⁸ the suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests;⁹ and the elimination of foreign military bases in Asia, Africa and Latin America.¹⁰

An item dealing with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America was placed on the agenda at the request of 21 Latin American States. Another item, on the question of the conclusion of a convention on

⁷ See Y.U.N., 1966, p. 17, text of resolution 2153 A (XXI).

⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 27-28, text of resolution 2162 C (XXI).

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 20-21, text of resolution 2163 (XXI).

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 32, text of resolution 2165 (XXI).

the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, was proposed by the USSR.

In connexion with the item on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the Assembly discussed the report of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (see above, pp. 4-6) and the report of the Preparatory Committee for the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States which had been set up by an Assembly decision of 17 November 1966.¹¹ In dealing with the item on general and complete disarmament, the Assembly not only considered general aspects of the question, but also a report by the Secretary-General on the effects and implications of nuclear weapons. The text of the Latin American Treaty was transmitted to the Assembly by the sponsors of the item dealing with it, and a draft convention on the prohibition of the

use of nuclear weapons was submitted by the USSR. (For details, see pp. 13 and 20.)

The General Assembly adopted eight resolutions related to disarmament. Two resolutions dealt with the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, two with the question of general and complete disarmament, and one each with suspension of nuclear tests, the elimination of foreign military bases in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, the question of the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, and the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America. (For details, see pp. 11-13, 9, 26, 20, 23, 24-25 and 17-18).

¹¹ Ibid, p. 18, text of resolution 2153 B (XXI).

The Effects and Implications of Nuclear Weapons

On 10 October 1967, the Secretary-General submitted to the General Assembly a report on the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons and on the security and economic implications for States of the acquisition and further development of such weapons. The report was prepared with the assistance of a group of consultant experts, in accordance with a General Assembly resolution of 5 December 1966.¹²

Commenting on the report, the Secretary-General said he felt that what made it particularly valuable was that, in reaching unanimity, the expert consultants had not avoided sensitive or even controversial issues. The report's value lay in its clear and fair exposition of the problem, and he was pleased to be able to endorse the findings of the consultant experts.

The Secretary-General also hoped that the report, and the ensuing debate by the General Assembly, would not only provide a deeper and clearer understanding of the effects of the nuclear arms race but would also contribute positively to the search for ways to bring it to an end.

The report analysed and documented the subject under the following three main headings: (a) effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons; (b) economic implications of the acquisition and further development of nuclear weapons; and (c) security implications of the

acquisition and further development of nuclear weapons. From their analysis, the experts drew the following general conclusions:

"Since the sense of insecurity on the part of nations is the cause of the arms race, which in turn enhances that very insecurity, and insofar as nuclear armaments are the end of a spectrum which begins with conventional weapons, the problem of reversing the trend of a rapidly worsening world situation calls for a basic reappraisal of all interrelated factors. The solution of the problem of ensuring security cannot be found in an increase in the number of States possessing nuclear weapons or, indeed, in the retention of nuclear weapons by the powers currently possessing them. An agreement to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons as recommended by the United Nations, freely negotiated and genuinely observed, would therefore be a powerful step in the right direction, as would also an agreement on the reduction of existing nuclear arsenals. Security for all countries of the world must be sought through the elimination of all stockpiles of nuclear weapons and the banning of their use, by way of general and complete disarmament.

"A comprehensive test-ban treaty, prohibiting the underground testing of nuclear devices, would also contribute to the objectives of non-proliferation and would clearly help to slow down the nuclear arms race. So would effective measures safeguarding the security of non-nuclear countries. Nuclear-weapon-free zones additional to those of Antarctica and Latin America, covering the maximum geographical extent possible

¹² See Y.U.N., 1966, p. 26, text of resolution 2162 A (XXI).

and taking into account other measures of arms control and disarmament, would equally be of major assistance.

"These measures are mentioned neither to argue the case for them nor to set them in any order of priority. What the analysis of the whole problem shows is that any one of them, or any combination of them, could help inhibit the further multiplication of nuclear weapons powers or the further elaboration of existing nuclear arsenals and so help to ensure national and world security. But it must be realized that these measures of arms limitations, however desirable, cannot of themselves eliminate the threat of nuclear conflict. They should be regarded not as ends sufficient in themselves but only as measures which could lead to the reduction of the level of nuclear armaments and the lessening of tension in the world and the eventual elimination of nuclear armaments. All countries have a clear interest in the evolution of a world which allows of peaceful and stable coexistence. Non-nuclear-weapon countries, as well as those which possess nuclear weapons, need to work in concert, creating conditions in which there should be free access to materials, equipment and information for achieving all the peaceful benefits of atomic energy, and for promoting international security.

"This report gives the bare outline of the disasters which could be associated with the use of nuclear weapons. It discusses the nature and variety of the economic burden they impose. And it unhesitatingly concludes from the considerations that have been set out that whatever the path to national and international security in the future, it is certainly not to be found in the further spread and elaboration of nuclear weapons. The threat of the immeasurable disaster which could befall mankind were nuclear war ever to erupt, whether by miscalculation or by mad intent, is so real that informed people the world over understandably become impatient for measures of disarmament additional to the few measures of arms limitation that have already been agreed to—the limited ban on testing, the prohibition of nuclear weapons in outer space, and the nuclear-free zone of Latin America. International agreement against the further proliferation of nuclear weapons and agreements on measures of arms control and disarmament will promote the security of all countries. The United Nations has the over-riding responsibility in this field. The more effective it becomes in action, the more powerful its authority, the greater becomes the assurance for man's future. And the longer the world waits, the more nuclear arsenals grow, the greater and more difficult becomes the eventual task."

During the discussion of the report at the General Assembly's twenty-second session, which took place mainly in the Assembly's First Committee, members expressed approval of the balanced, representative composition of the expert panel, the unanimity of its views and the cogent language of its report. Many speakers com-

mended the initiative taken by the Secretary-General in 1966.

Others stressed that the United Nations, for the first time, had been able independently to evaluate a subject as complex and controversial as the effects and implications of nuclear weapons, and appreciation was expressed for the spirit of harmony and co-operation which marked the report. Many members considered that the report demanded careful attention and that it should be widely publicized.

There was general agreement on the general findings of the report, namely, that nuclear deterrents were not tantamount to security; that the further spread of nuclear weapons would endanger peace; and that the situation called for a halt to the nuclear arms race.

The outcome of discussions was a resolution, whereby the Assembly: (1) took note with satisfaction of the Secretary-General's report as an authoritative statement on the effects of nuclear weapons and on the implications of their acquisition and further development; (2) expressed its appreciation to the Secretary-General and to the consultant experts for the prompt and effective manner in which the report had been prepared; (3) noted the conclusions of the report and expressed the hope that all parties concerned would consider them carefully; (4) recommended that the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament take into account the report and the conclusions thereof in its efforts towards the achievement of general and complete disarmament under effective international control; (5) requested the Secretary-General to arrange for the reproduction of the full report as a United Nations publication and, making full use of all the facilities of the United Nations Office of Public Information, to publicize the report in as many languages as was considered desirable and practicable; (6) recommended to all Governments the wide distribution and the publication in their respective languages as appropriate of the report so as to acquaint public opinion with its contents; and (7) invited regional inter-governmental organizations, the specialized agencies and the International Atomic Energy Agency, and national and international non-governmental organizations, to use all facilities available to them to make the report widely known.

The text to this effect was adopted at a plenary meeting of the General Assembly on 19 December 1967 by 113 votes to 0, with 1 abstention, as resolution 2342 A (XXII). This action was taken on the recommendation of the First Committee, which approved the draft resolution on 18 December 1967 by 100 votes to 0, with 1 abstention, on the proposal of the following 31 Members: Belgium, Canada, Chile, Co-

lombia, Costa Rica, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Finland, Guatemala, Haiti, Hungary, India, Jamaica, Japan, Libya, Malta, Mexico, Mongolia, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Poland, Sweden, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, the United Arab Republic, Upper Volta, Venezuela and Yugoslavia.

(For text, see DOCUMENTARY REFERENCES below.)

DOCUMENTARY REFERENCES

GENERAL ASSEMBLY—22ND SESSION
First Committee, meetings 1545-1555.
Fifth Committee, meeting 1230.
Plenary Meeting 1640.

Effects of Possible Use of Nuclear Weapons and Security and Economic Implications for States of Acquisition and Further Development of These Weapons. Report of Secretary-General transmitting study of his consultative group (A/6858). U.N.P. Sales No.:68.IX.1.

A/C.1/L.413 and Add.1-4. Belgium, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Finland, Guatemala, Haiti, Hungary, India, Jamaica, Japan, Libya, Malta, Mexico, Mongolia, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Poland, Sweden, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, United Arab Republic, Upper Volta, Venezuela, Yugoslavia: draft resolution, adopted by First Committee on 18 December 1967, meeting 1555, by 100 votes to 0, with 1 abstention.

A/C.5/1161, A/7027 and Corr.1. Administrative and financial implications of 31-power draft resolution, A/C.1/L.413. Statement by Secretary-General and report of Fifth Committee.

A/7017. Report of First Committee, draft resolution A. RESOLUTION 2342 A (xxii), as recommended by First Committee, A/7017, adopted by Assembly on 19 December 1967, meeting 1640, by 113 votes to 0, with 1 abstention.

"The General Assembly,

"Recalling its resolution 2162 A (XXI) of 5 December 1966, in which the Secretary-General was requested to prepare a concise report on the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons and on the security and economic implications for States of the acquisition and further development of these weapons,

"Noting that the report has been completed and is available,

"Convinced that the wide dissemination of the report would contribute to a better understanding of the threat presented by nuclear weapons and encourage speedy progress in the prevention of their spread, as well as in other measures of nuclear disarmament,

"1. Takes note with satisfaction of the Secretary-General's report as an authoritative statement on the effects of nuclear weapons and on the implications of their acquisition and further development;

"2. Expresses its appreciation to the Secretary-General and to the consultant experts who assisted him for the prompt and effective manner in which the report was prepared;

"3. Notes the conclusions of the report and expresses the hope that all the parties concerned will consider them carefully;

"4. Recommends that the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament should take into account the report and the conclusions thereof in its efforts towards the achievement of general and complete disarmament under effective international control;

"5. Requests the Secretary-General to arrange for the reproduction of the full report as a United Nations publication and, making full use of all the facilities of the United Nations Office of Public Information, to publicize the report in as many languages as is considered desirable and practicable;

"6. Recommends to all Governments the wide distribution of the report and its publication in their respective languages, as appropriate, so as to acquaint public opinion with its contents;

"7. Invites regional intergovernmental organizations, the specialized agencies and the International Atomic Energy Agency, and national and international non-governmental organizations to use all the facilities available to them to make the report widely known."

Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Questions relating to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons were discussed by the General Assembly in 1967 at its twenty-second session in pursuance of resolutions adopted by the Assembly on 17 November 1966.¹³

In this connexion, the Assembly had before it two reports, one by the Conference of the

¹³ See Y.U.N., 1966, pp. 17-18, text of resolutions 2153 A (XXI) and 2153 B (XXI).

Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and the other by the Preparatory Committee for the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, established by the Assembly on 17 November 1966. The agenda items on these matters were referred to the Assembly's First Committee for consideration.

Two resolutions were approved by the Assembly. One dealt with negotiations for a draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The other dealt with the calling of a conference of non-nuclear-weapon States.

DRAFT TREATY ON NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

The report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament—an interim report—described the Committee's two sessions held in 1967 and dealt, among other things, with the question of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (see pp. 4-6).

A draft resolution on the matter was submitted by Austria, Bulgaria, Canada, Colombia, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, India, Iraq, Italy, Libya, Mexico, Poland, the USSR, the United Arab Republic, the United Kingdom, the United States and Yugoslavia.

By the operative part of this 17-power text, the General Assembly would: (1) reaffirm its resolutions 2028(XX) of 19 November 1965 and 2149(XXI) and 2153 A (XXI) of 4 and 17 November 1966, respectively,¹⁴ calling for the early conclusion of a treaty to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons; (2) call upon the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament urgently to continue its work giving all due consideration to all proposals submitted to it, and to the views expressed by United Nations Member States in 1967 during the twenty-second session of the General Assembly; (3) request the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to submit a full report to the General Assembly, on or before 15 March 1968, on the negotiations on a draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, together with pertinent documents and records; and (4) recommend that, upon receipt of such a report, appropriate consultations be initiated in accordance with the Assembly's rules of procedure, on

setting an early date after 15 March 1968 for the resumption of the Assembly's twenty-second session to consider an item entitled "Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons: Report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament."

During the First Committee's debate, the USSR and the United States noted that the negotiations had reached a stage where agreement on a non-proliferation treaty could soon be expected.

India said, among other things, that the non-proliferation treaty, to be acceptable, should prevent not only an increase in the number of nuclear-weapon powers, but also an increase in the stocks of nuclear weapons possessed by the existing nuclear powers. Italy maintained that no time-limit should be set on the negotiations. Romania urged that a non-proliferation treaty should lead to the elimination of present discrimination between nuclear and non-nuclear powers, while Sweden regretted that parallel negotiations were not being held on a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

France stated that it would abstain on all items which referred directly or indirectly to the work of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee.

On 18 December 1967, the First Committee approved the 17-power proposal by 94 votes to 1, with 4 abstentions, and, at a plenary meeting on 19 December, the General Assembly adopted it by 112 votes to 1, with 4 abstentions, as resolution 2346 A (XXII). (For text, see **DOCUMENTARY REFERENCES below.**)

CONFERENCE OF NON-NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES

In its report to the Assembly, the Preparatory Committee for the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States (as requested by the Assembly on 17 November 1966¹⁵) recommended appropriate arrangements for convening the conference and for associating nuclear-weapon States with the work of the conference.

¹⁴ See Y.U.N., 1965, p. 73, text of resolution 2028 (XX), and Y.U.N., 1966, p. 16, text of resolution 2149(XXI) and p. 17, text of resolution 2153 A (XXI).

¹⁵ See Y.U.N., 1966, p. 18, text of resolution 2153 B (XXI).

The following 22 Members submitted a draft resolution on the matter in the Assembly's First Committee: Burundi, Chile, Ghana, Haiti, Italy, Jamaica, Kenya, Kuwait, Liberia, Libya, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Tunisia, Uganda, the United Republic of Tanzania, and Zambia.

By this text, as revised, the General Assembly would: (1) approve the recommendations of the Preparatory Committee for the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, subject to a change in the proposed date for the conference; (2) decide to convene the conference in Geneva in August-September 1968; (3) decide to invite non-nuclear-weapon States which were Members of the United Nations, and those which were members of the specialized agencies and of the International Atomic Energy Agency to the conference; and (4) request the Secretary-General to make appropriate arrangements for convening the conference in accordance with the recommendations of the Preparatory Committee.

On 18 December, in the light of information supplied by the Secretariat, the First Committee decided that the conference should be held from 29 August to 28 September 1968.

Stressing that it was necessary to hold the conference, Pakistan made the following points, among others. The draft non-proliferation treaty would have to be supplemented by provisions of security guarantees for the non-nuclear-weapon States. The non-nuclear-weapon States would have to consider the approach of the

nuclear powers in the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, which was based on the concept of assurances through existing United Nations machinery. It was necessary to have a forum where the non-nuclear-weapon States could reconcile their views and, at the same time, exchange views with the nuclear powers with regard to assurances that the latter might be prepared to offer outside the context of alliances. Agreement on a suitable formula for the guarantees to be provided by the nuclear powers would be facilitated by the conference.

Many Members, including Austria, Brazil, Burundi, Chile, Ethiopia, Ghana, Iran, Italy, Malaysia, Romania, Tunisia, Uganda, the USSR, the United Arab Republic, the United Republic of Tanzania, and the United States, expressed support for the conference.

Both Pakistan and the United States emphasized that the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States was to be convened in August-September 1968, regardless of the outcome of the negotiations on a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and of the discussions on that outcome in the resumed session of the General Assembly.

On 18 December the First Committee approved the 22-power proposal by a roll-call vote of 90 to 0, with 8 abstentions. On 19 December, it was adopted at a plenary meeting of the General Assembly by a roll-call vote of 110 to 0, with 8 abstentions, as resolution 2346 B (XXII). (For text, see DOCUMENTARY REFERENCES below.)

DOCUMENTARY REFERENCES

GENERAL ASSEMBLY—22ND SESSION
First Committee, meetings 1552-1555.
Fifth Committee, meeting 1230.
Plenary Meeting 1640.

A/6951 (DC/229). Interim report of Conference of Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.
A/C.1/955. Letter of 14 December 1967 from Italy.

DRAFT TREATY ON NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

A/C.1/L.416. Austria, Bulgaria, Canada, Colombia, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, India, Iraq, Libya, Mexico, Poland, USSR, United Arab Republic, United

Kingdom, United States, Yugoslavia: draft resolution.

A/C.1/L.416/Rev.1. Revised draft resolution, submitted by 16 powers listed above, and co-sponsored in addition by Italy, adopted by First Committee on 18 December 1967, meeting 1555, by 94 votes to 1, with 4 abstentions.

A/C.5/1167, A/7028. Financial implications of 17-power draft resolution, A/C.1/L.416/Rev.1. Statement by Secretary-General and report of Fifth Committee.

A/7016. Report of First Committee, draft resolution A. RESOLUTION 2346 A (xxii), as recommended by First Committee, A/7016, adopted by Assembly on 19 December 1967, meeting 1640, by 112 votes to 1, with 4 abstentions.

"The General Assembly,

"Having received the interim report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament,

"Noting the progress that the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament has made towards preparing a draft international treaty to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons,

"Noting further that it has not been possible to complete the text of an international treaty to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons,

"Reaffirming that it is imperative to make further efforts to conclude such a treaty at the earliest possible date,

"Expressing the hope that the remaining differences between all the States concerned can be quickly resolved,

"Taking into account the fact that the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament is continuing its work with a view to negotiating a draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and intends to submit a full report for the consideration of the General Assembly as soon as possible,

"1. Reaffirms its resolutions 2028(XX) of 19 November 1965, 2149(XXI) of 4 November 1966 and 2153 A (XXI) of 17 November 1966;

"2. Calls upon the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament urgently to continue its work, giving all due consideration to all proposals submitted to the Committee and to the views expressed by Member States during the twenty-second session of the General Assembly;

"3. Requests the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to submit to the General Assembly, on or before 15 March 1968, a full report on the negotiations regarding a draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, together with the pertinent documents and records;

"4. Recommends that upon the receipt of that report appropriate consultations should be initiated, in accordance with the rules of procedure of the General Assembly, on the setting of an early date after 15 March 1968 for the resumption of the twenty-second session of the General Assembly to consider agenda item 28 (a) entitled 'Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons: report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament'."

CONFERENCE OF NON-NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES

A/6817. Report of Preparatory Committee for Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States.

A/C.1/L.420. Burundi, Chile, Ghana, Haiti, Jamaica, Kenya, Kuwait, Liberia, Libya, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Tunisia, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia: draft resolution.

A/C.1/L.420/Rev.1. Revised draft resolution submitted by 21 powers listed above and in addition by Italy, adopted by First Committee on 18 December 1967, meeting 1555, by roll-call vote of 90 to 0, with 8 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burundi, Byelorussian SSR, Canada, Ceylon, Chile, China, Colombia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Finland, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guyana, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives Islands, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Syria, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian SSR, USSR., United Arab Republic, United Kingdom, United Republic of Tanzania, United States, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zambia.

Against: None.

Abstaining: Afghanistan, Burma, Cameroon, Cuba, Cyprus, France, Guinea, India.

A/C.5/1149/Rev.1, A/7029. Financial implications of 22-power draft resolution, A/C.1/L.420/Rev.1. Statement by Secretary-General and report of Fifth Committee.

A/7016. Report of First Committee, draft resolution B. RESOLUTION 2346 B (xxii), as recommended by First Committee, A/7016, adopted by Assembly on 19 December 1967, meeting 1640, by roll-call vote of 110 to 0, with 8 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burundi, Byelorussian SSR, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Ceylon, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo (Brazzaville), Democratic Republic of the Congo, Costa Rica, Czechoslovakia, Dahomey, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Finland, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives Islands, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, South Africa, Southern Yemen, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Syria, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, United Arab Republic, United Kingdom, United Republic of Tanzania, United States, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia.

Against: None.

Abstaining: Afghanistan, Burma, Cuba, Cyprus, France, Gabon, Guinea, India.

"The General Assembly,

"Recalling its resolution 2153 B (XXI) of 17 No-

ember 1966, by which it decided that a conference of non-nuclear-weapon States should be convened not later than July 1968.

"Having considered with appreciation the report of the Preparatory Committee for the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States,

"1. Approves the recommendations of the Preparatory Committee for the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, subject to paragraph 2 below;

"2. Decides to convene the Conference of Non-

Nuclear-Weapon States at Geneva from 29 August to 28 September 1968;

"3. Decides to invite to the Conference non-nuclear-weapon States Members of the United Nations and members of the specialized agencies and of the International Atomic Energy Agency;

"4. Requests the Secretary-General to make appropriate arrangements for convening the Conference in accordance with the recommendations of the Preparatory Committee."

Treaty to Ban Nuclear Weapons in Latin America

Questions pertaining to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America were discussed at the General Assembly's twenty-second session on the basis of a request by Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela.

The item on this subject was referred to the Assembly's First Committee, which had before it, among other things, the text of the Treaty, as signed at Tlatelolco, Mexico, on 14 February 1967, and opened for signature on that date for an indefinite period.

The text of the Treaty contained a preamble, 31 articles, one transitional article embodying the obligations of the Latin American parties to the Treaty, and two additional protocols.

The Treaty, in addition to setting out the obligations of the States party to it, contained provisions for: defining the term "nuclear weapon"; the establishment of an international agency for the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America to ensure compliance with the Treaty (including a safeguards system to be negotiated with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)); the development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy (including the use of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes); the zone of application of the Treaty; relations with other international organizations; measures in the event of violation of the Treaty; settlement of disputes; entry into force; amendments; duration; and denunciation.

The main obligations of the parties to the Treaty were defined in article 1 of the Treaty. In brief, the contracting parties would undertake to use exclusively for peaceful purposes the

nuclear material and facilities under their jurisdiction, and to prohibit and prevent in their respective territories: (a) the testing, use, manufacture, production or acquisition by any means whatsoever of any nuclear weapons, by the parties themselves directly or indirectly, on behalf of anyone else, or in any other way; and (b) the receipt, storage, installation, deployment and any form of possession of any nuclear weapons, directly or indirectly, by the parties themselves, by anyone on their behalf or in any other way. Further, they would undertake to refrain from engaging in, encouraging or authorizing, directly or indirectly, or in any way participating in, the testing, use, manufacture, production, possession or control of any nuclear weapon.

Nuclear weapons were defined in article 5 of the Treaty as "any device which is capable of releasing nuclear energy in an uncontrolled manner and which has a group of characteristics that are appropriate for use for warlike purposes."

Under article 7 of the Treaty, the parties would undertake to establish an international organization to be known as the "Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America," which was to ensure compliance with the obligations of the Treaty. For the purpose of verifying compliance, a control system was to be put into effect, in accordance with provisions contained in articles 13-18, which included safeguards to be negotiated with IAEA, periodic reports of the parties, special reports requested by the Secretary-General of the new organization and special inspections.

The right of the contracting parties to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, in particular for their economic development and social progress, was set out in article 17 of the

Treaty. Conditions for explosions of nuclear devices for peaceful purposes—including explosions which involved devices similar to those used in nuclear weapons—were provided for in article 18.

Additional Protocol I of the Treaty provided that the extra-territorial powers (France, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States) controlling certain territories situated within the limits of the Latin American geographical zone, as defined in the Treaty, would undertake to apply the statute of denuclearization in those territories for which, *de jure* or *de facto*, they were internationally responsible. Additional Protocol II provided that the nuclear-weapons powers would undertake themselves fully to respect the status of denuclearization of Latin America and also would undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the parties to the Treaty.

The discussions in the General Assembly resulted in the adoption of a resolution, by the preambular part of which, among other things, the General Assembly: (a) recalled that on 27 November 1963¹⁶ it had expressed its confidence that, once the Latin American States had concluded a treaty to prohibit nuclear weapons in Latin America, all States, particularly the nuclear powers, would co-operate fully to realize its peaceful aims; (b) considered that the principle of an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear powers had been established by a resolution of 19 November 1965;¹⁷ (c) recalled that, by a resolution of 17 November 1966,¹⁸ it had called upon nuclear-weapon powers to refrain from the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons against States which might conclude regional treaties in order to ensure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories, and noted that that was precisely the object of the Treaty to ban nuclear weapons in Latin America, the 21 signatories to which were convinced that the Treaty would constitute a measure that would spare their peoples from the squandering of their limited resources on nuclear armaments and would protect them against possible nuclear attacks, that it would stimulate the peaceful use of nuclear energy in the promotion of economic and social development and that it would act as a

significant contribution towards preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and would be a powerful factor for general and complete disarmament; (d) noted further that it was the intent of the signatory States that all signatory States within the zone defined by the Treaty might become parties to it without any restriction; and (e) took note of the fact that the Treaty contained two additional protocols open, respectively, to the signature of States which, *de jure* or *de facto*, were internationally responsible for territories which lay within the limit of the geographical zone established in the Treaty, and to the signature of States possessing nuclear weapons, and expressed conviction that the co-operation of such States was necessary for the greater effectiveness of the Treaty.

By the operative part of the resolution, the Assembly: (1) welcomed with special satisfaction the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, which constituted an event of historic significance in the efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and promote international peace and security and which, at the same time, established the right of Latin American countries to use nuclear energy for demonstrated peaceful purposes in order to accelerate the economic and social development of their peoples; (2) called upon all States to give their full co-operation to ensure that the régime laid down in the Treaty enjoyed the universal observance to which its lofty principles and noble aims entitled it; (3) recommended that States which were or might become signatories of the Treaty and those contemplated in Additional Protocol I of the Treaty should strive to take all measures within their power to ensure that the Treaty speedily obtained the widest application among them; and (4) invited the powers possessing nuclear weapons to sign and ratify Additional Protocol II of the Treaty as soon as possible.

The decisions to this effect were embodied in resolution 2286 (XXII) adopted at a plenary meeting of the Assembly on 5 December 1967

¹⁶ See Y.U.N., 1963, p. 145, text of resolution 1911 (XVIII).

¹⁷ See Y.U.N., 1965, pp. 72-73, text of resolution 2028(XX).

¹⁸ See Y.U.N., 1966, p. 17, text of resolution 2153 A (XXI).

by a roll-call vote of 82 to 0, with 28 abstentions. The Assembly adopted the text on the recommendation of its First Committee, which had approved it on 28 November 1967 by a roll-call vote of 79 to 0, with 21 abstentions, on the basis of a revised proposal sponsored by the following 20 Members: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela.

In the First Committee's debate, the Treaty was generally welcomed as a major step forward, aimed at preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and limiting the use of nuclear energy to peaceful purposes only. It was the first agreement, various Members stressed, to establish a nuclear-free zone in an inhabited area, and the Treaty had set an example for other areas as well.

Appreciation was also expressed at the fact that the Treaty envisaged the establishment of a comprehensive control system, to be negotiated with the IAEA with regard to peaceful nuclear activities. Also noted with appreciation was the Treaty's reliance on a régime of special inspections with regard to suspected clandestine activities.

The United States believed that the four following requirements had to be met for the establishment of nuclear-free zones: (1) the initiative was to originate within the area concerned; (2) the zone was to include all States deemed important; (3) its creation was not to disturb necessary security arrangements; and (4) provision? were to be made for follow up on alleged violations in order to give reasonable assurance of compliance. The Latin American Treaty, in the opinion of the United States, met these requirements.

France stated that it was continuing to study the political and legal implications of both protocols and that it was too early to prejudge the result of that study. The United Kingdom expressed its readiness to sign both protocols in the near future. Italy approved of the Treaty, which it regarded as an example of how other disarmament problems could be considered in keeping with the interests of the countries concerned.

The USSR considered that some of the provisions of the Treaty (for example, those concerning explosions of nuclear devices for peaceful purposes) and the lack of provisions (on preventing or prohibiting, for instance, the transporting of nuclear weapons through the territories of contracting parties) introduced elements of ambiguity in the Treaty. It also appeared, the USSR added, that nuclear weapons would remain in Puerto Rico and in other Latin American areas which the United States did not wish to include in the denuclearized zone, and they would also continue to appear inside the atom-free zone, in the Panama Canal. Moreover, according to article 4 of the Treaty, the zone to which the Treaty would apply would encompass huge areas of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, hundreds of kilometres beyond the territorial waters of States signing the Treaty.

Czechoslovakia and Poland indicated that they would abstain in the vote, as they, like the USSR, had serious reservations with regard to provisions pertaining to transit of nuclear weapons, peaceful nuclear explosions and the geographical boundaries of the Treaty.

Mexico, replying to the points raised by the USSR, asserted that a provision on the transport of nuclear weapons had been omitted from the Treaty for the simple reason that if the carrier was a party to the Treaty, transport was covered by the prohibitions of article 1 (by which, inter alia, the contracting parties undertook to prohibit and prevent in their respective territories: (a) the testing, use, manufacture, production or acquisition by any means whatsoever of any nuclear weapons, by the parties themselves, directly or indirectly, on behalf of anyone else or in any other way and (b) the receipt, storage, installation, deployment and any form of possession of any nuclear weapons, directly or indirectly, by the parties themselves, by anyone on their behalf or in any other way). If the carrier was not a party to the Treaty, Mexico added, "transport" would be identical with "transit" and, under international law, the territorial State concerned could grant or deny the permission on application by the interested State, unless some other arrangements were provided in a treaty between such States. The consensus of the Preparatory

Commission for the Denuclearization of Latin America (which had worked out the text of the Treaty) had been that transit by land was excluded, and that maritime or air transit at the discretion of the riparian State must be subject to the "right of innocent passage" provisions of the 1958 Geneva Convention on territorial and contiguous seas. As to the Panama Canal, Mexico noted that the United States, in a letter dated 10 December 1965 to the Chairman of the Preparatory Commission, had expressed readiness to include the Panama Canal Zone, provided the established transit rights were not affected.

Some Members, including Canada, Pakistan, Poland and the USSR, expressed reservations on the provisions of the Treaty relating to explosions of nuclear devices for peaceful purposes. Mexico, in reply, said that such explosions could be carried out directly by parties to the Treaty only if they did not require the use of a nuclear device as defined in article 5 of the Treaty. Article 18, furthermore, laid down further conditions concerning such matters as notification of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, verification, and collaboration of third parties in explosion of nuclear devices for peaceful purposes.

In this connexion, Brazil recalled its note to the Mexican Government upon signing the Treaty, wherein Brazil reaffirmed its interpretation of the meaning of article 18 as allowing the signatory States to carry out with their own means, or in association with third parties, nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, including explosions which might involve devices similar to those used in nuclear weapons.

India expressed agreement with the Brazilian interpretation, stating that the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, including the development of nuclear explosives for peaceful

purposes, should not be prohibited by any treaty.

Guyana expressed deep regret and concern over the fact that, by virtue of the "exclusionary provisions" of article 25 of the Treaty (which specified those to whom the Treaty was open for signature), it was precluded from being a signatory.¹⁹ Algeria, Kenya, the United Republic of Tanzania, and Uganda said they would abstain in the vote, as they had misgivings about article 25, which excluded Guyana.

The United States noted that Cuba was the only Latin American country which had refused to sign the Treaty. Cuba declared that it would consider becoming a party to the Treaty only if it included the denuclearization and abolition of United States military bases in Panama, Puerto Rico and Guantanamo, Cuba.

The USSR held that Cuba was unable to participate in the negotiations on the Latin American Treaty owing to the attitude of the United States concerning the zone of application.

Romania, while supporting Cuba's view that the Treaty should apply also to the United States military bases in the Panama Canal Zone, and Puerto Rico and that the United States should dismantle its base at Guantanamo, welcomed the objectives of the Treaty and its recognition of the right of signatories to develop peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

¹⁹ Article 25 of the Treaty, *inter alia*, provided that the General Conference of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America should not take any decision regarding the admission of a political entity part or all of whose territory was the subject, prior to the date when this Treaty was opened for signature, of a dispute or claim between an extra-continental country and one or more Latin American States, so long as the dispute had not been settled by peaceful means.

DOCUMENTARY REFERENCES

GENERAL ASSEMBLY—22ND SESSION

First Committee, meetings 1504-1511, 1531, 1533, 1535, 1538.

Plenary. Meeting 1620.

A/6663. Letter of 20 February 1967 from Mexico, transmitting Final Act of Preparatory Commission for Denuclearization of Latin America.

A/6676 and Add.1-4. Letter of 11 July 1967 from

following States requesting inclusion in agenda of item entitled, "Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America": Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela.

A/C.1/946. Treaty for Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons

in Latin America. Letter of 3 October 1967 from Mexico.

A/C.1/L.406. Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, Venezuela: draft resolution.

A/C.1/L.406/Rev.1 and 2. Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, Venezuela: revised draft resolution, adopted by First Committee on 28 November 1967, meeting 1538, by roll-call vote of 79 to 0, with 21 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Barbados, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Ceylon, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Finland, Guatemala, Guinea, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Romania, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Republic, United Kingdom, United States, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yugoslavia.

Against: None.

Abstaining: Algeria, Bulgaria, Byelorussian SSR, Cameroon, Congo (Brazzaville), Cuba, Czechoslovakia, France, Ghana, Guyana, Hungary, Kenya, Maldives Islands, Mauritania, Mongolia, Poland, Uganda, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia.

A/6921. Report of First Committee.

RESOLUTION 2286 (xxii), as recommended by First Committee, A/6921, adopted by Assembly on 5 December 1967, meeting 1620, by roll-call vote of 82 to 0, with 28 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Barbados, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Ceylon, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Dahomey, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Finland, Gambia, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Malta, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Republic, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yugoslavia.

Against: None.

Abstaining: Algeria, Botswana, Bulgaria, Burundi, Byelorussian SSR, Cameroon, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, France, Ghana, Guyana, Hungary, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Mongolia, Poland, Syria, Togo, Uganda, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Yemen, Zambia.

"The General Assembly,

"Recalling that in its resolution 1911 (XVIII) of 27 November 1963 it expressed the hope that the States of Latin America would carry out studies and take appropriate measures to conclude a treaty that would prohibit nuclear weapons in Latin America,

"Recalling also that in the same resolution it voiced its confidence that, once such a treaty was concluded, all States, and particularly the nuclear Powers, would lend it their full co-operation for the effective realization of its peaceful aims,

"Considering that in its resolution 2028 (XX) of 19 November 1965 it established the principle of an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers,

"Bearing in mind that in its resolution 2153 A (XXI) of 17 November 1966 it expressly called upon all nuclear-weapon Powers to refrain from the use, or the threat of use, of nuclear weapons against States which might conclude regional treaties in order to ensure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories,

"Noting that that is precisely the object of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, signed at Tlatelolco, Mexico, by twenty-one Latin American States, which are convinced that the Treaty will constitute a measure that will spare their peoples the squandering of their limited resources on nuclear armaments and will protect them against possible nuclear attacks on their territories, that it will be a stimulus to the peaceful use of nuclear energy in the promotion of economic and social development and that it will act as a significant contribution towards preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and as a powerful factor for general and complete disarmament,

"Noting that it is the intent of the signatory States that all existing States within the zone defined in the Treaty may become parties to the Treaty without any restriction,

"Taking note of the fact that the Treaty contains two additional protocols open, respectively, to the signature of States which, de jure or de facto, are internationally responsible for territories which lie within the limits of the geographical zone established in the Treaty and to the signature of States possessing nuclear weapons, and convinced that the co-operation of such States is necessary for the greater effectiveness of the Treaty,

"1. Welcomes with special satisfaction the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, which constitutes an event of historic significance in the efforts to prevent the proliferation

of nuclear weapons and to promote international peace and security and which at the same time establishes the right of Latin American countries to use nuclear energy for demonstrated peaceful purposes in order to accelerate the economic and social development of their peoples;

"2. Calls upon all States to give their full co-operation to ensure that the régime laid down in the Treaty enjoys the universal observance to which its lofty principles and noble aims entitle it;

"3. Recommends States which are or may become signatories of the Treaty and those contemplated in Additional Protocol I of the Treaty to strive to take all the measures within their power to ensure that the Treaty speedily obtains the widest possible application among them;

"4. Invites Powers possessing nuclear weapons to sign and ratify Additional Protocol II of the Treaty as soon as possible."

Suspension of Nuclear and Thermonuclear Tests

The item entitled "Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests" was discussed by the General Assembly in 1967 in pursuance of an Assembly resolution of 5 December 1966.²⁰ It was referred to the Assembly's First Committee for consideration.

The importance of ceasing all nuclear weapon tests was generally stressed in the debate.

Thus, Chile, Japan, Lebanon, Mexico and New Zealand regretted the continued testing of nuclear weapons by the People's Republic of China and/or by France. Japan appealed to France and the People's Republic of China, "in the most earnest terms," to change their current policies regarding continued atmospheric testing.

India emphasized that the Partial Test-Ban Treaty of 1963²¹ (banning nuclear weapon tests in outer space, in the atmosphere and under water) could not long endure if it were not universally adhered to. The nuclear powers, it added, should discontinue tests pending agreement on a comprehensive test-ban treaty (which would also ban underground testing of nuclear weapons). Iran, Pakistan and Uganda considered that lack of progress towards the cessation of all tests had permitted continuation of the nuclear arms race and might even undermine the stability of the 1963 Partial Test-Ban Treaty. Algeria maintained, in this connexion, that it was neither just nor logical to express regret that all States had not yet adhered to that Treaty, since not only was there no noteworthy progress towards disarmament, but a further armament race was on the way.

The USSR and Poland maintained that the lack of progress towards banning underground testing of nuclear weapons was due to the desire of the United States to retain the option of conducting underground tests.

Several delegations drew attention to the connexion between the need for a comprehensive test ban and the efforts to work out a treaty to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Afghanistan, Belgium and New Zealand, for instance, regarded a comprehensive test ban as a logical complement to non-proliferation. Japan thought that such a test ban would help slow down the arms race, as well as help the efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The United Kingdom hoped that when a non-proliferation treaty was signed, the improved political atmosphere would permit a comprehensive test ban to be arrived at as soon as possible. Sweden called for parallel negotiations on a comprehensive test ban and a non-proliferation treaty, and emphasized that a non-proliferation treaty had to be coupled with, or followed by, other measures, such as a comprehensive test ban and agreement on the cut-off of fissionable material.

The United States and the USSR restated their respective positions on inspection measures, as expressed in previous years.²² The former emphasized the need for some on-site inspection and the latter, supported by Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland and the Ukrainian SSR, claimed that national means of detection were adequate to verify the underground test ban. The United States suggested that it would be useful to bring together the scientists of various countries in order that they might come to some conclusion by which all might be guided.

Sweden drew attention to improved possibilities for verification through technical devel-

²⁰ See Y.U.N., 1966, pp. 20-21, text of resolution 2163(XXI).

²¹ See Y.U.N., 1963, pp. 137-140.

²² See, for instance, Y.U.N., 1965, p. 74, and Y.U.N., 1966, p. 6.

opments and international exchange of seismic data, which would provide a sufficiently reliable control system to deter parties from violations. Recalling its request to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to re-examine verification from the standpoint of deterrence rather than certainty, Sweden maintained that the question of control could no longer be used as a convenient reason for holding up agreement to ban underground tests. This point of view was supported by Chile, Ethiopia, Malaysia and Malta.

Yugoslavia believed that there was no longer any justification for postponing agreement on suspension of all nuclear and thermonuclear tests in view of the progress achieved in detection and identification systems. Pakistan favoured re-examination of the question of inspection in the light of technological developments in inspection and identification. Japan, however, considered that unless there were adequate scientific indications that all tests could be detected and identified, it was indispensable to have effective international control, including on-site inspection.

Sweden hoped that it would be possible to organize, without further delay, an international "detection club," along the lines it had proposed in 1965,²³ whereby countries would cooperate in exchange of seismological observations in a world-wide network of technologically advanced seismological stations.

The USSR considered that Sweden's "detection club" proposal deserved attention if it were conducive to obtaining a ban on underground tests without inspection. The USSR stressed that seismic data collected through the "detection club" would be evaluated independently by each State for itself and not by an international organization.

Among those supporting the idea of international seismic co-operation to improve detection were Australia, Canada, India, Japan and the United States. In view of the progress already achieved in verification methods, Canada said, it hoped that results of such international co-operation would yield completely instrumented verification methods, which would be generally acceptable.

Sweden also recalled the concept of "verification by challenge" proposed at the Confer-

ence of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (a system whereby a party suspected of underground nuclear weapon testing would find it in its interest to provide all available reassuring information, including possibly an invitation to other parties to inspect).²⁴ This concept, it pointed out, had played an important role in the Swedish outline for control. India, Chile and Japan supported the Swedish proposal, which they felt might provide a solution.

India supported the proposal to ban tests above an agreed seismic level, the threshold being lowered with improvements in identification techniques. The USSR recalled its support of previous years for the United Arab Republic's proposal for prohibition of underground tests above a certain seismic magnitude, with a voluntary moratorium on all other tests until prohibition of all tests was achieved.²⁵

Chile supported the moratorium with verification by invitation which, it hoped, could lead through an experimental period to a complete prohibition of nuclear weapons.

Spain suggested the possibility of a report by the Secretary-General, similar to the one he had submitted on the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons (see p. 7), on differentiating between seismic effects and underground explosions.

On 18 December 1967, the First Committee approved a draft resolution, by 92 votes to 1, with 6 abstentions, whereby the General Assembly would: (1) urge all States which had not done so to adhere without further delay to the 1963 Partial Test-Ban Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water; (2) call upon nuclear-weapon States to suspend nuclear weapon tests in all environments; (3) express the hope that States would contribute to an effective international exchange of seismic data; and (4) request the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to take up as a matter of urgency the elaboration of a treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests and to report to the General Assembly on the matter at its twenty-third session in 1968.

²³ See Y.U.N., 1965, p. 75.

²⁴ See Y.U.N., 1966, p. 6.

²⁵ See Y.U.N., 1965, p. 55.

On 19 December 1967, this was approved at a plenary meeting of the Assembly by 103 votes to 1, with 7 abstentions, as resolution 2343 (XXII). (For text, see DOCUMENTARY REFERENCES below.) The sponsors of the draft resolution in the First Committee were: Argentina,

Brazil, Burma, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Finland, Guatemala, Haiti, India, Japan, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden, Trinidad and Tobago, the United Arab Republic, Venezuela and Yugoslavia.

DOCUMENTARY REFERENCES

GENERAL ASSEMBLY—22ND SESSION
First Committee, meetings 1545-1555.
Plenary Meeting 1640.

A/C.1/L.414 and Add.1, 2. Argentina, Brazil, Burma, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Finland, Guatemala, Haiti, India, Japan, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden, Trinidad and Tobago, United Arab Republic, Venezuela, Yugoslavia: draft resolution adopted by First Committee on 18 December 1967, meeting 1555, by 92 votes to 1, with 6 abstentions.

A/7021. Report of First Committee.

RESOLUTION 2343 (xxii), as recommended by First Committee, A/7021, adopted by Assembly on 19 December 1967, meeting 1640, by 103 votes to 1, with 7 abstentions.

"The General Assembly,

"Having considered the question of the urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests and the interim report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament,

"Recalling its resolutions 1762 (XVII) of 6 November 1962, 1910 (XVIII) of 27 November 1963, 2032 (XX) of 3 December 1965 and 2163 (XXI) of 5 December 1966,

"Noting with regret the fact that all States have not yet adhered to the Treaty banning nuclear weapon

tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, signed in Moscow on 5 August 1963,

"Noting with increasing concern that nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere and underground are continuing,

"Taking into account the existing possibilities of establishing, through international co-operation, an exchange of seismic data, so as to create a better scientific basis for national evaluation of seismic events,

"Recognizing the importance of seismology in the verification of the observance of a treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests,

"Realizing that such a treaty would also constitute an effective measure to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons,

"1. Urges all States which have not done so to adhere without further delay to the Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water;

"2. Calls upon all nuclear-weapon States to suspend nuclear weapon tests in all environments;

"3. Expresses the hope that States will contribute to an effective international exchange of seismic data;

"4. Requests the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to take up as a matter of urgency the elaboration of a treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests and to report to the General Assembly on this matter at its twenty-third session."

Question of Concluding a Convention on Banning the Use of Nuclear Weapons

The question of concluding a convention on banning the use of nuclear weapons was considered by the General Assembly in 1967, at its twenty-second session, at the request of the USSR, which proposed the item for the agenda on 22 September 1967 as an urgent matter. In making the request, the USSR also submitted the text of a draft convention.

In an explanatory memorandum accompanying its request, the USSR said, among other things, that concluding an international agreement on banning the use of nuclear weapons would be an important step towards removing the threat of nuclear war. The United Nations,

it recalled, had in previous years given consideration to the possibility of concluding a convention on the matter. Despite the positive attitude of many Governments, no such step, however, had yet been taken. Now, with the accumulation of huge nuclear weapon stocks in the world and the complication of the international situation as the result of the aggressive action of certain States, the solution to the problem of banning the use of nuclear weapons had acquired special urgency. The USSR was convinced, the explanatory memorandum added, that a clear decision by the General Assembly in favour of the conclusion of a convention

prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons would serve the cause of peace, would relax international tension and would accord with the interests of all peoples.

The draft convention submitted by the USSR consisted of a preamble and five articles. By the preamble, the parties to the Convention would, among other things, state their awareness of the exceedingly serious consequences for all mankind of a nuclear war and make the point that concluding a convention banning the use of nuclear weapons would contribute significantly to the solution of other disarmament questions.

By article 1, each party to the convention would solemnly undertake to refrain from using, or from threatening to use, nuclear weapons and would refrain from inciting other States to use them.

By article 2, each party to the convention would undertake to make every effort to arrive as soon as possible at agreement on ceasing production, and destroying all stockpiles, of nuclear weapons in conformity with a treaty on general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

Article 3 dealt with signature, ratification, and accession and entry-into-force measures, stating, *inter alia*, that the convention would be open to all States for signature, that it would be subject to ratification by signatory States and that it would be open to any State for accession. It further provided that the convention should enter into force after its ratification by all parties to the convention possessing nuclear weapons.

Article 4 stated that the convention would be of unlimited duration. Article 5 provided that the convention (the Russian, English, French, Spanish and Chinese texts of which would be equally authentic) be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments.

The General Assembly referred the item to its First Committee for consideration.

In the debate, the USSR expressed its belief that the proposed convention would decrease the threat of nuclear war, would facilitate the physical destruction of nuclear weapons, would represent a step towards general and complete disarmament and would be beneficial both to nuclear-weapon powers and non-nuclear-

weapon powers. If mutually respected, the prohibition against using nuclear weapons would eliminate the possibility of nuclear retaliation against nuclear attack. Moreover, a prohibition of use of nuclear weapons would mean that the non-nuclear powers would cease to feel they might be the object of nuclear attack or blackmail. The proposed convention, the USSR added, was intimately linked to the General Assembly's declaration of 24 November 1961 on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons,²⁶ which the USSR's draft convention sought to formalize in juridical terms.

Afghanistan, Ghana, India and the United Arab Republic, while accepting the idea of a convention, stressed that in order to be effective, the convention would require the active support of all nuclear powers, which, Ghana pointed out, should include the People's Republic of China. Nepal thought that a world disarmament conference should be held for the purpose of concluding a convention prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons.

The United States said that a convention prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons even in self-defence, or in retaliation, would be "deceptive, dangerous and unrealistic." It was unrealistic to expect the nuclear powers to refrain from the use of nuclear weapons when their national existence was at stake. The measure might create dangerous illusions of security and divert attention from the main task of nuclear disarmament. In order to reduce the risk of nuclear war, the United States maintained, agreements providing for verification must first limit and later reduce and finally eliminate nuclear weapons in the context of general and complete disarmament under strict international control. As long as the present situation of stockpiling of nuclear weapons, massive conventional forces and the possibility of surprise attack existed, the most effective way of minimizing the risk of nuclear war, the United States said, would be through the credibility of mutual deterrence.

France felt that it would be neither realistic nor desirable to start a programme of disarma-

²⁶ See Y.U.N., 1961, pp. 30-31, text of resolution 1653 (XVI).

ment with provisions which, while of essential importance for the security and self-defence of States, could not, by their very nature, be effectively verified. It stressed that disarmament, and primarily nuclear disarmament, ought to be undertaken on a very urgent basis through genuine measures whose application could be verified and guaranteed.

Italy felt that a prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons might reduce the incentive to seek general and complete disarmament.

Poland said that the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons would mark the beginning of the process of reduction and liquidation of nuclear weapons.

Yugoslavia believed that the proposed convention would facilitate negotiation on general and complete disarmament, particularly on nuclear disarmament, and also improve prospects for agreement on collateral measures of disarmament.

Algeria and Ethiopia said they would view the signing of such a convention as a move in the right direction and thought that the measure would give impetus to efforts to bring about general and complete disarmament. Syria also supported the USSR initiative.

Madagascar believed that the measure would slow down the arms race because States would see no profit in producing and perfecting weapons whose use was prohibited.

The United Arab Republic, in welcoming the USSR initiative, underlined that unless the proposed convention was supported by all States, particularly the nuclear powers, within and outside the United Nations, it would have no positive result.

Chile said that the proposal to sign a convention banning the use of nuclear weapons was timely, and supported it either in isolation or within the scope of general and complete disarmament.

Australia, Canada, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and others felt that the question could best be dealt with in the context of general and complete disarmament.

The outcome of the discussions was the adoption of a resolution by the Assembly on 8 December 1967, by the preambular part of which the Assembly, *inter alia*: (a) reaffirmed its conviction, as expressed on 5 December 1966,²⁷

that the signing of a convention on banning the use of nuclear weapons would facilitate negotiations on general and complete disarmament and give further impetus to the search for a solution to the urgent problem of nuclear disarmament; and (b) considered it necessary to make new efforts to expedite a solution to the question of banning nuclear weapons.

By the operative part of the resolution, the Assembly: (1) expressed its conviction that it was essential to continue urgently the examination of the question of the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons and of the conclusion of an appropriate international convention; (2) urged all States in this connexion to examine, in the light of the Assembly's declaration of 24 November 1961 on the banning of the use of nuclear weapons, the question of the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons and the draft convention proposed by the USSR and such other proposals as might be made on this question, and to undertake negotiations concerning the conclusion of an appropriate convention through the convening of an international conference, by the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, or directly between States; and (3) requested the Secretary-General to transmit the USSR's text of a draft convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons and the records of the meetings of the First Committee relating to the discussion of this item to all Members of the United Nations and to the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

The decision to this effect was embodied in resolution 2289 (XXII), adopted at a plenary meeting of the Assembly on 8 December 1967 by a roll-call vote of 77 votes to 0, with 29 abstentions. (For text, see DOCUMENTARY REFERENCES below.)

The Assembly took this decision on the recommendation of its First Committee, which approved the draft resolution on 4 December 1967 by 56 votes to 0, with 33 abstentions, on the basis of a proposal by Czechoslovakia. Ethiopia, Iraq, Mongolia, Nigeria, Romania, Sudan, the USSR, the United Arab Republic and Yugoslavia.

²⁷ See Y.U.N., 1966, p. 29, text of resolution 2164 (XXI).

DOCUMENTARY REFERENCES

GENERAL ASSEMBLY—22ND SESSION

First Committee, meetings 1532, 1534-1537, 1539-1541.

Plenary Meeting 1623.

A/6834. Letter of 22 September 1967 from USSR, requesting inclusion in agenda of item entitled, "Conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons."

A/C.1/L.409. Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, Iraq, Mongolia, Nigeria, Romania, Sudan, USSR, United Arab Republic, Yugoslavia: draft resolution, adopted by First Committee on 4 December 1967, by 56 votes to 0, with 33 abstentions.

A/6945. Report of First Committee.

RESOLUTION 2289 (xxii), as recommended by First Committee, A/6945, adopted by Assembly on 8 December 1967, meeting 1623, by roll-call vote of 77* to 0, with 29 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Austria, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burundi, Byelorussian SSR, Cameroon, Ceylon, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Congo (Brazzaville), Democratic Republic of Congo, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldive Islands, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Romania, Rwanda, Senegal, Somalia, Spain, Sudan, Syria, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, United Arab Republic, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zambia.

Against: None.

Abstaining: Australia, Belgium, Burma, Canada, China, Cuba, Denmark, France, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Malawi, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Philippines, Portugal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, South Africa, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States.

"The General Assembly,

"Recalling the Declaration on the prohibition of

the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons, contained in its resolution 1653 (XVI) of 24 November 1961,

"Reaffirming its conviction, expressed in resolution 2164 (XXI) of 5 December 1966, that the signing of a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons would greatly facilitate negotiations on general and complete disarmament under effective international control and give further impetus to the search for a solution of the urgent problem of nuclear disarmament,

"Considering that it is necessary, in view of the present international situation, to make new efforts aimed at expediting the solution of the question of the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons,

"1. Expresses its conviction that it is essential to continue urgently the examination of the question of the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons and of the conclusion of an appropriate international convention;

"2. Urges all States, in this connexion, to examine in the light of the Declaration adopted by the General Assembly in resolution 1653 (XVI) the question of the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons and the draft convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons proposed by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and such other proposals as may be made on this question, and to undertake negotiations concerning the conclusion of an appropriate convention through the convening of an international conference, by the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, or directly between States;

"3. Requests the Secretary-General to transmit to all States Members of the United Nations and to the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament the draft convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons proposed by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the records of the meetings of the First Committee relating to the discussion of the item entitled 'Conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons'."

* The representative of Dahomey subsequently informed the Secretariat that he had intended to vote in favour of the draft resolution.

The Elimination of Foreign Military Bases in Asia, Africa and Latin America

The question of the elimination of foreign military bases in Asia, Africa and Latin America was included in the agenda of the twenty-second session of the General Assembly on the basis of a resolution adopted by the Assembly on 5 December 1966.²⁸ It was considered by the

Assembly's First Committee from 11 to 18 December 1967.

On 15 December, India, the United Arab

²⁸ See Y.U.N., 1966, p. 32, text of resolution 2165 (XXI).

Republic and Yugoslavia submitted a draft resolution by which the General Assembly, noting that the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament had not been able, in 1967, to give sufficient consideration to the question of the elimination of foreign military bases in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, would request it to resume consideration of the matter and to report on the progress achieved to the Assembly's twenty-third (1968) session.

The USSR stressed that the item required urgent consideration, in part because of the use of foreign military bases in the Viet-Nam conflict, which threatened international peace. This position was supported by Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Mongolia. Poland stated that use of dependent territories for military bases was incompatible with Articles 73 and 76 of the United Nations Charter,²⁹ as well as contrary to General Assembly resolutions on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples. This view was also shared by Bulgaria and Mongolia. Romania, too, favoured elimination of foreign military bases.

The United States did not consider the item as a matter for urgent discussion in the Eighteen-Nation Committee. It further stated that the item was not an arms control measure and had, in the past, produced profitless debate.

The United Kingdom favoured examination of the matter by the Eighteen-Nation Committee. Australia agreed, commenting that the question was intricately bound up with the question of security.

Lebanon hoped that the Eighteen-Nation Committee could develop political guidelines which would help the Special Committee on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States. Lebanon noted that the latter Committee was also dealing with the question of military bases. Iraq opposed the existence of all foreign military bases. Liberia questioned Europe's exclusion from the terms of the draft resolution on elimination of foreign military bases.

The right of States to conclude agreements to have military bases on their soil, or have them withdrawn, was emphasized by Australia, Canada, Liberia and the Philippines. Canada, Chile and the Philippines expressed the view that general and complete disarmament would be the effective way to eliminate foreign military bases.

Burundi was specifically opposed to the existence of foreign military bases in Africa, Asia and Latin America, since, among other things, it would lead to changes in the policy of non-alignment.

On 18 December 1967, the First Committee approved the three-power proposal by a vote of 86 to 0, with 11 abstentions. On 19 December, the text was adopted at a plenary meeting of the General Assembly as resolution 2344 (XXII), by 105 votes to 0, with 13 abstentions. (For text, see DOCUMENTARY REFERENCES below.)

²⁹ For text of Articles 73 and 76 of the Charter, see APPENDIX II.

DOCUMENTARY REFERENCES

GENERAL ASSEMBLY—22ND SESSION
First Committee, meetings 1545, 1555.
Plenary Meeting 1640.

A/C.1/L.418. India, United Arab Republic, Yugoslavia: draft resolution adopted by First Committee on 18 December 1967, meeting 1555, by 86 votes to 0, with 11 abstentions.

A/7022. Report of First Committee.

RESOLUTION 2344 (xxii), as recommended by First Committee, A/7022, adopted by Assembly on 19 December 1967, meeting 1640, by 105 votes to 0, with 13 abstentions.

"The General Assembly,

"Having received the interim report of the Con-

ference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament,

"Recalling its resolution 2165(XXI) of 5 December 1966,

"Noting that the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament has not been able to give sufficient consideration to the question of the elimination of foreign military bases in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America,

"1. Requests the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to resume consideration of the question of the elimination of foreign military bases in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 2165(XXI);

"2. Requests the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to report to the General Assembly at its twenty-third session on the progress achieved on the question of the elimination

of foreign military bases in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America."

A/6867. Letter of 18 October 1967 from Jamaica.

General and Complete Disarmament

The question of general and complete disarmament was placed on the agenda of the General Assembly's twenty-second session in 1967 on the basis of a resolution adopted by the Assembly on 5 December 1966.³⁰ The item was referred to the Assembly's First Committee, which discussed not only broader aspects of general and complete disarmament but also measures to ban the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons.

The Committee had before it three draft resolutions. One was submitted by Malta. As subsequently revised to incorporate amendments by the Netherlands, the General Assembly would thereby: (1) recommend that the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament consider as a matter of urgency the problems relating to the definition and use of chemical and biological weapons with a view to revision, updating or replacement of the Geneva Protocol (of 17 June 1925) for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its twenty-third session; (2) request the Secretary-General to prepare a concise report on the nature and probable effects of existing chemical and biological weapons and on the economic and health implications of the possible use of such weapons, with particular reference to States that were not in a position to establish comprehensive methods of protection; (3) recommend that the report be based on accessible material and prepared with the assistance of qualified consultant experts appointed by the Secretary-General; and (4) request further that the report be transmitted to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and to the Governments of United Nations Member States in time to permit its consideration at the twenty-third (1968) session of the General Assembly.

The second draft resolution was submitted by Hungary on 11 December and was subsequently co-sponsored by Madagascar and Mali. By this text, the General Assembly would: (1) demand

strict and absolute compliance by all States with the principles and norms established by the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925; (2) declare that the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons for the purpose of destroying human beings and the means of their existence constituted a crime against humanity; and (3) appeal to those States which had not done so, to accede to the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925.

Upper Volta submitted several amendments to the draft text, with a view, among other things, to deleting the operative paragraph by which the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons would be declared a crime against humanity.

The third draft resolution was sponsored by the following 24 Members: Afghanistan, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ethiopia, Finland, Hungary, Iceland, India, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Mongolia, Nigeria, Norway, Poland, Sweden, the United Arab Republic and Yugoslavia. By this text, the General Assembly, noting that the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament had not been able to devote sufficient time (in 1967) to the consideration of general and complete disarmament, and reaffirming its conviction of the need for new efforts to achieve agreement on general and complete disarmament, would: (1) request the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to resume at the earliest possible date consideration of the question of general and complete disarmament in accordance with the Assembly's resolution 2162 C (XXI) of December 1966, which had called for new efforts to achieve progress on general and complete disarmament as well as on collateral measures;³¹ (2) decide to transmit to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarma-

³⁰ See Y.U.N., 1966, pp. 27-28, text of resolution 2162 C (XXI).

³¹ Ibid.

ment all the documents and records of the meetings of the First Committee, as well as those of the plenary meetings of the General Assembly pertaining to this item; and (3) request the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to report on the progress achieved on the question of general and complete disarmament to the General Assembly at its twenty-third (1968) session.

Discussion on these three draft resolutions was brief. A number of Members described general and complete disarmament as the ultimate goal of disarmament negotiations.

Canada, Ghana, India, Sweden and Yugoslavia, among others, were critical of what they described as the escalating nuclear arms race,

particularly the deployment of anti-ballistic missiles.

On 15 December, Malta said that it would not insist on a vote on its draft resolution if no vote was requested on the three-power draft resolution submitted by Hungary. Hungary then stated that the sponsors of the three-power draft resolution and the amendments thereto would not press their proposals to a vote.

On 18 December, the First Committee approved the 24-power draft resolution by 97 votes to 0, with 2 abstentions. On 19 December, the text was adopted at a plenary meeting of the General Assembly as resolution 2342 B (XXII) by 113 votes to 0, with 3 abstentions. (For text, See DOCUMENTARY REFERENCES below.)

DOCUMENTARY REFERENCES

GENERAL ASSEMBLY—22ND SESSION
First Committee, meetings 1545-1555.
Plenary Meeting 1640.

PROPOSALS CONCERNING CHEMICAL AND BACTERIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

A/C.1/L.411 and Rev.1, Malta: draft resolution and revision.

A/C.1/L.412 and Add.1,2. Hungary, Madagascar, Mali: draft resolution.

A/C.1/L.415. Netherlands: amendments to draft resolution submitted by Malta, A/C.1/L.411.

A/C.1/L.417. Upper Volta: amendments to 3-power draft resolution A/C.1/L.412.

GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT

A/C.1/L.419 and Add.1,2. Afghanistan, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ethiopia, Finland, Hungary, Iceland, India, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Mongolia, Nigeria, Norway, Poland, Sweden, United Arab Republic, Yugoslavia: draft resolution, adopted by First Committee on 18 December 1967, meeting 1555, by 97 votes to 0, with 2 abstentions.

A/7017. Report of First Committee, draft resolution B.

RESOLUTION 2342 B (xxii), as recommended by First Committee, A/7017, adopted by Assembly on 19 December 1967, meeting 1640, by 113 votes to 0, with 3 abstentions.

"The General Assembly,

"Having received the interim report of the Confer-

ence of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament,

"Recalling its resolutions 1378(XIV) of 20 November 1959, 1722(XVI) of 20 December 1961, 1767 (XVII) of 21 November 1962, 1908(XVIII) of 27 November 1963, 2031 (XX) of 3 December 1965 and 2162 C (XXI) of 5 December 1966,

"Noting that since then the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament has not been able to devote sufficient time to the consideration of the question of general and complete disarmament,

"Reaffirming its conviction of the necessity of continuing to exert new efforts, for the purpose of ensuring tangible progress towards the achievement of an agreement on the question of general and complete disarmament,

"1. Requests the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to resume at the earliest possible date consideration of the question of general and complete disarmament in accordance with General Assembly resolution 2162 C (XXI) ;

"2. Decides to transmit to the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament all the documents and records of the meetings of the First Committee, as well as those of the plenary meetings of the General Assembly pertaining to this item;

"3. Requests the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to report on the progress achieved on the question of general and complete disarmament to the General Assembly at its twenty-third session."

Disarmament: Selected Bibliography, 1962-1967.
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