

Political and security questions

Chapter 1

Disarmament

International tensions and the continued arms race had an adverse effect on disarmament negotiations and deliberations during 1981, and as a consequence there were few tangible results in the field of disarmament. Various aspects of arms limitation, disarmament and the consequences of the arms race were considered by the Disarmament Commission, composed of all United Nations Member States; the Committee on Disarmament, a 40-nation negotiating body meeting at Geneva; and the General Assembly and its First Committee.

The Disarmament Commission, meeting at United Nations Headquarters from 18 May to 5 June,⁽⁷⁾ adopted a consensus recommendation restating some general principles in favour of nuclear and conventional disarmament (p. 21), and considered other matters without making substantive recommendations (p. 29). The Commission proposed to continue work in 1982 on unfinished business.

During much of the year, the Committee on Disarmament (p. 30) was the only active forum for interregional disarmament negotiations, since several sets of bilateral or trilateral talks outside the United Nations framework were in suspense. By the end of the year, the General Assembly was able to welcome the commencement, on 30 November, of negotiations between the USSR and the United States on medium-range nuclear forces in Europe.

The Committee met from 3 February to 24 April and from 11 June to 21 August, and submitted a report to the General Assembly.⁽⁴⁾ Four of its ad hoc working groups met during the year, dealing respectively with security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States, radiological weapons, chemical weapons and a comprehensive programme of disarmament. The Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons framed 18 draft articles or elements of an international convention to ban such weapons (p. 69). However, the Committee failed to agree on proposals to establish subsidiary bodies on a comprehensive nuclear-test ban or on cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament.

Work continued at two sessions in New York (4-15 May and 5-16 October) of the Preparatory Committee for the Second Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament,⁽⁸⁾ as a result of which the Assembly decided to hold the special session in New York from 7 June to 9 July 1982.⁽¹³⁾ Also, the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research completed in 1981 its first full year of operation (p. 106).

The General Assembly, at its regular 1981 session, discussed 20 disarmament items, some of them embracing more than one issue. Under those items, it adopted on 9 December a record number of 49 resolutions on specific disarmament questions. These resolutions were recommended by the First Committee, devoted to disarmament and related international security questions, following a general debate on disarmament at 24 meetings of the Committee (15 October-4 November). In addition, on 27 October,⁽¹²⁾ the Assembly requested a report by the Secretary-General suggesting obligations and measures to protect nature from the pernicious effects of the arms race, and to limit and prohibit the types of military activity presenting the greatest danger for nature.

Aspects of disarmament negotiations and machinery were dealt with in four resolutions initiated under the collective item on implementation of the recommendations adopted at the 1978 special session of the General Assembly on disarmament.⁽⁶²⁾ The Assembly urged States to intensify efforts to conclude negotiations taking place in the Committee on Disarmament and other forums,⁽⁴⁰⁾ and called on States to observe the principles of its 1979 Declaration on International Co-operation for Disarmament⁽¹⁰⁾ and to refrain from action that could hamper disarmament negotiations.⁽³¹⁾ Noting that the Disarmament Commission had been unable to conclude consideration of its agenda, the Assembly requested the Commission to continue its work.⁽²⁹⁾ The Assembly urged the Committee on Disarmament to continue negotiations on priority items and to complete the elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament (p. 22)

in time for consideration by the Assembly at its 1982 special session.⁽³³⁾

In other resolutions concerning disarmament bodies, the Assembly renewed the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference,⁽²⁷⁾ which held two brief sessions in 1981 without being able to agree on when such a conference might be held;⁽⁶⁾ and it recommended completion of the first review of the membership of the Committee on Disarmament during the 1982 special session.

On nuclear disarmament, the Assembly adopted several resolutions. By one, noting that the Committee on Disarmament had not reached agreement on a basis for negotiations on nuclear disarmament, the Assembly called on the Committee to continue consultations concerning the establishment of an ad hoc working group on the question.⁽³²⁾ By another, the Assembly urged the United States and the USSR to pursue negotiations towards achievement of substantial reductions and significant qualitative limitations of strategic arms, and invited them to keep it informed of the results.⁽⁵⁵⁾

The Assembly adopted three resolutions concerning non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war. By one, it urged all nuclear-weapon States and others to submit their views, proposals and practical suggestions for ensuring the prevention of nuclear war, for consideration at the 1982 special session.⁽¹⁴⁾ By another, it declared again that the use of nuclear weapons would be a violation of the Charter of the United Nations and a crime against humanity, and that the use or threat of use of such weapons should be prohibited, pending nuclear disarmament.⁽³⁶⁾ In a Declaration on the Prevention of Nuclear Catastrophe, the Assembly proclaimed that States and statesmen first to use nuclear weapons would be committing the gravest crime against humanity, and that doctrines allowing for such use were incompatible with moral standards and United Nations ideals.⁽⁶¹⁾

The Assembly adopted seven resolutions on the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and related matters. Concerning Africa, it reiterated its call on all States to respect that continent as a nuclear-weapon-free zone and called on States, corporations and others to terminate military and nuclear collaboration with South Africa, including the provision of electronic equipment and related technology;⁽²¹⁾ and it reaffirmed that South Africa's nuclear plans and capability endangered peace and security.⁽²⁰⁾ With regard to Latin America, the Assembly, noting that the United States had ratified Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, reiterated its invitation to France to do likewise.⁽¹⁷⁾

In three resolutions related to a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, the Assembly requested that its 1980 resolution urging steps to implement the proposal for such a zone⁽¹¹⁾ be transmitted to the 1982 special session;⁽²²⁾ it stated that the Israeli attack in June 1981 on Iraqi nuclear installations (p. 275) adversely affected prospects for establishing the zone and declared it imperative that Israel place its nuclear facilities under safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency;⁽²³⁾ and, after receiving a report by a Group of Experts on Israeli nuclear armament,⁽²⁾ it requested the Security Council to prohibit all nuclear cooperation with Israel and to institute enforcement action to prevent that country from endangering peace and security by its nuclear-weapon capability.⁽⁵⁹⁾ The Assembly also reaffirmed its endorsement in principle of the concept of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia.⁽²⁴⁾

Further, with the object of making the Indian Ocean a zone of peace, the Assembly requested the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean to make every effort to accomplish preparatory work for a Conference on the Indian Ocean, including consideration of convening the Conference by the first half of 1983.⁽²⁶⁾ The Committee held four series of meetings at United Nations Headquarters in 1981⁽⁵⁾ but was unable to harmonize views on convening the Conference.

With regard to other nuclear disarmament issues, the Assembly adopted seven resolutions, calling for the Committee on Disarmament: to elaborate an agreement on the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on territories where there were none at present;⁽⁵¹⁾ to continue negotiations on security guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon States with a view to elaborating a convention;⁽⁴²⁾ to explore further efforts to reach a common formula on such guarantees which could be included in a legally binding international instrument;⁽⁴³⁾ to start negotiations on a convention prohibiting neutron weapons;⁽³⁸⁾ to initiate negotiations on a treaty to prohibit nuclear-weapon tests as a matter of the highest priority⁽¹⁹⁾— a request that was coupled in another resolution with a call for a halt to all nuclear-test explosions by the USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States;⁽¹⁸⁾ and to pursue at an appropriate stage the question of a verified prohibition of the production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons and other explosive devices.⁽⁵³⁾

In the field of non-nuclear weapons, the Assembly adopted two resolutions on chemical weapons prohibition: by one it urged the Committee on Disarmament to continue negotiations on a chemical weapons convention and to re-

establish its Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons for this purpose;⁽⁴⁴⁾ and by the other it urged similar action and also called on States to refrain from producing and deploying binary and other new types of chemical weapons.⁽⁴⁵⁾ In a separate action,⁽⁴⁶⁾ it extended the mandate of the Group of Experts to Investigate Reports on the Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons, which presented an initial, inconclusive report in November.⁽⁹⁾

The Assembly also requested the Committee to intensify negotiations towards an agreement to prohibit new weapons of mass destruction⁽²⁵⁾ and to continue negotiations for the early conclusion of a treaty prohibiting radiological weapons.⁽⁴⁸⁾ Regarding a possible arms race in outer space, it adopted two resolutions, one favouring the negotiation of effective and verifiable agreements, starting with one on anti-satellite systems,⁽⁴⁹⁾ and the other the conclusion of a general treaty against the stationing of weapons in space.⁽⁶⁰⁾

In the sphere of conventional weapons, the Assembly urged States to sign and ratify the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects,⁽⁴¹⁾ which was opened for signature in April together with three annexed Protocols covering such devices as incendiary weapons and land-mines. It requested the establishment of a group of experts to prepare a study on conventional armaments and disarmament,⁽⁴⁷⁾ and referred to the special session on disarmament a 1980 study on regional disarmament.⁽⁵⁴⁾

In two resolutions on military budgets, the Assembly appealed to States to exercise restraint in their military expenditures while the Disarmament Commission considered principles for freezing and reducing them,⁽¹⁵⁾ and recommended that all Member States report their military expenditures annually to the United Nations, using a form devised by an expert panel in 1980.⁽¹⁶⁾ On the link between disarmament and international security, it called for action by States to render Security Council decisions effective as a spur to disarmament negotiations.⁽⁵⁷⁾

In addition to the study on Israeli nuclear armament (mentioned above), five studies on aspects of disarmament were completed in 1981 and submitted to the Assembly, which took note of them in separate resolutions. The topics were disarmament and development,⁽³⁴⁾ disarmament and international security,⁽⁵⁸⁾ confidence-building measures,⁽⁵²⁾ institutional arrangements for disarmament⁽⁵⁰⁾ and a World Disarmament Campaign.⁽³⁰⁾ A study on a proposed internation-

al agency for satellite monitoring of compliance with international disarmament agreements was submitted to the Preparatory Committee for the 1982 special session (p. 104). The Assembly noted with appreciation a report on the work of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies.⁽³⁹⁾

Finally, with regard to information and training of personnel on disarmament questions, the Assembly decided to continue the United Nations programme of fellowships on disarmament,⁽²⁸⁾ requested an annual compilation of a table listing the States parties to multilateral disarmament agreements,⁽³⁵⁾ and invited views concerning a proposed world-wide collection of signatures in support of disarmament.⁽³⁷⁾ The United Nations continued to issue two serial publications on disarmament activities: *Disarmament: A Periodic Review by the United Nations*⁽¹⁾ and *The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*.⁽³⁾

Publications: ⁽¹⁾*Disarmament: A Periodic Review by the United Nations*, vol. IV, No. 1, Sales No. E.81.IX.5; No. 2, Sales No. E.81.IX.6. ⁽²⁾*Study on Israeli Nuclear Armament Disarmament Study Series 6 (A/36/431)*, Sales No. E.82.IX.2. ⁽³⁾*The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, vol. 6, 1981, Sales Nos. E.82.IX.6 (cloth), E.82.IX.7 (paper).

Reports: ⁽⁴⁾*Committee on Disarmament, A/36/27*; ⁽⁵⁾*Committee on Indian Ocean, A/36/29*; ⁽⁶⁾*Committee on World Disarmament Conference, A/36/28*; ⁽⁷⁾*Disarmament Commission, A/36/42*; ⁽⁸⁾*Preparatory Committee for Second Special Session of General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament, A/36/49 & Corr.1*; ⁽⁹⁾*S-G and Group of Experts on alleged use of chemical weapons, A/36/613*.

Resolutions: GA: ⁽¹⁰⁾34/88, 11 Dec. 1979 (YUN 1979, p. 86); (11)35/147, 12 Dec. 1980 (YUN 1980, p. 66); ⁽¹²⁾36/7, 27 Oct. 1981 (p. 836); (13)36/81 A (p. 29), ⁽¹⁴⁾36/81 B (p. 40), ⁽¹⁵⁾36/82A (p. 91), (16)36/82 B (p. 92), (17)36/83 (p. 49), ⁽¹⁸⁾36/84 (p. 66), ⁽¹⁹⁾36/85 (p. 67), (20)36/86A (p. 47), ⁽²¹⁾36/86 B (p. 45), (22)36/87A (p. 50), ⁽²³⁾36/87B (p. 54), ⁽²⁴⁾36/88 (p. 55), ⁽²⁵⁾36/89 (p. 78), ⁽²⁶⁾36/90 (p. 95), ⁽²⁷⁾36/91 (p. 27), ⁽²⁸⁾36/92A (p. 108), ⁽²⁹⁾36/92 B (p. 30), (30)36/92C (p. 110), (31)36/92D (p. 25), ⁽³²⁾36/92 E (p. 37), (33)36/92 F (p. 33), (34)36/92 G (p. 99), (35)36/92H (p. 109), ⁽³⁶⁾36/92 I (p. 41), ⁽³⁷⁾36/92 J (p. 112), (38)36/92 K (p. 63), (39)36/92 L (p. 107), (40)36/92M (p. 24), (41)36/93 (p. 85), (42)36/94 (p. 60), (43)36/95 (p. 61), (44)36/96A (p. 72), (45)36/96 B (p. 73), ⁽⁴⁶⁾36/96 C (p. 76), ⁽⁴⁷⁾36/97 A (p. 88), ⁽⁴⁸⁾36/97B (p. 80), (49)36/97C (p. 83), ⁽⁵⁰⁾36/97 D (p. 106), ⁽⁵¹⁾36/97 E (p. 57), ⁽⁵²⁾36/97 F (p. 104), ⁽⁵³⁾36/97 G (p. 68), (54)36/97 H (p. 89), ⁽⁵⁵⁾36/97 I (p. 39), (56)36/97J (p. 34), ⁽⁵⁷⁾36/97K (p. 101), (58)36/97 L (p. 102), (59)36/98 (p. 52), (60)36/99 (p. 83), ⁽⁶¹⁾36/100 (p. 43), 9 Dec.

Yearbook reference: ⁽⁶²⁾1978, p. 17.

Meeting records: GA: 1st Committee, A/C.1/36/PV.3 & Corr.1, 4-44, 52, 53 (19 Oct.-4 Dec.); plenary, A/36/PV.91 (9 Dec.).

General aspects of disarmament

General disarmament issues

DISARMAMENT COMMISSION ACTION. During its 1981 substantive session (New York, 18

May-5 June), the Disarmament Commission, as in previous years, considered various aspects of the arms race, with the aim of elaborating a general approach to negotiations on nuclear and conventional disarmament. In its recommendations, adopted by consensus on 5 June and set out in its report to the General Assembly,⁽¹⁾ the Commission noted with grave concern that it was meeting at a critical moment of deterioration in international relations and that the arms race, particularly in its nuclear aspect, had escalated to new levels. The Commission expressed the conviction that the arms race, particularly the nuclear-arms race, ran counter to efforts to relax international tensions, that progress in disarmament would benefit the strengthening of peace and security and the improvement of international relations, and that all nations had a vital interest in nuclear and conventional disarmament.

The Commission referred to the special responsibility of nuclear-weapon States in achieving nuclear disarmament, and added that States with the largest military arsenals had special responsibility in pursuing conventional armaments reduction.

The Commission considered nuclear disarmament to be the most effective security assurance against the use of nuclear weapons (p. 34) and that, pending its achievement, the nuclear-weapon States should give effective assurance to non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of such weapons (p. 58). The Commission recommended the strengthening of the existing nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America (p. 48), the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in other regions and the establishment of zones of peace.

The most recent agreements on strategic arms control between the two most heavily armed nuclear-weapon States remained unratified, the Commission noted (p. 37). Further, it deplored the continuing increase in military expenditures (p. 89), largely in the nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States, and it emphasized the need to release such resources for international economic and social development, particularly for the benefit of developing countries (p. 96).

The Commission noted with profound regret that, although there had been limited progress in certain areas, there continued to be a marked lack of progress in others. Accordingly, it urged all States, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, to intensify the search for a common approach to disarmament, especially in areas with the highest concentration of armaments, including Europe. To that end, it was urgent to initiate or intensify negotiations, particularly multi-

lateral negotiations on questions vital to both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States.

The United States reserved its position on the Commission's recommendations, noting that they were based on a working paper introduced in the closing days of the session and observing that the Commission's deliberations had been insufficiently detailed to permit the development of considered judgements on the important and complicated issues covered.

Report: ⁽¹⁾Disarmament Commission, A/36/42.

Comprehensive disarmament programme

CONSIDERATION BY THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT. Work on a comprehensive programme of disarmament continued at the 1981 session of the Committee on Disarmament⁽¹⁾ on the basis of an outline adopted in 1980,⁽⁴⁾ providing for an introduction or preamble and chapters on objectives, principles, priorities, measures, stages of implementation, and machinery and procedures.

The Committee's Ad Hoc Working Group on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, meeting between 19 February and 17 August, completed a preliminary examination of all chapters except the introduction or preamble, whose form and substance could not be determined pending completion of substantive chapters. The Group considered a number of working papers, containing the views of various delegations on the programme.

At the conclusion of its work in 1981, the Group reported to the Committee that, although it had made progress towards elaboration of the programme, several important and complex issues remained unresolved, particularly those relating to measures, stages and the nature of the programme. It had used a four-stage programme as a working hypothesis and had then discussed which disarmament measures should be included in the first stage, but different views had been expressed on specific measures and on time-frames for implementation. The Group recommended that it resume work in January 1982.

GENERAL ASSEMBLY ACTION. In a resolution of 9 December on the report of the Committee on Disarmament,⁽²⁾ the General Assembly requested that body to complete, during the first part of its 1982 session, the elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament and to submit the programme in time for consideration and adoption by the Assembly at the second special session devoted to disarmament, in June/July 1982 (p. 27).

Discussing in the First Committee the work done on the programme, Mexico remarked that views still differed on three points: whether to establish the number of stages in the programme,

whether to determine their duration and what the content of those stages should be.

A number of countries, such as Algeria, Chile, Egypt, India, Malaysia, Nepal, Pakistan, Somalia and Yugoslavia, stated that the programme should specify disarmament priorities to be achieved within certain time-frames. Ghana thought the document should be legally binding. India recalled that in 1962 both the USSR and the United States had presented draft treaties on general and complete disarmament which were to have been implemented in their entirety within a decade or so.⁽⁵⁾ In China's view, the programme would facilitate disarmament by providing for specific measures by stages.

Austria and Finland, however, expressed doubts about the advisability of rigid time-frames for the various stages, but favoured regular review conferences to monitor and direct the implementation of the programme. The need for review was also stressed by the Federal Republic of Germany, which added that the credibility of the programme would be judged on the basis of how realistic its goals were. Belgium believed that the task of reviewing implementation could be entrusted to the Disarmament Commission. Sweden remarked that the programme's impact would be completely dependent on the will to implement it through multilateral negotiations.

Bangladesh suggested that the programme might also envisage parallel progress in dispute settlement and in building a United Nations interregional security and peace-keeping capability.

Czechoslovakia observed that the socialist States of Eastern Europe saw the programme as a practical instrument for a comprehensive revitalization of disarmament negotiations in all necessary directions. The German Democratic Republic considered that calls to alter disarmament priorities in the name of realism, especially regarding such issues as verification and "transparency", were actually appeals to sit still and must therefore be rejected. Poland suggested that, apart from specific priorities, the programme should reaffirm the principles of disarmament negotiations, such as the sovereign equality of States, undiminished security for all at the lowest possible level of military force, and a balance of rights and obligations.

Report: ⁽¹⁾Committee on Disarmament, A/36/27 (Committee documents, CD/228, appendix II, vols. I, II).

Resolution: ⁽²⁾GA 36/92 F, para. 2, 9 Dec. p. 33).

Yearbook references: ⁽³⁾1962, p. 6; ⁽⁴⁾1980, p. 28.

Implementation of the resolutions of the tenth special session

By a resolution of 9 December 1981⁽³⁾ on implementation of the recommendations and de-

terminations of its tenth special session—the first such session devoted to disarmament, held in 1978⁽⁴⁾—the General Assembly expressed concern about the arms race and constantly growing military budgets, and called on States to promote international security and disarmament. It urged States to intensify efforts to bring to a successful end the negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament and other international forums, and to proceed to or resume negotiations on disarmament agreements in priority areas. It recommended that the Committee on Disarmament concentrate on substantive and priority items with a view to achieving tangible results (p. 31). Calling on States to refrain from actions which could have negative effects in regard to disarmament, the Assembly invited all States engaged in disarmament negotiations outside the United Nations framework to keep it and the Committee on Disarmament informed of results, and to implement the results so as to create conditions for further progress.

This resolution, sponsored by 28 States, was adopted by the Assembly without vote, after the First Committee approved it in similar fashion on 20 November, on the basis of a draft revised by its sponsors. It was introduced by Yugoslavia, which stressed that, despite the significance attached by all to implementation of the measures set out in the Final Document of the 1978 session,⁽²⁾ there was deep concern that many aims of the session had not been attained. Accordingly, the sponsors felt that implementation of the decisions taken at that session would be the best way to halt the arms race and create conditions conducive to disarmament.

The sponsors' revisions to the draft reflected parts of an earlier draft resolution by the German Democratic Republic and Mongolia, entitled "Obligation of States to contribute to effective disarmament negotiations".⁽¹⁾ By that proposal, the Assembly would have expressed alarm about escalation of the arms race and conviction that disarmament negotiations must be conducted without pre-conditions. In addition to urging intensified negotiating efforts, it would have called for preservation and expansion of the existing system of disarmament agreements, and recommended that special attention be attached at future Assembly sessions to continuous review of such negotiations. In the light of the ideas incorporated in the 28-nation draft, of which it had become a sponsor, the German Democratic Republic decided not to press the proposal to a vote.

The United States, which joined in the consensus, stated that, although it strongly supported the call for genuine progress in arms control, it was concerned that the resolution failed to

acknowledge the importance of verification, balance and mutual restraint.

During the First Committee debate on disarmament, several States referred to the issue of verification of compliance with disarmament agreements. The USSR stated that verification should proceed from a clear-cut agreement on arms limitation and disarmament measures, should be commensurate with the scope and form of the obligations established by agreements on arms limitation and disarmament, should not infringe on the sovereign rights of States or allow interference in their internal affairs, and should not be used for a hostile and slanderous campaign by one State against another or serve as a means of complicating international relations. The United Kingdom held that, in most disarmament negotiations, the problem of verification would be near the heart of the discussion; efforts for the conclusion of disarmament agreements built on confidence must be redoubled, and confidence could develop only if there was a willingness to move away from secrecy towards a freer exchange of information.

France also stressed the importance of verification provisions as necessary conditions for mutual confidence in disarmament agreements, while Belgium stated that verification mechanisms, if they were to be credible and effective, must be strictly adapted to the material to be verified. New Zealand believed that greater openness in the provision of information and flexibility in considering verification proposals, especially on the part of States which had shown reluctance to co-operate in those areas, would contribute substantially to disarmament prospects.

Draft resolution not pressed: ⁽¹⁾German Democratic Republic, Mongolia, A/C.1/36/L.25.

Resolutions: GA: ⁽²⁾S-10/2, 30 June 1978 (YUN 1978, p. 39); ⁽³⁾36/92 M 9 Dec. 1981, text following.

Yearbook reference: ⁽⁴⁾1978, p. 17.

Meeting records: GA: 1st Committee, A/C.1/36/PV.3 & Corr.1, 4-10, 12-26, 32, 34-38 (19 Oct.-20 Nov.); plenary, A/36/PV.91 (9 Dec.).

General Assembly resolution 36/92 M

Adopted without vote Meeting 91 9 December 1981

Approved by First Committee (A/36/752) without vote. 20 November (meeting 38): 28-nation draft (A/C.1/36/L.26/Rev.1); agenda item 51 (h)

Sponsors: Algeria, Argentine, Bahamas, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Qatar, Romania, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yugoslavia, Zaire.

Implementation of the recommendations and decisions of the tenth special session

The General Assembly,

Having reviewed the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session, the first special session devoted to disarmament,

Recalling its resolutions S-10/2 of 30 June 1978, 34/83 C of 11 December 1979, 35/46 of 3 December 1980 and 35/152 E of 12 December 1980,

Reaffirming the importance of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, which constitutes a comprehensive basis for further efforts towards promoting international security, halting and reversing the arms race, and the achievement of general and complete disarmament under effective international control,

Considering it imperative to achieve genuine progress in all negotiations dealing with disarmament issues,

Convinced that the success of disarmament negotiations, in which all peoples of the world have a vital interest, would be achieved through the active participation of Member States in such negotiations, thereby contributing to the maintenance of international peace and security,

Reaffirming that the United Nations has a central role and primary responsibility in the sphere of disarmament,

Deeply concerned about the continuing arms race and, in particular, the nuclear-arms race, which constitutes a growing threat to international peace and security,

Mindful of a growing awareness among States and peoples of the dangers of the continuing arms race, in particular the nuclear-arms race, and of the need to eliminate the danger of the outbreak of a nuclear war,

Calling attention to the tasks set forth in the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade, which demand intensified efforts to be taken in the Committee on Disarmament and other appropriate forums,

Stressing the need to promote the development, strengthening and intensification of international co-operation designed to achieve general and complete disarmament, as defined by the General Assembly at its tenth special session,

Noting with concern the lack of tangible progress with respect to the implementation of the measures set forth in the Programme of Action in section III of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly,

Bearing in mind that at its second special session devoted to disarmament, to be held from 7 June to 9 July 1982, the General Assembly will undertake a review of the progress made in the implementation of the recommendations and decisions of the first special session on disarmament,

Conscious of the need to contribute to the success of the second special session through concrete accomplishments in the field of disarmament, thereby maintaining and further intensifying the momentum generated by the first special session,

1. Expresses its deep concern about the continued arms race, in particular the nuclear-arms race, and about the constantly growing military budgets, which bear negative consequences and pose a growing threat to international peace and security as well as to the development of States, particularly developing countries;

2. Urgently calls upon all States, in particular nuclear-weapon States and other major military Powers, immediately to take steps in order to promote international security and lead to the effective halting and reversing of the arms race and to disarmament;

3. Urges those States also to intensify their efforts to bring to a successful end the negotiations which are currently taking place in the Committee on Disarmament and other international forums and to proceed to or resume negotiations on effective international agreements on items of the highest priority as laid down by the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament;

4. Recommends that the Committee on Disarmament should concentrate its work on the substantive and priority items on its agenda with a view to achieving tangible results in order to contribute to the success of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and to the accomplishment of the tasks set forth in the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade:

5. Calls upon all States to refrain from any actions which have or may have negative effects on the implementation of the relevant recommendations and decisions of the first special session devoted to disarmament;

6. Invites all States which are engaged in disarmament and/or arms limitation negotiations outside the framework of the United Nations to keep the General Assembly and the Committee on Disarmament informed of the results of such negotiations in conformity with the relevant provisions of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly;

7. Also calls upon States engaged in such negotiations outside the framework of the United Nations to implement the results achieved, so as to create favourable conditions for further progress;

8. Recommends that the General Assembly should keep under review at its forthcoming sessions the implementation of its recommendations and decisions on disarmament issues.

International co-operation for disarmament

In a resolution adopted on 9 December 1981 on international co-operation for disarmament⁽³⁾ the General Assembly called on all States to observe the principles of its 1979 Declaration on International Co-operation for Disarmament⁽²⁾ so as to secure a constructive mutual dialogue aimed at limiting armaments, particularly nuclear weapons. It called on Member States to be guided in all disarmament negotiations by the generally recognized principles of international law; to submit and constructively consider disarmament proposals; to refrain from action that could hamper, complicate or render impossible disarmament negotiations, particularly by discussing unrelated issues; and to disseminate widely the principles of international co-operation to achieve disarmament.

The resolution was adopted by a recorded vote of 116 to none, with 26 abstentions, following First Committee approval on 23 November by a recorded vote of 95 to none, with 25 abstentions.

Sponsored by 28 States, the resolution was introduced by Czechoslovakia, which stated that the principal aim of the text was to encourage co-operation among States aimed at the implementation of disarmament objectives, especially those emanating from the 1978 special session of the Assembly on disarmament.⁽⁴⁾ Such co-operation should be based on clear principles, reflecting a political will to find acceptable, practical solutions.

The United Kingdom, explain in the abstention of the European Community (EC) member States in the vote, stated that the proposal added nothing to the principles of such international instruments as the Charter of the United Nations or the 1978 Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly.⁽¹⁾ Finland, Mexico and Turkey also abstained, recalling their reservations on the 1979 Declaration.

China, while favouring the concept of co-operation for disarmament, did not participate in the vote, since it regarded as ambiguous the phrase suggesting that "unrelated issues" should not be raised in disarmament negotiations.

Pakistan voted in favour but found difficulties with a preambular paragraph stating that a new round of the arms race would jeopardize international stability; Pakistan's view was that the increasing use of force led to international tension, of which the arms race was one manifestation.

Resolutions: GA: ⁽¹⁾S-10/2, 30 June 1978 (YUN 1978, p. 39); ⁽²⁾34/88, 11 Dec. 1979 (YUN 1979, p. 86); ⁽³⁾36/92 D, 9 Dec. 1981, text following.

Yearbook reference: ⁽⁴⁾1978, p. 17.

Meeting records: GA: 1st Committee, A/C.1/36/PV.3 & Corr.1, 4-10, 12-26, 31, 34, 38, 40 (19 Oct.-23 Nov.); plenary, A/36/PV.91 (9 Dec.).

General Assembly resolution 36/92 D

116-0-26 (recorded vote) Meeting 91 9 December 1981

Approved by First Committee (A/36/752) by recorded vote (95-0-25).

23 November (meeting 40); 28-nation draft (A/C.1/36/L.12): agenda item 51.

Sponsors: Afghanistan, Angola, Benin, Congo, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Ethiopia, German Democratic Republic, Grenada, Guinea, Guyana, Hungary, Indonesia, Jordan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Madagascar, Mali, Mongolia, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Niger, Poland, Sao Tome and Principe, Syrian Arab Republic, Ukrainian SSR, Viet Nam, Yemen.

International co-operation for disarmament

The General Assembly,

Stressing again the urgent need for an active and sustained effort to intensify the comprehensive implementation of the recommendations and decisions unanimously adopted at its tenth special session, the first special session devoted to disarmament, as contained in the Final Document of that session,

Convinced that, to this end, effective, constructive and continuing co-operation among all States at all levels, including the highest, on the basis of mutual confidence and political will, is essential.

Deeply concerned over the growing danger of a new round of the arms race, which would seriously jeopardize international stability and increase the danger of a nuclear catastrophe,

Convinced that the halting of the arms race and adoption of effective disarmament measures, particularly in the field of nuclear disarmament, would release considerable financial and material resources to be used for the economic and social development of all States, in particular developing countries,

Taking into consideration the central role and primary responsibility of the United Nations in combining efforts and in supporting and developing active co-operation among States aimed at the solution of disarmament problems,

Recalling in this context the Declaration on International Co-operation for Disarmament, of 11 December 1979,

Noting that that Declaration may play a positive role in concerting efforts for the achievement of effective measures in the implementation of the goals set forth to this end in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session,

1. Calls upon all States to observe the principles and make active use of the ideas contained in the Declaration on International Co-operation for Disarmament so as to secure a constructive mutual dialogue aimed at limiting armaments, particularly nuclear weapons, through the conclusion of agreements, keeping in mind the ultimate objective of general and complete disarmament under effective international control:

2. Calls upon Member States to be guided in all disarmament negotiations by the generally recognized principles of international law and to submit and constructively to consider, with full responsibility and in the spirit of co-operation, proposals and initiatives aimed at promoting speedy progress in disarmament negotiations and facilitating the achievement of mutually acceptable concrete disarmament measures;

3. Calls upon Member States to refrain from any action that could hamper, complicate or render impossible the disarmament negotiations which are under way, the opening of new negotiations or the achievement of specific disarmament agreements and, in particular, not to hinder possible progress in negotiations on disarmament by the discussion of unrelated issues;

4. Recommends that the Preparatory Committee for the Second Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament should make active use of the Declaration on International Co-operation for Disarmament in the preparations for the special session;

5. Calls upon Member States to disseminate widely, in connection with Disarmament Week, the principles of international co-operation designed to achieve the goals of disarmament.

Recorded vote In Assembly as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian SSR, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Grenade, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia.

Against: None.

Abstaining: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Federal Republic of Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, Zaire.

Proposed World Disarmament Conference

AD HOC COMMITTEE ACTIVITIES. The Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference held two sessions in 1981, consisting of two meetings on 6 and 8 April, and three meetings between 6 and 10 July.

In its report to the General Assembly,⁽¹⁾ the Committee stated that, through its Chairman, it had maintained close contact with representatives of the nuclear-weapon States so as to remain currently informed of their attitudes.

According to the report, the USSR believed the Assembly should take a decision that would contribute to the realization of previous recommendations for convening such a conference, which could adopt specific decisions on halting the arms race and realizing disarmament.

The four other nuclear Powers maintained their reservations on the practicability or value

of a conference. China's position remained unchanged: it had previously maintained as pre-conditions for a conference that the major nuclear Powers undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons and that they end all forms of their military presence in other countries. France stated that the international situation was not conducive to real progress on such an initiative, and that account should be taken of the achievements of the Assembly's 1978 special session on disarmament⁽³⁾ and the conclusions that would emerge from its second such session, in 1982 (p. 27). The United Kingdom maintained that, in the light of the deteriorating international situation in the past two years, it was not useful to continue to consider, for the time being, the idea of a world disarmament conference. The United States continued to believe it premature to set a date and begin preparations for a conference; insufficient political agreement on the issues would probably hinder rather than assist efforts to reach concrete and verifiable arms control measures.

For its part, the Committee reiterated that the idea of a world disarmament conference had wide support among the United Nations membership, though with varying degrees of emphasis and differences regarding conditions and certain aspects relevant to its convening, including the deteriorating international situation. It was also evident that no consensus on convening a conference under current conditions had been reached among the nuclear-weapon States, whose participation was widely deemed essential. The Committee suggested that the Assembly might decide that, after its 1982 disarmament session, a conference would take place as soon as the necessary consensus was reached.

GENERAL ASSEMBLY ACTION. In a resolution on the World Disarmament Conference,⁽²⁾ adopted without vote on 9 December, the General Assembly renewed the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee, requested it to maintain close contact with nuclear and all other States in order to remain informed of their attitudes, and asked it to report to the Assembly at its special session on disarmament as well as at its 1982 regular session. The 10-nation text, introduced by Sri Lanka, was approved by the First Committee on 25 November, also without vote.

Albania dissociated itself from the consensus, stating that the proposal for a world disarmament conference had been made by the USSR for propaganda purposes and that holding such a conference would adversely affect the significance of other United Nations disarmament activities. The United Kingdom, speaking for the EC members, doubted whether further meetings of the Ad Hoc Committee at the current stage

would lead to the convening of a conference. The United States assumed that any expenditure flowing from the resolution would be made without prejudice to the United Nations zero-growth budget policy.

A number of Eastern European States and others, including Bulgaria, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Poland, the Ukrainian SSR and Viet Nam, emphasized the importance they attached to convening a conference following the 1982 special session. Bulgaria felt that the Assembly should play an active part at that session in speeding up talks on urgent disarmament questions, thus paving the way for a conference. Poland considered that the projected comprehensive disarmament programme (p. 22) must envisage the convening of a world disarmament conference at an early date, and the Lao People's Democratic Republic and Zambia viewed the special session as a step towards convening the conference. Zimbabwe held that such a conference would be in the interest of peace and security.

Report: ⁽¹⁾Ad Hoc Committee, A/36/28.

Resolution: ⁽²⁾GA, 36/91, 9 Dec., text following.

Yearbook reference: ⁽³⁾1978, p. 17.

Financial implications: Committee on Conferences observations, A/C.5/36/71/Add.1; 5th Committee report, A/36/804; S-G statements, A/C.1/36/L.57, A/C.5/36/71. Meeting records: GA: 1st Committee, A/C.1/36/PV.3 & Corr.1, 4-10, 12-26, 34, 36, 38, 44 (19 Oct.-25 Nov.); 5th Committee, A/C.5/36/SR.67 (8 Dec.); plenary, A/36/PV.91 (9 Dec.).

General Assembly resolution 36/91

Adopted without vote Meeting 91 9 December 1981

Approved by First Committee (A/36/751) without vote, 25 November (meeting 44): 10-nation draft (A/C.1/36/L.27); agenda item 50.

Sponsors: Burundi, Cuba, Madagascar, Mongolia, Niger, Panama, Peru, Poland, Spain, Sri Lanka.

World Disarmament Conference

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 2833(XXVI) of 16 December 1971, 2930(XXVII) of 29 November 1972, 3183(XXVIII) of 18 December 1973, 3260(XXIX) of 9 December 1974, 3469(XXX) of 11 December 1975, 31/190 of 21 December 1976, 32/89 of 12 December 1977, 33/69 of 14 December 1978, 34/81 of 11 December 1979 and 35/151 of 12 December 1980.

Reiterating its conviction that all the peoples of the world have a vital interest in the success of disarmament negotiations and that all States should be in a position to contribute to the adoption of measures for the achievement of this goal,

Stressing anew its conviction that a world disarmament conference, adequately prepared and convened at an appropriate time, could provide the realization of such an aim and that the co-operation of all nuclear-weapon Powers would considerably facilitate its attainment,

Taking note of the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference,

Recalling that, in paragraph 122 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament, it decided that, at the earliest appropriate time, a world disarmament conference should be convened with universal participation and with adequate preparation,

Recalling that, in paragraph 23 of the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade, contained in the

annex to its resolution 35/46 of 3 December 1980, the General Assembly considered it pertinent also to recall that in paragraph 122 of the Final Document it had stated that at the earliest appropriate time a world disarmament conference should be convened with universal participation and with adequate preparation,

Recalling further that the subject of the possible convening of a world disarmament conference has been included in the draft agenda for the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, to be held from 7 June to 9 July 1982,

1. Notes with satisfaction that in its report to the General Assembly the Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference stated, *inter alia*, the following:

"Having regard for the important requirements of a world disarmament conference to be convened at the earliest appropriate time, with universal participation and with adequate preparation, the General Assembly may wish to decide that, after its second special session devoted to disarmament, a world disarmament conference would take place as soon as the necessary consensus on its convening has been reached";

2. Renews the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee;

3. Requests the Ad Hoc Committee to maintain close contact with the representatives of the States possessing nuclear weapons in order to remain currently informed of their attitudes, as well as with all other States, and to consider any possible relevant proposals and observations which might be made to the Committee, especially having in mind paragraph 122 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly;

4. Requests the Ad Hoc Committee to report to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament and at its thirty-seventh session;

5. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-seventh session the item entitled "World Disarmament Conference".

Preparations for the second special session of the General Assembly on disarmament (1982)

In 1981 the General Assembly endorsed recommendations on the agenda and dates (7 June-9 July 1982) for its second special session on disarmament. The decision to convene the session in 1982 had been taken by the Assembly in 1978⁽⁵⁾ following the first such session—the Assembly's tenth special session—held at United Nations Headquarters from 23 May to 1 July 1978.⁽⁹⁾ The Preparatory Committee for the Second Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament, which began work in 1980,⁽¹⁰⁾ held its second and third sessions in 1981, at which it made recommendations that the Assembly endorsed in December.⁽⁷⁾

DISARMAMENT COMMISSION CONSIDERATION. In a recommendation adopted by consensus on 5 June,⁽²⁾ the Disarmament Commission agreed on an outline for its report to the special session. It requested the Secretariat to prepare a draft, including an introduction on the Commission's establishment by the Assembly in 1978,⁽⁴⁾ and sections on the Commission's organizational and substantive work. The Commission also agreed that the part of the report related to conclu-

sions and recommendations would be prepared at its next substantive session (in 1982).

PREPARATORY COMMITTEE ACTIVITIES. AS a result of two sessions held in 1981 at United Nations Headquarters, from 4 to 15 May and from 5 to 16 October, the 78-member Preparatory Committee for the Second Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament recommended in its report to the Assembly⁽³⁾ that the special session be held at United Nations Headquarters between 7 June and 9 July 1982. It recommended also that every effort be made to ensure that, in so far as possible, decisions on matters of substance would be adopted by consensus at that session; that Member States should be represented at the highest possible political level; that the session have a committee of the whole, a working group on the comprehensive programme of disarmament and as many open-ended groups or subsidiary organs as necessary; and that non-governmental organizations and peace and disarmament institutions be accorded the same facilities at the 1982 session as at the previous disarmament session in 1978.

The Committee recommended a provisional agenda for the session, to include the following substantive items: review of implementation of the decisions and recommendations adopted at the 1978 disarmament session; consideration and adoption of the comprehensive programme of disarmament (p. 22); implementation of the Assembly's Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade, adopted in 1980,⁽⁶⁾ and consideration of proposals by Member States; enhancing the effectiveness of disarmament machinery and strengthening the United Nations role in that field, including the possible convening of a world disarmament conference; measures to mobilize world public opinion in favour of disarmament; and adoption, in an appropriate format, of the document or documents of the session. There would be a general debate, including a review and appraisal of the international situation in the light of the pressing need for specific, generally agreed measures to eliminate the danger of war, halt and reverse the arms race, and achieve substantial progress in disarmament.

The Committee also recommended that it hold one further session, from 26 April to 14 May 1982, to continue its preparatory work.

GENERAL ASSEMBLY ACTION. By a resolution on preparations for the second special session devoted to disarmament,⁽⁷⁾ the General Assembly endorsed the report and recommendations of the Preparatory Committee and invited Member States to submit to the Secretary-General, by 31 March 1982, further views on substantive issues. In addition, the Assembly requested all Member

States engaged in bilateral, regional or multi-lateral negotiations on disarmament issues outside the United Nations framework to submit information on such negotiations to the Assembly before the special session. The Assembly adopted this resolution on 9 December without vote, following similar approval by the First Committee on 25 November of a 43-nation draft introduced by Yugoslavia.

In a resolution on the activities of the Disarmament Commission,⁽⁸⁾ also adopted on 9 December, the Assembly requested the Commission to submit at the special session a substantive report on its work.

Greece, one of the sponsors of the resolution on preparations for the special session, believed that the debate at the session should be detailed and should focus on all forms of disarmament and on concrete proposals to ensure their verification. Lebanon hoped States would be represented at the highest possible political level and recalled its 1980 suggestion that heads of State should attend.

In the view of Bangladesh, the special session should help achieve an increased awareness by the public and Governments of the need to halt and reverse the arms race and of the urgency of progress towards disarmament. Uganda also stressed the role of the session in focusing public opinion on concrete action for disarmament.

Brazil said the session could be meaningful only if States, particularly the nuclear-weapon Powers, acknowledged the widespread concern for positive steps to replace procedural haggling, the empty rhetoric of declaratory resolutions and worn-out accusations of blame. The Byelorussian SSR stated that the session could be successful if all States attended with a serious desire to make honest and constructive attempts to solve the problems of restricting the arms race, and if they relinquished intentions to distract the Assembly from making such efforts. Chile thought success would be possible only by creating a climate of peace and harmony and achieving greater stability in international relations. In China's view, the session should find the root cause for the continued intensification of the arms race and the lack of progress in disarmament, so as to set a correct course for future efforts.

The German Democratic Republic hoped the session would provide fresh impetus for opening, resuming or continuing disarmament talks. The Federal Republic of Germany thought the session could lay the conceptual groundwork for future world-wide disarmament negotiations and play a part in bringing them to a conclusion. Zambia saw it as giving new impetus to negotiations on specific urgent problems.

France said it was important for the Assembly to take cognizance at the special session, if not of any far-reaching results, at least of clear and concrete signs of a willingness to act for disarmament. Ghana warned that the session's significance would be lost unless delegations, particularly of the super-Powers and their allies, showed a greater commitment to disarmament than in the past. In the view of Italy, the session's success would be measured by its ability to channel efforts into an agreed and dynamic framework which took account of the legitimate security requirements of States. Jamaica hoped the session would generate a new momentum towards general and complete disarmament.

Nigeria hoped the session would be used to reassess the attitudes of all States to disarmament, revamp disarmament machinery and adopt concrete instruments and measures. In Romania's opinion, the session could restore confidence in the possibility of disarmament; its goal should be to crystallize guidelines for action that would radically change the world situation. Togo thought the session should emphasize that nations and peoples could benefit immediately from disarmament.

Commenting on the activities of the Preparatory Committee, Argentina observed that it had engaged in sterile discussions which, though finally producing a draft agenda for the special session, had prevented members from preparing for the work of the session.

The USSR, in a letter to the Secretary-General dated 27 April from its Minister for Foreign Affairs,⁽¹⁾ considered that the special session should provide further stimulus for arms limitation and disarmament talks and serve as a landmark on the road to convening a world disarmament conference.

Letter: ⁽¹⁾USSR, 27 Apr., A/36/226.
 Reports: ⁽²⁾Disarmament Commission, A/36/42; ⁽³⁾Preparatory Committee, A/36/49 & Corr.1.
 Resolutions: GA: ⁽⁴⁾S-10/2, para. 118, 30 June 1978 (YUN 1978, p. 46); ⁽⁵⁾33/71 H, sect. III, 14 Dec. 1978 (ibid., 128); ⁽⁶⁾35/46, annex, 3 Dec. 1980 (YUN 1980, p. 102); ⁽⁷⁾36/81 A, 9 Dec. 1981, text following; ⁽⁸⁾36/92 B, para. 4.9 Dec. (p. 30).
 Yearbook references: ⁽⁹⁾1978, p. 17; ⁽¹⁰⁾1980, p. 97.
 Financial implications: 5th Committee report, A/36/801; S-G statements, A/C.1/36/L.49, A/C.5/36/87.
 Meeting records: GA: 1st Committee, A/C.1/36/PV.3 & Corr.1, 4-10, 12-26, 27, 28, 30, 34, 38, 43 (19 Oct.-25 Nov.); 5th Committee, A/C.5/36/SR.67 (8 Dec.); plenary, A/36/PV.91 (9 Dec.).

General Assembly resolution 36/81 A

Adopted without vote Meeting 91 9December 1981

Approved by First Committee (A/36/740) without vote. 25 November (meeting 43); 43-nation draft (A/C.1/36/L.5); agenda item 39.

Sponsors: Algeria, Argentina, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Burma, Canada, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Finland, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Guyana, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Mali, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Netherlands, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Romania, Sene-

gal, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Sweden, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zaire.

Preparations for the session

The General Assembly,

Recalling section III of its resolution 33/71 H of 14 December 1978, in which it decided to convene a second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament in 1982 at United Nations Headquarters in New York,

Having considered the report of the Preparatory Committee for the Second Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament,

1. Endorses the report of the Preparatory Committee for the Second Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament and the recommendations contained therein for the session to be held in New York from 7 June to 9 July 1982;

2. Endorses a/so the recommendation of the Preparatory Committee to meet in New York from 26 April to 14 May 1982 in order to continue consideration of substantive issues related to the session, including the implementation of the decisions and recommendations adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session, the first special session devoted to disarmament, for incorporation in the document or documents to be adopted at the second special session devoted to disarmament, and any remaining organizational and procedural matters;

3. Expresses its appreciation to the members of the Preparatory Committee for their constructive contribution to its work;

4. Invites Member States to submit to the Secretary-General, not later than 31 March 1982, further views on the substantive issues related to the second special session devoted to disarmament, including the implementation of the decisions and recommendations adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session;

5. Requests all Member States engaged in bilateral, regional or multilateral negotiations on disarmament issues outside the framework of the United Nations to submit appropriate information on such negotiations to the General Assembly, in accordance with paragraph 27 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the Assembly, before the second special session devoted to disarmament;

8. Requests the Secretary-General to render to the Preparatory Committee all necessary assistance for the completion of its work.

Disarmament Commission

ACTIVITIES OF THE COMMISSION. The Disarmament Commission, composed of all United Nations Member States, held its 1981 substantive session from 18 May to 5 June at United Nations Headquarters. Its agenda included two items carried over from previous sessions on which it adopted recommendations that were included in its 1981 report to the General Assembly:⁽¹⁾ aspects of the arms race (p. 21), particularly the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament (p. 34), with the aim of elaborating a general approach to negotiations on nuclear and conventional disarmament; and reduction of military budgets (p. 89). It considered for the first time a matter pertaining to South Africa's nuclear capability (p. 46). New items appearing on the Commission's 1981 agenda concerned plans for a United Nations study on conventional weapons (p. 85) and preparation of the Commission's report for

the 1982 special session of the Assembly on disarmament (p. 27).

At an organizational session on 10 and 11 December 1981, the Commission reviewed the draft resolutions then before the Assembly having a bearing on its work, and discussed its schedule and agenda for 1982.

GENERAL ASSEMBLY ACTION. By a resolution on the report of the Disarmament Commission, adopted without vote on 9 December,⁽²⁾ the General Assembly noted that the Commission had not been able to conclude consideration of the items on its agenda. The Assembly requested the Commission to continue its work and to meet for up to four weeks in 1982. The Commission was also asked to submit a substantive report at the Assembly's 1982 special session on disarmament. The First Committee approved the text on 20 November, also without vote.

The resolution was sponsored by Barbados, Egypt and Uruguay. Introducing it, Egypt observed that, while important deliberations had taken place in the Commission on a number of items, further deliberations were required before that body could make substantive recommendations.

After approval of the resolution in Committee, Brazil expressed confidence that the Commission would complete discussion of the guidelines for a study on conventional weapons (p. 85), while the Federal Republic of Germany thought the Commission's 1982 session should be kept shorter than usual in view of the Assembly's special session.

In the Committee's debate, Australia said care should be taken to ensure that the Commission did not become another defunct United Nations body, meeting year after year without achievement or purpose. Austria suggested that the scope of the Commission's activities be discussed at the special session on disarmament. Nepal also thought the Commission's mandate should be reviewed at the Assembly's special session, as a repetition in the Commission of the First Committee's debate served no useful purpose. Believing that the Commission had not found a proper identity, Spain thought it necessary to examine whether the Commission's existence met a definite need. Yugoslavia said it could not agree with attempts to push the Commission to the sidelines and prevent it from dealing with substantive issues.

Several States expressed dissatisfaction with developments at the Commission's 1981 session. Brazil said the non-aligned, neutral and other States had not been given a fair chance to discuss the substance of items and to have their opinions taken into account. Guyana expressed concern about what it saw as the efforts of some States to

obstruct the Commission's work, and said it could not agree to leave disarmament negotiations to a small directorate. Nigeria complained that a few members of the Commission tended to exercise the semblance of a veto when consensus was sought on issues such as the nuclear capability of South Africa. Peru saw certain practices and the positions of some States as incompatible with the holding of proper negotiations. Venezuela stressed that the consensus rule should not become a tool used to advance the interests of the major Powers.

Report: ⁽¹⁾Disarmament Commission, A/36/42.
Resolution: ⁽²⁾GA, 36/92 B, 9 Dec., text following.
Meeting records: GA: 1st Committee, A/C.1/36/PV.3 & Corr.1, 4-10, 12-26, 28-31, 37, 38 (19 Oct.-20 Nov.); plenary, A/36/PV.91 (9 Dec.).

General Assembly resolution 36/92 B

Adopted without vote Meeting 91 9 December 1981
Approved by First Committee (A/36/752) without vote. 20 November (meeting 38): 3-nation draft (A/C.1/36/L.4); agenda item 51 (a).
Sponsors: Barbados, Egypt, Uruguay.

Report of the Disarmament Commission

The General Assembly,
Having considered the report of the Disarmament Commission,

Emphasizing again the importance of an effective follow-up to the relevant recommendations and decisions adopted at the tenth special session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament,

Considering the important role that the Disarmament Commission has played and the significant contribution it has made in examining and submitting recommendations on various problems in the field of disarmament and in the promotion of the implementation of the relevant decisions of the tenth special session.

Recalling its resolutions 33/71 H of 14 December 1978, 34/83 H of 11 December 1979 and 35/152 F of 12 December 1980,

1. Takes note of the report of the Disarmament Commission;

2. Notes that the Disarmament Commission was not able to conclude its consideration of the items on its agenda;

3. Requests the Disarmament Commission to continue its work in accordance with its mandate, as set forth in paragraph 118 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, and to continue consideration of the items included in the agenda of its session in 1981 and, to that end, to meet for a period not exceeding four weeks during 1992;

4. Requests the Disarmament Commission to submit a substantive report on its work to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament, to be held from 7 June to 9 July 1982;

5. Requests the Secretary-General to transmit to the Disarmament Commission the report of the Committee on Disarmament, together with all the official records of the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly relating to disarmament matters, and to render all assistance that it may require for implementing the present resolution;

6. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-seventh session the item entitled "Report of the Disarmament Commission".

Committee on Disarmament

ACTIVITIES OF THE COMMITTEE. The 40-member Committee on Disarmament met at

Geneva from 3 February to 24 April and from 11 June to 21 August 1981. Holding 49 formal and 45 informal plenary meetings, it discussed substantially the same agenda items as in 1980,⁽²⁾ concerning a nuclear-test ban (p. 64), cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament (p. 35), security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States (p. 58), chemical weapons (p. 69), new types of weapons of mass destruction (p. 77) and radiological weapons (p. 79, a comprehensive programme of disarmament (p. 22), and adoption of its report to the General Assembly.⁽¹⁾ It also dealt with the Israeli attack of 7 June on Iraqi nuclear installations (p. 53) and discussed the question of its own membership (p. 33).

On 12 February the Committee re-established the three ad hoc working groups set up in 1980, on security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States, chemical weapons and radiological weapons. All three groups met in 1981, as did the Ad Hoc Working Group on the comprehensive disarmament programme, also established in 1980. In addition, the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events continued its work in relation to a prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests.

The Committee was unable to reach agreement on the establishment of further subsidiary bodies, such as a working group on a nuclear-test ban. In this connection, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sweden and Yugoslavia submitted a paper for consideration at the 1982 session whereby the Committee's rules of procedure would be amended to ensure that the rule of consensus would not be used to prevent the establishment of subsidiary bodies.

Comments on the results of the Committee's work in 1981 were submitted in August in papers by China, a group of socialist States and the "Group of 21" (Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Burma, Cuba, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Iran, Kenya, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zaire). The group of socialist States said that even in the difficult international situation they had maintained an approach aimed at constructive negotiations and were convinced of the importance of intensifying efforts to limit the arms race. The Group of 21 considered it imperative to initiate negotiations to reduce international tensions and halt and reverse the arms race, especially the nuclear-arms race.

Introducing the Committee's report in the Assembly's First Committee, the representative of Indonesia, as its current Chairman, noted that the Committee on Disarmament and its subsidiary bodies had held 258 meetings in 1981, as

compared with 185 in the previous year. He cautioned against judging the work of the Committee solely on the basis of concrete results and suggested that it be assessed on the basis of the proposals considered and the ongoing discussions, which could give a clearer picture of the complex nature of the problems and of the obstacles in the path of progress.

Report: ⁽¹⁾Committee on Disarmament, A/36/27 (Committee documents, CD/228, appendix II, vols. I, II).
Yearbook reference: ⁽²⁾1980, p. 20.

Work programme of the Committee on Disarmament

In a resolution of 9 December 1981 on the work of the Committee on Disarmament,⁽⁴⁾ the General Assembly urged the Committee to continue or undertake substantive negotiations in 1982 on priority issues on its agenda, providing its existing ad hoc working groups with appropriate negotiating mandates and establishing groups on the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament and on the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. The Committee was requested to complete the elaboration of a comprehensive disarmament programme (p. 22) and to submit at the Assembly's 1982 special session on disarmament (p. 27) a report on the state of negotiations on the questions it was considering. The Assembly invited Committee members involved in separate negotiations on specific disarmament questions to intensify their efforts and submit to the Committee a full report on the status of negotiations and the results achieved.

The Assembly adopted the resolution by a recorded vote of 136 to none, with 9 abstentions. The text was approved by the First Committee on 25 November by a recorded vote of 115 to none, with 8 abstentions.

In another resolution of 9 December,⁽⁵⁾ on implementation of the recommendations and decisions of its tenth special session, held in 1978,⁽⁶⁾ the Assembly recommended that the Committee on Disarmament concentrate on substantive and priority items with a view to achieving tangible results in order to contribute to the success of the 1982 special session on disarmament and to the accomplishment of the tasks set forth in the Assembly's Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade, adopted in 1980.⁽²⁾ In a third resolution of the same date, on prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, the Assembly urged Committee members to bear in mind that the consensus rule should not be used in such a manner as to prevent the establishment of subsidiary bodies.⁽³⁾

The resolution on the Committee on Disarmament, sponsored by 27 States, was introduced by Yugoslavia, which stated that, while the Com-

mittee and its working groups had worked intensively and striven for progress, they had not been able to achieve concrete results or even to begin substantive negotiations on the highest priority items on the Committee's agenda, concerning nuclear disarmament. Three and a half years after the Assembly's first special session on disarmament in 1978, at which the decision was taken to establish the Committee,⁽¹⁾ there was resistance on the part of some of its members, including some nuclear-weapon States, to negotiate in that body on specific issues or to establish working groups for that purpose.

The USSR, although voting in favour, considered that the work and mandates of the Committee's subsidiary bodies were its own prerogative; further, the content, volume and character of information on negotiations conducted outside the Committee fell within the competence of States parties to such talks. Australia, which also voted in favour, believed similarly that instructing the Committee how to conduct its work constituted unwarranted interference by the Assembly, while Belgium, France and the United States abstained for similar reasons; the United States added that the Committee was not the only forum for disarmament negotiations and its involvement at an inappropriate stage could even jeopardize other negotiations. Turkey, voting in favour, regarded the resolution as procedural and thought the Committee could not object to requests that it speed its work.

Explaining their abstention in the vote on the resolution concerning a nuclear-test ban, Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece and Japan considered that the text challenged the basic principle of consensus in the Committee on Disarmament. The USSR also had reservations concerning the text's reference to matters within the Committee's exclusive prerogatives.

In the First Committee's debate, Nigeria said the Committee on Disarmament should be able to justify its existence through its ability to function according to the machinery it had set up or wished to set up, including the establishment of ad hoc working groups, particularly on nuclear disarmament and a nuclear-test ban. Egypt, commenting that the consensus rule had been used in such a way as to prevent the Committee from realizing even procedural progress, said the Committee should consider freeing the establishment of subsidiary bodies from the application of that rule. India contended that the rule had been intended to apply to substantive questions, not procedural ones, and hoped it would not be used to obstruct the establishment of working groups.

Ghana and Uganda called for a reversal of

what they saw as a trend to change the consensus rule into a type of veto; Uganda added that, if the Committee could not take decisions, steps should be studied to ensure that its rules were not used to prevent it from conducting negotiations. The need to allow the Committee to function autonomously was also mentioned by Madagascar. Also critical of the Committee's inability to take decisions even on procedural matters, Jamaica said it should be more responsive to Assembly directions.

Algeria ascribed the absence of progress in the Committee largely to the determination of some Powers to reduce its role to that of a registry of accords negotiated in private clubs. Noting that not a single agreement had emerged from the Committee since its first session, Malaysia saw the lack of progress as testimony that the two super-Powers were unwilling to negotiate in good faith. Nepal stated that the deadlock in the Committee was due basically to the relations between the USSR and the United States; it was sceptical about any increase in membership and thought the Committee devoted too much time to procedural questions. Sweden said the Committee had achieved so few successes due to the fact that the leading military Powers, particularly the two super-Powers, had not demonstrated readiness or willingness to exploit its potential because of the way they interpreted their own security needs and interests. Venezuela expressed concern that in priority areas, where the Committee could accomplish useful work, its efforts had been obstructed by some Powers which were trying to divert attention to non-priority subjects.

The USSR asserted that the United States had blocked the establishment of working groups, and Mongolia said the Committee's lack of progress was due to the fact that Western States were blocking its substantive consideration of priority issues.

Austria and Finland thought ways to increase the Committee's effectiveness, including a review of its membership, should be discussed at the special session on disarmament. While improvements in organizational and procedural aspects would help, Indonesia stated, an improved international political climate and a genuine will to negotiate remained the key to successful performance.

No one believed the Committee could take over the role of all bilateral arms control negotiations, said Australia, but its work was crucial to future negotiations. Poland, while disappointed with the results, lauded the Committee as the only working disarmament body whose representative character had made it possible for the representatives of all the nuclear-weapon Powers

to remain on speaking terms in disarmament matters.

Resolutions: GA: ⁽¹⁾S-10/2, para. 120, 30 June 1978 (YUN 1978, p. 47); ⁽²⁾35/46, annex, 3 Dec. 1980 (YUN 1980, P. 102); ⁽³⁾36/84, para. 4 (a), 9 Dec. 1981 (p. 67); ⁽⁴⁾36/92 F, 9 Dec., text following; ⁽⁵⁾36/92 M, para. 4, 9 Dec. (p. 24).

Yearbook reference: ⁽⁶⁾1978, p. 17.

Meeting records: GA: 1st Committee, A/C.1/36/PV.3 & Corr.1, 4-10, 12-26, 31, 34, 36, 38, 44 (19 Oct.-25 Nov.); plenary, A/36/PV.91 (9 Dec.).

General Assembly resolution 36/92 F

136-0-9 (recorded vote) Meeting 91 9 December 1981

Approved by First Committee (A/36/752) by recorded vote (115-0-8), 25 November (meeting 44); 27-nation draft (A/C.1/36/L.19): agenda item 51 (b).

Sponsors: Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Burma, Congo, Cuba, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iran, Madagascar, Mexico, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Romania, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zaire.

Report of the Committee on Disarmament

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 34/83 B of 11 December 1979 and 35/152 J of 12 December 1980,

Having considered the report of the Committee on Disarmament,

Affirming that the establishment of ad hoc working groups offers the best available machinery for the conduct of multilateral negotiations on items on the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament and contributes to the strengthening of the negotiating role of the Committee on Disarmament,

Regretting that, despite the expressed wish of the great majority of members of the Committee on Disarmament, the establishment of ad hoc working groups to undertake multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament and on prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests was prevented during the session of the Committee in 1981,

Expressing its deep concern that the Committee on Disarmament has not thus far been able to achieve concrete results on disarmament issues which have been under consideration for a number of years,

Convinced that the Committee on Disarmament, as the single multilateral negotiating body on disarmament, should play the central role in substantive negotiations on priority questions of disarmament and on the implementation of the Programme of Action set forth in section III of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament,

Stressing that negotiations on specific disarmament issues conducted outside the Committee on Disarmament should in no way serve as a pretext for preventing the conduct of multilateral negotiations on such questions in the Committee,

1. Urges the Committee on Disarmament to continue or undertake, during its session in 1982, substantive negotiations on the priority questions of disarmament on its agenda, in accordance with the provisions of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly and the other relevant resolutions of the Assembly on those questions and, in order to reach that goal, to provide the existing ad hoc working groups with appropriate negotiating mandates and to establish, as a matter of urgency, ad hoc working groups on the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament and on the prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests:

2. Requests the Committee on Disarmament to complete, during the first part of its session in 1992, the elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament and to submit the programme in time for consideration and adoption by the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament, to be held from 7 June to 9 July 1982;

3. Also requests the Committee on Disarmament to intensify its negotiations on priority questions of disarmament,

so that it may be in a position to contribute, through concrete accomplishments, to the success of the second special session devoted to disarmament:

4. Invites the members of the Committee on Disarmament involved in separate negotiations on specific priority questions of disarmament to intensify their efforts to achieve without further delay a positive conclusion of those negotiations for submission to the Committee and, at the same time, to submit to the Committee a full report on their separate negotiations and the results achieved in order to contribute most directly to the negotiations in the Committee in accordance with paragraph 1 above;

5. Further requests the Committee on Disarmament to submit to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament a special report on the state of negotiations on the various questions under consideration by the Committee and also to submit a report on its work to the Assembly at its thirty-seventh session;

6. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-seventh session the item entitled "Report of the Committee on Disarmament".

Recorded vote in Assembly as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Belorussian SSR, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia.

Against: None.

Abstaining: Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Federal Republic of Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, United Kingdom, United States.

Membership of the Committee on Disarmament

During a discussion at the 1981 session of the Committee on Disarmament on the question of its membership, many members considered the current membership to be adequate and representative of the world community, while some others favoured a small increase. Still another view was that any eventual change in membership could take the form of expansion, reduction or rotation of members within the respective regions or groups. Proposals on an improved functioning of the Committee were also discussed, and the Committee agreed to continue considering them in 1982.⁽¹⁾

By a resolution on a review of the Committee's membership,⁽³⁾ adopted on 9 December, the General Assembly recommended that the first review be completed during its 1982 special session on disarmament (p. 27), following consultation among Member States. The Assembly also reaffirmed that States not members of the Com-

mittee should, at their request, continue to be invited by the Committee to participate in its work. The Assembly adopted this resolution by a recorded vote of 134 to none, with 12 abstentions, following its approval by the First Committee on 24 November by a recorded vote of 118 to none, with 10 abstentions.

Introducing the 19-nation resolution, Turkey remarked that, while the sponsors understood the tendency of the members of the Committee on Disarmament to conserve its present composition, they felt such an approach did not comply with the wish expressed in the Final Document of the 1978 special session on disarmament that the Committee's membership should be regularly reviewed.⁽²⁾ The sponsors did not request the inclusion of the membership review issue in the agenda of the Assembly's next regular session, on what they considered the somewhat optimistic assumption that a satisfactory solution would be found at the 1982 special session.

Explaining their abstention in the vote, Hungary and the USSR stated that the Committee's membership was a question for the Committee on Disarmament itself and that many socialist, non-aligned and other members did not favour reviewing the membership during the next few years. Greece, while recognizing the delicate nature of the membership question, voted affirmatively in the hope of encouraging the Committee to adopt measures aimed at facilitating participation in its work by States outside its membership.

In the First Committee debate, Finland and Norway expressed interest in joining the Committee on Disarmament as full members. Portugal felt that all States which so desired should be able to participate in disarmament bodies and hoped that procedures would be worked out to enable interested States to exercise that right.

Report: ⁽¹⁾Committee on Disarmament, A/36/27.

Resolutions: GA: ⁽²⁾S-10/2, para. 120, 30 June 1978 (YUN 1978, p. 47); ⁽³⁾36/97 J, 9 Dec. 1981, text following.

Meeting records: GA: 1st Committee, A/C.1/36/PV.3 & Corr.1, 4-10, 12-26, 34, 36-38, 42 (19 Oct.-24 Nov.); plenary, A/36/PV.91 (9 Dec.).

General Assembly resolution 36/97 J

134--0-12 (recorded vote) Meeting 91 9 December 1981

Approved by First Committee (A/36/756) by recorded vote (118-0-10). 24 November (meeting 42): 19-nation draft (A/C.1/36/L.44); agenda item 55 (h).

Sponsors: Bahamas, Chile, Ghana, Guatemala, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Liberia, Madagascar, Mauritania, New Zealand, Niger, Portugal, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Spain, Sudan, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Uruguay.

Review of the membership of the Committee on Disarmament

The General Assembly,

Recognizing that all the peoples of the world have a vital interest in the success of disarmament negotiations,

Recognizing also that all States have the duty to contribute to and the right to participate in disarmament negotiations, as

acknowledged in paragraph 28 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament,

Recalling, to that effect, its resolutions 33/91 G of 16 December 1978 and 35/156 I of 12 December 1980,

Noting that under section IX of the rules of procedure of the Committee on Disarmament non-member States have been invited to participate in the work of the Committee,

Recalling also that the membership of the Committee on Disarmament is to be reviewed at regular intervals in accordance with paragraph 120 of the Final Document,

1. Takes note of the relevant part of the report of the Committee on Disarmament on its session in 1981, in which various options and different views were stated;

2. Recommends that the first review of the membership of the Committee on Disarmament should be completed, following appropriate consultation among Member States, during the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament;

3. Reaffirms that States not members of the Committee on Disarmament should, upon their request, continue to be invited by it to participate in the work of the Committee.

Recorded vote In Assembly as follows:

In favour: Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Burundi, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, United States, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia.

Against: None.

Abstaining: Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Mongolia, Poland, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, Viet Nam.

Nuclear weapons

Nuclear disarmament

DISARMAMENT COMMISSION ACTION. In its recommendations to the General Assembly adopted on 5 June 1981,⁽²⁾ the Disarmament Commission, in the context of its consideration of the arms race and disarmament (P. 21), stated that the threat of destruction as a result of nuclear war was among the greatest perils facing the world. The special responsibility borne by nuclear-weapon States entailed respect for the security concerns of non-nuclear-weapon nations, refraining from action to intensify the nuclear-arms race, and the pursuit of concrete measures of nuclear disarmament.

The Commission regarded nuclear disarmament as the most effective assurance of security

against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Pending that, the nuclear-weapon States should give effective assurance in that regard to non-nuclear-weapon States (p. 58). The Commission recommended the strengthening of the existing nuclear-weapon-free zone (in Latin America) and the establishment of other such zones, as well as zones of peace.

CONSIDERATION BY THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT. No consensus was reached in 1981 by the Committee on Disarmament⁽¹⁾ on a proposal by the Group of 21 (p. 31) for the establishment of an ad hoc working group on cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament, or on a proposal by a group of socialist countries for the establishment of an ad hoc working group on prohibition of the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear neutron weapons (p. 62).

In its paper, the Group of 21 stated that doctrines of nuclear deterrence, far from being responsible for the maintenance of peace and security, were at the root of the continuing escalation of nuclear armaments, and that the competitive accumulation of nuclear arms could not be condoned on the ground that it was indispensable to national security. China, in a working paper, asserted that the race between the two super-Powers for nuclear superiority accounted for lack of substantive progress in disarmament, and that those countries should take action in advance of others to halt the nuclear-arms race.

Two different approaches were advocated in the Committee's discussion. Several members, expressing grave concern over the nuclear-arms race, the risks inherent in nuclear deterrence doctrines and the danger of nuclear war, urged the Committee to initiate negotiations on nuclear disarmament as a matter of urgency. Others, while emphasizing their belief in the need to reduce the level of nuclear confrontation, believed that the existence of nuclear weapons had been a critical factor in preserving stability in much of the world for many years and considered that negotiations on nuclear disarmament should be undertaken initially by the nuclear-weapon States concerned.

The proposal for a working group on nuclear disarmament, reiterated by the Group of 21 in February at the start of the 1981 session, was discussed at informal meetings in March. A formal proposal by the Group was submitted to the Committee for decision on 14 July, but the Chairman announced that there was no consensus in favour of it. Following further consultations conducted by the Chairman at the suggestion of a group of socialist States, he announced that the members who did not agree to setting up a working group were willing to consider the

establishment of a contact group to deal with the questions raised by the proposal. The Committee agreed to the Chairman's suggestion that further consultations be deferred until the beginning of its 1982 session.

GENERAL ASSEMBLY ACTION. By a resolution on nuclear weapons in all aspects,⁽³⁾ adopted on 9 December, the General Assembly said it believed that negotiations on cessation of the production of nuclear weapons and on gradual reduction of stockpiles, up to and including total destruction, must be initiated as a matter of high priority. The Assembly deemed it appropriate that the Committee on Disarmament begin by considering stages of nuclear disarmament and their tentative content, including the content of the first stage. Within the framework of discussion on first-stage measures, it would be appropriate to consider the cessation of development and deployment of new types and systems of nuclear weapons. The Committee on Disarmament was called on to continue consultations on the establishment of an ad hoc working group, with a clearly defined mandate, on the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and on nuclear disarmament.

This 12-nation resolution, sponsored mainly by Eastern European States and introduced by the German Democratic Republic, was adopted by a recorded vote of 118 to 18, with 5 abstentions, after the First Committee approved the text on 23 November by a recorded vote of 83 to 17, with 8 abstentions. In Committee, the sponsors revised it in writing and also orally, the latter change deleting a preambular paragraph that would have had the Assembly express concern about intentions to gain strategic superiority and to resort to the first use of nuclear weapons.

Belgium, explaining its negative vote, said the text was polemical, took a unilateral view of the problem of nuclear weapons, and failed to mention the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, which condemned the threat or use of force in international relations and confirmed just as solemnly the right of States to self-defence. Greece abstained for similar reasons.

Austria voted in favour in the belief that all approaches which could lead to progress in the nuclear area must be explored, even though it considered the preamble to be burdened by a number of sweeping and unbalanced elements concerning strategic doctrines and the intentions of nuclear-weapon States. Finland, which rejected all concepts of limited nuclear war, cast an affirmative vote as its expression of concern about all doctrines which might bring nearer the possibility of a nuclear war. Also voting in favour, Sweden emphasized its opposition to all formal doctrines as well as measures taken by the

nuclear-weapon States to develop and deploy weapons, but said it would have preferred the text to give an accurate and balanced description of the nuclear postures of the major nuclear-weapon States.

In the First Committee debate, most States continued to emphasize the primacy of the task of halting the nuclear-arms race and moving towards nuclear disarmament.

Among the nuclear Powers, China stressed the need for the super-Powers to take the lead in nuclear disarmament, after which the other nuclear countries, including China, would join them in reducing nuclear weapons until they were completely eliminated. France declared that it could not envisage any commitment regarding its nuclear forces unless, following reductions agreed among the major Powers, the massive disproportion between arsenals was to change; in the meantime, it was compelled to maintain its effectiveness at the levels required to ensure their deterrent effect, bearing in mind the quantitative and qualitative increase in the most important arsenals. The USSR expressed its readiness to discuss, for example in the Committee on Disarmament, possible stages for nuclear disarmament and their approximate content, including as a first step the question of putting an end to the design and deployment of new types and systems of nuclear weapons. The United States said the profound changes that had taken place during the past decade in the strategic environment had required it to review its arms control policies and take steps to restore its deterrent capability.

Austria, urging negotiations to achieve quantitative and qualitative limitations of nuclear arsenals, said both super-Powers had shifted to a doctrine emphasizing the targeting of military and nuclear installations; the result was greater pressure on decision-makers in time of crisis, increased risks of nuclear conflict through human error or technical malfunction, a premium for preemptive nuclear strikes, and the emergence of dangerous illusions that nuclear war could be limited and winnable. Brazil said the world must be satisfied that negotiations between the two super-Powers did not aim at perpetuating the nuclear threat by a handful of nations, thus freezing a power structure based on possession of the means to dictate one's will and make the law.

Chile cited two additional reasons for seeking nuclear disarmament: nuclear weapons gave the Powers possessing them the greatest destructive capacity ever seen, and within a few years many States would have the capacity to use nuclear energy for military purposes. Nuclear disarmament would be achieved, according to Denmark, not by augmenting nuclear stockpiles or creating new variations of nuclear arms, but by strength-

ening existing treaties and negotiating new ones. India stated that the concept of an arms balance between opposing camps had not helped cap the nuclear-arms race, and the doctrine of deterrence could not avoid war because a nation using nuclear weapons would invite its own annihilation. If a nuclear war was ignited, said Jordan, fear alone would make certain that all arsenals and peoples throughout the world would become involved. The Netherlands held that high priority should be given to de-emphasizing the role of nuclear weapons, with the aim of substantial reductions and eventual elimination of those arms.

The Byelorussian SSR told the Committee that more than 50,000 nuclear weapons had already been accumulated world-wide and that their destructive force was estimated to be enough to decimate more than 1 million cities the size of Hiroshima. Ireland remarked that the two super-Powers had more than 15,000 strategic nuclear warheads—three times as many as in 1970. In Nigeria's view, the accumulation of nuclear weapons bore no direct relevance or proportion to the realistic defence requirements of the States possessing them.

The Eastern European States urged that priority be given to nuclear disarmament in current international negotiations, including those in the Committee on Disarmament. The German Democratic Republic, stressing the dangers of a qualitative nuclear-arms race, considered that, among measures in the first stage of nuclear disarmament, prohibition of the development of new types and systems of nuclear weapons and their non-deployment should play a significant role. The Ukrainian SSR held the United States responsible for instigating every new round of the nuclear-arms race, including more recently the deployment of cruise missiles and the invention of the neutron weapon, while the USSR and other socialist States had consistently tried to do away with nuclear weapons.

Italy argued that nuclear disarmament could not be treated in isolation; it should proceed in parallel with conventional disarmament to maintain a balance compatible with the principle of undiminished security. Similarly, Portugal stated that it was unrealistic to concentrate on the nuclear element in disarmament efforts, since such a selective approach would create an imbalance that would weigh more heavily on some States than on others.

Bangladesh regarded arrangements to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons as only an interim measure, stating that the ultimate goal should be the destruction of all nuclear weapons; it also urged serious consideration for proposals to reduce nuclear weapons by 50 per cent and to impose a freeze on the introduction of new or

improved nuclear weapons. Pakistan, reiterating its commitment to nuclear non-proliferation, stated that peaceful nuclear programmes in several developing countries, including its own, had become a target of false and politically motivated propaganda.

The Byelorussian SSR and Poland, as well as a number of other States, favoured the establishment by the Committee on Disarmament of a subsidiary body on nuclear disarmament.

Reports: ⁽¹⁾Committee on Disarmament, A/36/27 (Committee documents, CD/228, appendix II, vols. I, II); ⁽²⁾Disarmament Commission, A/36/42.

Resolution: ⁽³⁾GA, 36/92 E, 9 Dec., text following.

Meeting records: GA: 1st Committee, A/C.1/36/PV.3 & Corr.1, 4-10, 12-26, 34-36, 38, 40 (19 Oct.-23 Nov.); plenary, A/36/PV.91 (9 Dec.).

General Assembly resolution 36/92 E

118-18-5 (recorded vote) Meeting 91 9 December 1981

Approved by First Committee (A/36/752) by recorded vote (83-17-8), 23 November (meeting 40); 12-nation draft (A/C.1/36/L.14/Rev.1), orally revised; agenda item 51 (i).

Sponsors: Bulgaria, Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, Viet Nam.

Nuclear weapons in all aspects

The General Assembly,

Reaffirming once again that nuclear weapons pose the most serious threat to mankind and its survival and that it is therefore essential to proceed with nuclear disarmament and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons,

Reaffirming also that all nuclear-weapon States, in particular those which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, bear a special responsibility for the fulfilment of the task of achieving the goals of nuclear disarmament,

Stressing again that existing arsenals of nuclear weapons alone are more than sufficient to destroy all life on earth, and bearing in mind the devastating results which nuclear war would have on belligerents and non-belligerents alike,

Recalling that at its tenth special session, the first special session devoted to disarmament, it decided that effective measures of nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war had the highest priority and that it was essential to halt and reverse the nuclear-arms race in all its aspects in order to avert the danger of war involving nuclear weapons,

Recalling further that, in its resolution 35/152 B of 12 December 1980, it noted with alarm the increased risk of a nuclear catastrophe associated both with the intensification of the nuclear-arms race and with the adoption of the new doctrine of limited or partial use of nuclear weapons giving rise to illusions of the admissibility and acceptability of a nuclear conflict,

Noting with alarm that this dangerous doctrine leads to a new twist in the spiral of the arms race, which may seriously hamper the reaching of agreement on nuclear disarmament,

Noting, in this connection, an urgent need for the cessation of the development and deployment of new types and systems of nuclear weapons as a step on the road to nuclear disarmament,

Stressing again that priority in disarmament negotiations should be given to nuclear weapons, and referring to paragraphs 49 and 54 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 33/71 H of 14 December 1978, 34/83 J of 11 December 1979 and 35/152 B and C of 12 December 1980,

Noting that the Committee on Disarmament, during its session held in 1981, discussed the question concerning the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament

and, inter alia, the establishment of an ad hoc working group for negotiations on the subject,

Taking note of the proposals and statements made in the Committee on Disarmament, both during its formal and informal meetings, on the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament, and, inter alia, on prerequisites for the conduct of negotiations on nuclear disarmament,

Noting with regret that the Committee on Disarmament, during its session held in 1981, was not able to reach agreement on a basis for multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament or on prerequisites for such negotiations,

Convinced that the Committee on Disarmament is the most suitable forum for the preparation and conduct of the negotiations on nuclear disarmament,

1. Believes it necessary to initiate, as a matter of high priority, negotiations on the cessation of the production of nuclear weapons and on the gradual reduction of their stock-piles up to and including their total destruction, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly;

2. Notes the decision of the Committee on Disarmament to resume intensive consideration, at its session in 1982, of the item on the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament;

3. Calls upon the Committee on Disarmament, as a matter of priority and for the purpose of an early commencement of the negotiations on the substance of the problem, to continue consultations in which to consider, inter alia, the establishment of an ad hoc working group on the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and on nuclear disarmament with a clearly defined mandate;

4. Deems it appropriate, as envisaged in paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session, that the Committee on Disarmament should proceed, as a first step, to the consideration of stages of nuclear disarmament and their tentative content, inter alia, the content of the first stage;

5. Also deems it appropriate to consider, within the framework of the discussion on the content of measures to be carried out during the first stage, the question of the cessation of the development and deployment of new types and systems of nuclear weapons;

6. Requests the Committee on Disarmament to report on the results of those negotiations to the General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session.

Recorded vote in Assembly as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian SSR, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Melts, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia.

Against: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States.

Abstaining: Greece, Israel, Mali, Morocco, Zaire,

Strategic arms limitation talks

By a resolution on the strategic arms limitation talks between the USSR and the United

States,⁽²⁾ adopted without vote on 9 December 1981, the General Assembly noted that the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (SALT II), signed in 1979, had not been ratified. The Assembly urged a continuation of the process begun by the 1972 SALT I Treaty and signature of the SALT II Treaty, and urged the two States to negotiate towards an agreement for substantial reductions and significant qualitative limitations of strategic arms. The Assembly welcomed the commencement of nuclear-arms negotiations at Geneva on 30 November 1981 between the USSR and the United States, trusted that the negotiations would facilitate the enhancement of stability and international security, and invited the two Governments to keep the Assembly informed of results. It stressed the need for both parties to bear in mind that the vital interests of all peoples were at stake.

The text, revised by its 12 sponsors, was approved by the First Committee on 4 December without vote. It included an oral revision dropping the word "control" from a reference to the object of the latest bilateral negotiations.

Introducing the text, Mexico noted that it was similar to the 1980 resolution on the question,⁽¹⁾ due to the unfortunate fact that the Assembly's exhortation asking the two major nuclear Powers to ratify the SALT II Treaty had remained a dead letter. The Assembly's interest in the SALT question, Mexico added, dated back to the origins of the SALT negotiations in 1969; since 1972, it had been reflected in an uninterrupted series of resolutions.

The USSR said it favoured the immediate resumption of talks with the United States on strategic arms limitation, which should be based on everything constructive and positive that had already been achieved. However, the United States had suspended the dialogue initiated in the 1970s on a number of questions relating to military detente, including limiting strategic arms and the arms trade, anti-satellite systems, banning chemical weapons and nuclear tests, and a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean.

The United States, calling the resolution forward-looking, stated that the two major Powers must look forward to negotiations which would result in substantial and militarily significant reductions in strategic arms, which the United States referred to as the strategic arms reduction talks (START). However, the United States goal was deterrence and a second-strike capability, whereas the USSR aimed not at stability but at threatening the survivability of the United States strategic forces.

The Byelorussian SSR remarked that the

United States had blocked the SALT process, thereby giving the go-ahead for the unrestrained development of the most devastating weapons. The United States was not seeking a military-strategic balance, said the German Democratic Republic, for a balance already existed; rather, it was concerned about so-called strategic superiority and the capability to strike first. Hungary and other Eastern European States, as well as Democratic Yemen and the Lao People's Democratic Republic, urged the early ratification of the SALT II Treaty by the United States.

Austria stated that the SALT negotiations had become the backbone of the entire detente process, and that a breakdown of the process would have disastrous consequences for international security. Similarly, Zambia feared a major disaster if the talks failed, including intensification of disputes, greater instability and the diminution of peaceful exchanges throughout the world.

Canada, Guyana, Norway, Pakistan and Turkey hoped the bilateral talks would be directed towards reducing rather than merely limiting nuclear missiles. The Bahamas trusted that the super-Powers would become more flexible and less preoccupied about which was the more powerful in terms of nuclear weapons. India stated that neither SALT I nor SALT II had done more than to define the parameters for USSR-United States competition in strategic armaments. Nigeria, appealing for continued negotiations, observed that it had taken 10 years for the super-Powers to agree to negotiate SALT I, while SALT II had taken another seven years before it was signed. In Rwanda's view, the spirit of negotiations must change; the good faith and readiness of the other side must be recognized, because it was not true that all evil was on one side and all virtue on the other. The United Kingdom, speaking for the European Community members, said the encouraging prospects of a renewed dialogue between the USSR and the United States on strategic arms limitation was in keeping with the responsibility of the super-Powers to take the first steps in nuclear disarmament.

Albania dissociated itself from the consensus, on the ground that the two Powers had continued to expand the arms race and were acting in bad faith in dealing with strategic arms limitation.

Participants in the debate also commented on prospects for USSR-United States negotiations on medium-range nuclear-armed missiles, also called intermediate or theatre nuclear forces, which began at Geneva on 30 November.

Welcoming these talks, Denmark said efforts were needed to reduce nuclear arms in Europe, thereby limiting the trend towards an increasing

nuclear build-up with new and terrible weapons systems. The Federal Republic of Germany said the aim of the talks, as seen by the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), was to limit medium-range missiles at the lowest possible level on both sides, ideally at zero; if no agreement was reached by the autumn of 1983, when Western intermediate land-based nuclear missiles were to be deployed, the Federal Republic would honour its NATO commitment to take necessary measures for the security of itself and its defence alliance. Italy said the NATO decision was aimed at restoring the balance in theatre nuclear forces that had been seriously altered by the deployment of a steadily increasing number of highly precise, mobile, multiple-warhead SS-20 Soviet missiles. According to the United States, the USSR sought to prevent NATO from adopting countermeasures to the USSR deployment of 250 SS-20 missiles targeted at Western Europe and increasing at the rate of one missile every week.

Finland hoped these talks would be guided by fundamental political considerations and not be obsessed by technical data about military forces. Ireland stated that a serious approach to the negotiations by both sides, together with restraint in the development and deployment of new weapons, could increase confidence and improve the climate. Romania suggested that the Assembly speak out against the stationing and development in Europe of new nuclear medium-range missiles and in favour of starting negotiations among all European States to eliminate such missiles and nuclear weapons in general. Sweden rejected the argument that balance had to be achieved in each category of weapons; the objectives must be to reduce drastically the number of long-range nuclear theatre systems such as the Soviet SS-20 missiles, to avoid the deployment of the new NATO missiles and to negotiate a drastic reduction or even abolition of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe.

The German Democratic Republic, protesting against plans to deploy Pershing-2 and cruise missiles in Western Europe, said such a move would force the socialist States to take appropriate steps to restore the balance. The Byelorussian SSR regretted that doubt had been cast on the USSR proposal for a moratorium on the deployment of new medium-range missiles by NATO and the USSR. In Czechoslovakia's view, it was in the interest of world peace to preserve the existing approximate parity in Europe, preferably at the lowest possible level.

Resolutions: GA: ⁽¹⁾35/156 K, 12 Dec. 1980 (YUN 1980, p. 69); ⁽²⁾36/97 I, 9 Dec. 1981, text following.

Meeting records: GA: 1st Committee, A/C.1/36/PV.3 & Corr.1, 4-10, 12-26, 27, 33, 36, 38, 39, 47, 42, 49, 53 (19 Oct.-4 Dec.); plenary. A/36/PV.91 (9 Dec.).

General Assembly resolution 36/97 I

Adopted without vote Meeting 91 9 December 1981
Approved by First Committee (A/36/756) without vote, 4 December (meeting 53); 12-nation draft (A/C.1/36/L.42/Rev.1), orally revised: agenda item 55 (j).

Sponsors: Algeria, Argentina, Bangladesh, Congo, Cuba, Mexico, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Romania, Sweden, Yugoslavia.

Strategic arms limitation talks

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 2602 A (XXIV) of 16 December 1969, 2932 B (XXVII) of 29 November 1972, 3184 A and C (XXVIII) of 18 December 1973, 3261 C (XXIX) of 9 December 1974, 3484 C (XXX) of 12 December 1975, 31/189 A of 21 December 1976, 32/87 G of 12 December 1977 and 35/156 K of 12 December 1980,

Recalling that the SALT I agreement—which bears the official title of “Interim Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on certain measures with respect to the limitation of strategic offensive arms”—entered into force on 3 October 1972 following more than two years of bilateral negotiations,

Recalling that the SALT II agreement—which bears the official title of “Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms”—was finally signed on 18 June 1979, after six years of bilateral negotiations, and that its text, together with the texts of the Protocol to the Treaty and of the Joint Statement of principles and basic guidelines for subsequent negotiations on the limitation of strategic arms, both signed on the same date as the Treaty, and that of the Joint Communique, also issued on 18 June 1979, were reproduced as a document of the Committee on Disarmament,

Reaffirming once again its resolution 33/91 C of 16 December 1978, in which it, *inter alia*:

(a) Reiterated its satisfaction at the solemn declarations made in 1977 by the heads of State of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America in which they stated that they were ready to endeavour to reach agreements which would permit starting the gradual reduction of existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons and moving towards their complete and total destruction, with a view to a world truly free of nuclear weapons,

(b) Recalled that one of the disarmament measures deserving the highest priority, included in the Programme of Action set forth in section III of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, was the conclusion of the bilateral agreement known as SALT II, which should be followed promptly by further strategic arms limitation negotiations between the two parties, leading to agreed significant reductions of and qualitative limitations on strategic arms,

(c) Stressed that in the Programme of Action—it was established that, in the task of achieving the goals of nuclear disarmament, all nuclear-weapon States, in particular those among them which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, bear a special responsibility.

Reaffirming that, as stated in its resolution 34/87 F of 11 December 1979, it shares the conviction expressed by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America in the joint statement of principles and basic guidelines for subsequent negotiations on the limitation of strategic arms that early agreement on the further limitation and further reduction of strategic arms would serve to strengthen international peace and security and to reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war,

Recalling that, at its first special session devoted to disarmament, it proclaimed that existing arsenals of nuclear weapons alone were more than sufficient to destroy all life on earth, that the increase in weapons, especially nuclear weapons, far from helping to strengthen international security, on the contrary weakened it, and that the existence of nuclear weapons and the continuing arms race posed a threat to the very survival of mankind, for which reasons the General

Assembly declared that all the peoples of the world had a vital interest in the sphere of disarmament.

Recalling also that in the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade, annexed to its resolution 35/46 of 3 December 1980, it recommended that special priority be given to the ratification of the SALT II Treaty,

1. Notes that the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (SALT II) has not yet been ratified;

2. Urges that the process begun by the SALT I Treaty and signature of the SALT II Treaty should continue and be built upon;

3. Trusts that the signatory States will continue to refrain from any act which would defeat the object and purpose of that process;

4. Urges the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, with reference to resolutions 34/87 F and 35/156 K, to pursue negotiations, in accordance with the principle of equality and equal security, looking towards the achievement of an agreement which will provide for substantial reductions and significant qualitative limitations of strategic arms;

5. Welcomes the commencement of negotiations at Geneva on 30 November 1981 between representatives of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on nuclear arms in accordance with the joint communique issued by Secretary of State Haig and Foreign Minister Gromyko on 23 September 1981, and trusts that such negotiations will facilitate the enhancement of stability and international security;

6. Stresses the need for both parties to bear constantly in mind that not only their national interests but also the vital interests of all the peoples of the world are at stake in this question;

7. Invites the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America to keep the General Assembly appropriately informed of the results of their negotiations, in conformity with the provisions of paragraphs 27 and 114 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly;

8. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-seventh session the item entitled "Strategic arms limitation talks".

Non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war

Prevention of nuclear war

Expressing alarm at the threat which the existence of nuclear weapons posed to the survival of mankind and labelling as matters of highest priority the prevention of nuclear war and reduction of the risks of such war, the General Assembly, in a resolution adopted without vote on 19 December 1981,⁽⁴⁾ urged all nuclear-weapon States and all other Member States that so desired to submit to the Secretary-General, for consideration at its 1982 special session on disarmament (p. 27), their views, proposals' and practical suggestions for ensuring the prevention of nuclear war.

The revised draft resolution, sponsored by 17 States, was approved by the First Committee on 25 November, also without vote. The text incorporated the essence of amendments submitted by Mexico,⁽¹⁾ according to which all Member

States rather than just nuclear-weapon States were urged to submit their views and proposals. The revised text also included a preambular paragraph proposed by Mexico, reiterating the vital interest of all peoples in disarmament. Mexico withdrew its amendments after the draft resolution was revised.

Introducing the draft, Argentina asserted that the Powers possessing nuclear weapons must state clearly, in writing and in detail, their views and proposals for preventing nuclear war, after which non-nuclear States had the right and duty to assess those positions and make their own proposals. The latter States could not delegate to others the quest for solutions.

In the First Committee debate, some countries, such as Nigeria and the USSR, rejected the idea of a limited or winnable nuclear war as either suicidal and adventuristic or lacking in validity and evidence. With the quantity and quality of weapons spread throughout the world, said Cuba, it was illusory to believe that a nuclear war could be concentrated in a given territory. Mauritius stated that, while the world's leaders might not envisage a nuclear war by design, no human activity could be accident-free, as evidenced in a report by the Armed Services Committee of the United States Senate that, four times in 18 months, nuclear bomber crews and intercontinental ballistic missile units had been ordered to be ready for action as a result of alarms that later proved false.

In an appeal of 23 June from the Supreme Soviet of the USSR to the parliaments and peoples of the world, transmitted to the Secretary-General by a letter from the USSR dated 24 June,⁽³⁾ legislatures were urged to support negotiations, without preliminary conditions or attempts to dictate a point of view, to prevent a new phase of the nuclear missile race. Support for a proposal by the USSR for the establishment of an international committee of scientists for the defence of mankind from the threat of a nuclear catastrophe was expressed in a Declaration of the General Assembly of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, adopted at Sofia in May and forwarded in a note verbale of Bulgaria dated 25 June.⁽²⁾

Amendments withdrawn: ⁽¹⁾Mexico, A/C.1/36/L.50.

Letter and note verbale (nv): ⁽²⁾Bulgaria, 25 June, A/36/364 (nv). ⁽³⁾USSR, 24 June, A/36/347.

Resolutions: ⁽⁴⁾GA, 36/81 B, 9 Dec., text following.

Meeting records: GA: 1st Committee, A/C.1/36/PV.3 & Corr.1, 4-10. 12-26, 27, 33, 34, 38, 39, 44 (19 Oct.-25 Nov.); plenary, A/36/PV.91 (9 Dec.).

General Assembly resolution 36/81 B

Adopted without vote Meeting 91 9 December 1981
Approved by First Committee (A/36/740 and Corr.1) without vote.
25 November (meeting 44); 17-nation draft (A/C.1/36/L.43/Rev.1); agenda item 39.

Sponsors: Algeria, Argentina, Bangladesh, Brazil, Ecuador, Egypt, India, Ireland, Mexico, Pakistan, Peru, Romania, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Sweden, Venezuela, Yugoslavia,

Prevention of nuclear war

The General Assembly,

Alarmed by the threat to the very survival of mankind posed by the existence of nuclear weapons and the continuing arms race,

Recalling that removal of the threat of a world war—a nuclear war—is the most acute and urgent task of the present day,

Reiterating that it is the shared responsibility of all Member States to save succeeding generations from the scourge of another world war,

Recalling the provisions of paragraphs 47 to 50 and 56 to 58 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament, regarding procedures designed to secure the avoidance of nuclear war,

Considering that prevention of nuclear war and reduction of the risks of nuclear war are matters of the highest priority, which should be considered by the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament,

Reiterating the vital interest of all the peoples of the world in disarmament,

Aware of the special responsibility of nuclear-weapon States,

1. Urges all nuclear-weapon States to submit to the Secretary-General by 30 April 1982, for consideration at the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, their views, proposals and practical suggestions for ensuring the prevention of nuclear war;

2. Invites all other Member States that so desire to do likewise;

3. Requests the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament a report containing the views, proposals and practical suggestions referred to in paragraph 1 above, as well as those received from other Member States.

Non-use of nuclear weapons

On 9 December 1981, by a resolution on the non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war,⁽¹⁾ the General Assembly declared again that the use of nuclear weapons would be a violation of the Charter of the United Nations and a crime against humanity, and that the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons should therefore be prohibited, pending nuclear disarmament. The Assembly urged consideration, at its 1982 special session on disarmament (p. 27), of the question of an international convention on the non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war, or some other agreement on the subject.

The Assembly took this action by a recorded vote of 121 to 19, with 6 abstentions. The text, sponsored by 30 States, was approved by the First Committee on 23 November by a recorded vote of 99 to 18, with 5 abstentions.

India, in introducing the text, emphasized that the nuclear-arms race had acquired a new momentum, both quantitatively and qualitatively, and there was greater apprehension than ever that a nuclear war, with all its catastrophic consequences, might break out. Thus; States shared

the collective responsibility to undertake all possible measures to reduce such a threat. Although the United Nations Charter permitted self-defence, it would be a mockery of the Charter to suggest that, in pursuing its security concerns, a State might jeopardize the survival of all, and that a State's choice of weapons and means of warfare, even in the exercise of individual and collective self-defence, was not unlimited.

Ireland, though opposed to any use of nuclear weapons, voted against the resolution because of misgivings about the approach it adopted. Greece abstained in the vote because of the proclamatory nature of the text and because it thought the paragraph declaring the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons a violation of the Charter, and prohibiting such action alone, left a serious vacuum and a vagueness of interpretation. While agreeing with the objectives of the text, Sweden abstained because it thought the resolution's interpretation of the Charter was not legally correct. The German Democratic Republic, which voted in favour, remarked that among those which had voted against were nuclear-weapon States and their allies, whose co-operation was essential in the endeavour to prevent nuclear war.

Resolution: ⁽¹⁾GA, 36/92 I, 9 Dec., text following.

Meeting records: GA: 1st Committee, A/C.I/36/PV.3 & Corr.1, 4-10, 12-26, 32, 34, 36, 40 (19 Oct.-23 Nov.); plenary, A/36/PV.91 (9 Dec.).

General Assembly resolution 36/92 I

121-19-6 (recorded vote) Meeting 91 9 December 1981
Approved by First Committee (A/36/752) by recorded vote (99-18-5).
23 November (meeting 40); 30-nation draft (A/C.1/36/L.29); agenda item 51 (g).

Sponsors: Algeria, Argentina, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Bhutan, Colombia, Congo, Cyprus, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Jordan, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Peru, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Sri Lanka, Yemen, Yugoslavia,

Non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war

The General Assembly,

Alarmed by the threat to the survival of mankind and to the life-sustaining system posed by nuclear weapons and by their use, inherent in concepts of deterrence,

Convinced that nuclear disarmament is essential for the prevention of nuclear war and for the strengthening of international peace and security,

Recalling its declaration, contained in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, that all States should actively participate in efforts to bring about conditions in international relations among States in which a code of peaceful conduct of nations in international affairs could be agreed upon and which would preclude the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Recalling its resolutions 1653(XVI) of 24 November 1961, 33/71 B of 14 December 1978, 34/83 G of 11 December 1979 and 35/152 D of 12 December 1980.

Taking note of the Comprehensive Study on Nuclear Weapons prepared by the Secretary-General with the assistance of a group of experts,

1. Declares once again that:

(a) The use of nuclear weapons would be a violation of the Charter of the United Nations and a crime against humanity;

(b) The use or threat of use of nuclear weapons should therefore be prohibited, pending nuclear disarmament;

2. Urges the consideration, at the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, of the question of an international convention on the non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war or some other agreement on the subject, taking into account the proposals and views of States in this regard;

3. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-seventh session the item entitled "Non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war".

Recorded vote in Assembly as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian SSR, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia,

Against: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States,

Abstaining: Austria, Comoros, Finland, Greece, Israel, Sweden,

Declaration on the Prevention of Nuclear Catastrophe

In recognition that all the horrors of past wars and other calamities would pale in comparison with what a nuclear catastrophe could bring to humanity, the General Assembly, on 9 December 1981,⁽⁴⁾ proclaimed on behalf of United Nations Member States: that States and statesmen that resorted first to the use of nuclear weapons would be committing the gravest crime against humanity; that there would be no justification or pardon for the decision to be the first to use such weapons; that any doctrines allowing first use of nuclear weapons were incompatible with moral standards and the ideals of the Organization; that the leaders of nuclear-weapon States had the duty to act so as to eliminate the risk of nuclear conflict; and that nuclear energy should be used exclusively for peaceful purposes.

This Declaration on the Prevention of Nuclear Catastrophe was adopted by the Assembly by a recorded vote of 82 to 19, with 41 abstentions. The twice-revised text, sponsored by Angola, the German Democratic Republic, Mongolia and the USSR, was approved by the First Committee on 25 November by a recorded vote of 67 to 18, with 37 abstentions. The sponsors incor-

porated an oral amendment proposed by Mexico, adding to a reference to negotiations on the nuclear-arms race, contained in paragraph 4, a phrase specifying that the ultimate goal was the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

The Declaration was originally proposed by the USSR which requested in a letter of 22 September⁽¹⁾ that an item on this subject be put on the Assembly's agenda at its 1981 session. The request was endorsed by the General Committee on 6 October⁽³⁾ and added to the agenda by the Assembly on the same day.

The USSR stated in its letter that the United Nations should adopt the proposed text so as to exert a restraining influence on the dangerous development of world events. In the First Committee, the USSR said the task of preventing a nuclear catastrophe commanded the highest priority in international relations, particularly because the United States, banking on force as an instrument for achieving political goals, continued to strive for a position of military supremacy. Further, by a letter of 21 October,⁽²⁾ the USSR transmitted to the Assembly the text of a statement by Premier Leonid I. Brezhnev, given to a Pravda correspondent, rejecting the concept of a winnable nuclear war and expressing hope that the United States President would also reject as criminal the idea of nuclear attack.

Several States, particularly from Eastern Europe, voiced strong support for the USSR initiative. Bulgaria saw it as having a moderating influence in the face of mad notions of a limited nuclear war or a pre-emptive attack. In the view of the Byelorussian SSR, the Declaration would remind statesmen involved in the use of nuclear weapons that each of them bore personal responsibility for the fate of humanity. The proposal expressed the vital interests of all peoples, said Hungary, against the background of an intensified arms race generated by those who advocated the acceptability of nuclear war. No country could oppose such a declaration, said the Lao People's Democratic Republic, unless it nurtured the illusion of victory in a limited or widespread nuclear conflict. Mongolia viewed the proposal as a serious warning to those who could not give up the times of the "cold war" and the doctrine of a pre-emptive strike. Such a declaration was needed, said the Ukrainian SSR, because of the unprecedented build-up of nuclear arms, the whipping-up of war psychosis and the reliance on force in international relations.

Explaining its favourable vote, Cyprus warned that the concepts of a limited nuclear war and of victory resulting from a first strike brought the world closer to a nuclear conflagration. Also voting in favour, Jordan expressed sur-

prise that there had been so much polarization on an issue on which all were agreed— that any resort to nuclear war was a crime against humanity.

Some Western States, however, questioned the value and motivation of the proposal. The Federal Republic of Germany found it inconsistent with various statements of Soviet military doctrine, and thought that, by implication, it sanctioned non-nuclear warfare and could force States to choose between violation of an accepted international obligation and unconditional surrender. The Netherlands also pointed to what it regarded as inconsistencies with earlier USSR commitments, and added that the right of self-defence included the right to determine what level of force was needed to dissuade the aggressor. The United States said the proposal fell into a pattern of propaganda initiatives by the USSR dating back to the mid-1950s, aimed at masking its own weapons build-up and forestalling the development of deterrent countermeasures by the Western alliance; meaningful arms control was prudently feasible only when all States refrained from the threat or use of force against the territory or political independence of other States.

China said the aim of the proposal was to give full advantage to USSR superiority in conventional weapons, allowing it to threaten neighbouring States which could do no more than submit to its superiority in that area. France opposed the Declaration for three reasons: it would benefit a State that used force in international relations by guaranteeing that nuclear weapons would not be used for defence; it deprived the principle of non-use of force of its highest place among the obligations of States; and it would deprive the nuclear component of its deterrent effect. Portugal said it could not support such vague, purely declaratory and unrealistic proposals. The United Kingdom, speaking for the European Community members, said they could not support vague proposals such as those for no first use of nuclear weapons, which were unrealistic, unenforceable and declaratory; disarmament would come about only through negotiation of concrete agreements on measures to limit and reduce armaments, taking account of the principles of parity and equality. Zaire stated that the suggestion for preventing the first use of nuclear weapons solved nothing, since some States saw it as tantamount to exposing their flanks.

Egypt expressed the view that the most effective way to eliminate the threat of nuclear war, pending the achievement of nuclear disarmament, was to prohibit the use or threat of nuclear weapons—not the first use alone.

Responding to the argument that the Declaration would enable the members of the Warsaw

Treaty Organization to make use of their superiority in conventional weapons, Czechoslovakia called this a false allegation and recalled that the Warsaw Treaty members had proposed to their counterparts in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization the conclusion of an agreement to prohibit the first use of conventional as well as nuclear weapons. Poland noted in this regard that the USSR had previously made other proposals on the non-use of force in international relations. The German Democratic Republic, responding to another argument by opponents of the Declaration, said the threat of use of nuclear weapons could never create stability, but only fears of an unprovoked preventive strike.

Several of those voting for the resolution—India, Nigeria, Pakistan, the Philippines, Sierra Leone and Sri Lanka—stressed that prohibition of the first use of nuclear weapons was only one aspect of the larger issues of a total ban on their use and of nuclear disarmament in general.

Abstaining in the vote, Argentina, Austria, the Bahamas, Bangladesh, Brazil, Finland, Ireland, Kenya, Malaysia, Senegal, the Sudan and Sweden expressed a number of reservations: that the Declaration did not deal with the more general problem of banning the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and the use of force in international relations (Austria, Bangladesh, Brazil, Kenya, Malaysia, Senegal); that the two sides were too deeply divided over the proposal (Argentina, Bahamas, Finland, Ireland); that the matter should have been studied more closely before a declaration was pressed (Bahamas, Sudan); that the problem must be dealt with by arms limitation and reduction agreements, not by declarations (Austria, Ireland); that the subject was dealt with adequately in other resolutions (Senegal); and that it was incongruous to talk of first strike in a committee dedicated to disarmament (Bahamas).

Albania did not participate in the vote, stating that the proposal was aimed at diverting attention from the substance of the problem, which was the divide-and-dominate policies of the two super-Powers and China.

Letters: USSR: ⁽¹⁾22 Sep., A/36/241; ⁽²⁾21 Oct., A/C.1/36/7

Report: ⁽³⁾General Committee, A/36/250/Add.1

Resolution: ⁽⁴⁾GA, 36/100, 9 Dec., text following.

Meeting records: GA: General Committee, A/BUR/36/SR.3 (6 Oct.); 1st Committee, A/C.1/36/PV.3 & Corr.1,4-10, 12-26, 27, 29, 32, 34-37, 39, 41, 43 (19 Oct.-25 Nov.); plenary, A/36/PV.28,91 (6 Oct., 9 Dec.).

General Assembly resolution 36/100

82-19-41 (recorded vote) Meeting 91 9 December 1981
Approved by First Committee (A/36/759) by recorded vote (67-18-37).
25 November (meeting 43); 4-nation draft (A/C.1/36/L.2/Rev.2); agenda item 135.

Sponsors: Angola, German Democratic Republic, Mongolia, USSR,

**Declaration on the Prevention of Nuclear Catastrophe
The General Assembly,**

Bearing in mind that the foremost task of the United Nations, born in the flames of the Second World War, has been, is and will be to save present and succeeding generations from the scourge of war,

Recognizing that all the horrors of past wars and all other calamities that have befallen people would pale in comparison with what is inherent in the use of nuclear weapons capable of destroying civilization on earth,

Reaffirming that the universally accepted objective is to eliminate completely the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons through the cessation of their production, followed by the destruction of their stockpiles, and that, to this end, priority in disarmament negotiations should be given to nuclear disarmament,

Convinced that, as the first step in this direction, the use of nuclear weapons and the waging of nuclear war should be outlawed,

Solemnly proclaims, on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations:

1. States and statesmen that resort first to the use of nuclear weapons will be committing the gravest crime against humanity.

2. There will never be any justification or pardon for statesmen who would take the decision to be the first to use nuclear weapons.

3. Any doctrines allowing the first use of nuclear weapons and any actions pushing the world towards a catastrophe are incompatible with human moral standards and the lofty ideals of the United Nations.

4. It is the supreme duty and direct obligation of the leaders of nuclear-weapon States to act in such a way as to eliminate the risk of the outbreak of a nuclear conflict. The nuclear-arms race must be stopped and reversed by joint efforts, through negotiations conducted in good faith and on the basis of equality, having as their ultimate goal the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

5. Nuclear energy should be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and only for the benefit of mankind.

Recorded vote in Assembly as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Bahrain, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bulgaria, Burundi, Byelorussian SSR, Cape Verde, Chad, Colombia, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Fiji, German Democratic Republic, Grenada, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Saint Lucia, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka; Suriname, Swaziland,^a Syrian Arab Republic, Uganda, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia,

Against: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States.

Abstaining: Argentina, Austria, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Central African Republic, Chile, Comoros, Costa Rica, Democratic Kampuchea, Egypt, El Salvador, Finland, Gabon, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Ireland, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Liberia, Malaysia, Morocco, Niger, Oman, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Rwanda, Samoa, Senegal, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sudan, Sweden, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Zaire.

^a Later advised the Secretariat it had intended to abstain.

**Establishment of
nuclear-weapon-free zones**

As in previous years, the General Assembly adopted resolutions in 1981 on the proposed establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in

Africa (see below), the Middle East (p. 49) and South Asia (p. 55), as well as on Latin America (p. 48) –the only region where such a zone had been established by treaty. It also took action with respect to a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean (p. 94).

Aside from these regions, support for the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Nordic area was expressed by Finland and Sweden, with the latter asserting that such arrangements would have to include concrete commitments by the USSR and the United States. The Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia and the USSR supported the establishment of such zones in northern Europe and in the Balkan region, as well as zones of peace and co-operation in the Mediterranean and South-East Asia. Hungary also favoured the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones in the Balkans and the Mediterranean, and Bulgaria and Romania supported the establishment of such a zone in the Balkans.

By a letter of 11 November,⁽¹⁾ Bulgaria transmitted a speech of 20 October by the General Secretary of the Central Committee of its Communist Party and President of its State Council, proposing a 1982 meeting in Sofia of the leaders of the Balkan States to discuss the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Balkans.

Letter: ⁽¹⁾Bulgaria, 11 Nov., A/C.1/36/11.

Africa

**Implementation of the 1964 Declaration
on the Denuclearization of Africa**

By a resolution of 9 December 1981,⁽¹⁾ the General Assembly reiterated its call on all States to consider and respect Africa-including surrounding islands and Madagascar—as a nuclear-weapon-free zone. It requested the Secretary-General to assist the Organization of African Unity (OAU) towards the realization of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa, adopted by OAU in 1964, and it condemned nuclear collaboration with South Africa as frustrating the objective of that Declaration. Most of the text dealt with nuclear weapons and South Africa (p. 46).

The resolution, sponsored by 29 African States, was adopted by a recorded vote of 132 to none, with 12 abstentions, after approval by the First Committee on 24 November by a recorded vote, requested by the United States, of 113 to none, with 11 abstentions. Paragraph 4, calling for the termination of military and nuclear collaboration with South Africa, was adopted by a separate vote.

The text was introduced by Nigeria, which said the objective of a denuclearized Africa remained fundamental to the continent's efforts

for collective self-defence, and hoped that all nuclear and non-nuclear countries would refrain from any action or inaction which might frustrate the objective of a nuclear-weapon-free Africa.

Portugal and the United Kingdom, explaining their abstentions in the vote, cited difficulties with provisions on South Africa (p. 47). A number of States which voted in favour—Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bolivia, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Japan, Norway, Spain, Sweden and Turkey—expressed general agreement with its main thrust but objected to some language as intemperate or overly polemical. Albania voted in favour but maintained its reservations with regard to nuclear-weapon-free zones.

In the First Committee debate, Chad and Madagascar said that only a treaty on the denuclearization of Africa, whereby African States undertook not to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons, could guarantee the security of those States, prevent nuclear proliferation and channel the savings to development. Liberia opposed having nuclear weapons of any kind in Africa.

Resolution: ⁽¹⁾GA, 36/86 B, 9 Dec., text following.

Meeting records: GA: 1st Committee, A/C.1/36/PV.3 & Corr.1, 4-10, 12-26, 30, 34, 36-39, 41 (19 Oct.-24 Nov.); plenary, A/36/PV.91 (9 Dec.).

General Assembly resolution 36/86 B

132-0-12 (recorded vote) Meeting 91 9 December 1981

Approved by First Committee (A/36/746) by recorded vote (113-0-11).
24 November (meeting 41): 29-nation draft (A/C.1/36/L.16); agenda item 45.

Sponsors: Algeria, Angola, Benin, Burundi, Cape Verde, Chad, Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Morocco, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Togo, United Republic of Cameroon, Zaire, Zambia.

Implementation of the Declaration

The General Assembly,

Bearing in mind the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at its first ordinary session, held at Cairo from 17 to 21 July 1964,

Recalling its resolutions 1652(XVI) of 24 November 1961, 32/81 of 12 December 1977, 33/63 of 14 December 1978, 34/76 A of 11 December 1979 and 35/146 B of 12 December 1980, in which it called upon all States to consider and respect the continent of Africa, comprising the continental African States, Madagascar and other islands surrounding Africa, as a nuclear-weapon-free zone,

Recalling also that in its resolution 33/63 it vigorously condemned any attempt by South Africa to introduce in any way whatsoever nuclear weapons into the continent and demanded that South Africa refrain forthwith from conducting any nuclear explosion in the continent of Africa or elsewhere,

Reaffirming that the nuclear programme of the racist regime of South Africa constitutes a very grave danger to international peace and security and, in particular, jeopardizes the security of African States,

Noting with concern that South Africa has persistently refused to conclude adequate and comprehensive safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency with a view to preventing the diversion of nuclear materials from peaceful uses to the manufacture of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices,

Taking note of the report of the Security Council Committee established by resolution 421(1977) concerning the question of South Africa on ways and means of making the mandatory arms embargo against South Africa more effective, in particular its recommendation that all forms of nuclear collaboration with South Africa should cease, and the report of the international Conference on Sanctions against South Africa, held at Paris from 20 to 27 May 1981,

Gravely concerned over the possibility that South Africa has acquired nuclear weapons,

Convinced that the acquisition of such weapons by South Africa would endanger the implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa as well as the maintenance of international peace and security,

Expressing its indignation that certain Western countries and Israel have continued to collaborate with South Africa in the nuclear field despite the risk of proliferation of nuclear weapons which the South African nuclear programme represents,

Recalling its decision taken at the tenth special session, devoted to disarmament, that the Security Council should take appropriate effective steps to prevent the frustration of the decision of the Organization of African Unity for the denuclearization of Africa,

1. Once again reiterates its call upon all States to consider and respect the continent of Africa, comprising the continental African States, Madagascar and other islands surrounding Africa, as a nuclear-weapon-free zone;

2. Reaffirms that the nuclear programme of the racist regime of South Africa constitutes a very grave danger to international peace and security and, in particular, jeopardizes the security of African States and increases the danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons;

3. Condemns any form of nuclear collaboration by any State, corporation, institution or individual with the racist regime of South Africa since such collaboration frustrates, inter alia, the objective of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa adopted by the Organization of African Unity to keep Africa a nuclear-weapon-free zone;

4. Calls upon such States, corporations, institutions and individuals, therefore, to terminate forthwith such military and nuclear collaboration with the racist regime of South Africa, including the provision to it of such related materials as computers, electronic equipment and corresponding technology;

5. Requests the Security Council, in keeping with the recommendation of its Committee established by resolution 421(1977) concerning the question of South Africa, to prohibit all forms of co-operation and collaboration with the racist regime of South Africa in the nuclear field;

6. Demands that South Africa submit all its nuclear installations to inspection by the international Atomic Energy Agency;

7. Requests the Secretary-General to render all necessary assistance to the Organization of African Unity towards the realization of its solemn Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa;

8. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-seventh session the item entitled "Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa".

Recorded vote in Assembly as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian SSR, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania,

Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia.

Against: None.

Abstaining: Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Guatemala, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, United Kingdom, United States.

Nuclear weapons and South Africa

DISARMAMENT COMMISSION CONSIDERATION. The question of South Africa's capability to produce nuclear weapons and the related issue of nuclear collaboration with South Africa were discussed in the Disarmament Commission at its May/June 1981 session,⁽¹⁾ primarily under an agenda item concerning a letter from the Chairman of the Special Committee against Apartheid transmitting to the Commission the report of the United Nations Seminar on Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa, held in London in February 1979.⁽¹¹⁾

The Commission first studied a working paper submitted by Cuba on behalf of the non-aligned countries, asserting that evidence pointed to South Africa's achievement of nuclear capability through the active collaboration and collusion of certain countries. On the basis of that document, an informal working group produced a working paper which stressed, among other things, the need to prevent further acquisition of arms or arms technology by racist régimes, especially through strict adherence by all States to relevant Security Council decisions. No agreement was reached in the Commission, however; the two papers were annexed to the Commission's report to the General Assembly.

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL. In a report issued on 3 September,⁽²⁾ the Secretary-General stated that he had given maximum publicity, as requested by the General Assembly in December 1980,⁽⁵⁾ to the report he submitted in September 1980 on South Africa's plan and capability in the nuclear field.⁽¹²⁾ He had identified no further information on South Africa's nuclear developments to add to his 1980 report.

GENERAL ASSEMBLY ACTION. On 9 December, under its agenda item on the denuclearization of Africa, the General Assembly adopted a resolution on the nuclear capability of South Africa⁽⁶⁾ by a recorded vote of 129 to 4, with 10 abstentions.

Deploring the massive build-up of South Africa's military machine and reaffirming that the régime's nuclear plans and capability gravely endangered peace and security, the Assembly requested the Security Council to intensify its

efforts to prohibit all forms of nuclear cooperation and collaboration with South Africa and to institute effective enforcement action so as to prevent that régime from endangering peace and security through acquisition of nuclear weapons. The Assembly called on States, corporations, institutions and individuals to terminate military and nuclear collaboration with South Africa, including the provision of such materials as computers, electronic equipment and related technology. It demanded that South Africa submit all its nuclear installations to inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

The text, sponsored by 27 African States and Qatar, was approved by the First Committee on 24 November by a recorded vote of 108 to 4, with 9 abstentions.

In a resolution, also adopted on 9 December,⁽⁷⁾ on implementation of the 1964 OAU Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa, the Assembly condemned nuclear collaboration with South Africa by any State, corporation, institution or individual. This resolution, like the 28-nation text, included provisions reaffirming that South Africa's nuclear programme was a grave danger to peace and security, calling for an end to military and nuclear collaboration, requesting the Security Council to prohibit such collaboration and demanding that South Africa submit to IAEA inspection. Paragraph 4 of the text, containing the call for termination of military and nuclear collaboration, was adopted in Committee by a separate recorded vote, requested by the United States, of 101 to 6, with 16 abstentions.

Under the agenda item on apartheid and South Africa, the Assembly, on 17 December, condemned specified Western States and Israel for nuclear collaboration with South Africa, and urged the Security Council to take mandatory measures to ensure the immediate cessation of any military and nuclear collaboration with that régime.⁽⁹⁾ On the same date, it urged the Security Council to strengthen the arms embargo against South Africa and called on States to ensure the cessation of all military relations with that country.⁽¹⁰⁾

In a resolution of 9 December on strengthening peace and security, the Assembly called on the Security Council to promote the denuclearization of Africa in order to avert the serious danger posed by South Africa's nuclear capability to the African States as well as to international peace and security.⁽⁸⁾

Introducing the resolution on South Africa's nuclear capability, Nigeria felt it unacceptable that the glitter of gold or other geopolitical or geostrategic interests of South Africa's supporters should become a more convincing con-

sideration than the lives, liberty and well-being of Africans. The sponsors also regarded as ominous the use of the veto in the Security Council by certain States on southern African issues, and stressed the Council's duty to promote peace and security.

Several States explained their vote against the resolution on South Africa's nuclear capability and their abstention on the other resolution on the denuclearization of Africa. Israel recalled that it had voted for the Assembly's 1978 resolution on denuclearization of Africa⁽⁴⁾ but observed that it had been singled out by name in later resolutions for alleged nuclear collaboration with South Africa, although such accusations were unfounded and false. The United Kingdom emphasized that it did not collaborate in any way with South Africa towards that country's development of a nuclear-weapon capability. The United States felt that the two resolutions, with their intemperate language and unproved allegations, would discourage South Africa from implementing a non-proliferation policy rather than serve their intended purposes; also, it rejected efforts to include all high-technology items under the arms embargo against South Africa.

France, which voted against the nuclear capability resolution, and the Netherlands, which abstained, said the two texts failed to distinguish between peaceful and military uses of nuclear energy; France also regarded the Assembly request for enforcement action as at variance with the Charter and the criticism of vetoes in the Security Council as a breach of the principle of respect for the sovereignty of States.

Canada abstained on both texts, stating that they contained questionable assumptions and unsubstantiated allegations; further, it doubted the appropriateness of requesting the Security Council to institute enforcement action. Australia abstained on the resolution on nuclear capability, objecting to the tendentious naming of States and the failure to distinguish between military and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. New Zealand did likewise, finding the text less accurate and more tendentious than in previous resolutions. Portugal abstained on both texts because it considered the global condemnation of any nuclear co-operation with South Africa excessive; condemnation should cover only military co-operation.

Many delegations, while voting in favour of both resolutions, expressed reservations regarding various paragraphs. The reservations of Austria, Bolivia, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Norway and Spain concerned the request to the Security Council, which these States did not regard as in keeping with the respective functions of the Assembly and the Council under the Charter. Aust-

ria, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Norway, Spain, Sweden and Turkey objected to preambular provisions in both resolutions referring to continued support and collaboration by certain Western countries and Israel. Finland also regretted the lack of reference to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,⁽³⁾ and Ireland was concerned about the failure to distinguish between peaceful and military nuclear uses.

Although voting in favour of both resolutions, Argentina did not agree with some of their language and voiced reservations with regard to nuclear safeguards requirements. Japan voted for the resolution on the denuclearization of Africa but thought conclusive evidence was lacking for some of its assertions.

In the First Committee debate, many States reiterated their concern about 'the nuclear plans and capability of South Africa which, in their view, could constitute a serious threat to peace and security and increase the danger of nuclear-weapon proliferation. A number of African States said their fears had been reinforced by the 1980 report of the Secretary-General and the possibility that South Africa might indeed have acquired nuclear weapons.

Nigeria, referring to the Disarmament Commission's discussion of this subject, said a few of the Commission's members tended to exercise the semblance of a veto when consensus was sought on substantive issues such as this.

Reports: ⁽¹⁾Disarmament Commission, A/36/42; ⁽²⁾S-G, A/36/430.

Resolutions: GA: ⁽³⁾2373(XXII), annex, 12 June 1968 (YUN 1968, p. 17); ⁽⁴⁾33/63, 14 Dec. 1978 (YUN 1978, p. 91); ⁽⁵⁾35/146A, para. 9, 12 Dec. 1980 (YUN 1980, p. 65); ⁽⁶⁾36/86A, 9 Dec. 1981, text following; ⁽⁷⁾36/86 B, 9 Dec. (p. 45); ⁽⁸⁾36/102, para 11, 9 Dec. (p. 145); ⁽⁹⁾36/172 E, 17 Dec. (p. 185); ⁽¹⁰⁾36/172 F, 17 Dec. (p. 174).

Yearbook references: ⁽¹¹⁾1979, p. 173; ⁽¹²⁾1980, p. 45.

Meeting records: GA: 1st Committee, A/C.1/36/PV.3 & Corr.1. 4-10, 12-26, 30 34, 36, 38, 39, 41 (19 Oct.-24 Nov.); plenary, A/36/PV.91 (9 Dec.).

General Assembly resolution 36/86 A

129-4-10 (recorded vote) Meeting 91 9 December 1981
Approved by First Committee (A/36/746) by recorded vote (108-4-9), 24 November (meeting 41): 28-nation draft (A/C.1/36/L.15): agenda item 45.

Sponsors: Algeria, Angola, Benin, Burundi, Cape Verde, Chad, Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Qatar, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sudan, United Republic of Cameroon, Zaire, Zambia,

Nuclear capability of South Africa

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 34/76 B of 11 December 1979 and 35/146 A of 12 December 1980.

Bearing in mind the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at its first ordinary session, which was held at Cairo from 17 to 21 July 1964,

Recalling that, in its resolution 33/63 of 14 December 1978, it vigorously condemned any attempt by South Africa

to introduce in any way whatsoever nuclear weapons into the continent and demanded that South Africa refrain forthwith from conducting any nuclear explosion in the continent of Africa or elsewhere.

Alarmed by the content and growing sophistication of South Africa's military and nuclear programme,

Alarmed also at the fact that South Africa's nuclear programme has enabled it to acquire nuclear-weapon capability enhanced by the continued support and collaboration which certain Western countries and Israel have given to it,

Noting with grave concern that South Africa's capacity to produce nuclear weapons has been established, inter alia, by the content of its nuclear programme, as well as by the report of the Secretary-General on South Africa's plan and capability in the nuclear field following the reported detonation by that country of a nuclear device on 22 September 1979, and that it might indeed have acquired nuclear weapons,

Taking note of the report of the Security Council Committee established by resolution 421 (1977) concerning the question of South Africa on ways and means of making the mandatory arms embargo against South Africa more effective, as well as the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 473(1980),

Having examined the report of the Secretary-General of 9 September 1980, as well as his report of 3 September 1981, submitted pursuant to General Assembly resolution 35/146 A on the nuclear capability of South Africa,

Noting with concern that South Africa has persistently refused to conclude adequate and comprehensive safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency with a view to preventing the diversion of nuclear materials from peaceful uses to the manufacture of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices,

Gravely concerned that South Africa, in flagrant violation of the principles of international law and the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, has continued its military attacks against independent States of southern Africa, in particular Angola, and has increased its acts of subversion aimed at destabilizing those States,

Equally concerned that the acquisition of military equipment and nuclear-weapon capability by the racist regime of South Africa, with its abhorrent system of apartheid and its record of violence and aggression, poses a serious danger to international peace and security,

Recalling its decision taken at the tenth special session, devoted to disarmament, that the Security Council should take appropriate effective steps to prevent the frustration of the decision of the Organization of African Unity for the denuclearization of Africa,

Expressing its indignation at the fact that some Western countries, by a ready recourse to the use of the veto, have continually frustrated every effort at the United Nations to deal with the question of South Africa,

1. Deplores the massive build-up of South Africa's military machine, including its frenzied acquisition of a nuclear-weapon capability for repressive and aggressive purposes and as an instrument of blackmail;

2. Reaffirms that the racist régime's plans and capability in the nuclear field constitute a very grave danger to international peace and security and, in particular, jeopardize the security of African States and increase the danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons;

3. Requests the Security Council to intensify its efforts to prohibit all forms of co-operation and collaboration with the racist regime of South Africa in the nuclear field and, in particular, to institute effective enforcement action against that régime so as to prevent it from endangering international peace and security through its acquisition of nuclear weapons;

4. Calls upon all States, corporations, institutions and individuals to terminate forthwith all military and nuclear collaboration with the racist régime, including the provision to it of such related materials as computers, electronic equipment and corresponding technology;

5. Demands that South Africa submit all its nuclear installations to inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency;

6. Requests the Secretary-General to continue to follow closely South Africa's evolution in the nuclear field and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session;

7. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-seventh session the item entitled "Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa".

Recorded vote in Assembly as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian SSR, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia,

Against: France, Israel, United Kingdom, United States.

Abstaining: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Germany, Federal Republic of, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal,

Latin America

By a resolution adopted on 9 December 1981,⁽¹⁾ the General Assembly, noting with satisfaction that the United States, on 23 November, had become a party to Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco), expressed regret that France had not done so although it had signed the Protocol in 1979. The Assembly noted that non-sovereign territories could receive the benefits of the Treaty if the States internationally responsible for them adhered to the Protocol, and it recalled that the Netherlands and the United Kingdom had previously done this.

The resolution was adopted by a non-recorded vote of 138 to none, with 5 abstentions, following its approval by the First Committee on 25 November by a recorded vote of 121 to none, with 3 abstentions (Cuba, France, Guyana). The text was sponsored by the 21 Latin American/Caribbean States parties to the Treaty.

Introducing the resolution, Mexico, the Treaty's depositary Government, expressed hope that France would ratify the Protocol by the time of the Assembly's 1982 session.

France rejected the thrust of the text, stating that it called into question that country's responsibility although the Treaty had not been ratified, or even signed, by all the States in the region it covered; France maintained that it was

not for the Assembly to interfere in the treaty ratification procedures of States. Guyana considered it incomprehensible and contradictory that a treaty seeking to make Latin America a nuclear-free zone should arbitrarily deny Guyana's membership through a discriminatory clause (specifying that no decision could be taken on the admission of a political entity involved in a territorial dispute).

The United States, while voting in favour, regretted that the resolution singled out one country rather than calling on all eligible States to sign and ratify. Argentina, which also voted in favour, expressed reservations on the preambular paragraph mentioning the adherence of the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, since it related to a fundamental question of territorial sovereignty.

Resolution: ⁽¹⁾GA, 36/83, 9 Dec., text following.

Meeting records: GA: 1st Committee, A/C.1/36/PV.3 & Corr.1, 4-10, 12-26, 27, 32, 35, 44 (19 Oct.-25 Nov.); plenary, A/36/PV.91 (9 Dec.).

General Assembly resolution 36/83
138-0-5 Meeting 91 9December 1981

Approved by First Committee (A/36/742) by recorded vote (121-0-3).
25 November (meeting 44); 21-nation draft (A/C.1/36/L.41/Rev.2); agenda item 41.

Sponsors: Bahamas, Barbados, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Grenade, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, Venezuela.

Implementation of General Assembly resolution 35/143 concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco)

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 2288(XXII) of 5 December 1967, 3262(XXIX) of 9 December 1974, 3473(XXX) of 11 December 1975, 32/76 of 12 December 1977, S-10/2 of 30 June 1978, 33/58 of 14 December 1978, 34/71 of 11 December 1979 and 35/143 of 12 December 1980 concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco).

Taking into account that within the zone of application of that Treaty, to which twenty-two sovereign States are already parties, there are some territories which, in spite of not being sovereign political entities, are nevertheless in a position to receive the benefits deriving from the Treaty through its Additional Protocol I, to which the States that de jure or de facto are internationally responsible for those territories may become parties,

Recalling with satisfaction that the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Netherlands became parties to Additional Protocol I in 1969 and 1971, respectively,

Noting with satisfaction that the United States of America likewise became a party to Additional Protocol I on 23 November 1981, when its instrument of ratification was deposited,

1. Regrets that the signature of Additional Protocol I by France, which took place on 2 March 1979, has not yet been followed by the corresponding ratification, notwithstanding the time already elapsed and the pressing invitations addressed to France by the General Assembly and which it reiterates with special urgency in the present resolution;

2. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-seventh session an item entitled "Implementation of

General Assembly resolution 36/83 concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco)".

Middle East

Proposal for a nuclear-weapon-free zone

COMMUNICATIONS. In a letter dated 26 February 1981,⁽²⁾ Egypt informed the Secretary-General that on that date it had ratified the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;⁽⁸⁾ annexed to the letter was a statement issued on the occasion by Egypt's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, stating that Egypt's commitment to non-proliferation should not impair its right to develop and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in conformity with the Treaty. In a further letter dated 20 April,⁽³⁾ Egypt suggested that a study exploring the modalities for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East might be undertaken to help facilitate the realization of that goal.

In a letter to the Secretary-General dated 9 June⁽⁵⁾ and a similar letter to the Security Council President dated 15 June,⁽⁶⁾ Israel requested all States in and adjacent to the Middle East to indicate during 1981 their consent to holding a preparatory conference to discuss the modalities of a conference aimed at negotiating a multilateral treaty on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East; Israel also welcomed the Egyptian proposal for a study and suggested that it be undertaken by experts from the States in the region, including Israel. In a subsequent letter dated 26 October,⁽⁷⁾ Israel stated that, without prejudice to any political or legal claim by the States of the region, it behooved them, for the sake of their common future, to take concrete steps towards the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

Israel, in a letter dated 27 May,⁽⁴⁾ responded to a Pakistani letter of 3 February⁽¹¹⁾ which stated that Pakistan's nuclear research and development programme was entirely geared to peaceful purposes, and quoted a February 1980 news report to the effect that Israel had carried out a nuclear explosion in 1979 off South Africa's coast and with its co-operation. Israel replied that there was abundant evidence indicating that Pakistan aimed at producing nuclear weapons; as to the purported explosion, Israel cited a comment to the press by its Prime Minister on 24 February 1981 rejecting newspaper reports concerning the event.

GENERAL ASSEMBLY ACTION. On 9 December, the General Assembly, in a resolution⁽¹⁰⁾ sponsored by Egypt and adopted without vote, requested the Secretary-General to transmit to the Assembly at its 1982 special session on disar-

mament (p. 27) the text of the 1980 resolution⁽⁹⁾ by which it had urged all parties directly concerned to consider taking practical and urgent steps to implement the proposal for a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. The resolution, revised by its sponsor, was approved on 25 November 1981 by the First Committee, also without vote.

Egypt's initial draft would have had the Secretary-General appoint a special representative to ascertain the attitudes of parties in the Middle East on procedures for establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone. Qatar submitted amendments⁽¹⁾ to this proposal which would have replaced the paragraphs on a special representative with a request to the Secretary-General for a report, and added references to Israel's attack of 7 June on Iraqi nuclear installations (p. 53). When Egypt revised its proposal to include only a request to transmit the 1980 resolution to the special session, Qatar did not press its amendments.

Introducing its original proposal, Egypt stated that the appointment of a special representative of the Secretary-General would maintain the momentum for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and transmute the theoretical concept into a practical one without infringing on basic positions. The proposal for a special representative was endorsed by Lebanon.

Many countries expressed support for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East as a practical approach towards enhancing the security of States in that region. Supporters included the United States, which offered to assist the States of the region to resolve problems in regard to such a zone. Oman stated that the Middle East must become a nuclear-weapon-free zone. The Syrian Arab Republic said it was ready to implement such a zone if Israel made such a commitment, but it held no hope that an entity which had violated international law would commit itself to a resolution in opposition to its strategy of expansion.

A number of Middle Eastern states—including Bahrain, Democratic Yemen, Egypt, Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon, the Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia and the United Arab Emirates—expressed deep concern that the development of nuclear weapons by Israel (p. 51) would constitute a serious threat to regional security and jeopardize the effort to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone. Some advocated that, pending establishment of such a zone, all parties in the region should pledge to refrain on a reciprocal basis from producing, acquiring or in any other way possessing nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices. Iraq remarked

that, in discussing a nuclear-weapon-free zone for the Middle East, it was not valid to make a comparison with Latin America, as the Zionist entity had not signed the non-proliferation Treaty and had refused to place its nuclear facilities under international control.

Commenting on the initial Egyptian proposal, Israel remarked that it omitted reference to the indispensable negotiating process and did not deal realistically with a number of fundamental and practical aspects; a committee of experts could generate a more realistic momentum than could the itinerant efforts of a special representative.

The Sudan stated that Israel, which already possessed a nuclear-weapon capability, had ulterior motives in supporting a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East; it should first demonstrate its readiness to abide by international instruments and resolutions and adhere to the non-proliferation Treaty.

Explaining their positions, Finland, the United Kingdom (for the European Community members) and the United States said they would have supported Egypt's original proposal and regretted that it had not been possible to consider a text that would have dealt with the matter substantively. Iraq noted that the original text had failed to take into account the Israeli attack on Iraq's nuclear installations; while it regarded the revised text as unsatisfactory, it had gone along with the consensus.

Amendments not pressed: ⁽¹⁾Qatar, A/C.1/36/L.53.
 Letters: Egypt: ⁽²⁾26 Feb., A/36/112-S/14387; ⁽³⁾20 Apr., A/36/220. Israel: ⁽⁴⁾27 May, A/36/298; ⁽⁵⁾9 June, A/36/315; ⁽⁶⁾15 June, S/14534; ⁽⁷⁾26 Oct., A/36/630.
 Resolutions: GA: ⁽⁸⁾2373(XXII), annex, 12 June 1968 (YUN 1968, p. 17); ⁽⁹⁾35/147, 12 Dec. 1980 (YUN 1980, p. 66); ⁽¹⁰⁾36/87 A, 9 Dec. 1981, text following.
 Yearbook reference: ⁽¹¹⁾1980, p. 48.
 Financial implications: S-G statement, A/C.1/36/L.52.
 Meeting records: GA: 1st Committee, A/C.1/36/PV.3 & Corr.1, 4-10, 12-26, 37, 38, 44 (19 Oct.-25 Nov.); plenary, A/36/PV.91 (9 Dec.).

General Assembly resolution 36/87 A

Adopted without vote Meeting 91 9 December 1981
 Approved by First Committee (A/36/747) without vote. 25 November (meeting 44); draft by Egypt (A/C.1/36/L.34/Rev.1); agenda item 46.

The General Assembly.

Recalling its resolutions 3263(XXIX) of 9 December 1974, 3474(XXX) of 11 December 1975, 31/71 of 10 December 1976, 32/82 of 12 December 1977, 33/64 of 14 December 1978, 34/77 of 11 December 1979 and 35/147 of 12 December 1980 on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East,

1. Requests the Secretary-General to transmit General Assembly resolution 35/147 to the Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament, to be held from 7 June to 9 July 1982;

2. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-seventh session the item entitled "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East".

Nuclear weapons and Israel

REPORT BY THE GROUP OF EXPERTS. The Group of Experts to Prepare a Study on Israeli Nuclear Armament, appointed by the Secretary-General in accordance with a 1979 General Assembly resolution,⁽³⁾ submitted its study to the Secretary-General on 19 June 1981⁽¹⁾ and he transmitted it to the Assembly in September. The five-member Group held four sessions: one in 1980⁽⁵⁾ and the rest in 1981- 19 to 30 January and 20 April to 4 May at United Nations Headquarters, and 15 to 19 June at Geneva.

The study consisted of an introduction, four main chapters—on Israel's nuclear development, its nuclear-weapon potential, factors affecting its nuclear policy and international reports concerning its nuclear armament—and conclusions.

The experts observed that Israel had failed to adhere to the non-proliferation Treaty⁽²⁾ and to submit all of its nuclear facilities to international inspection, and had also appeared to undermine the credibility of the nuclear safeguards supervised by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), particularly by the bombing of an Iraqi nuclear reactor which was under IAEA safeguards (p. 53).

The report stated that although Israeli authorities had not supplied information on the major part of Israel's nuclear programme and activities, there was no doubt, given its technical skills and infrastructure, that the country had the technical capability to manufacture nuclear weapons and possessed the means of delivering such weapons to targets in the area. Whereas Israel could be moved by a number of cogent arguments to refrain from acquiring nuclear weapons, various considerations might be thought to prompt it to acquire them. Israel's apparent posture of deliberate ambiguity in that regard might contribute to instability in the region and could be an obstacle to creating the confidence necessary for a political settlement there.

The Group of Experts stated that, on the basis of available authoritative information, it was not able to conclude definitively whether or not Israel currently possessed nuclear weapons. However, the experts did not doubt that, if Israel had not already crossed the threshold, it had the capability to manufacture nuclear weapons within a short time. The Group believed that it would contribute to avoiding the danger of a nuclear-arms race in the Middle East if Israel should renounce the possession of or any intention to possess nuclear weapons and agree to submit all its nuclear activities to international safeguards.

GENERAL ASSEMBLY ACTION. In a resolution on Israeli nuclear armament,⁽⁴⁾ adopted on 9 December by a recorded vote of 101 to 2, with

39 abstentions, the General Assembly expressed deep alarm that the Secretary-General's report (to which the study by the Group of Experts was annexed) had established Israel's technical capability to manufacture nuclear weapons and its possession of means of delivery. Expressing concern that Israel had undermined the credibility of IAEA nuclear safeguards, the Assembly reaffirmed that Israel's attack on Iraqi nuclear facilities and Israel's capability were a serious destabilizing factor in the Middle East. It requested the Security Council to prohibit all nuclear co-operation with Israel and to institute enforcement action to prevent it from endangering peace and security by its nuclear-weapon capability, and called on States and others to terminate such co-operation. It demanded that Israel renounce any possession of nuclear weapons and place all its nuclear activities under international safeguards.

The text, sponsored by 18 Arab and other States, was approved by the First Committee on 24 November by a recorded vote of 93 to 2, with 32 abstentions.

Before acting on the text as a whole, the Assembly took a separate recorded vote on operative paragraphs 5, 6 and 7, on nuclear co-operation with Israel and Security Council enforcement action, and adopted them by 89 to 21, with 30 abstentions. The same paragraphs were approved in Committee by a recorded vote of 82 to 17, with 25 abstentions.

Introducing the proposal, Iraq remarked that it was based principally on the report of the Group of Experts and was a culmination of efforts to condemn Israeli nuclear armament.

Israel, voting against the resolution, described it as one-sided and hypocritical. The resolution establishing the Group had been discriminatory in selecting Israel alone for study, and the terms of reference, referring to "Israeli nuclear armament", had been prejudicial. The Group consisted of four political scientists and only one nuclear physicist, who happened to be an Arab. Iraq's insistence in forcing resolutions condemning Israel was inspired by the contingencies of inter-Arab rivalry and the need to divert attention from its own frenetic nuclear activities.

The United States, also voting against, said that targeting one country for sanctions was not an appropriate approach to the goal of non-proliferation, and objected to any attempt to engage the Security Council in what it called an unbalanced and politically motivated activity.

Several States which abstained in the vote, namely Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, New Zealand, Portugal and Sweden, regretted the formulations of the three paragraphs put to a separate vote. The objections

were that the text failed to respect the division of responsibilities between the Assembly and the Security Council (Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, New Zealand, Sweden); did not differentiate between military and peaceful applications of nuclear energy when it called for an end to nuclear co-operation (Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Portugal); did not adequately reflect the conclusions by the Group of Experts (Belgium, Federal Republic of Germany); and referred to a question—the Israeli attack on Iraqi nuclear facilities—that had no bearing on the nuclear capability of Israel (Belgium). The Ivory Coast said it had abstained because nuclear disarmament, regional or world-wide, required a balanced approach.

Other States which supported the resolution as a whole—Argentina, the Bahamas and Spain—also expressed reservations regarding some of the language of the three paragraphs, on which they abstained; Argentina also recalled its reservations regarding the non-proliferation Treaty, as did Spain regarding the leeway given to States to choose whether to adhere to that Treaty.

Egypt, which abstained in the Committee vote but voted in favour in the Assembly, said the recent attitude of certain Arab countries could jeopardize efforts to put an end to any nuclear armament in the region. Voting in favour, the USSR stated that IAEA safeguards were sound and effective, and that Israel's bandit-like attack on the Iraqi nuclear centre could not be taken as an indication of their inadequacy.

Mexico, Panama, Peru and Venezuela, though they voted affirmatively in the vote on three paragraphs, stated that if there had been a separate vote on each paragraph they would have abstained on paragraph 7, requesting Security Council enforcement action against Israel.

In the First Committee debate, Iraq asserted that the report of the Group of Experts had confirmed that the Zionist entity had enough political reasons to produce nuclear weapons so as to annex further Arab territories and establish Zionist settlements; it possessed nuclear weapons and had established a nuclear alliance with Taiwan and South Africa. Somalia believed Israel should not be afforded the benefits of nuclear or military co-operation while it continued to flaunt its contempt for international law. According to the Sudan, available information about Israel's reactor at Dimona confirmed that Israel possessed nuclear weapons of the capacity of the bomb dropped on Nagasaki, Japan, in 1945, as well as the capability of producing more bombs and developing delivery systems.

Publication: ⁽¹⁾ Study on Israeli Nuclear Armament, Disarma-

ment Study Series 6 (A/36/431), Sales No. E.82.IX.2.

Resolutions: GA: ⁽²⁾2373(XXII), annex, 12 June 1968 (YUN 1968, p. 17); ⁽³⁾34/89, 11 Dec. 1979 (YUN 1979, P. 59); ⁽⁴⁾36/98, 9 Dec. 1981, text following.

Yearbook reference: ⁽⁵⁾1980, p. 43.

Meeting records: GA: 1st Committee, A/C.1/36/PV.3 & Corr.1, 4-10, 12-26, 34, 36, 37, 42 (19 Oct.-24 Nov.); plenary, A/36/PV.91 (9 Dec.).

General Assembly resolution 36/98

101-2-39 (recorded vote) Meeting 91 9 December 1981
Approved by First Committee (A/36/757) by recorded vote (93-2-32),
24 November (meeting 42); 18-nation draft (A/C.1/36/L.30); agenda
item 56.

Sponsors: Bahrain, Chad, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Sudan, United Arab Emirates, Yemen.

Israeli nuclear armament

The General Assembly.

Recalling its relevant resolutions on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East,

Recalling also its resolutions 33/71 A of 14 December 1978 on military and nuclear collaboration with Israel and 34/89 of 11 December 1979 and 35/157 of 12 December 1980 on Israeli nuclear armament,

Alarmed by the increasing evidence regarding Israel's attempts to acquire nuclear weapons,

Noting with concern that Israel has persistently refused to adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons despite repeated calls by the General Assembly and the Security Council to place its nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards,

Recalling Security Council resolution 487(1981) of 19 June 1981,

Recalling the resolution adopted on 12 June 1981 by the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency and resolution GC(XXV)/RES/381 adopted on 26 September 1981 by the General Conference of the Agency, in which the Conference, inter alia, considered the Israeli act of aggression as an attack against the Agency and its safeguards regime and decided to suspend the provision of any assistance to Israel.

Recalling its repeated condemnation of the nuclear collaboration between Israel and South Africa,

Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General transmitting the study of the Group of Experts to Prepare a Study on Israeli Nuclear Armament,

1. Expresses its appreciation to the Secretary-General for his report on Israeli nuclear armament;

2. Expresses its deep alarm at the fact that the report has established that Israel has the technical capability to manufacture nuclear weapons and possesses the means of delivery of such weapons;

3. Also expresses its deep concern that Israel has undermined the credibility of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, in particular by the bombing of the Iraqi nuclear facilities which were under Agency safeguards;

4. Reaffirms that Israel's attack on the Iraqi nuclear facilities and Israel's capability constitute a serious destabilizing factor in an already tense situation in the Middle East, and a grave danger to international peace and security;

5. Requests the Security Council to prohibit all forms of co-operation with Israel in the nuclear field;

6. Calls upon all States and other parties and institutions to terminate forthwith all nuclear collaboration with Israel;

7. Requests the Security Council to institute effective enforcement action against Israel so as to prevent it from endangering international peace and security by its nuclear-weapon capability;

8. Demands that Israel should renounce, without delay, any possession of nuclear weapons and place all its nuclear activities under international safeguards;

9. Requests the Secretary-General to give maximum publicity to the report on Israel nuclear armament and to distribute it to Member States, the specialized agencies and the International Atomic Energy Agency and non-governmental organizations, so that the international community and public opinion may be fully aware of the danger inherent in Israel's nuclear capability;

10. Also requests the Secretary-General to follow closely Israeli military nuclear activity and to report thereon as appropriate;

11. Further requests the Secretary-General to transmit the report on Israeli nuclear armament to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament;

12. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-seventh session the item entitled "Israeli nuclear armament".

Recorded vote in Assembly as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Benin, Bhutan, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burundi, Byelorussian SSR, Cape Verde, Chad, China, Comoros, & Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Gabon, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guinea Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia.

Against: Israel, United States.

Abstaining: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Belize, Burma, Canada, Central African Republic, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Fiji, Finland, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Luxembourg, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Portugal, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Swaziland, Sweden, United Kingdom, Uruguay.

Israeli attack on Iraqi nuclear facilities

In the Committee on Disarmament,⁽¹⁾ many members condemned the Israeli air attack of 7 June 1981 against Iraq's nuclear facilities near Baghdad (p. 275). The Group of 21 (p. 31) said the attack challenged the inherent right of States to develop nuclear technology for peaceful purposes; the Group rejected the idea that peaceful nuclear energy programmes in developing countries inevitably led to nuclear-weapon proliferation. A group of socialist States called for a halt to nuclear assistance to Israel and urged examination of the question of strengthening international provisions for the protection of civilian nuclear installations against military attacks.

The Security Council condemned the Israeli attack on 19 June.⁽⁷⁾

On 13 November, the General Assembly condemned Israel for a premeditated and unprecedented act of aggression, warned Israel to cease its threats and commission of armed attacks against nuclear facilities, reiterated its call that States cease providing arms which enabled Israel to commit aggression, and requested the Security Council to investigate Israel's nuclear

activities and the collaboration of others in those activities.⁽⁴⁾ Also, in an 11 November resolution on IAEA,⁽³⁾ the Assembly described the attack as a serious threat to IAEA safeguards and to the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and called on all States to refrain from armed attacks on nuclear installations.

On 9 December, by a resolution⁽⁶⁾ introduced by Iraq on behalf of the Arab Group under the item on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East (p. 49), the Assembly stated that the Israeli military attack on Iraqi nuclear installations adversely affected prospects for establishment of such a zone. The Assembly declared it imperative that Israel forthwith place all its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. The resolution was adopted by a recorded vote of 107 to 2, with 31 abstentions.

When Iraq introduced the 9 December resolution at a plenary meeting, it asserted that the resolution on a Middle East zone which the Assembly also adopted on that date⁽⁵⁾ was purely procedural and did not take due account of the dangerous developments in the region, particularly the unprecedented Israeli act of aggression against the Iraqi nuclear installations. That assault had grave effects on the non-proliferation Treaty⁽²⁾ and on the IAEA safeguards system. Israel, having taken the law into its own hands, should not be allowed to repeat such destructive actions or to dictate its own formula as to the proper modalities for establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region.

Israel, which voted against the resolution, viewed the proposal as a revival of the amendments Qatar had submitted to the Egyptian draft resolution on a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East; since no zone would be established without consensus, Iraq's action raised doubts about its intentions. The United States, also voting against, considered the Iraqi text to be improper and disruptive; harping on a subject already dealt with at length in the Security Council served no good purpose.

Argentina did not participate in the vote, stating that it did not share the aim of the text to impose full-scope safeguards on a country by means of an Assembly resolution. India, while condemning the Israeli attack, abstained in the vote because of its opposition to discriminatory agreements such as the non-proliferation Treaty and to nuclear safeguards deriving therefrom.

Canada, though condemning the attack, abstained in the vote as it did not believe that the incident should be allowed to affect either the future of the non-proliferation Treaty or the prospects for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East—a view shared by the United Kingdom, speaking

for the European Community members. Costa Rica, which supported the establishment of the zone, abstained because it did not believe the Israeli attack was the only threat to non-proliferation in the region. Finland felt that the attack made the establishment of the zone more urgent, but that the Iraqi proposal did not contribute to that objective.

Albania voted in favour in order to condemn the attack, but reaffirmed its continuing reservations in respect of nuclear-weapon-free zones and the non-proliferation Treaty. Austria voted affirmatively in the conviction that adequate safeguard arrangements for all nuclear installations in all States of the Middle East would greatly facilitate the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone. Brazil, while supporting the text and its condemnation of the attack, remarked that the non-proliferation Treaty could not constitute the basis for serious steps to achieve the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones.

During the First Committee debate on establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, Austria, Japan, Malaysia, Nepal, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Pakistan, Somalia and Tunisia regarded the Israeli attack as a challenge to or as undermining the IAEA safeguards system, while Mauritania and Oman asserted that the incident demonstrated the ineffectiveness or failure of that system. Ireland saw it as an attack on the effort to consolidate an international regime against nuclear proliferation. According to China, the assault had created new difficulties for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. Poland saw the attack as hindering efforts to draft a treaty banning radiological weapons.

Austria said that any unilateral military action to prevent nuclear activities of other countries posed a severe threat to the regime of the non-proliferation Treaty and might even provoke regional nuclear-arms races. Belgium stated that when a verification mechanism existed, as was the case under the Treaty, it could not accept calling into question the validity of controls such as those exercised by IAEA.

Report: ⁽¹⁾Committee on Disarmament, A/36/27 (Committee documents, CD/228, appendix II, vols. I, II).

Resolutions: GA: ⁽²⁾2373(XXII), annex, 12 June 1968 (YUN 1968, P. 17); ⁽³⁾36/25, 11 Nov. 1981 (p. 713); ⁽⁴⁾36/27, 13 Nov. (p. 282); ⁽⁵⁾36/87 A, 9 Dec. (p. 50); ⁽⁶⁾36/87 B, 9 Dec., text following. ⁽⁷⁾SC: 487(1981), 19 June (p. 282).

Meeting records: GA: 1st Committee, A/C.1/36/PV.3 & Corr.1, 4-10, 12-26 (19 Oct.-4 Nov.); plenary, A/36/PV.91 (9 Dec.).

General Assembly resolution 36/87 B

107-2-31 (recorded vote) Meeting 91 9 December 1981
Draft by Iraq (A/30/L.53); agenda item 46.

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions concerning the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East,

Recalling also the recommendations for the establishment of such a zone in the Middle East consistent with paragraphs 60 to 63, in particular paragraph 63 (d) of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament,

Recalling further Security Council resolution 487(1981) of 19 June 1981,

Taking into consideration the resolution adopted on 12 June 1981 by the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency and resolution GC(XXV)/RES/381 adopted on 26 September 1981 by the General Conference of the Agency,

Recalling further the report of the Secretary-General concerning Israeli nuclear armament,

Realizing that adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons by all parties of the region will be conducive to a speedy establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone,

Deeply concerned that the future of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in the region has been gravely endangered by the attack carried out by Israel, which is not a party to the Treaty, on the nuclear installations of Iraq, which is a party to that Treaty,

1. Considers that the Israeli military attack on the Iraqi nuclear installations adversely affects the prospects of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East;

2. Declares that it is imperative, in this respect, that Israel place forthwith all its nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards;

3. Requests the Secretary-General to transmit the present resolution to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament.

Recorded vote in Assembly as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Benin, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burundi, Byelorussian SSR, Cape Verde, Chad, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Hungary, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia.

Against: Israel, United States.

Abstaining: Australia, Belgium, Belize, Canada, Central African Republic, Chile, Costa Rica, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Fiji, Finland, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Solomon Islands, Swaziland, Sweden, United Kingdom.

South Asia

In September 1981 the Secretary-General submitted a report,⁽¹⁾ as requested by the General Assembly in December 1980,⁽²⁾ on the proposed establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia. He said he had been in contact with States of the region and that there had been no request by them for his assistance regarding the subject. In the course of those contacts, a view

had been expressed that he should continue to be available for that purpose.

On 9 December 1981, the Assembly reaffirmed its endorsement, in principle, of the concept of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia.⁽³⁾ It again urged States in the region and interested neighbouring non-nuclear-weapon States to continue to make all possible efforts to establish such a zone and to refrain, in the mean time, from any action contrary to that objective. Also by this resolution, adopted by a recorded vote of 93 to 3, with 44 abstentions, the Assembly called on nuclear-weapon States to respond positively to the proposal and to co-operate in efforts to establish the zone.

The First Committee approved the text on 25 November by a recorded vote of 82 to 2, with 38 abstentions.

The resolution was sponsored by Pakistan, which asserted that South Asia was a distinct region, fully qualified to pursue the objective of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone. Moreover, as countries of the region had more than once unilaterally declared their commitment to nuclear non-proliferation, it should be possible to translate those commitments into a joint declaration.

India cast a negative vote, stating that the proposal did not meet internationally recognized principles for the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones, particularly in that the initiative must come from the States of the region; in its view, South Asia was a contiguous and integral part of the Asia-Pacific region, where foreign bases were being maintained and different countries had different perceptions and security concerns. Also voting against the text, Bhutan stressed the importance of consultation to bring about an agreement among all the States concerned, which even after eight years had not been achieved.

Among States which abstained in the vote, the Bahamas and Sweden cited the lack of agreement among all States of the region, although the two States accepted the concept of a zone in principle. Australia and Brazil considered it essential that all States of the region participate on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at and negotiated among themselves; Australia believed that the zone should respect accepted principles of international law and be fully verifiable, while Brazil added that there should be a commitment among the nuclear Powers not to interfere in the negotiations.

Bangladesh, which voted in favour, stated that contacts and consultations must take place among the States concerned in order to ensure unanimity on the issue, including such aspects as defining the limits of such a zone. Sri Lanka,

which also supported the text, believed the zone could be viable provided that it had the consent, support and co-operation of all countries in the region. Japan and the United States reiterated their support of nuclear-weapon-free zones initiated by the States concerned, and considered that under appropriate conditions the zone could contribute to both non-proliferation and the promotion of peace and security. The Netherlands, supporting the proposal, called on the States in the region and other interested States to start consultations on arrangements to ensure that nuclear explosions were ruled out, and to refrain in the mean time from action contrary to that goal; but it wondered whether requirements such as geographical delimitation and full participation by the States concerned could be met under current circumstances.

During the First Committee debate, Democratic Kampuchea declared that the situation resulting from the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea and the USSR invasion of Afghanistan prevented the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia.

Report: ⁽¹⁾S-G, A/36/408.

Resolutions: GA: (2)35/148, para. 4, 12 Dec. 1980 (YUN 1980, p. 68); ⁽³⁾36/88, 9 Dec. 1981, text following.

Meeting records: GA: 1st Committee. A/C.1/36/PV.3 & Corr.1, 4-10, 12-26, 31, 44 (19 Oct.-25 Nov.); plenary, A/36/PV.91 (9 Dec.).

General Assembly resolution 36/88

93-3-44 (recorded vote) Meeting 91 9 December 1981
Approved by First Committee (A/36/748) by recorded vote (82-2-38), 25 November (meeting 44); draft by Pakistan (A/C.1/36/L.18); agenda item 47.

Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 3265 B (XXIX) of 9 December 1974, 3476 B (XXX) of 11 December 1975, 31/73 of 10 December 1976, 32/83 of 12 December 1977, 33/65 of 14 December 1978, 34/78 of 11 December 1979 and 35/148 of 12 December 1980 concerning the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia,

Reiterating its conviction that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions of the world is one of the measures which can contribute most effectively to the objectives of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and general and complete disarmament,

Believing that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia, as in other regions, will strengthen the security of the States of the region against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Noting the declarations issued at the highest level by Governments of South Asian States reaffirming their undertaking not to acquire or manufacture nuclear weapons and to devote their nuclear programmes exclusively to the economic and social advancement of their peoples,

Recalling that in the above-mentioned resolutions it called upon the States of the South Asian region and such other neighbouring non-nuclear-weapon States as might be interested to make all possible efforts to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia and to refrain, in the mean time, from any action contrary to this objective.

Further recalling that, in its resolutions 3265 B (XXIX),

31/73 and 32/83, it requested the Secretary-General to convene a meeting for the purpose of the consultations mentioned therein and to render such assistance as might be required to promote the efforts for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia.

Bearing in mind the provisions of paragraphs 60 to 63 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament, regarding the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, including in the region of South Asia.

Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia,

1. Reaffirms its endorsement, in principle, of the concept of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia;

2. Urges once again the States of South Asia and such other neighbouring non-nuclear-weapon States as may be interested to continue to make all possible efforts to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia and to refrain, in the mean time, from any action contrary to this objective;

3. Calls upon those nuclear-weapon States which have not done so to respond positively to this proposal and to extend the necessary co-operation in the efforts to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia;

4. Requests the Secretary-General to render such assistance as may be required to promote the efforts for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia and to report on the subject to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament as well as at its thirty-seventh session;

5. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-seventh session the item entitled "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia".

Recorded vote in Assembly as follows:

In favour: Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Burundi, Canada, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, Germany, Federal Republic of Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, United States, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Zaire, Zambia.

Against: Bhutan, India, Mauritius.

Abstaining: Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Byelorussian SSR, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Congo, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ethiopia, Fiji, France, German Democratic Republic, Grenada, Guinea-Bissau, Hungary, Indonesia, Israel, Italy, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Madagascar, Mongolia, Mozambique, Norway, Poland, Samoa,^a Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Sweden, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, United Kingdom, Viet Nam, Yugoslavia.

^a Later advised the Secretariat it had intended to vote in favour.

Non-stationing of nuclear weapons

Expressing regret that little progress had been made in the Committee on Disarmament, the General Assembly, by a resolution adopted on 9 December 1981,⁽²⁾ again requested the Committee to proceed without delay to talks with a view to elaborating an international agreement on the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there were no such weapons. The Assembly called on all nuclear-weapon States to refrain from further action involving the stationing of nuclear weapons on the territo-

ries of other States. This resolution, sponsored by 19 States, was adopted by a recorded vote of 84 to 18, with 42 abstentions, following its approval by the First Committee on 25 November by a recorded vote of 67 to 17, with 38 abstentions.

Introducing the resolution, Hungary stated that the conclusion of an international agreement on the non-stationing of nuclear weapons would strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation régime and could contribute to the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and to reducing the danger of nuclear war. Recent decisions to deploy nuclear weapons in States where there were none and to deploy additional nuclear weapons in States where they already existed had increased the importance and timeliness of the question. As the Committee on Disarmament had been unable to deal appropriately with the question, efforts must continue towards the elaboration and conclusion of an international agreement.

Belgium explained its negative vote on the ground that the text would prevent States from exercising the right of collective self-defence as provided for in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations. Japan also cast a negative vote, asserting that the measures proposed might destabilize the international military balance and thereby prove detrimental to the maintenance of peace and security.

Of the States which abstained, Brazil observed that the proposal failed to include the specific requirement of withdrawal and elimination of nuclear weapons from the territories of States where such weapons already existed. Brazil, Peru and Yugoslavia considered that an international agreement such as the one contemplated in the resolution could, therefore, confer legality on the existence of nuclear weapons on the territories of countries that already possessed them. Peru thought the right approach was the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones. Greece felt that the subject of the resolution should be dealt with in a broader, global context, founded on the sovereign right of every country freely to decide on questions concerning its own collective or individual defence. Ireland wished to avoid taking sides on strategic issues between the two alliances. Sweden considered that the question of non-stationing could not be dealt with in isolation and security arrangements; also, a serious problem of credibility and consistency arose when the USSR co-sponsored a resolution against the stationing of nuclear weapons on new territories after a Soviet submarine, in all probability carrying a nuclear warhead, had recently violated Swedish territorial waters and penetrated into a militarily restricted area.

Albania did not participate in the vote, as it considered the resolution to be part of the rivalry between the two major nuclear Powers, aimed at securing advantages over the adversary.

India stated that its affirmative vote was without prejudice to its consistent support for the total elimination of all nuclear weapons, wherever deployed; consequently, it viewed the proposal as only one aspect of the problem of achieving nuclear disarmament and not as an end in itself. Similarly, the Sudan declared that its support should not be construed as acceptance of the existence of nuclear weapons currently on some territories or acceptance of any attempt to legalize such existence. Finland, while voting in favour, took exception to the request that nuclear-weapon States refrain from stationing nuclear weapons on the territories of other States and to a preambular paragraph by which the Assembly expressed alarm at nuclear weapon build-ups in other States; those clauses, it said, were intended to prejudice the Geneva talks on intermediate-range nuclear forces in Europe. The Niger said its affirmative vote did not diminish its resolve not to accept foreign dication on the means of ensuring its security.

In the First Committee debate, Czechoslovakia supported a USSR initiative for an agreement not to increase the number of nuclear weapons where such arsenals already existed. Also endorsing this idea, the German Democratic Republic said the introduction of additional foreign nuclear weapons in States which already had some on their territory would do great harm to confidence and stability, and undermine the security of the areas of deployment. The USSR said the 1980 General Assembly call for the beginning of talks on the question⁽¹⁾ had not been heeded owing to the obstructionist position of a number of Western States and China.

Resolutions: GA: ⁽¹⁾35/156 C, para. 1, 12 Dec. 1980 (YUN 1980, p. 68); ⁽²⁾36/97 E, 9 Dec. 1981, text following.

Meeting records: GA: 1st Committee, A/C.1/36/PV.3 & Corr.1, 4-10, 12-26, 31, 34, 43 (19 Oct.-25 Nov.); plenary, A/36/PV.91 (9 Dec.).

General Assembly resolution 36/97 E

84-18-42 (recorded vote) Meeting 91 9 December 1981
Approved by First Committee (A/36/756) by recorded vote (67-17-38), 25 November (meeting 43); 19-nation draft (A/C.1/36/L.20); agenda item 55 (d).

Sponsors: Afghanistan, Angola, Bulgaria, Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Ethiopia, German Democratic Republic, Guinea, Hungary, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Madagascar, Mongolia, Mozambique, Poland, Romania, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, Viet Nam.

Non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present
The General Assembly,

Conscious that a nuclear war would have devastating consequences for the whole of mankind,

Recalling its resolution 33/91 F of 16 December 1978, which contains an appeal to all nuclear-weapon States to

refrain from stationing nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present, and to all non-nuclear-weapon States which do not have nuclear weapons on their territories to refrain from any steps which would directly or indirectly result in the stationing of such weapons on their territories,

Recalling further its resolution 35/156 C of 12 December 1980, in which it requested the Committee on Disarmament to proceed without delay to talks with a view to elaborating an international agreement on the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present,

Noting with regret that this appeal by the General Assembly remains unheeded,

Considering that the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present would constitute a step towards the larger objective of the subsequent complete withdrawal of nuclear weapons from the territories of other States, thus contributing to the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons and leading eventually to the total elimination of nuclear weapons,

Bearing in mind the clearly expressed intention of many States to prevent the stationing of nuclear weapons on their territories,

Deeply alarmed by plans and practical steps leading to a build-up of nuclear-weapon arsenals on the territories of other States,

1. Requests once again the Committee on Disarmament to proceed without delay to talks with a view to elaborating an international agreement on the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present;

2. Calls upon all nuclear-weapon States to refrain from further action involving the stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of other States;

3. Requests the Secretary-General to transmit to the Committee on Disarmament all documents relating to the discussion of this question by the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session;

4. Requests the Committee on Disarmament to submit a report on the question to the General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session;

5. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-seventh session the item entitled "Non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present: report of the Committee on Disarmament".

Recorded vote in Assembly as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Angola, Argentina, Bahrain, Barbados, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Burundi, Byelorussian SSR, Cape Verde, Chad, Chile, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, German Democratic Republic, Grenada, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Panama, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Seychelles, Solomon Islands, Sudan, Swaziland, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia.

Against: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States.

Abstaining: Algeria, Austria, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Belize, Brazil, Burma, Central African Republic, Colombia, Comoros, Costa Rica, Djibouti, Gabon, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Ireland, Israel, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Lebanon, Mauritania, Morocco, Nepal, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Samoa, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, Yugoslavia, Zaire.

Security guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon States

CONSIDERATION BY THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT. In 1981, the Committee on Disarmament⁽¹⁾ considered an agenda item entitled "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons", both in plenary meetings and in an Ad Hoc Working Group re-established for that purpose on 12 February.

The Ad Hoc Working Group on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons held 23 meetings between 17 February and 13 August. It decided to concentrate on the substance of assurances and followed a two-stage approach: (1) identification of the various features of assurances; and (2) consideration of possible alternatives which could be explored in the search for a "common approach" or "formula".

In the conclusions and recommendations of its report, which the Committee adopted on 20 August, the Working Group reaffirmed that non-nuclear-weapon States should be effectively assured by nuclear-weapon States in this regard. However, negotiations on the substance of effective arrangements had revealed differing perceptions by some nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States as well as the complexities involved in finding a common formula. The Group recognized that adequate consideration must be given to the security interests of non-nuclear-weapon States, and regarded the efforts devoted to the search for a common approach or formula as a positive step towards agreement on the question of security assurances.

Against that background, the Working Group recommended that a similar group be established at the beginning of the Committee's 1982 session to explore alternatives and seek a common formula which could be included in a legally binding international instrument.

GENERAL ASSEMBLY ACTION. On 9 December, the General Assembly adopted two resolutions concerning security guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon States. By the first, it called for declarations by nuclear-weapon States as a first step towards an international convention; by the second, it recommended continued negotiations to find a common approach or formula.

The call addressed to nuclear-weapon States in the first of these resolutions⁽²⁾ was that they make declarations on the non-use of nuclear weapons against States having no such weapons on their territories, as a first step towards an international convention. The declarations, if they all met their objective, would be approved by the Security Council. Meanwhile, the Committee on Disarma-

ment was requested to continue negotiations on the subject, and participating States were called on to make efforts for the elaboration and conclusion of a convention.

The Assembly adopted this resolution by a recorded vote of 115 to 17, with 12 abstentions. The text was approved in the First Committee on 23 November by a recorded vote of 93 to 16, with 14 abstentions. It had 10 sponsors and was introduced by Bulgaria.

By the second resolution,⁽⁴⁾ the Assembly appealed to all States, especially the nuclear-weapon States, to demonstrate the necessary political will to reach agreement on a common approach, and particularly a common formula which could be included in a legally binding international instrument. The Assembly recommended a further search for such a common approach or formula, including continued negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament, taking into account the widespread support for an international convention and giving consideration to any other proposals having the same objective.

This resolution, sponsored and revised by Pakistan, was adopted by a recorded vote of 145 to none, with 3 abstentions, following its approval in the First Committee on 25 November by a recorded vote of 121 to none, with 4 abstentions.

When Bulgaria introduced the first of these resolutions, it stated that total nuclear disarmament would be the most effective and credible security guarantee to non-nuclear-weapon and all other States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Pending attainment of that objective, banning the use of nuclear weapons concurrently with the renunciation of the use of force in international relations would be a radical solution to the problem of strengthening the security of non-nuclear-weapon States.

Pakistan, introducing the second resolution, stated that interim assurances were needed pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons. In the effort to arrive at a common formula for such assurances, the strategic doctrines of the major nuclear Powers had thus far presented insurmountable obstacles. Their unilateral declarations expressed their narrowly conceived security concerns, whereas effective assurances would have to be unconditional and legally binding. Pakistan thought the most reasonable modality could be the adoption of an international convention, and disagreed with the suggestion that incorporating the existing unilateral declarations of the major nuclear Powers in a Security Council or General Assembly resolution could serve as the effective arrangement sought by the non-nuclear-weapon States.

Turkey voted against the resolution calling for declarations by nuclear-weapon States; referring

to a preambular paragraph expressing concern at plans for stationing nuclear weapons on other States' territories, it said provisions relating to the defence posture of the two alliances were alien to the concept of security assurances.

Explaining its abstention in the vote on this resolution, Austria said the Working Group's difficulties in finding a common approach stemmed from placing too much emphasis on the security concerns of the nuclear-weapon States. Austria and Ireland, which also abstained, objected that the resolution favoured the idea of an international convention, which seemed to imply further obligations for non-nuclear-weapon States. Sweden abstained for similar reasons, remarking that most non-nuclear-weapon States had adhered to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons⁽²⁾ and there was no reason for them to undertake further obligations. The Niger said that merely calling for declarations from the nuclear-weapon States did not offer all the necessary guarantees that would be contained in the text of a convention recommended by the Committee on Disarmament.

Among those which voted for the resolution, Argentina none the less had doubts about the value of either unilateral declarations or a Security Council resolution and said that, had separate votes been taken on the paragraphs referring to such concepts, it would have abstained in those votes. Brazil reiterated that the reference in the text to non-stationing of nuclear weapons on territories of States where none existed should not be understood as legitimizing the presence of such weapons in States where they already existed.

Austria voted for the resolution calling for continued negotiations towards a common formula because it found the reference to the idea of a convention more balanced and moderate than in the other text or in past Assembly resolutions. Sweden supported the resolution for similar reasons. Canada and France also voted affirmatively, though they feared that some provisions could prejudice the responsibility of the Committee on Disarmament for determining its own procedures. While voting in favour, Japan voiced reservations about the resolution's references to a specific modality of security assurances. Finland voted for both resolutions in the conviction that all approaches to non-use assurances—also referred to as “negative security guarantees”—should continue to be explored, including unilateral declarations and multilateral agreements. The Ivory Coast, which abstained in the First Committee vote but voted in favour in the Assembly action on security assurances, asserted that the best guarantee lay in disarmament itself.

In the First Committee debate, a number of non-nuclear-weapon States were critical of the assurances which nuclear Powers had given or might be willing to give in future. Algeria remarked that negotiations on this topic were focused on the extensive restrictions most nuclear Powers intended to impose on non-nuclear-weapon States rather than on the assurances to be given to those States. Finland asserted that the current unilateral assurances fell short of the goal of effective international arrangements, not to speak of legally binding instruments, and that they were functions of the respective military doctrines and diluted by political and legal reservations. Pakistan said it could not accept any proposition which provided the illusion rather than the substance of security assurances while attempting to secure additional obligations on the part of non-nuclear-weapon States. Observing that the Working Group of the Committee on Disarmament had been trying to reconcile the unilateral declarations of the major Powers with the just demands for security of the non-nuclear-weapon States, Venezuela remarked that, if different viewpoints were to be reconciled, it must be realized that all States had the right to security and not just a few because of their military power.

Since many non-nuclear-weapon States were facing a serious nuclear threat, said China, the nuclear-weapon countries should unconditionally guarantee not to use or threaten to use such weapons against any such State. France, however, was of the view that, in the absence of nuclear disarmament, assurances of the non-use of nuclear weapons could be granted only to States which did not possess such weapons, especially those in nuclear-weapon-free zones. Norway, arguing that existing guarantees were not sufficient for non-aligned States, held that such States which had been asked to renounce their own option to acquire nuclear weapons had a legitimate claim to guarantees against nuclear attack, and that the nuclear-weapon States bore a special responsibility for finding a solution.

Regarding the form and legal character of security assurances, Egypt, Kenya, Lebanon, Nepal, Qatar and Uganda emphasized the need for unconditional guarantees that would be unequivocal and legally binding. Austria asserted that only co-ordinated, binding commitments free of conditions and escape clauses would have the desired confidence-building effect; however, it had reservations on the idea of a convention. Italy and New Zealand confirmed their interest in identifying a common formula to be incorporated in a binding international instrument; Italy preferred this approach to either individual declarations by nuclear Powers or a single inter-

national juridical instrument embodying such declarations. The Netherlands noted that it had proposed such a formula for a Security Council resolution; while some non-nuclear-weapon States favoured a more ambitious approach, it was better to be satisfied with what was obtainable rather than reach for the impossible. Sweden suggested that the Assembly consider urging the Council to embody existing negative assurances in a resolution so as to make them legally binding.

Poland stated that consideration should be given to the adoption, as an interim measure, of identical declarations by the five nuclear Powers, confirmed by the Council. This approach was supported by Afghanistan, Bulgaria, the Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary and Nepal. The German Democratic Republic remarked that some nuclear-weapon States obviously did not want to admit any restriction on their options to use nuclear weapons.

The USSR continued to hold that, in the absence of nuclear disarmament, the most effective means to ensure the security of non-nuclear-weapon States would be a convention to assure the non-use of nuclear weapons against States which had no such weapons on their territory; States which made their territory available for the deployment of nuclear weapons undermined their own security, because they could not guarantee that a nuclear strike would not be launched from their territory, possibly provoking nuclear retaliation. The Byelorussian SSR remarked that the emphasis placed by certain Western Powers on the supposed impossibility of drafting a convention reflected a lack of desire and political will to give clear-cut guarantees. Mongolia regretted that the Committee on Disarmament had been unable to reach agreement on such a convention because of the negative position of certain Western nuclear Powers.

Romania and the United Republic of Cameroon called for action in 1982 to work out international arrangements for a system of guarantees covering all non-nuclear-weapon States.

Report: ⁽¹⁾Committee on Disarmament, A/36/27 (Committee documents, CD/228, appendix II, vols. I, II).

Resolutions: GA: ⁽²⁾2373(XXII), annex, 12 June 1968 (YUN 1968, p. 17); ⁽³⁾36/94, 9 Dec. 1981, text following; ⁽⁴⁾36/95, 9 Dec., text following.

Meeting records: GA: 1st Committee, A/C.1/36/PV.3 & Corr.1, 4-10, 12-26, 31, 32, 35, 38, 39, 44 (19 Oct.-25 Nov.); plenary, A/36/PV.91 (9 Dec.).

General Assembly resolution 36/94

115-17-12 (recorded vote) Meeting 91 9 December 1981

Approved by First Committee (A/36/754) by recorded vote (93-16-14), 23 November (meeting 39); 10-nation draft (A/C.1/36/L.10); agenda item 53.

Sponsors: Angola, Bulgaria, Byelorussian SSR, Congo, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Ethiopia, Mongolia, Nicaragua, USSR.

Conclusion of an international convention on the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons
The General Assembly,

Convinced of the need to take effective measures for the strengthening of the security of States and prompted by the desire shared by all nations to eliminate war and prevent nuclear conflagration,

Taking into account the principle of non-use of force or threat of force enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and reaffirmed in a number of United Nations declarations and resolutions,

Noting with satisfaction the desire of States in various regions to prevent nuclear weapons from being introduced into their territories, including through the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned, and being anxious to contribute to the attainment of this objective,

Considering that, until nuclear disarmament is achieved on a universal basis, it is imperative for the international community to develop effective measures to ensure the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons from any quarter,

Recognizing that effective measures to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons can constitute a positive contribution to the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons,

Mindful of the statements made and views expressed by various States on the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States,

Concerned at the continuing escalation of the arms race, in particular the nuclear-arms race, and the increased danger of recourse to the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Deeply concerned at the plans for further stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States that could directly affect the security of non-nuclear-weapon States,

Desirous of promoting the implementation of paragraph 59 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament, in which it urged the nuclear-weapon States to pursue efforts to conclude, as appropriate, effective arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Recalling its resolutions 33/72 of 14 December 1978, 34/84 and 34/85 of 11 December 1979, 35/154 and 35/155 of 12 December 1980 and the relevant provisions of its resolution 35/46 of 3 December 1980,

Noting the consideration by the Committee on Disarmament in 1981 of the item entitled "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons" and the setting up of an Ad Hoc Working Group to continue the negotiations on this item,

Recalling the drafts of an international convention submitted on that item to the Committee on Disarmament in 1979 and noting with satisfaction that the idea of concluding such a convention has received widespread international support,

Taking note of the report of the Committee on Disarmament, including the report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons,

Wishing to promote an early and successful completion of the negotiations on the elaboration of a convention on the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Noting further that the idea of interim arrangements as a first step towards the conclusion of such a convention has also been considered in the Committee on Disarmament, particularly in the form of a Security Council resolution on this subject, and recalling the recommendation made in that respect by the General Assembly in paragraph 6 of its resolution 35/154,

Mindful of the second special session devoted to disarmament, to be held from 7 June to 9 July 1982, at which the General Assembly will review the progress achieved in the field of disarmament, including the implementation of paragraph 59 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly,

1. Welcomes the conclusion of the Committee on Disarmament that there is continuing recognition of the urgent need to reach agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;

2. Notes with satisfaction that in the Committee on Disarmament there is once again no objection, in principle, to the idea of an international convention on this subject;

3. Requests the Committee on Disarmament to continue the negotiations on the question of strengthening the security guarantees of non-nuclear-weapon States during its session in 1982;

4. Calls upon all States participating in these negotiations to make efforts for the elaboration and conclusion of an international convention on this matter;

5. Calls once again upon all nuclear-weapon States to make solemn declarations, identical in substance, concerning the non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States having no such weapons on their territories, as a first step towards the conclusion of an international convention, and recommends that the Security Council should examine such declarations and, if they all meet the above-mentioned objective, should adopt an appropriate resolution approving them;

6. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-seventh session the item entitled "Conclusion of an international convention on the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons".

Recorded vote in Assembly as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burundi, Byelorussian SSR, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Grenada, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia.

Against: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States.

Abstaining: Austria, Burma, Greece, Guatemala, India, Ireland, Israel, Japan, Morocco, Sweden, Tunisia, Zaire.

General Assembly resolution 38/95

145-0-3 (recorded vote) Meeting 91 9 December 1981

Approved by First Committee (A/36/755) by recorded vote (121-0-4), 25 November (meeting 44): draft by Pakistan (A/C.1/36/L.17/Rev.1); agenda item 54.

Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons

The General Assembly,

Bearing in mind the need to allay the legitimate concern of the States of the world with regard to ensuring lasting security for their peoples,

Convinced that nuclear weapons pose the greatest threat to mankind and to the survival of civilization.

Deeply concerned at the continuing escalation of the arms race, in particular the nuclear-arms race,

Convinced that nuclear disarmament and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons are essential to remove the danger of nuclear war,

Taking into account the principle of the non-use of force or threat of force enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations,

Deeply concerned about the possibility of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Recognizing that the independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty of non-nuclear-weapon States need to be safeguarded against the use or threat of use of force, including the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Considering that, until nuclear disarmament is achieved on a universal basis, it is imperative for the international community to develop effective measures to ensure the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons from any quarter,

Recognizing that effective measures to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons can constitute a positive contribution to the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons,

Recalling its resolution 3261 G (XXIX) of 9 December 1974, Further recalling its resolution 31/189 C of 21 December 1976,

Bearing in mind paragraph 59 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament, in which it urged the nuclear-weapon States to pursue efforts to conclude, as appropriate, effective arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Desirous of promoting the implementation of the relevant provisions of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session,

Recalling its resolutions 33/72 of 14 December 1978, 34/85 of 11 December 1979 and 35/155 of 12 December 1980,

Further recalling paragraph 12 of the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade, contained in the annex to its resolution 35/46 of 3 December 1980, in which it is stated, *inter alia*, that all efforts should be exerted, therefore, by the Committee on Disarmament urgently to negotiate with a view to reaching agreement, and to submit agreed texts, where possible, before the second special session devoted to disarmament, on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Welcoming the in-depth negotiations undertaken in the Committee on Disarmament and its Ad Hoc Working Group on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, with a view to reaching agreement on this item,

Noting the proposals submitted under that item in the Committee on Disarmament, including the drafts of an international convention,

Taking note of the decision of the Sixth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Havana from 3 to 9 September 1979, as well as the relevant recommendations of the Eleventh and Twelfth Islamic Conferences of Foreign Ministers, held at Islamabad from 17 to 22 May 1980 and at Baghdad from 1 to 5 June 1981, respectively, calling upon the Committee on Disarmament to elaborate and reach an agreement on an international basis to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Further noting the support expressed in the Committee on Disarmament and in the General Assembly for the elaboration of an international convention to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, as well as the difficulties pointed out in evolving a common approach acceptable to all,

1. Reaffirms the urgent need to reach agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;

2. Notes with satisfaction that in the Committee on Disarmament there is no objection, in principle, to the idea of an international convention to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, although the difficulties as regards evolving a common approach acceptable to all have also been pointed out;

3. Appeals to all States, especially the nuclear-weapon States, to demonstrate the political will necessary to reach agreement on a common approach and, in particular, on a common formula which could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character;

4. Recommends that further intensive efforts should be devoted to the search for such a common approach or common formula and that the various alternative approaches, including in particular those considered during the session of the Committee on Disarmament held in 1981, should be further explored in order to overcome the difficulties;

5. Recommends that the Committee on Disarmament should actively continue negotiations with a view to reaching early agreement and concluding effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, taking into account the widespread support for the conclusion of an international convention and giving consideration to any other proposals designed to secure the same objective;

6. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-seventh session the item entitled "Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons".

Recorded vote in Assembly as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian SSR, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia,

Against: None.

Abstaining: India, United Kingdom, United States.

Proposed prohibition of the neutron bomb

CONSIDERATION BY THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT. During the 1981 session of the Committee on Disarmament, ⁽¹⁾ the question of the nuclear neutron weapon, also known as the enhanced radiation weapon, was raised in connection with the agenda item on nuclear disarmament. A group of socialist countries proposed

the establishment of an ad hoc working group on prohibition of production, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear neutron weapons, to negotiate a draft convention. The United States and other Western countries saw the enhanced radiation weapon as part of the general problem of nuclear disarmament; there was no reason to give it special treatment. Members of the Group of 21 (p. 31) emphasized the need for a working group on nuclear disarmament (p. 35).

Following consideration on 20 August of the proposal for a working group on the neutron weapon, the Chairman announced that there was no consensus for its adoption.

GENERAL ASSEMBLY ACTION. By a resolution of 9 December on prohibition of the nuclear neutron weapon,⁽²⁾ the General Assembly requested the Committee on Disarmament to start without delay negotiations in an appropriate organizational framework with a view to concluding a convention on prohibition of the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear neutron weapons. In adopting this text by a recorded vote of 68 to 14, with 57 abstentions, the Assembly further requested the Committee to report on the question to the Assembly in 1982.

The First Committee approved the 18-nation resolution on 23 November by a recorded vote of 58 to 13, with 40 abstentions.

Introducing the text, the German Democratic Republic said the idea that a qualitatively new type of weapon was to be added to an arsenal of the most dreadful weapons had prompted many Governments to call for its prohibition. The effects of that weapon were especially cruel and inhumane, and its production and deployment would aggravate the arms race and considerably increase the danger of a nuclear war. The sponsors viewed the decision to produce such weapons as a reflection of the doctrine of limited nuclear war.

Among those which voted against the text, France held that, since the weapon was part of the overall problem of nuclear disarmament, there was no reason to give it special consideration or provide for a special convention. The United States, calling the text misguided and hypocritical, declared that its own motivation to begin assembling the weapon lay in the massive USSR arms build-up, sustained over many years, which had turned the European military balance against democratic societies; contrary to what the resolution implied, the reduced-blast weapon, rather than making nuclear war more thinkable, would make aggression less so by adding to the credibility of deterrence and thus reducing the likelihood that nuclear weapons would be used in a conflict.

Albania did not participate in the vote because it felt the proposal was an attempt to use the

neutron weapon in polemics or bargaining which had nothing to do with real nuclear disarmament; neither the resolution nor a convention would serve any useful purpose, since neutron weapons were already part of the super-Powers' nuclear arsenals. Also not participating, China stated that the USSR's motive for giving separate prominence to the neutron weapon, instead of including it in overall negotiations on nuclear disarmament, was the fear of losing military superiority in Europe and a favourable position in future disarmament negotiations; further, China viewed past USSR proposals on prohibition of a particular type of weapon as attempts to camouflage its own development of that weapon.

Cyprus and Indonesia explained their affirmative votes as reflecting their support for any measure that would help prevent the development and production of another weapon of mass destruction. India, which voted in favour in line with its opposition to all nuclear weapons, said it was up to the Committee on Disarmament to determine the best means of dealing with the subject. The Niger, which supported the text in the First Committee but abstained in the Assembly vote, remarked that all nuclear weapons, whether they were termed offensive or defensive, represented the same danger for humanity.

Denmark and the Netherlands, which abstained in the vote, said that, while they would not accept the weapon on their soil, the resolution was politically inspired and sought to split the Western alliance. Argentina, Austria, Brazil, Egypt, Greece, Ireland, Pakistan, Peru, Sweden, Venezuela and Yugoslavia, which also abstained, found essentially that the resolution's approach in singling out one type of nuclear weapon did not serve a useful purpose and that the matter should be dealt with in the general context of nuclear disarmament. For similar reasons, Senegal did not participate in the vote.

In the First Committee debate, Afghanistan demanded that the United States reverse its decision to begin large-scale production of the neutron weapon. The Byelorussian SSR, Cuba and Poland stated that the weapon was unacceptable because it dangerously lowered the nuclear threshold and made nuclear war more likely. The Ukrainian SSR recalled that the socialist States of Eastern Europe and Mongolia had presented to the Committee on Disarmament in 1978 a draft convention to prohibit the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of neutron bombs.⁽³⁾ The USSR said it was ready to conclude an agreement prohibiting the manufacture and deployment of the neutron weapon, and favoured the adoption of a resolution to ban that weapon, not out of fear that the United States would come to possess it but because its intro-

duction would open the door to a new spiral in the arms race; the USSR would not begin to manufacture the weapon if other States did not possess it.

Rwanda said the neutron bomb must be banned, because it was certainly no gift to mankind. Sweden stated that there was every reason to denounce the decision to produce the neutron bomb, designed specifically for use in Europe.

Report: ⁽¹⁾Committee on Disarmament, A/36/27 (Committee documents, CD/228, appendix II, vols. I, II).

Resolution: ⁽²⁾GA, 36/92 K, 9 Dec., text following.

Yearbook reference: ⁽³⁾1978, p. 51.

Meeting records: GA: 1st Committee, A/C.1/36/PV.3 & Corr.1, 4-10, 12-26, 33, 34, 36, 38, 40 (19 Oct.-23 Nov.); plenary, A/36/PV.91 (9 Dec.).

General Assembly resolution 36/2 K

68-14-57 (recorded vote) Meeting 91 9 December 1981

Approved by First Committee (A/36/752) by recorded vote (56-13-40), 23 November (meeting 40): 18-nation draft (A/C.1/36/L.33); agenda item 51.

Sponsors: Angola, Bulgaria, Byelorussian SSR, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Ethiopia, German Democratic Republic, Grenada, Hungary, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Mongolia, Mozambique, Poland, Romania, Sao Tome and Principe, Ukrainian SSR, Viet Nam.

Prohibition of the nuclear neutron weapon

The General Assembly,

Recalling paragraph 47 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, in which it is stated that nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger to mankind and that it is essential to halt and reverse the nuclear-arms race in order to avert the danger of war involving nuclear weapons,

Stressing that the termination of the qualitative arms race and the use of scientific and technological achievements solely for peaceful purposes are in the interest of all States and peoples,

Sharing the world-wide concern over the production and intended deployment of nuclear neutron weapons expressed by numerous Member States and by many non-governmental organizations,

Considering that the introduction of the nuclear neutron weapon in the military arsenals of States escalates the nuclear-arms race and significantly lowers the threshold of nuclear war, thereby increasing the danger of such a war,

Aware of the inhumane effects of that weapon, which constitutes a grave threat, particularly for the unprotected civilian population,

Recalling the proposals for the prohibition of the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear neutron weapons,

Desiring to contribute to halting the arms race, particularly in the field of weapons of mass destruction.

1. Requests the Committee on Disarmament to start without delay negotiations in an appropriate organizational framework with a view to concluding a convention on the prohibition of the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear neutron weapons;

2. Requests the Secretary-General to transmit to the Committee on Disarmament all documents relating to the discussion of this question by the General Assembly at its, thirty-sixth session;

3. Requests the Committee on Disarmament to submit a report on this question to the General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session;

4. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-seventh session an item entitled "Prohibition of the nuclear neutron weapon".

Recorded vote in Assembly as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Bahrain, Benin, Bulgaria, Burundi, Byelorussian SSR, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Grenada, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Mali, Malta, Mexico, Mongolia, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Panama, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Vanuatu, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia.

Against: Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Portugal, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States.

Abstaining: Argentina, Austria, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Brazil, Burma, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Denmark, Djibouti, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Fiji, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Ireland, Jamaica, Lebanon, Malaysia, Maldives, Mauritania, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, Niger, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Sweden, Thailand, Tunisia, United Republic of Cameroon, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zaire.

Prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests

CONSIDERATION BY THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT. No consensus emerged in the Committee, on Disarmament during 1981 on proposals by the Group of 21 (p. 31) and by a group of socialist States to establish an ad hoc working group on a nuclear-test ban. Several Western members expressed a preference for leaving the topic to tripartite negotiations among the USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States, which had begun in 1977 with the aim of formulating a treaty prohibiting nuclear-weapon tests.

During an initial discussion in February, many Committee members supported a 1980 proposal to establish a working group.⁽⁶⁾ At subsequent informal meetings, the Group of 21 submitted on 24 April a proposal for the establishment of an ad hoc working group to negotiate provisions relating to the scope, verification of compliance and final clauses of a draft treaty. In a statement on 13 July, a group of socialist States, including the USSR, advocated the early conclusion of a treaty on the complete cessation of nuclear-weapon tests and the establishment of an ad hoc working group, with the participation of all nuclear Powers, to elaborate a draft. Of the other participants in the tripartite negotiations, the United Kingdom reaffirmed its view that those talks offered the most realistic way forward, while the United States said it could not agree to the establishment of a working group because it was reviewing its policy concerning nuclear testing, including the question of negotiations on a test ban.

The Group of 21 proposal was put formally to the Committee on 14 July, and the proposal by the group of socialist States on 23 July. On both occasions the Chairman noted a lack of con-

sensus. Five members of the Group of 21 subsequently proposed that the consensus rule in the Committee's rules of procedure not be used to block establishment of subsidiary organs (p. 31).

In its report to the General Assembly,⁽¹⁾ the Committee, recognizing that this item was of highest priority, expressed its intention of pursuing efforts at its 1982 session towards the conclusion of a nuclear test-ban treaty. The United States reserved its position on this point, observing that it was not in a position to say what its intentions might be in 1982.

Also in connection with this item, the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events held its eleventh session from 3 to 12 February 1981 and its twelfth from 3 to 12 August. The Group's Chairman reported that it had started to assess a number of national investigations into the international transmission of seismological messages. On 10 March and 18 August, the Committee adopted the largely procedural recommendations contained in the Group's two progress reports.

GENERAL ASSEMBLY ACTION. On 9 December, the General Assembly adopted two resolutions on the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests.

By the first,⁽⁴⁾ sponsored by 11 nations, the Assembly urged members of the Committee on Disarmament to support the establishment of an ad hoc working group to start multilateral negotiations on a treaty to prohibit all nuclear-weapon tests. It also urged Committee members to bear in mind that the consensus rule should not be used to prevent the establishment of subsidiary bodies (p. 31). Further, the Assembly called on the depositary States (USSR, United Kingdom, United States) of the 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water and the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,⁽²⁾ to halt without delay all nuclear-test explosions, either jointly or unilaterally.

The resolution as a whole was adopted by a recorded vote of 118 to 2, with 23 abstentions, after its paragraph 5, calling for action by the three depositary States, was adopted by a separate vote of 95 to 2, with 42 abstentions. The First Committee, on 23 November, approved paragraph 5 by a recorded vote of 84 to 2, with 38 abstentions, before approving the text as a whole by a recorded vote of 103 to 2, with 21 abstentions.

By the second resolution,⁽⁵⁾ sponsored by 22 nations, the Assembly called on the three negotiating nuclear-weapon States to resume negotiations, exert their best efforts for early success and report on the state of the negotiations in time for the Assembly's 1982 special session on

disarmament (p. 27). It requested the Committee on Disarmament to take the necessary steps, including the establishment of a working group, to initiate substantive negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty as a matter of the highest priority. The Committee was asked to determine, in the context of those negotiations, the institutional and administrative arrangements necessary for establishing, testing and operating an international seismic monitoring network and an effective verification system.

This resolution was adopted by a non-recorded vote of 140 to none, with 5 abstentions. The First Committee approved the text on 24 November by a recorded vote of 121 to none, with 5 abstentions (Argentina, China, France, United Kingdom, United States).

The 11-nation resolution was introduced by Mexico, which observed that the non-nuclear-weapon States in the Committee on Disarmament had exhibited impatience, not to say justifiable indignation, at the inexplicable reluctance of some of the nuclear-weapon States to respond to the Assembly's repeated appeals.

When Australia introduced the 22-nation resolution, it expressed deep disappointment that, despite the Assembly's request in 1980,⁽³⁾ the Committee on Disarmament had not begun consideration of the question nor had the trilateral negotiations been resumed. Australia looked for a treaty leading to the cessation of all nuclear-test explosions, for both military and peaceful purposes.

The United States voted against the first resolution on the ground that it contained a number of unacceptable provisions, in particular a call for an unverified moratorium.

Explaining its abstention in the vote on this text, the Federal Republic of Germany felt that no useful purpose was served by singling out some nuclear-weapon States for accusation. New Zealand objected that the text called for negotiation by the Committee on Disarmament of a treaty for the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests rather than a comprehensive test-ban treaty, and advocated only a partial moratorium rather than one covering so-called peaceful nuclear explosions as well. Samoa remained opposed to any explosions of nuclear weapons in any environment, and felt that the resolution condoned, by omission, test explosions of nuclear weapons by some States in some environments. Australia, Fiji and Japan abstained for similar reasons. France thought the proposed measure was not a step towards nuclear disarmament and would consecrate the qualitative and quantitative advantages already enjoyed by the two major nuclear Powers. Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece and

Japan considered that the text challenged the basic principle of consensus in the Committee on Disarmament.

India and the USSR voted for the resolution as a whole but abstained on paragraph 5 because of the selective nature of the moratorium requested; the USSR also had reservations concerning the text's reference to matters within the Committee's exclusive prerogatives.

The United States, which abstained in the vote on the second resolution, considered it inappropriate for the Assembly to suggest how the Committee on Disarmament should handle its agenda items. Similar reservations were voiced by two States that voted in favour: Belgium, which also feared that the resolution could be used as a pretext to prevent progress towards limited solutions falling short of a global solution; and the USSR, which also had misgivings about the appeal to the three Powers for a report on negotiations which were not currently taking place.

Argentina abstained in the belief that the text left a shadow of doubt about the right of nations to access to peaceful applications of nuclear energy. Brazil, although voting affirmatively, stressed the importance it attached to a multilateral treaty on the prohibition of further testing of nuclear weapons; such a treaty should contain an unequivocal commitment to nuclear disarmament and promote freedom of access by all nations to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. Bulgaria, also voting in favour, felt that the resolution could have been improved if a clear distinction had been drawn between the positions of the nuclear Powers as to their willingness to negotiate and conclude a treaty.

In the First Committee debate, China viewed a nuclear-test ban as an integral part of disarmament, to be linked with other measures such as a ban on the development, production and use of nuclear weapons and their reduction and destruction. France believed that a prohibition of tests could not be isolated from, or precede, nuclear disarmament. The United States contended that international conditions were not propitious for immediate action; moreover, for a test ban to be effective, it must be verifiable and be concluded under conditions which would enhance rather than diminish international security and stability.

The USSR remarked that the trilateral talks had produced agreement on most provisions for a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon testing, yet no treaty had been concluded, due not to the difficulty of resolving outstanding issues but to lack of political will and readiness on the part of the United States. The Lao People's Democratic Republic

and Mongolia held that obstructionism and negativism on the part of certain nuclear Powers and their allies was the main reason for continued failure. The Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Ireland, Japan and Mongolia appealed for a resumption of the talks without delay. Afghanistan did likewise, and added that a one-year moratorium on all nuclear explosions by all nuclear Powers would prove helpful.

Asserting that more than 1,200 nuclear tests had taken place, Japan stressed the importance of universal adherence to the partial test-ban Treaty of 1963, particularly by China and France, the two nuclear-weapon States which had not done so. Ireland stated that 783 nuclear tests had taken place since 1963 as compared with 488 between 1945 and 1963, and that 49 nuclear-test explosions had been carried out in 1980 alone; it favoured a moratorium followed by a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Also endorsing a moratorium, Guyana said that if negotiating efforts were genuine, there should be no hesitation in agreeing to an immediate halt to all nuclear-weapon testing, pending the conclusion of a comprehensive treaty.

Commenting on efforts in the Committee on Disarmament to establish a working group on a nuclear-test ban, Mexico noted that the United Kingdom and the United States had been the only members of that Committee to oppose its creation. Brazil was puzzled by the two Powers' argument that the Committee should not set up a working group because of the trilateral negotiations, as those negotiations had not led to concrete agreements. The Byelorussian SSR, Nepal and the Netherlands favoured the establishment of such a working group with the participation of all nuclear Powers. Cuba accused the United Kingdom and the United States of imposing a double veto on the Committee's work. India argued that the negotiations should be entrusted to the Committee on Disarmament, the sole multilateral negotiating body. Negotiations in the Committee were also urged by a number of other States, including Ecuador, the German Democratic Republic and Malaysia.

Nigeria rejected the notion that the trilateral negotiations constituted the only valid basis for a comprehensive test ban, as nuclear disarmament was a concern of all nations. Pakistan said it was unlikely that the tripartite negotiations could produce a generally acceptable treaty while seeking to impose an unequal arrangement on non-nuclear-weapon States; multilateral negotiations on an equitable and universally acceptable treaty should commence without delay.

Spain, while understanding the objections of some nuclear Powers to the creation of a multi-

lateral working group, said they should demonstrate that their procedure was the more effective method. Sweden noted that the tripartite talks had been suspended since mid-1980 and added that certain States were using the consensus rule to deny the Committee its right to start negotiations in a working group.

Several States, including Canada, Japan, the Netherlands and Spain, saw encouragement in the work of the Group of Scientific Experts and particularly in its trial exchange of seismic data. In this connection, Finland observed that it had an unparalleled seismic detection capability in its part of the world, due to its technical capability and location. Commenting on another aspect of verification, India remarked that the trilateral negotiators envisaged one set of verification provisions applicable only among themselves and another set for other States parties.

Austria stated that the link between disarmament and non-proliferation lent urgency to the conclusion of a test-ban treaty as a logical first step towards nuclear disarmament. Similar remarks were made by Australia, Denmark, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Italy, Jamaica, New Zealand and Norway.

Report: ⁽¹⁾Committee on Disarmament, A/36/27 (Committee documents, CD/228, appendix II, vols. I, II).

Resolutions: GA: ⁽²⁾2373(XXII), annex, 12 June 1968 (YUN 1968, p. 17); ⁽³⁾35/145 B, 12 Dec. 1980 (YUN 1980, p. 56); ⁽⁴⁾36/84, 9 Dec. 1981, text following; ⁽⁵⁾36/85, 9 Dec., text following.

Yearbook reference: ⁽⁶⁾1980, p. 20.

Meeting records: GA: 1st Committee, A/C.1/36/PV.3 & Corr.1, 4-10, 12-26, 27, 32, 34, 38, 39, 41 (19 Oct.-24 Nov.); plenary, A/36/PV.91 (9 Dec.).

General Assembly resolution 36/84

118-2-23 (recorded vote) Meeting 91 9 December 1981

Approved by First Committee (A/36/744) by recorded vote (103-2-21).
23 November (meeting 39): 11-nation draft (A/C.1/36/L.22); agenda item 43.

Sponsors: Bangladesh, Ecuador, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Niger, Pakistan, Panama, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Yugoslavia.

Cessation of all test explosions of nuclear weapons

The General Assembly,

Bearing in mind that the complete cessation of nuclear-weapon tests, which has been examined for more than twenty-five years and on which the General Assembly has adopted more than forty resolutions, is a basic objective of the United Nations in the sphere of disarmament, to whose attainment it has repeatedly assigned the highest priority,

Stressing that on seven different occasions it has condemned such tests in the strongest terms and that, since 1974, it has stated its conviction that the continuance of nuclear-weapon testing will intensify the arms race, thus increasing the danger of nuclear war,

Reiterating the assertion made in several previous resolutions that, whatever may be the differences on the question of verification, there is no valid reason for delaying the conclusion of an agreement on a comprehensive test ban,

Recalling that since 1972 the Secretary-General has declared that all the technical and scientific aspects of the problem have been so fully explored that only a political decision is now necessary in order to achieve final agreement, that

when the existing means of verification are taken into account it is difficult to understand further delay in achieving agreement on an underground test ban, and that the potential risks of continuing underground nuclear-weapon tests would far outweigh any possible risks from ending such tests,

Recalling also that the Secretary-General, in his foreword to the report entitled "Comprehensive nuclear-test ban", reiterated with special emphasis the opinion he expressed nine years ago and, after specifically referring to it, added: "I still hold that belief. The problem can and should be solved now",

Noting that in the same report, which was prepared in compliance with General Assembly decision 34/422 of 11 December 1979, the experts emphasized that non-nuclear-weapon States in general have come to regard the achievement of a comprehensive test ban as a litmus test of the determination of the nuclear-weapon States to halt the arms race, adding that verification of compliance no longer seems to be an obstacle to reaching agreement,

Taking into account that the three nuclear-weapon States which act as depositaries of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water undertook in that Treaty, almost twenty years ago, to seek the achievement of the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and that such an undertaking was explicitly reiterated in 1968 in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Recalling that in its resolution 35/145 A of 12 December 1980 it urged all States members of the Committee on Disarmament to support the establishment by the Committee from the beginning of its session in 1981, of an ad hoc working group which should start the multilateral negotiations of a treaty for the prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests,

Deploring that the Committee on Disarmament, as stated in paragraph 44 of its report to the Assembly, was prevented from responding to that exhortation owing to the negative attitude of two nuclear-weapon States,

1. Reiterates once again its grave concern that nuclear-weapon testing continues unabated against the wishes of the overwhelming majority of Member States;

2. Reaffirms its conviction that a treaty to achieve the prohibition of all nuclear-weapon-test explosions by all States for all time is a matter of the highest priority and constitutes a vital element for the success of efforts to prevent both vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons and a contribution to nuclear disarmament;

3. Urges all States that have not yet done so to adhere without further delay to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water and, meanwhile, to refrain from testing in the environments covered by that Treaty;

4. Urges likewise all States members of the Committee on Disarmament:

(a) To bear in mind that the consensus rule should not be used in such a manner as to prevent the establishment of subsidiary bodies for the effective discharge of the functions of the Committee;

(b) To support the establishment by the Committee, from the beginning of its session in 1982, of an ad hoc working group which should start the multilateral negotiations of a treaty for the prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests;

(c) To exert their best endeavours in order that the Committee may transmit the multilaterally negotiated text of such a treaty to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament, to be held from 7 June to 9 July 1982;

5. Calls upon the States depositaries of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, by virtue of their special responsibilities under those two treaties and as a provisional measure, to bring to a halt without delay all nuclear-test explosions, either through a trilaterally agreed moratorium or through three unilateral moratoria;

6. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-seventh session the item entitled "Cessation of all test explosions of nuclear weapons".

Recorded vote in Assembly as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian SSR, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire.

Against: United Kingdom, United States.

Abstaining: Australia, Belgium, Belize, Canada, China, Denmark, Fiji, France, Germany, Federal Republic of Greece, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Papua New Guinea, Portugal, Samoa, Spain, Turkey, Zambia.

General Assembly resolution 36/85

140-0-5 Meeting 919 December 1981

Approved by First Committee (A/36/745) by recorded vote (121-0-5), 24 November (meeting 41); 22-nation draft (A/C.1/36/L.31); agenda item 44.

Sponsors: Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Canada, Denmark, Ecuador, Fiji, Finland, Ireland, Japan, Malaysia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Norway, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Samoa, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Sweden, Thailand.

Implementation of General Assembly resolution 35/145 B
The General Assembly,

Recalling its previous resolutions on a comprehensive nuclear-test ban, in particular resolution 32/78 of 12 December 1977, paragraph 51 of resolution S-10/2 of 30 June 1978, resolution 33/60 of 14 December 1978, section IV of resolution 33/71 H of 14 December 1978, resolution 34/73 of 11 December 1979 and resolution 35/145 B of 12 December 1980,

Reaffirming its conviction that it is in the interest of all people that nuclear-weapon testing by all States in all environments should cease, as this would be a major step towards ending the qualitative improvement, development and proliferation of nuclear weapons, a means of relieving the deep apprehension concerning the harmful consequences of radioactive contamination for the health of present and future generations and a measure of the utmost importance in bringing the nuclear-arms race to an end,

Recalling that the parties to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons expressed their determination in those treaties to continue negotiations to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time,

Expressing the belief that, to be effective and capable of attracting the widest possible adherence, a treaty prohibiting nuclear testing should include provision for an effective verification system,

Recognizing, accordingly, the importance to such a treaty of the work assigned by the Committee on Disarmament to the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events on a global network of stations for the exchange of seismological data,

Deeply concerned about the fact that the three negotiating nuclear-weapon States have not resumed their negotiations

on a treaty prohibiting nuclear-test explosions in all environments and its protocol covering nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes,

Emphasizing the urgent need for a complete cessation of the testing of nuclear weapons,

Recognizing the indispensable role of the Committee on Disarmament in the negotiation of a comprehensive test-ban treaty capable of attracting the widest possible international support and adherence,

Expressing regret that it did not prove possible for the Committee on Disarmament to commence negotiations on such a treaty,

Convinced that the proceedings of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, to be held from 7 June to 9 July 1982, would benefit substantially from positive progress towards the conclusion of such a treaty,

1. Reiterates its grave concern that, despite the express wishes of the overwhelming majority of Member States, nuclear-weapon testing continues unabated;

2. Reaffirms its conviction that a treaty to achieve the prohibition of all nuclear-weapon-test explosions by all States for all time is a matter of the greatest urgency and highest priority;

3. Expresses the conviction that such a treaty constitutes a vital element for the success of efforts to halt and reverse the nuclear-arms race and the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to additional countries;

4. Calls upon the three negotiating nuclear-weapon States to resume their negotiations and to exert their best efforts to bring them to an early successful conclusion and invites them to prepare a report on the state of negotiations in good time for submission to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament;

5. Reiterates its conviction that the Committee on Disarmament has an indispensable role in the negotiation of a treaty prohibiting nuclear testing;

6. Requests the Committee on Disarmament to take the necessary steps, including the establishment of a working group, to initiate substantive negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty as a matter of the highest priority at the beginning of its session in 1982;

7. Also requests the Committee on Disarmament to determine, in the context of its negotiations on such a treaty, the institutional and administrative arrangements necessary for establishing, testing and operating an international seismic monitoring network and an effective verification system;

8. Further requests the Committee on Disarmament to exert all efforts in order that the draft of such a treaty may be submitted to the General Assembly at the earliest possible date;

9. Urges all members of the Committee on Disarmament, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, to co-operate with the Committee in fulfilling its mandate;

10. Calls upon the Committee on Disarmament to report on progress to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament and at its thirty-seventh session;

11. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-seventh session an item relating to implementation of the present resolution.

Prohibition of the production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons

By a resolution of 9 December 1981,⁽¹⁾ the General Assembly, considering that the prohibition of the production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons and other explosive devices would help prevent their proliferation, requested the Committee on Disarmament, at an appropriate stage, to pursue the question of an adequately

verified cessation and prohibition of production of fissionable material for such weapons and devices.

The resolution was adopted by a recorded vote of 125 to 14, with 6 abstentions. The First Committee approved the text on 24 November by a recorded vote of 99 to 13, with 6 abstentions.

The 19-nation resolution was introduced by Canada, which recalled that the Assembly had made similar requests to the Committee on Disarmament each year since 1978. The subject was one of the most significant areas for nuclear disarmament and agreement on it would underwrite, support and guarantee other agreements on nuclear-weapon control.

The USSR voted against the text, declaring that the problem of prohibition of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes could not be separated from that of cessation of all nuclear-weapon production and the gradual reduction of stockpiles. Mexico, although voting in favour, observed that two objectives would have to be pursued: cessation of the production of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, and cessation of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes.

In the First Committee debate, Australia saw an agreement on this subject as an important brake on nuclear proliferation, since it would help restrict the production of existing types of nuclear weapons, limit nuclear arsenals to approximately their current size and so contribute to scaling down the arms race. Ireland stated that since the production of fissionable material would henceforth be for civilian purposes only, the same International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards could be applied to all States, thus helping to make the non-proliferation regime more attractive to those States which had so far chosen to remain outside it. Making a similar point, Norway stated that such a ban, by requiring nuclear-weapon States to accept much the same IAEA safeguards as non-nuclear-weapon States, would eliminate an important element of discrimination between the two categories of States. The Netherlands observed that the safeguards system could provide verification for an agreement on this subject. New Zealand, while not expecting early progress, urged the Committee on Disarmament to keep the question under review.

Resolution: ⁽¹⁾GA, 36/97 G, 9 Dec., text following.

Meeting records: GA: 1st Committee, A/C.1/36/PV.3 & Corr.1, 4-10, 12-26, 33, 34, 36, 41 (19 Oct.-24 Nov.); plenary, A/36/PV.91 (9 Dec.).

General Assembly resolution 36/97 G

125-14-6 (recorded vote) Meeting 91 9 December 1981

Approved by First Committee (A/36/756) by recorded vote (99-13-6), 24 November (meeting 41); 19-nation draft (A/C.1/36/L.28): agenda item 55.

Sponsors: Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Canada, Denmark, Greece, Indonesia, Ireland, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Norway, Philippines, Romania, Singapore, Sweden.

Prohibition of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 33/91 H of 16 December 1978, 34/87 D of 11 December 1979 and 35/156 H of 12 December 1980, in which it requested the Committee on Disarmament, at an appropriate stage of the implementation of the Programme of Action set forth in section III of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, and of its work on the item entitled "Nuclear weapons in all aspects", to consider urgently the question of adequately verified cessation and prohibition of the production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices and to keep the Assembly informed of the progress of that consideration.

Noting that the agenda for 1981 of the Committee on Disarmament included the item entitled "Nuclear weapons in all aspects" and that the Committee's programme of work for both parts of its session held in 1981 contained the item entitled "Cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament",

Recalling the proposals and statements made in the Committee on Disarmament on these items,

Considering that the cessation of production of fissionable material for weapons purposes and the progressive conversion and transfer of stocks to peaceful uses would be a significant step towards halting and reversing the nuclear-arms race,

Considering that the prohibition of the production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons and other explosive devices also would be an important measure in facilitating the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and explosive devices,

Requests the Committee on Disarmament, at an appropriate stage of its work on the item entitled "Nuclear weapons in all aspects", to pursue its consideration of the question of adequately verified cessation and prohibition of the production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices and to keep the General Assembly informed of the progress of that consideration.

Recorded vote in Assembly as follows:

In favour: Algeria, Angola, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Burma, Burundi, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab, Jamahiriya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia.

Against: Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Byelorussian SSR, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Mongolia, Poland, Seychelles,^a Ukrainian SSR, USSR, Viet Nam.

Abstaining: Argentina, Brazil, France, India, United Kingdom, United States.

^a Later advised the Secretariat it had intended to abstain.

Nuclear safeguards

In a resolution on IAEA adopted on 11 November 1981,⁽¹⁾ the General Assembly commended the

Agency for its continuing efforts to ensure the safe and secure use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The Assembly noted with satisfaction the steady improvement of the Agency's safeguards system, and welcomed its conclusion that nuclear material under those safeguards remained in peaceful activities or was otherwise adequately accounted for. States were urged to continue to support IAEA endeavours to improve the effectiveness of safeguards.

Addressing the General Assembly on 10 November at the start of its annual discussion of IAEA, the Agency's Director-General said that more than 95 per cent of all nuclear material outside the nuclear-weapon States was under IAEA safeguards.

Resolution: ⁽¹⁾GA, 36/25, paras. 3 & 5, 11 Nov. (p. 714).

Non-nuclear weapons

Chemical weapons

Proposed prohibition of chemical weapons

CONSIDERATION BY THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT. Negotiations towards a multilateral instrument on the total prohibition of chemical weapons, called for by the General Assembly in December 1980,⁽²⁾ continued during 1981 in the Committee on Disarmament. Much of the work was conducted in the Committee's Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons, which was re-established on 12 February. The Group held 23 meetings from 18 February to 22 April and from 17 June to 17 August, as well as additional informal consultations, during which time it formulated and discussed for the first time wording for 18 future articles or elements of a convention on chemical weapons.

The Working Group began its 1981 activities with a detailed examination of the issues involved in negotiating a multilateral convention. It then considered draft elements of a chemical weapons convention suggested by its Chairman, who later submitted revised versions on the basis of delegation comments. The Group's report, which the Committee adopted on 20 August and incorporated into its own report to the General Assembly,⁽¹⁾ set out the Chairman's text and various comments, including dissenting views. Some delegations did not wish to discuss certain elements, including those relating to verification, until general agreement had been reached on the scope of the prohibitions to be verified.

Among the elements suggested by the Chairman for inclusion in a chemical weapons convention were the following:

Chemical weapons would be defined to include harmful chemicals and their precursors intended for

hostile or military purposes, and the munitions and devices which released such chemicals. States parties to the convention would be prohibited from transferring such weapons to anyone. They would have to declare any stocks of chemical weapons in their possession, and undertake to destroy those stocks or divert them to permitted uses, along with means of production. A 1,000-kilogramme limit would be placed on any State's stock of super-toxic lethal chemicals for non-military uses. International co-operation for peaceful and protective uses of chemicals would be encouraged, and a substantial part of any savings resulting from chemical disarmament would be allocated to economic and social development, particularly of the developing countries.

National and international measures would be taken to verify compliance with the convention. Recommendations and guidelines for the functions and organization of national verification systems would eventually be annexed to the convention. Deliberate concealment to impede national verification measures would be prohibited. States parties would consult one another when problems arose, and States suspecting violations could request clarifications from those concerned. An expert body known as the Consultative Committee, with one member from each State party, would be established to monitor the situation and undertake on-site inspections, in consultation with the State to be inspected; that State could decline to be inspected if it considered that its supreme national interests would be jeopardized.

The convention would enter into force after 20 States ratified or acceded to it. A review conference would be held at least every five years.

The Working Group informed the Committee that despite the convergence of views on many issues emerging from its work in 1980 and 1981, some important divergencies of opinion still existed. The Group recommended that it be re-established in 1982 with a revised mandate that would enable it to resolve differences and achieve agreement on a convention at the earliest date.

GENERAL ASSEMBLY ACTION. Two resolutions calling for continued negotiations on a convention to prohibit chemical weapons were adopted by the General Assembly on 9 December 1981. By the first of these,⁽⁵⁾ the Assembly urged the Committee on Disarmament to continue negotiations on a multilateral chemical weapons convention as a matter of high priority, taking into account all existing proposals and future initiatives, and to re-establish its Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons with a revised mandate enabling the Committee to achieve agreement on a convention at the earliest date. The Committee was requested to report on the results in 1982.

The resolution was adopted by a recorded vote of 147 to none, with 1 abstention. The First Committee approved the text on 24 November

by a recorded vote of 127 to none, with 1 abstention, following the approval of paragraph 3, on the Working Group, by a recorded vote of 101 to 2 (Canada, United States), with 19 abstentions. This paragraph was approved in the form of a 10-nation amendment introduced by Sweden. It added to the original 37-nation text, whose sponsors were from both East and West, the phrase urging the re-establishment of the Working Group with a revised mandate so as to achieve agreement on a convention at the earliest date.

By the second resolution on this topic,⁽⁴⁾ the Assembly reaffirmed the necessity of the earliest elaboration and conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction. In a provision with the same wording as the amended paragraph of the first resolution, the Assembly urged continued negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament and the re-establishment of the Working Group with a revised mandate. It called on the USSR and the United States to resume bilateral negotiations on the subject at the earliest possible date, and to submit their joint initiative to the Committee on Disarmament. The Assembly called on all States to refrain from action which could impede negotiations and specifically to refrain from production and deployment of binary and other new types of chemical weapons.

The resolution, with 13 sponsors from Eastern Europe and elsewhere, was adopted in the Assembly by a recorded vote of 109 to 1, with 33 abstentions. The text, as revised by its sponsors, was approved by the First Committee on 24 November by a recorded vote of 95 to 1, with 30 abstentions.

The first resolution was introduced by Canada, which believed that the text took into account the views of those who wished to see the Assembly give more precise direction regarding the Working Group's mandate, as well as the wishes of those who hoped to see a stronger statement on the resumption of bilateral discussions. Sweden, introducing the amendment, recalled the efforts of many Committee members over the past two years to obtain a mandate for the Working Group that would enable it to carry out genuine negotiations, and their disappointment at the failure of those efforts so far.

The second resolution was introduced by the German Democratic Republic, which described the two texts as complementary and said that having multilateral and bilateral negotiations at the same time might enhance the effectiveness of both. It added that the production and deployment of binary chemical weapons would greatly worsen prospects for achieving a prohibition of chemical weapons and tend to promote their use.

The United States voted against the amendment to the first resolution because it could not support any infringement on the authority of the Committee on Disarmament, which was authorized to decide its own internal procedures. Canada voted against because the specificity of the amendment was not acceptable to all delegations.

While not disagreeing with the aim of the amendment, Japan and Poland abstained in the vote out of concern that its wording would hinder consensus on the resolution as a whole. Finland also mentioned the importance it attached to consensus in explaining why it had abstained. Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Germany and the USSR, all voting for the amendment and the text as a whole, shared the reservations expressed by Canada. Regret that the amendment had made it impossible to achieve consensus on the resolution was expressed by several States which voted for both—Belgium, Finland, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom, the last speaking for the members of the European Community (EC).

In explanation of its negative vote on the second resolution, the United States declared that it had unilaterally ceased production of chemical weapons in 1969 and that its only production facility was inactive, while the USSR maintained and operated at least 14 such facilities and had a much larger chemical warfare organization in the armed forces; accordingly, the United States saw the proposal as one-sided, superfluous and an attempt to inhibit countermeasures required by the Soviet programme.

Japan abstained in the vote, arguing that the call to States to refrain from certain actions could have a detrimental effect by prejudging the outcome of the negotiations on chemical weapons prohibition in the Committee on Disarmament. Democratic Kampuchea did not participate in the vote on this resolution because, it said, those who were massacring its people were among the sponsors.

During the debate in the First Committee, Bulgaria, the Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, the USSR and Viet Nam saw a link between delays in reaching a negotiated agreement and the growing military chemical arsenals of the United States and other countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, as well as the launching of large-scale production programmes for such weapons. The German Democratic Republic stated that while refusing to continue bilateral negotiations with the USSR on a chemical weapons ban, the United States was allocating \$6 billion for the production of binary weapons over the next five years;

the introduction of such weapons made verification more difficult because their components hardly differed from those used for chemical products for civilian use. The USSR asserted that the United States continued to develop chemical weapons, including binary weapons, and possessed some 400,000 tons of lethal poisonous substances in its arsenals. Afghanistan also mentioned the allocation of funds for chemical weapons by the United States.

Austria, expressing concern about reported actions by some States to upgrade and increase their chemical warfare capabilities, appealed to all nations to refrain from any activities incompatible with efforts to reach agreement in the negotiations.

Responding, the United States said that, while the USSR had given chemical-warfare training to 100,000 of its troops and its military doctrine provided for large-scale employment of offensive chemical weapons, there had been no allocation for such weapons in the United States military budget since 1969; also, binary weapons, which became toxic only on launching, were designed to protect the personnel handling them as well as the environment.

Australia saw a need for international machinery to investigate allegations of the use of chemical weapons and to test or confirm denials of such use. Finland observed that since 1972 it had worked on a project aimed at developing a national chemical-weapons-control capacity and had periodically presented reports to the Committee on Disarmament. The Federal Republic of Germany attached particular importance to reliable verification provisions in a chemical weapons convention. India observed that verification measures would necessarily be imperfect, as the purpose of a ban on chemical weapons was not to regulate the production of lethal and even super-toxic chemicals, many of which had legitimate peaceful uses, but rather to prevent their diversion for chemical weapons; collective security would be better served by an immediate ban on such weapons with the means of verification currently available.

Japan saw the question of on-site inspections as one of the more difficult problems awaiting solution; attempts to establish too strict a verification system would make it too complicated and difficult to implement and lessen the chance of universal consent. Kenya thought there could be no mutual confidence in the convention without an international verification mechanism. Poland thought that verification should combine national control measures and international procedures, through a mechanism that would be both effective and consistent with the scope of prohibition.

While noting that appropriate verification was essential, Norway observed that the political costs of breaking away from an internationally agreed ban on chemical weapons should not be underestimated. Portugal asserted that the difficulties encountered by the United Nations Group of Experts to Investigate Reports of the Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons (p. 74) gave a striking illustration of the drawbacks and dangers inherent in omitting verification machinery in disarmament agreements, and that consultations should start on the creation of effective verification machinery for the obligations entered into under the 1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare. The Ukrainian SSR stated that the convention should be written so as not to impinge on the peaceful activities of States.

China stated that, since prohibition of the use of chemical weapons was at the heart of the question, the Committee on Disarmament should proceed with negotiations on a convention on the complete prohibition and total destruction of those weapons, including a ban on their use. Hungary, on the other hand, asserted that the main stumbling-block to achieving more substantial progress had been the insistence of some countries on including in the convention a ban on the use of chemical weapons, which Hungary considered was already fully covered by the 1925 Geneva Protocol. In Sweden's view, the effectiveness of the convention would be significantly improved if loopholes that would allow maintenance of a chemical warfare capability were closed.

The United Kingdom, speaking on behalf of the EC members, remarked that good progress had been made in the Committee on Disarmament during the past year in the negotiations on a verifiable convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. Many delegations, including those of Austria, Belgium, Egypt, France, Japan, Romania, Sweden and Venezuela, supported the proposal by the Working Group on Chemical Weapons that its mandate should be revised in order to permit negotiations in 1982 on the text of a convention.

Bulgaria, Hungary, Japan, the Netherlands and Poland urged the USSR and the United States to reopen their suspended bilateral negotiations at an early date.

Report: ⁽¹⁾Committee on Disarmament, A/36/27 (Committee documents, CD/228, appendix II, vols. I, II).

Resolutions: GA: ⁽²⁾35/144 B, 12 Dec. 1980 (YUN 1980, p. 84); ⁽³⁾36/96 A, 9 Dec. 1981, text following; ⁽⁴⁾36/96 B, 9 Dec., text following.

Meeting records: GA: 1st Committee, A/C.1/36/PV.3 & Corr.I, 4-10, 12-26, 29, 30, 34-36, 38, 42 (19 Oct.-24 Nov.); plenary, A/36/PV.91 (9 Dec.).

General Assembly resolution 36/96 A

147-0-1 (recorded vote) Meeting 91 9 December 1981

Approved by First Committee (A/36/743) by recorded vote (127-0-1). 24 November (meeting 42); 37-nation draft (A/C.1/36/L.35), amended by 10 nations (A/C.1/36/L.48); agenda item 42.

Sponsors of draft: Afghanistan, Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Byelorussian SSR, Canada, Chile, Congo, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Finland, France, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of Greece, Honduras, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Ivory Coast, Japan, Kenya, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Mali, Mongolia, Netherlands, Niger, Norway, Poland, Qatar, Spain, Ukrainian SSR, Viet Nam.

Sponsors of amendment: Brazil, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Venezuela, Yugoslavia.

Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons

The General Assembly,

Reaffirming its resolutions 2454 A (XXIII) of 20 December 1968, 2603 B (XXIV) of 16 December 1969, 2662(XXV) of 7 December 1970, 2827 A (XXVI) of 16 December 1971, 2933(XXVII) of 29 November 1972, 3077(XXVIII) of 6 December 1973, 3256(XXIX) of 9 December 1974, 3465(XXX) of 11 December 1975, 31/65 of 10 December 1976, 32/77 of 12 December 1977, S-10/2 of 30 June 1978, 33/59 A of 14 December 1978, 34/72 of 11 December 1979 and 35/144 B of 12 December 1980, relating to the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and to their destruction.

Reaffirming also the necessity of strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of the Protocol for Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, and of the adherence by all States to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction.

Having considered the report of the Committee on Disarmament, which embodies, inter alia, the report of its Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons.

Taking note of the recommendation in the report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons that the Committee on Disarmament should re-establish, at the beginning of its session in 1982, the Ad Hoc Working Group with an appropriately revised mandate, which would enable the Committee to build upon the areas of convergence and to resolve the differences of views which were identified by the Group during its sessions held in 1980 and 1981, so as to achieve agreement on a chemical weapons convention at the earliest date.

Considering it necessary that all efforts be exerted for the resumption and successful conclusion of the bilateral and multilateral negotiations on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction,

1. Takes note with satisfaction of the work of the Committee on Disarmament during its session held in 1981 regarding the prohibition of chemical weapons, in particular the progress in the work of its Ad Hoc Working Group on that question;

2. Expresses its regret that an agreement on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction has not yet been elaborated;

3. Urges the Committee on Disarmament to continue, from the beginning of its session in 1982, negotiations on such a multilateral convention as a matter of high priority, taking into account all existing proposals and future initiatives, and in particular to re-establish its Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons with an appropriately revised mandate enabling the Committee to achieve agreement on a chemical weapons convention at the earliest date;

4. Requests the Committee on Disarmament to report on the results of its negotiations to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament, to be held from 7 June to 9 July 1982, and at its thirty-seventh session.

Recorded vote in Assembly as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian SSR, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Grenade, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia.

Against: None.

Abstaining: United States.

General Assembly resolution 36/96 B

109-1-33 (recorded vote) Meeting 91 9 December 1981

Approved by First Committee (A/36/743) by recorded vote (95-1-30).
24 November (meeting 42); 13-nation draft (A/C.1/36/L.36/Rev.1):
agenda item 42.

Sponsors: Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Byelorussian SSR, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Mongolia, Poland, Ukrainian SSR, Viet Nam.

The General Assembly,

Recalling that, in paragraph 75 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, it stated that the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and their destruction represented one of the most urgent measures of disarmament.

Convinced of the need for the earliest conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction, which would contribute to general and complete disarmament under effective international control,

Taking into consideration the work done in this area in the Committee on Disarmament as well as in the bilateral negotiations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, which regrettably had been suspended and did not take place in 1981.

Deeming it desirable for States to refrain from taking any action that could delay or further complicate such negotiations.

Expressing profound concern over the production of new types of chemical weapons and other actions that would intensify the chemical arms race and compromise international efforts on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction.

1. Reaffirms the necessity of the earliest elaboration and conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction;

2. Appeals to all States to facilitate in every possible way the conclusion of such a convention;

3. Urges the Committee on Disarmament to continue, from the beginning of its session in 1982, negotiations on such a multilateral convention as a matter of high priority, taking into account all existing proposals and future initiatives, and in particular to re-establish its Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons with an appropriately revised mandate enabling the Committee to achieve agreement on a chemical weapons convention at the earliest date;

4. Calls upon the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America to resume at the earliest possible date bilateral negotiations on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction and to submit their joint initiative to the Committee on Disarmament;

5. Calls upon all States to refrain from any action which could impede negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons and specifically to refrain from production and deployment of binary and other new types of chemical weapons, as well as from stationing chemical weapons in those States where there are no such weapons at present.

Recorded vote in Assembly as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian SSR, Cape Verde, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Grenada, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia, Against: United States.

Abstaining: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Belize, Canada, Central African Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Norway, Paraguay, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, Upper Volta, Zaire.

Alleged use of chemical weapons

Several Governments sent communications to the United Nations in 1981 alleging that chemical weapons had been used in recent or current armed conflicts. The Group of Experts to Investigate Reports on the Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons presented, for submission to the General Assembly, what it described as an inconclusive report. The Assembly, in December, decided to continue the Group's mandate.

COMMUNICATIONS. Letters and notes verbales included 14 communications from Democratic Kampuchea, 2 from the United States, 2 from Viet Nam and 1 from the USSR.

The letters from Democratic Kampuchea concerned instances of what it called the use of toxic chemical weapons by the Vietnamese aggressors to massacre the Kampuchean population. Specific instances, including the firing of poison gas shells, the spreading of toxic chemical products, the addition of toxic substances to water supplies and the poisoning of food, were cited in letters of 26 January,⁽¹⁾ 17 February,⁽²⁾ 9 March,⁽³⁾ 6 April,⁽⁵⁾ 14 April,⁽⁶⁾ 27 April,⁽⁷⁾ 8 June,⁽¹⁰⁾ 9 November,⁽¹¹⁾ 13 November⁽¹²⁾ and 3 December.⁽¹⁴⁾ The incidents were said to have occurred between December 1980 and November 1981.

Annexed to a letter of 27 March⁽⁴⁾ was an open letter, dated 22 March, from the people of

Kampuchea addressed to the international community, asking the United Nations to send its Group of Experts to collect on-site evidence of the use of chemical weapons by Viet Nam, so that measures could be taken in time to save the nation and its people. A letter of 5 May⁽⁸⁾ annexed a statement of 30 April by a Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman protesting the escalation of chemical warfare by Viet Nam. A Ministry of Public Health statement of 10 April, annexed to a letter dated 14 May,⁽⁹⁾ placed the number of Kampucheans killed by chemical weapons at more than 1,100 since April 1980, out of 2,900 victims. On 24 November,⁽¹³⁾ Democratic Kampuchea transmitted a 20 November statement by its Foreign Ministry spokesman supporting a call for an international conference aimed at preventing Viet Nam and the USSR from pursuing chemical warfare.

In a note verbale dated 14 September,⁽¹⁶⁾ the United States reiterated its concern over reports that lethal and incapacitating chemical weapons were being used in the conflicts in Laos and Kampuchea and, since the USSR invasion in December 1979, in Afghanistan; urged the Group of Experts to visit refugee camps and the areas of reported attacks in order to obtain first-hand information and evidence; and informed the Secretary-General that analysis of vegetation obtained from the site of a chemical attack in Kampuchea had revealed evidence of the use of lethal mycotoxins (poisons associated with fungi). Analyses of additional samples from areas of reported chemical attacks in Laos and Kampuchea were presented in a United States note verbale dated 12 November,⁽¹⁷⁾ in which it was stated that test results and eyewitness testimony supported the judgement that trichothecene mycotoxins had been used as chemical warfare agents in those countries.

In a statement of 17 September, transmitted by a letter of 22 September,⁽¹⁸⁾ a spokesman for the Foreign Ministry of Viet Nam asserted that the United States was conducting bacteriological warfare against Cuba, supplying toxic chemicals to the reactionaries in Afghanistan and elsewhere, and trying to cover up its use of chemical warfare for more than 10 years during its aggression against Viet Nam. Responding to United States allegations, Viet Nam transmitted, by a letter dated 9 October,⁽¹⁹⁾ an article written by a Vietnamese scientist stating that the American campaign of slander against the USSR might be designed to cover up United States efforts to increase its chemical weapons stockpile.

The USSR, in a letter of 3 December,⁽¹⁵⁾ said irresponsible references and a noisy propaganda campaign by the United States on alleged USSR participation in the use of chemical and toxin

weapons in South-East Asia and Afghanistan were inherently absurd, lacked physical evidence and did not stand the test of elementary scientific analysis; the United States itself had resorted to the widespread use of chemical weapons in South-East Asia, while in Afghanistan chemical weapons prepared in the United States had been used against civilians by American-backed bands of Afghan counter-revolutionaries.

ACTIVITIES OF THE GROUP OF EXPERTS. The Group of Experts to Investigate Reports on the Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons, composed of four experts, submitted a report⁽²⁰⁾ in response to a December 1980 request by the General Assembly for an impartial investigation to ascertain facts pertaining to reports regarding the alleged use of chemical weapons and to assess the extent of the damage caused by such use.⁽²¹⁾ The Group held three sessions in New York during 1981: 20 to 24 April, 13 to 28 July and 20 October to 19 November. The third session included a visit (31 October-10 November) to holding centres for Indo-Chinese refugees in Thailand, for on-site collection and examination of evidence.

The report of the Group, submitted to the Secretary-General on 19 November, included background to the problem of the alleged use of chemical weapons and sources of information on which the investigation was based, general observations on such weapons and parameters of the investigation, evaluation of written submissions, a section on mycotoxins, a section on on-site collection and examination of evidence, and conclusions. The Group concentrated on submissions by Canada in respect of Laos and by the United States in respect of Afghanistan, Kampuchea and Laos; it noted charges by Viet Nam of United States use of toxic chemicals in Kampuchea, Laos and Viet Nam but said it felt unable to investigate on the territories of the Lao People's Democratic Republic and Viet Nam in view of communications from those Governments indicating that they would not co-operate with the Group.

The Group described its report as inconclusive, stating that, from the submissions it had received, and in assessing the individual cases presented to it, it had been unable to reach a final conclusion as to whether or not chemical warfare agents had been used.

The Group pointed out that, despite its expressed desire to carry out investigations on the territories where chemical attacks had allegedly occurred and where alleged victims and eyewitnesses of such attacks were being hosted, it had only been able to visit some refugee camps in Thailand. During that visit, the Group had unsuccessfully sought to meet individuals mentioned in submissions by the United States.

While the medical personnel interviewed in the refugee camps claimed they had not come across cases attributable to chemical warfare agents, refugees related stories similar to those appearing in the submissions by Canada and the United States. However, all those interviewed had related alleged chemical attacks occurring several months earlier, and the Group had been unable to detect signs and symptoms suggestive of exposure to chemical warfare agents; further, routine blood biochemical, haematological and urine analyses obtained by the Group had yielded no significant abnormalities. Although the Group had received some samples for analysis by qualified and impartial laboratories, it could not base final conclusions on the results of such analyses since it could not ascertain the source of the samples.

The Group stated that any investigation designed to lead to definitive conclusions regarding the alleged use of chemical weapons and to an assessment of the extent of damage caused by such weapons would require timely access to the areas of alleged use in order to establish the facts. Such an exercise had so far been impossible.

GENERAL ASSEMBLY ACTION. In a resolution of 9 December,⁽²²⁾ the General Assembly took note with appreciation of the Secretary-General's report annexing the findings of the Group of Experts. Noting that the Group had not completed its investigations, the Assembly requested the Secretary-General to continue his investigations, with the Group's assistance, and to report back to the Assembly in 1982.

The resolution was adopted by a recorded vote of 86 to 20, with 34 abstentions. The First Committee approved the text on 4 December by a recorded vote of 74 to 18, with 30 abstentions.

The resolution was sponsored by Australia, Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain and Turkey. Introducing the text, New Zealand expressed appreciation to the Group of Experts for the objectivity of its inquiry and the integrity of its conclusions. It added that, as certain aspects of the investigation had not been completed, the Group should receive additional time.

This view was supported by Canada, China, Fiji, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Nigeria and Senegal. Canada and France, in particular, observed that the resolution was procedural and non-polemical and did not imply any accusation; rather, it reflected the great importance attached to the 1925 Geneva Protocol banning the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons. The United States viewed the resolution as one of the most important-perhaps the most important-adopted at the 1981 Assembly

session; the United Nations, with further evidence accumulated, had again accepted the responsibility to conduct an immediate, impartial investigation of the use of chemical weapons.

Other States did not share this view. Czechoslovakia felt the need to close the chapter on the Assembly's activities on the matter, and thereby release resources for solving more important and real issues, such as the conclusion of a convention on prohibition of chemical weapons and destruction of their stockpiles. In its opinion, the investigation of so-called reports of the alleged use of chemical weapons detracted from the main issue by creating an atmosphere of uncertainty, suspicion and propagandistic hysteria, and played into the hands of those who opposed the prohibition of chemical weapons. Similar

views were expressed by Afghanistan, Bulgaria, the Byelorussian SSR, Cuba, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Mongolia, Poland, the Ukrainian SSR, the USSR and Viet Nam, none of which saw need or justification for extending the Group's mandate. The USSR stated that the report of the Group, as well as other documents, facts and events, led to the conclusion that none of the Governments or competent international organizations possessed any data that could confirm the United States assertions about the alleged combat use of chemical substances in Kampuchea, Laos and Afghanistan. Viet Nam said chemical weapons were not currently being used in the three countries, and that the determination of the resolution's sponsors to institutionalize investigative machinery amounted to an illegal revision of the 1925 Geneva Protocol.

New Zealand rejected the notion advanced by several opponents of the text that the Group of Experts had been appointed to reach certain definite conclusions, or that it had not reached the expected conclusions; the international community had an obligation to try to ascertain the facts, and the resolution contained a simple request that the Group complete its work to the best of its ability.

Bangladesh, China, Fiji, the Ivory Coast, the Niger, Nigeria and Senegal, which voted for the resolution, shared the view that the Group should be allowed to continue its work so as to assess the facts and complete its mandate; China added that no one should be allowed to obstruct the Group's investigations. Guinea, Mexico, Peru and Yugoslavia stated that they had abstained, as in 1980, because in general they regarded the text as containing confrontational or inconsistent elements which they could not accept. Afghanistan and Mozambique, which voted against, considered the proposal to be

insincere and saw no reason to renew the mandate, as the Group had found no evidence of the use of chemical weapons.

In the First Committee debate, Afghanistan said the United States provided chemical ammunition to bands of mercenaries in that country. Cuba asserted that United States imperialism had unleashed an undeclared biological war against Cuban territory, seriously affecting its cattle, tobacco and sugar-cane crops, and people. The United States, said the Lao People's Democratic Republic, was the only country that had used chemical weapons on a massive scale. Viet Nam declared that the United States had used more than 100,000 tons of chemical toxins in almost all the provinces of South Viet Nam, causing the death of 3,500 people and affecting 2 million others; it was, therefore, ironic and revolting that the United States should whip up a campaign of slander against the Lao People's Democratic Republic, the USSR and Viet Nam with regard to the use of chemical weapons.

The United States termed the Cuban and Vietnamese charges totally false and without foundation, adding that it had destroyed all of its biological weapons stocks; it also said that for five years lethal chemical weapons had been used against unsophisticated and defenceless people in Laos and Kampuchea, and more recently in Afghanistan. Democratic Kampuchea said Vietnamese military deserters had corroborated their use of toxic gases and other chemical weapons against civilian and military targets in Kampuchea; the atrocious death of tens of thousands of Kampuchean caused by Vietnamese-USSR chemical weapons could not go unpunished.

Singapore remarked that there could be no final word on the question at the moment and that it would be futile to make charges and countercharges which only reduced the issue to a propaganda war.

The sub-item relating to the Secretary-General's report was included in the agenda by decision of the Assembly on 18 September, after the General Committee, on 16 September, rejected a motion of the USSR to delete it by a vote of 18 to 4, with 2 abstentions.

Letters and notes verbales (nv): Democratic Kampuchea: ⁽¹⁾26 Jan., A/36/81; ⁽²⁾17 Feb., A/36/104; ⁽³⁾9 Mar., A/36/121; ⁽⁴⁾27 Mar., A/36/157; ⁽⁵⁾6 Apr., A/36/173; ⁽⁶⁾14 Apr., A/36/207; ⁽⁷⁾27 Apr., A/36/229; ⁽⁸⁾5 May, A/36/232-S/14473; ⁽⁹⁾14 May, A/36/254; ⁽¹⁰⁾8 June, A/36/312; ⁽¹¹⁾9 Nov., A/36/664; ⁽¹²⁾13 Nov., A/36/687; ⁽¹³⁾24 Nov., A/36/721-S/14770; ⁽¹⁴⁾3 Dec., A/36/769. ⁽¹⁵⁾USSR: 3 Dec., A/C.1/36/16. United States: ⁽¹⁶⁾14 Sep., A/36/509 (nv); ⁽¹⁷⁾12 Nov., A/C.1/36/10 (nv). Viet Nam: ⁽¹⁸⁾22 Sep., A/36/549; ⁽¹⁹⁾9 Oct., A/C.1/36/5.

Report: ⁽²⁰⁾S-G and Group of Experts, A/36/613.

Resolutions: GA: ⁽²¹⁾35/144 C, 12 Dec. 1980 (YUN 1980, p. 85); ⁽²²⁾36/96 C, 9 Dec. 1981, text following.

Financial implications: Committee on Conferences observations, A/C.1/36/L.62/Add.1; 5th Committee report, A/36/802; S-G statements, A/C.1/36/L.62, A/C.5/36/92. Meeting records: GA: General Committee, A/BUR/36/SR.1 (16 Sep.); 1st Committee, A/C.1/36/PV.3 & Corr.1, 4.10, 12-26, 29, 30-32, 44, 52, 53 (19 Oct.-4 Dec.); 5th Committee, A/C.5/36/SR.68 (9 Dec.); plenary, A/36/PV.91 (9 Dec.).

General Assembly resolution 30/96 C

86-20-34 (recorded vote) Meeting 91 9 December 1981

Approved by First Committee (A/36/743) by recorded vote (74-18-30), 4 December (meeting 53); 9-nation draft (A/C.1/36/L.54): agenda item 42.

Sponsors: Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Federal Republic of Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Turkey.

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 35/144 C of 12 December 1980 in which, inter alia, it decided to carry out an impartial investigation to ascertain the facts pertaining to reports regarding the alleged use of chemical weapons and requested the Secretary-General to carry out such an investigation with the assistance of qualified medical and technical experts,

Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General, to which is annexed the report prepared by the Group of Experts to Investigate Reports on the Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons,

Noting that, as indicated by the conclusions of its report, the Group of Experts has not yet completed the investigation called for under paragraph 5 of General Assembly resolution 35/144C,

Noting also the views of the Group of Experts concerning the importance of prompt on-site investigations of allegations of the use of chemical weapons and the need to devise appropriate procedures for impartial collection and analysis of samples that may be obtained in the course of any such investigations,

Considering, accordingly, that the Group of Experts should continue its investigations,

1. Takes note with appreciation of the report of the Secretary-General,

2. Requests the Secretary-General, with the assistance of the Group of Experts to Investigate Reports on the Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons, to continue his investigation pursuant to General Assembly resolution 35/144 C and to report to the Assembly at its thirty-seventh session.

Recorded vote in Assembly as follows:

In favour: Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Bolivia, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Costa Rica, Democratic Kampuchea, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Fiji, France, Gabon, Germany, Federal Republic of Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Maldives, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Philippines, Portugal, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Spain, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Vanuatu, a Zaire, Zambia.

Against: Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Byelorussian SSR, Congo, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Ethiopia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Mongolia, Mozambique, Poland, Romania, Seychelles, Syrian Arab Republic, Ukrainian SS, USSR, Viet Nam.

Abstaining: Argentina, Bahrain, Bhutan, Brazil, Burma, Burundi, Cape Verde, Finland, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon, Madagascar, Mali, Malts, Mexico, Nepal, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Qatar, Sri Lanka, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia.

^a Later advised the Secretariat it had intended to abstain.

Proposed prohibition of weapons of mass destruction

CONSIDERATION BY THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT. On 30 June 1981, the Committee on Disarmament,⁽¹⁾ acting on a proposal by Hungary, agreed by consensus to hold informal meetings on the question of new types of weapons of mass destruction, with the understanding that it was a normal practice for every delegation to have the right to utilize experts at any time. In the three informal meetings that followed, experts from some member States made statements concerning possible areas of new weapons development and gave an account of their potential in certain fields. No new weapons were reported to have appeared and the possibility of their development remained a matter of controversy.

No consensus was reached on a proposal for a group of governmental experts to keep the question of new weapons of mass destruction under continuing review. Another proposal was for the General Assembly to establish a group of experts to review recent trends in scientific developments, to identify any possible new weapons of mass destruction and to recommend the most appropriate means to prevent their emergence. It was also proposed, as another alternative, that the Committee hold annual informal meetings with experts. The Committee felt that the question should be kept under continuing review.

GENERAL ASSEMBLY ACTION. By a resolution of 9 December,⁽²⁾ the General Assembly requested the Committee on Disarmament to intensify negotiations, assisted by governmental experts, with a view to preparing a draft comprehensive agreement on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons, and to draft possible agreements on particular types of such weapons. The Assembly again urged States to refrain from action which could adversely affect talks aimed at working out agreements on this subject. It also called on the permanent members of the Security Council, as well as other militarily significant States, to make identical declarations, to be approved by the Council, on the refusal to create new types and systems of such weapons, as a first step towards a comprehensive agreement.

The Assembly adopted this resolution by a recorded vote of 116 to none, with 27 abstentions. The text was approved in the First Committee on 23 November by a recorded vote of 95 to none, with 27 abstentions.

Introducing the 28-nation draft, the Byelorussian SSR stated that it took into account both approaches to the problem, namely, preparation of a comprehensive agreement to prohibit the development and manufacture of all new types of

weapons of this kind, and the drafting of agreements on particular types of such weapons.

On behalf of the European Community members, the United Kingdom explained their abstention on the ground that specific, verifiable agreements were necessary for an effective prohibition of new weapons and their technologies; that the special importance given in the proposal to negotiation of a single blanket prohibition did not appear warranted; that a comprehensive agreement could not distinguish between peaceful and military-oriented research; and that the proposed Security Council action would not be a step towards a comprehensive agreement or an effective measure to prevent such weapons from emerging.

Among the others abstaining, Japan considered it inappropriate for the Committee on Disarmament to negotiate on a comprehensive agreement whose scope and application was far from clear and presented difficulties in such areas as verification; moreover, an approach based on declarations by militarily significant States was unrealistic. Portugal also questioned the comprehensive agreement approach, noted that the resolution failed to mention verification and remarked that the concept of weapons of mass destruction had not been sufficiently defined. Sweden recalled its doubts about a general prohibition and its continuing support for the elaboration of specific agreements relating to such weapons as were identified.

India stated that its affirmative vote did not signify support for the establishment of a working group of governmental experts in the Committee on Disarmament, since the means of dealing with the question was a matter for that Committee to decide; India also had reservations on the call for interim measures. Of the others which voted in favour, Argentina stated that it would have abstained had a separate vote been taken on the paragraph calling for declarations by militarily significant States, in view of its position concerning unilateral and non-verifiable declarations. Finland supported the proposal in the belief that all approaches should be explored.

In the First Committee debate, many Eastern European and other States called for the conclusion of a comprehensive treaty on the prohibition of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction. Czechoslovakia said there was an urgent need to prevent the emergence of such weapons in view of the United States decision to manufacture the neutron bomb. The USSR suggested that the militarily significant States, as a first step towards a comprehensive agreement, should make similar or identical statements renouncing the development of new types and systems of such weapons, to be approved later by

the Security Council. This idea was endorsed by Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic and the Ukrainian SSR.

The Byelorussian SSR said that, as a result of the position of certain States, the Committee on Disarmament had not even begun talks on the subject. Bulgaria, the Byelorussian SSR and Mongolia stated that it would be helpful if that Committee made it possible for a group of governmental experts to work on the problem. Hungary and the Ukrainian SSR thought such a group should work on a comprehensive agreement as well as special agreements on individual weapons.

Afghanistan and Uganda expressed concern at the lack of progress in such an important area. Bhutan stated that the diversion of tremendous resources to such purposes as the production of more sophisticated weapons of mass destruction would diminish the already inadequate resources available for combating poverty in the developing countries.

The United States, on the other hand, described the proposed treaty as a meaningless proposal which addressed undefined and non-existent weapons and which would be impossible to implement or verify; such a propaganda ploy should not mask the build-up of the USSR offensive threat against the United States.

Report: ("Committee on Disarmament, A/36/27 (Committee documents, CD/228, appendix II, vols. I, II).

Resolution: ⁽²⁾GA, 36/89, 9 Dec., text following.

Meeting records: GA: 1st Committee, A/C.1/36/PV.3 & Corr.1 4-10, 12-26, 34, 35, 38, 40 (19 Oct.-23 Nov.); plenary, A/36/PV.91 (9 Dec.).

General Assembly resolution 36/89

1 16-0-27 (recorded vote) Meeting 91 9 December 1981

Approved by First Committee (A/36/749) by recorded vote (95-0-27).
23 November (meeting 40); 28-nation draft A/C.1/36/L.13; agenda item 48.

Sponsors: Afghanistan, Angola, Benin, Bulgaria, Burundi, Byelorussian SSR, Congo, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Ethiopia, German Democratic Republic, Guinea, Hungary, Jordan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Madagascar, Mongolia, Mozambique, Niger, Poland, Romania, Sao Tome and Principe, Syrian Arab Republic, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, Viet Nam, Yemen.

Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 3479(XXX) of 11 December 1975, 31/74 of 10 December 1976, 32/84 A of 12 December 1977, 33/66 B of 14 December 1978, 34/79 of 11 December 1979 and 35/149 of 12 December 1980 concerning the prohibition of new types of weapons of mass destruction,

Bearing in mind the provisions of paragraph 39 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, according to which qualitative and quantitative disarmament measures are both important for halting the arms race and efforts to that end must include negotiations on the limitation and cessation of the qualitative improvement of armaments, especially weapons of mass destruction, and the development of new means of warfare,

Recalling the decision contained in paragraph 77 of the

Final Document to the effect that, in order to help prevent a qualitative arms race and so that scientific and technological achievements might ultimately be used solely for peaceful purposes, effective measures should be taken to prevent the emergence of new types of weapons of mass destruction based on new scientific principles and achievements, and that efforts aimed at the prohibition of such new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction should be appropriately pursued,

Expressing once again its firm belief, in the light of the decisions adopted at the tenth special session, in the importance of concluding an agreement or agreements to prevent the use of scientific and technological progress for the development of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons,

Noting that in the course of its session in 1981 the Committee on Disarmament considered the item entitled "New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons".

Noting with satisfaction that in the course of its session in 1961 the Committee on Disarmament held informal meetings on this item with the participation of qualified governmental experts,

Convinced that all ways and means should be utilized to prevent the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons,

Taking into consideration the part of the report of the Committee on Disarmament relating to this question,

1. Requests the Committee on Disarmament, in the light of its existing priorities, to intensify negotiations, with the assistance of qualified governmental experts, with a view to preparing a draft comprehensive agreement on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons, and to draft possible agreements on particular types of such weapons;

2. Once again urges all States to refrain from any action which could adversely affect the talks aimed at working out an agreement or agreements to prevent the emergence of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons;

3. Calls upon the States permanent members of the Security Council, as well as upon other militarily significant States, to make declarations, identical in substance, concerning the refusal to create new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons, as a first step towards the conclusion of a comprehensive agreement on this subject, bearing in mind that such declarations would be approved thereafter by a decision of the Security Council;

4. Requests the Secretary-General to transmit to the Committee on Disarmament all documents relating to the consideration of this item by the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session;

5. Requests the Committee on Disarmament to submit a report on the results achieved to the General Assembly for consideration at its thirty-seventh session;

6. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-seventh session the item entitled "Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons: report of the Committee on Disarmament".

Recorded vote in Assembly as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian SSR, Caps Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Grenada, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua,

gua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia.

Against: None.

Abstaining: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Swaziland, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States.

Radiological weapons

CONSIDERATION BY THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT. In dealing with its agenda item on "New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons", the Committee on Disarmament⁽⁶⁾ re-established on 12 February 1981, for the duration of the 1981 session, its Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons. The Group's mandate remained the same as in 1980: to seek agreement on a convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons.⁽⁵⁾ The Group held 21 meetings between 20 February and 14 August 1981, in addition to informal consultations. The subject was also discussed in the Committee.

The Group reported at the conclusion of its 1981 work that divergences still existed, particularly on the scope of prohibition, the definition of radiological weapons, the procedure for verifying compliance, peaceful uses, and the relationship of the proposed treaty with other international agreements and disarmament measures.

Concerning the scope of prohibition, some members thought that, while the development of specific radiological weapons was a remote possibility, any treaty should deal with the real danger of mass destruction from dissemination of radioactive substances resulting from attacks on nuclear facilities. Others considered that the possible threat of radiological weapons should be dealt with before they came into existence, and that an attempt to deal in the same negotiations with radiological weapons and the protection of nuclear facilities could lead to confusion.

In regard to definition, differences persisted over whether the proposed agreement should exclude nuclear weapons. With regard to peaceful uses, some felt that the treaty should recognize the right of all States to develop and apply programmes for the peaceful use of radioactive materials, while others considered that provisions on peaceful uses should not be too detailed, given the main purpose of the treaty and the goal of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. As to verification of compliance, there were different views as to whether the Security Council should deal with complaints of viola-

tions and some countries wished to see provisions for on-site inspection.

On 20 August, the Committee adopted the Working Group's report. There was no consensus, however, on the Group's recommendation that its work be resumed in 1982.

GENERAL ASSEMBLY ACTION. By a resolution of 9 December on conclusion of a convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons,⁽³⁾ adopted without vote, the General Assembly called on the Committee on Disarmament to continue negotiations with a view to early conclusion of the elaboration of a treaty, in order that it might be submitted if possible at the Assembly's 1982 special session on disarmament (p. 27).

The First Committee approved the text in similar fashion on 20 November, after its sponsor, Hungary, accepted an oral amendment by Argentina-supported by China, India and Yugoslavia- to add the words "if possible" to the paragraph on submission of a treaty in 1982.

Introducing the resolution, Hungary stated that, as a consequence of the spread of nuclear power production, material which could be used in radiological weapons was now found in many facilities and in many countries. Thus, prevention of the appearance of a new type of weapon of mass destruction-radiological weapons-had become timely and important. Hungary added that the proposal was practically a reproduction of the Assembly's 1980 resolution⁽²⁾ and was of a procedural nature, designed to enable the Committee on Disarmament to continue its work on radiological weapons in 1982.

India, while joining the consensus, noted that serious divergencies still existed, particularly concerning the scope of the future treaty and the definition of radiological weapons; hence, adoption of the resolution should in no way be used to upset existing priorities in the Committee on Disarmament.

During the First Committee's debate, the USSR stated that prospects were good for the early conclusion of negotiations on this topic, under way since 1979 in the Committee on Disarmament. The United States said it was prepared to participate in that Committee with a view to completing negotiations on a radiological weapons convention.

The idea that negotiation of a draft agreement should be concluded in the near future was supported by Bulgaria, France, Hungary and the Ukrainian SSR. However, Hungary conceded that serious difficulties continued to exist on vital questions.

Sweden remarked that the USSR-United States proposal on major elements of a treaty, presented to the Working Group in 1979,⁽⁴⁾ totally

lacked substance as it failed to include a ban against attacks on civilian nuclear installations. Egypt, Finland, Japan, Pakistan and Somalia believed that, the Swedish proposal had been rendered more relevant by the Israeli attack in June on Iraqi nuclear facilities (p. 53). Poland, on the other hand, believed the two-Power document remained a good starting point.

Belgium suggested that the principles contained in the Swedish proposal be embodied in the convention, along with a commitment to negotiate later a legal instrument covering all possible implications. Expressing hope that negotiations on radiological weapons would be completed in 1982, France suggested that the difficulties raised by proposals aimed at settling in that convention questions alien to its true purpose might be considered in another framework.

Nepal supported the view expressed in the Committee on Disarmament by the Group of 21 (p. 31) that the definition of radiological weapons should not include an exclusion clause with respect to nuclear weapons.

Report: ⁽¹⁾Committee on Disarmament, A/36/27 (Committee documents, CD/228, appendix II, vols. I, II).

Resolutions: GA: ⁽²⁾35/156 G, 12 Dec. 1980 (YUN 1980, p. 86); ⁽³⁾36/97 B, 9 Dec. 1981, text following.

Yearbook references: ⁽⁴⁾1979, p. 25; ⁽⁵⁾1980, p. 27.

Meeting records: GA: 1st Committee, A/C.1/36/PV.3 & Corr.1, 4-10, 12-26, 29, 35, 38 (19 Oct.-20 Nov.); plenary, A/36/PV.91 (9 Dec.).

General Assembly resolution 36/97 B

Adopted without vote Meeting 91 9 December 1981

Approved by First Committee (A/36/756) without vote, 20 November (meeting 38); draft by Hungary (A/C.1/36/L.6), orally amended by Argentina; agenda item 55 (g).

Conclusion of an international convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons

The General Assembly,

Recalling the resolution of the Commission for Conventional Armaments of 12 August 1948, which defined weapons of mass destruction to include atomic explosive weapons, radioactive material weapons, lethal chemical and biological weapons and any weapons developed in the future which have characteristics comparable, in destructive effect to those of the atomic bomb or the other weapons mentioned above,

Recalling its resolution 2602 C (XXIV) of 16 December 1969,

Recalling paragraph 76 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, in which it is stated that a convention should be concluded prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons,

Reaffirming its resolutions 34/87 A of 11 December 1979 and 35/156G of 12 December 1980 on the conclusion of such a convention,

Convinced that such a convention would serve to spare mankind the potential dangers of the use of radiological weapons and thereby contribute to strengthening peace and averting the threat of war,

Noting that negotiations on the conclusion of an international convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons have been conducted in the Committee on Disarmament,

Taking note of that part of the report of the Committee on

Disarmament which deals with these negotiations, including the report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons,

Recognizing that divergent views continue to exist in connection with various aspects relating to a convention prohibiting radiological weapons,

Noting with satisfaction the wide recognition of the need to reach agreement on the text of a treaty prohibiting radiological weapons,

1. Calls upon the Committee on Disarmament to continue negotiations with a view to an early conclusion of the elaboration of a treaty prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons, in order that it may be submitted if possible to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament, to be held from 7 June to 9 July 1982;

2. Takes note, in this connection, of the recommendation of the Ad Hoc Working Group, on Radiological Weapons, in the report adopted by the Committee on Disarmament, to set up at the beginning of its session in 1982 a further ad hoc working group, under an appropriate mandate to be determined at that time, to continue negotiations on the elaboration of a treaty prohibiting radiological weapons;

3. Requests the Secretary-General to transmit to the Committee on Disarmament all documents relating to the discussion by the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session of the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons;

4. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-seventh session the item entitled "Prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons".

Prohibition of weapons and prevention of an arms race in outer space

In 1981, concern was expressed during the General Assembly session that rapid advances in science and technology had made the extension of the arms race into outer space a real possibility, and that new kinds of weapons were still being developed despite the existence of international agreements such as the 1966 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies,⁽²⁾ which prohibited nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction from being placed in orbit or elsewhere in space.

On 9 December 1981, the Assembly adopted two resolutions aimed at preventing an arms race in outer space: one by Western European and other States asking the Committee on Disarmament to consider the question of negotiating effective and verifiable agreements, starting with an agreement on anti-satellite systems; and another by Eastern European and other States requesting that body to embark on negotiations on an international treaty against the stationing of any weapons in space. The latter resolution resulted from an initiative by the USSR to place the subject on the Assembly's agenda as a separate item.

By the first of these resolutions on prevention of an arms race in outer space,⁽³⁾ the Assembly requested the Committee on Disarmament to

consider, from the beginning of its 1982 session, the question of negotiating effective and verifiable agreements in that regard, taking into account all existing and future proposals. As an important step towards that end, the Committee was asked to consider as a matter of priority the question of negotiating an effective and verifiable agreement to prohibit anti-satellite systems. This resolution, sponsored by 17 Western European and other States, was adopted by a recorded vote of 129 to none, with 13 abstentions, following its approval in the First Committee on 23 November by a recorded vote of 110 to none, with 14 abstentions.

By the second resolution, on the conclusion of a treaty on the prohibition of weapons in outer space,⁽⁴⁾ the Assembly expressed the view that it was necessary to take effective steps, by concluding an international treaty, to prevent the spread of the arms race to outer space. It requested the Committee on Disarmament to embark on negotiations with a view to achieving agreement on the text of such a treaty. The Assembly adopted the resolution, sponsored by 13 Eastern European and other States, by a recorded vote of 123 to none, with 21 abstentions, after the First Committee approved the text on 23 November by a recorded vote, requested by the Netherlands, of 105 to none, with 20 abstentions.

Italy introduced the first of these resolutions, stating that a much broader involvement of the international community was desirable on an issue likely to affect the future security of the whole world. Noting the complexity of the subject, Italy recommended that priority be accorded to elements such as anti-satellite systems designed to impair the functioning of, interfere with, damage or destroy satellites of other nations. The comparatively early stage of development of such capabilities presented an opportunity to negotiate a realistic and verifiable agreement.

The item entitled "Conclusion of a treaty on the prohibition of the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space" was inscribed in the 1981 Assembly agenda on 18 September, at the request of the USSR. That country, in a letter of 10 August to the Secretary-General,⁽⁵⁾ stated that no existing international instrument excluded the possibility of stationing in outer space weapons not covered by the definition of weapons of mass destruction; consequently, the danger of militarizing outer space still existed and had recently been increasing. A nine-article draft treaty annexed to the letter would prohibit objects carrying any kind of weapons from being placed in earth orbit, on celestial bodies, on reusable manned space vehicles or anywhere else in space.

Introducing the resolution submitted under this item, Mongolia remarked that, as there were varying approaches to the problem and in view of its complexity, the sponsors proposed that the Assembly should, without prejudging the content of an agreement, request the Committee on Disarmament to embark on negotiations.

A number of countries, particularly from Eastern Europe, welcomed the USSR initiative, asserting that increased production of so-called "potential" weapons, especially by the United States, made it important to secure general approval of the draft treaty. Bulgaria, the Byelorussian SSR and Hungary referred to the possible military use of the United States reusable manned space vehicle Columbia (known as the space shuttle) and the potential use of laser and particle beams as weapons in space. Poland, noting that the proposal to bring the question to the United Nations had been made by a nation with considerable technological capability in space, said its readiness to forgo part of that capability should be emulated by those with a comparable capability.

The Ukrainian SSR observed that existing agreements did not exclude the placement in space of weapons which were no less destructive than the weapons of mass destruction already banned from outer space. In a similar vein, Czechoslovakia viewed the proposed treaty as a device to fill the gaps in the system of norms and principles governing the conduct of States in space.

The Netherlands, while welcoming the draft treaty, criticized it for failing to prohibit the testing, production or use of space weapons under certain circumstances, for lacking a clear definition of the term "weapon" and for leaving verification to exclusively national means. A similar view was put forward by Sweden, which felt that the USSR draft omitted some aspects of the militarization of outer space which were as important as those it covered, and that it needed additional provisions on verification, complaints and review.

Sweden, supported by Argentina, Ghana, Nigeria and Sri Lanka, suggested that the two proposals be amalgamated so as to avoid having two different resolutions on the same subject, two sets of instructions to the Committee on Disarmament and two items on the same subject in the provisional agenda of the Assembly's 1982 session. Both Italy and Mongolia, although agreeing to consider the suggestion to consult before the vote in the Assembly, maintained that each resolution had its own identity and approach, and was therefore appropriate for discussion as a distinct item.

India, Mexico, Nigeria and Yugoslavia voted in favour of both resolutions but with the under-

standing that consideration of the subject in the Committee on Disarmament would have to be determined in the light of existing priorities. India further stated that measures to prevent an arms race in outer space should cover both the deployment and the testing of weapons of any kind in that environment, and that demilitarization of outer space should not become a pretext for preventing developing countries from deriving the full benefits of space research. Sierra Leone, while supporting the text introduced by Italy, feared that requesting the Committee on Disarmament to consider the question rather than immediately embark on negotiations could mean that the item might be shelved indefinitely.

Argentina declared that its support of both resolutions did not mean concurrence with all the language used or acceptance in advance of certain priorities in the consideration of items or treaty texts which had not yet been studied in depth. Egypt, which also voted for both resolutions, stated that it concurred with their objective but did not think it advisable to be specific on either the draft treaty or the issue of priority for anti-satellite systems. The Philippines supported both texts, as it favoured all proposals aimed at keeping outer space for peaceful purposes for the benefit of all mankind.

China voted in favour of both proposals, which it regarded as basically procedural; it was concerned about the increasing military rivalry between the super-Powers in outer space and therefore supported any effort which might lead to the peaceful use of that environment and against its militarization.

The USSR abstained on the proposal introduced by Italy on the ground that it over-emphasized the prohibition of anti-satellite systems and thus tended to shift the focus away from the general problem of preventing an arms race in outer space, and because the preamble erroneously suggested that the USSR-United States talks on limiting anti-satellite systems were in progress although they had been broken off by the United States and the prospects of their resumption remained unclear.

The United States supported the resolution introduced by Italy as an adequate basis for consideration of the question in the Committee on Disarmament; but it abstained in the vote on the proposal introduced by Mongolia, stating that primary emphasis in outer-space arms-control discussions would have to be placed on the threat posed by the USSR anti-satellite system, as that country was the only one which had already deployed a weapons system for destroying satellites.

Albania did not participate in the vote on

either text and stated that it would not support the idea of concluding a treaty based on the USSR proposal; it questioned the sincerity of the proposal and said that outer space had been turned into an arena of military competition between the USSR and the United States.

In the First Committee debate, Austria regarded development by both super-Powers of space-stationed anti-satellite and anti-ballistic-missile technology as threatening a wasteful and destabilizing arms race. Egypt warned that space technology would provide greater reliability and accuracy to strategic weapons, with the result that existing strategic doctrines would be replaced by more aggressive ones. India stated that demilitarization of outer space should not become a pretext for perpetuating an exclusive space club or preventing developing nations from deriving the full benefits of space research. Nepal said it would support any proposal for an effective and verifiable control mechanism to stop the militarization of outer space.

Several States urged the prompt resumption of the anti-satellite talks between the USSR and the United States, suspended since 1979. Finland, Ireland and the Netherlands, while acknowledging the need for agreement between the two major space Powers, saw a parallel role for multilateral negotiations in a body such as the Committee on Disarmament. Canada, Mongolia and the Ukrainian SSR also thought that Committee should start work on a draft convention. Norway expressed the view that a treaty prohibiting anti-satellite weapons would have a stabilizing influence on super-Power relations and enhance the possibilities of verifying disarmament treaties. Also urging the conclusion of an anti-satellite-weapons treaty were Bangladesh and Italy.

Brazil argued that, by entrusting negotiation of the proposed treaty to the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, the General Assembly would allow the Committee on Disarmament to concentrate on the priority items already on its agenda, while ensuring that the question of the militarization of outer space was handed over to a body which had adequate representation as well as technical and legal expertise. Chile saw the need for both Committees to study the military aspects of the use of outer space, where 80 per cent of all human activities had been for military purposes. The Netherlands, on the other hand, did not believe it appropriate or opportune to refer the matter to the Committee on outer space in view of that body's heavy work programme and because a decision to bypass the single multilateral disarmament body would involve a serious question of principle.

Letter: ⁽¹⁾USSR, 10 Aug., A/36/192.

Resolutions: GA: ⁽²⁾2222(XXI), annex, 19 Dec. 1966 (YUN 1966, p. 41); ⁽³⁾36/97 C, 9 Dec. 1981, text following; ⁽⁴⁾GA, 36/99, 9 Dec., text following.

Meeting records: GA: General Committee, A/BUR/36/SR.1 (16 Sep.); 1st Committee, A/C.1/36/PV.3 & Corr.1, 4-10, 12-26, 29, 30, 32-35, 38, 39(19 Oct.-23 Nov.); plenary, A/36/PV.91 (9 Dec.).

General Assembly resolution 36/97 C

129-0-13 (recorded vote) Meeting 91 9 December 1981
Approved by First Committee (A/36/756) by recorded vote (110-0-14), 23 November (meeting 39): 17-nation draft (A/C.1/36/L.7); agenda item 55.

Sponsors: Australia, Barbados, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Greece, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Norway, Spain, United Kingdom, Uruguay.

Prevention of an arms race in outer space

The General Assembly,
inspired by the great prospects opening up before mankind as a result of man's entry into outer space,

Believing that any activity in outer space should be for peaceful purposes and carried on for the benefit of all peoples, irrespective of the degree of their economic and scientific development,

Recalling that the States Parties to the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, have undertaken in article III to carry on activities in the exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, in accordance with international law and the Charter of the United Nations, in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international co-operation and understanding,

Recalling also article IV of the Treaty,

Recalling further paragraph 80 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, in which it is stated that, in order to prevent an arms race in outer space, further measures should be taken and appropriate international negotiations held in accordance with the spirit of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies,

Noting the important and growing contribution of satellites both for civilian purposes and the verification of disarmament agreements and aware of the possibilities of their use to promote peace, stability and international co-operation,

Mindful of the widespread interest expressed by Member States to ensure that the exploration and use of outer space should be for peaceful purposes, inter alia, in the course of the negotiations on and following the adoption of the above-mentioned Treaty, and taking note of proposals submitted to the General Assembly at its tenth special session, devoted to disarmament, and at its regular sessions and to the Committee on Disarmament,

Aware of the need to prevent an arms race in outer space and in particular of the threat posed by anti-satellite systems and their destabilizing effects on international peace and security,

Convinced that further measures are needed to prevent outer space from becoming an area of military confrontation, contrary to the spirit of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies,

Considering it necessary for the international community to give attention, in the Committee on Disarmament, to specific measures regarding the question of anti-satellite systems,

Bearing in mind that the restraint of anti-satellite systems has already been a subject of negotiations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America,

1. Considers that further effective measures to prevent an arms race in outer space should be adopted by the international community:

2. Urges all States, in particular those with major space capabilities, to contribute actively to the goal of preventing an arms race in outer space and to refrain from any action contrary to that aim;

3. Requests the Committee on Disarmament to consider, as from the beginning of its session in 1982, the question of negotiating effective and verifiable agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in outer space, taking into account all existing and future proposals designed to meet this objective;

4. Requests the Committee on Disarmament to consider as a matter of priority the question of negotiating an effective and verifiable agreement to prohibit anti-satellite systems, as an important step towards the fulfilment of the objectives set out in paragraph 3 above;

5. Requests the Committee on Disarmament to report on its consideration of this subject to the General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session;

6. Requests the Secretary-General to transmit to the Committee on Disarmament all documents relating to the consideration of this subject by the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session;

7. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-seventh session an item entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space and prohibition of anti-satellite systems".

Recorded vote in Assembly as follows:

In favour: Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Brazil, Burundi, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Germany, Federal Republic of Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, United States, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia.

Against: None.

Abstaining: Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Byelorussian SSR, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Mongolia, Poland, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, Viet Nam.

General Assembly resolution 36/99

123-0-21 (recorded vote) Meeting 91 9 December 1981
Approved by First Committee (A/36/758) by recorded vote (105-0-20), 23 November (meeting 39): 13-nation draft (A/C.1/36/L.8); agenda item 128.

Sponsors: Angola, Bulgaria, Byelorussian SSR, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Mongolia, Poland, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, Viet Nam.

Conclusion of a treaty on the prohibition of the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space

The General Assembly,

Guided by the goals of strengthening peace and international security,

Expressing the common interest of all mankind in the further 'exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes for the good of all States and in the interest of developing friendly relations and mutual understanding between them,

Conscious of the danger which would threaten mankind if outer space became an arena for the arms race,

Desiring not to allow outer space to become an arena for the arms race and a source of strained relations between States,

Taking into account the draft treaty on the prohibition of the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space, submitted to the General Assembly by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the views and comments expressed during the consideration of this item at its thirty-sixth session,

1. Considers it necessary to take effective steps, by concluding an appropriate international treaty, to prevent the spread of the arms race to outer space:

2. Requests the Committee on Disarmament to embark on negotiations with a view to achieving agreement on the text of such a treaty;

3. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-seventh session the item entitled "Conclusion of a treaty on the prohibition of the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space".

Recorded vote in Assembly as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burundi, Byelorussian SSR, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia.

Against: None.

Abstaining: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Greece, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Tunisia, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States.

Conventional weapons and forces

Convention against excessively injurious conventional weapons

The first international arms regulation agreements negotiated at a special United Nations conference, the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects and its three annexed Protocols, concluded in October 1980,⁽⁸⁾ were opened for signature on 10 April 1981. These instruments provided new rules for the protection of military personnel, civilians and civilian objects from injury or attack by means of incendiary weapons, landmines, booby traps and other devices, as well as fragments that cannot be readily detected in the human body by X-rays.

The Convention was signed by 34 States on the day it was opened for signature and by a total of 46 countries as at 31 December 1981: Afghanistan, Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Byelorussian SSR, Canada, China, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, Finland, France, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of,

Greece, Hungary, Iceland, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Sierra Leone, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Togo, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, United Kingdom, Viet Nam and Yugoslavia.

In communications to the Secretary-General, five signatory States—Belgium⁽¹⁾ (28 May), the Federal Republic of Germany⁽²⁾ (22 April) Ireland⁽³⁾ (18 June), Italy⁽⁴⁾ (10 April) and the Netherlands⁽⁵⁾ (23 April) —pledged to continue efforts for the establishment of measures and mechanisms to ensure implementation of and compliance with the Convention.

A report of the Secretary-General,⁽⁶⁾ as depositary of the Convention and Protocols, contained the list of signatories as at 31 August 1981, along with the declarations and reservations submitted by France, Italy and the United Kingdom.

GENERAL ASSEMBLY ACTION. By a resolution adopted without vote on 9 December,⁽⁷⁾ the General Assembly urged States to sign and ratify the Convention and its Protocols as early as possible so as to obtain its entry into force and ultimately its universal adherence. The Assembly noted that, under the Convention, conferences might be convened to consider amendments to the Convention or its Protocols, to consider additional protocols relating to further categories of conventional weapons, or to review the scope and operation of the Convention and its Protocols. The First Committee approved the text on 23 November, also without vote.

The resolution was introduced by Nigeria on behalf of 26 sponsors from all geographical regions. Although the Convention and Protocols were not disarmament measures, Nigeria observed, they were useful for their humanitarian considerations. As they had not come into force, nothing should be done at the current stage to disturb the delicate balance achieved during negotiations; any proposals or amendments could be considered later.

Democratic Yemen was among several States welcoming the conclusion of negotiations on the Convention. Ecuador viewed its adoption as proof that the United Nations could reach agreements which not only strengthened humanitarian international law but also encouraged arms control and disarmament. Sweden, appealing for signatures and ratifications, favoured the outlawing of all incendiary weapons and the international regulation of small-calibre weapons.

Denmark, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, New Zealand, Sweden and the United Kingdom, the last speaking for the European Community (EC) members, stressed the importance of establishing a mechanism for investigat-

ing alleged breaches of the Convention, while China hoped that inadequacies such as the failure to provide for control and verification could be rectified. Ireland and the United States reiterated their support for the establishment of a consultative committee to investigate facts if doubts arose about compliance.

Letter (I) and notes verbales: ⁽¹⁾Belgium, 28 May, A/36/309; ⁽²⁾Germany, Federal Republic of, 22 Apr., A/36/221; ⁽³⁾Ireland, 18 June, A/36/334; ⁽⁴⁾Italy, 10 Apr., A/36/224 (I); ⁽⁵⁾Netherlands, 23 Apr., A/36/225.

Report: ⁽⁶⁾S-G, A/36/406.

Resolution: ⁽⁷⁾GA, 36/93, 9 Dec., text following.

Yearbook reference: ⁽⁸⁾1980, p. 76.

Meeting records: GA: 1st Committee, A/C.1/36/PV.3 & Corr.1, 4-10, 12-26, 33, 37-39 (19 Oct.-23 Nov.); plenary, A/36/PV.91 (9 Dec.).

General Assembly resolution 36/93

Adopted without vote Meeting 91 9 December 1981

Approved by First Committee (A/36/753) without vote, 23 November (meeting 39); 26-nation draft (A/C.1/36/L.40); agenda item 52.

Sponsors: Bangladesh. Belgium. Bulgaria. Cuba, Denmark, Ecuador. Finland, France, German Democratic Republic, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Mexico, Mongolia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Panama, Spain, Sweden, USSR, United Kingdom, Viet Nam, Yugoslavia.

United Nations Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 32/152 of 19 December 1977, 33/70 of 14 December 1978, 34/82 of 11 December 1979 and 35/153 of 12 December 1980.

Recalling the successful conclusion of the United Nations Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, which resulted in a convention and three protocols, adopted by the Conference on 10 October 1980, namely, the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, the Protocol on Non-Detectable Fragments (Protocol I), the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby Traps and Other Devices (Protocol II) and the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of incendiary Weapons (Protocol III),

Reaffirming its conviction that the suffering of civilian populations and of combatants would be further significantly reduced if general agreement could be attained on the prohibition or restriction for humanitarian reasons of the use of specific conventional weapons, including any which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects,

Taking note with satisfaction of the report of the Secretary-General, in which indication was given that many States have already signed the Convention, which was opened for signature in New York on 10 April 1981,

1. Urges those States which have not yet done so to exert their best endeavours to sign and ratify the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects and the Protocols annexed thereto as early as possible so as to obtain the entry into force of the Convention, and ultimately its universal adherence;

2. Notes that, under article 8 of the Convention, conferences may be convened to consider amendments to the Convention or any of the Protocols annexed thereto, to consider additional protocols relating to other categories of conventional weapons not covered by the existing annexed Proto-

cols, or to review the scope and operation of the Convention and the Protocols annexed thereto and to consider any proposal for amendments to the Convention or to the existing Protocols and any proposals for additional protocols relating to other categories of conventional weapons not covered by the existing annexed Protocols;

3. Requests the Secretary-General, as depositary of the Convention and the three Protocols annexed thereto, to inform the General Assembly from time to time of the state of adherence to the Convention and its Protocols;

4. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-seventh session the item entitled "United Nations Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects".

Study on conventional disarmament

DISARMAMENT COMMISSION CONSIDERATION. On 28 May 1981, the Disarmament Commission established an informal open-ended Working Group to elaborate the general approach, structure and scope of a study on all aspects of the conventional arms race and on conventional disarmament—a task entrusted to it by the General Assembly in December 1980.⁽³⁾ Working papers were submitted by China, Denmark, the German Democratic Republic and India. The Working Group also considered two papers by its Chairman containing suggested guidelines, which were later annexed to the Commission's report to the Assembly.⁽¹⁾

The Chairman's suggested guidelines, which some delegations were ready to accept as a mandate for the study, listed several provisions and principles to underlie its general approach, including the need of States to protect their security, the objective of promoting or enhancing stability at a lower military level, the need for verification in agreements on reduction of armed forces and armaments, and the need to take account of both global and regional aspects. Among the elements suggested for the scope and structure of the study were identification of the main causes of the conventional arms race, a factual account of the arms build-up, the nature of military alliances, international conventional-arms transfers, use of conventional arms against States, the impact of technology, a description of social and economic consequences, and the contribution of confidence-building measures. The experts who were to assist the Secretary-General in carrying out the study, as stipulated in the 1980 resolution, would be asked to assess the effects of the conventional arms race on prospects for disarmament and to identify areas in which measures to curb the race were most urgent and feasible.

After five meetings of the Working Group between 28 May and 5 June, the Commission concluded, in a text adopted on 5 June, that a significant divergence of views prevented it at that stage from discharging the responsibility

assigned to it by the Assembly. It recommended that Member States consider the matter further with the aim of reconciling the differences.

GENERAL ASSEMBLY ACTION. By a resolution on the study on conventional disarmament,⁽⁴⁾ adopted on 9 December, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to establish a Group of Experts on All Aspects of the Conventional Arms Race and on Disarmament relating to Conventional Weapons and Armed Forces. It asked the Disarmament Commission to complete in 1982 its consideration of the general approach to the study, its structure and scope, and to transmit its conclusions to the Group of Experts. The Assembly agreed that the Group should pursue its work after the Disarmament Commission met, taking into consideration such conclusions as the Commission might submit and, if necessary, its 1981 deliberations. The Secretary-General was requested to submit a final report in 1983.

The Assembly adopted the resolution by a recorded vote of 114 to none, with 26 abstentions. The text, sponsored and revised by Denmark and incorporating an amendment by Brazil, was approved in the First Committee on 25 November by a recorded vote of 98 to none, with 21 abstentions.

The initial draft resolution would have had the Assembly request the Secretary-General to initiate the work of the Group, taking the Commission's 1981 deliberations as guidance, and to submit a progress report in 1982 prior to the final report in 1983. As the sponsor, Denmark, explained it, this would have meant that the Group would begin work as soon as the resolution was adopted. After objections by some States that the Disarmament Commission should be given another chance to agree on the mandate, the text was revised by Denmark to allow the Commission to complete its consideration of the matter before the Group met. The revised text was further altered to incorporate a Brazilian amendment inserting the words "if necessary" before the reference to the Commission's 1981 deliberations.

Commenting on the original Danish draft, Brazil, India and Peru saw it as eroding the competence of the Disarmament Commission, to which the Assembly had assigned responsibility for working out the general approach, structure and scope of the proposed study. Emphasizing their support for enhancing the Commission's role, these States called on others to avoid actions that might adversely affect that role. Brazil and India recommended that the draft resolution be withdrawn so that the Commission could give further consideration to working out generally approved guidelines for the study.

Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Spain and the United Kingdom, the last speaking for the EC members, supported the original Danish proposal. The United Kingdom said the Assembly should not impose upon the experts detailed guidelines on every aspect of their work, and that delaying action on the study and referring the matter back to the Commission could detract from the standing of that body. The Federal Republic of Germany thought that, in deciding on its organization of work and mode of operation, the Group would find useful and sufficient the guidelines that could be derived from the list of topics presented in the Commission; a later substantive input to their work by the Commission was not ruled out. Spain commented that returning the question to the Commission would be tantamount to preventing the study from being carried out.

Explaining their positions on the revised text, a number of States which voted in favour, including the Bahamas, Ecuador, Pakistan and Peru, agreed that it had removed the preoccupations which the initial version had created regarding the Commission's mandate to work out the general approach to the study. Italy expressed confidence that, if the Commission experienced difficulties, the Group of Experts would be in a position to pursue its work. The United States assumed that expenditures in connection with the proposed study would be made without prejudice to the zero-growth budget policy of the United Nations.

India, which abstained in the vote, felt that, although the revised text addressed some of its preoccupations, the study should be undertaken only after the Commission had fully discussed and agreed on guidelines. The USSR also abstained, stating that the proposed guidelines given in the Commission's report were one-sided in that they emphasized such questions as the nature of military alliances, political doctrines, data collection and questions related to the qualitative aspects of the conventional arms race, instead of focusing on the task of promoting disarmament.

Several States commented favourably on the potential usefulness of the study. Nepal, for example, believed that it could form the basis for efforts to control international conventional-arms transfers. Egypt said the study must recognize that nuclear disarmament took priority; it should take into account the root causes of the conventional armaments race and it should not be used to infringe the rights of peoples and States to self-determination, sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence. Nor-

way attached special importance to the recommendations for compilation and dissemination of data on the military use of human and material resources and military transfers.

In the First Committee debate, many States supported a limitation of the build-up and transfer of conventional weapons. In general, Western States continued to see conventional arms control and disarmament as an important question that should be pursued simultaneously with nuclear disarmament, while developing countries largely regarded it as important but secondary to nuclear disarmament.

Italy saw a direct relationship between the nuclear and conventional arms races, since the growth of conventional arsenals of one side could provide an impetus for the other side to expand its nuclear arsenals. Belgium voiced a similar concern, holding that the uncontrolled growth of conventional weapons could lead to a risk of nuclear proliferation. Austria, the Netherlands and Spain regretted that the United Nations had not devoted sufficient attention to the problem.

A number of arguments for conventional disarmament were advanced. Chile remarked that 80 per cent of military expenditures was devoted to the production of conventional weapons, while Ireland said that 25 million people had been killed by conventional weapons since the Second World War, most of them in the third world. China, stating that conventional disarmament should proceed in conjunction with nuclear disarmament, observed that all the wars of aggression launched directly or indirectly by the super-Powers had been fought with conventional weapons. Singapore, remarking that conventional arms had been used in several invasions of small countries by their bigger and stronger neighbours, said there could be no certainty that a third world war would not have broken out if the balance of nuclear terror had not existed.

Guyana recognized that States must equip themselves for defence but said some which faced no obvious external enemy or threat had made preparations which far exceeded the normal requirements of legitimate self-defence. New Zealand, observing that all States were entitled to maintain armed forces for defence, said that while this had a restraining effect in some cases, conventional armaments and armed forces sometimes increased the potential for conflict, with the risk of great-Power involvement. The Philippines contended that increased acquisition of conventional arms could raise the level of fear and threat in the minds of neighbours and possible adversaries, encouraging them to take steps to eliminate the perceived dangers. Zambia saw the conventional arms race, especially in devel-

oping countries, as threatening world peace and security.

The Byelorussian SSR observed that only the USSR had declared its readiness to adhere to a ceiling on the armed forces and conventional armaments of the permanent members of the Security Council, as called for by the Assembly in 1980⁽²⁾

Several States stressed the socio-economic advantages that would accrue from conventional disarmament. Greece expressed a widely shared view that progress in this area would have favourable consequences on the economies and development efforts of all countries, especially the smaller ones.

Support for the limitation of international arms sales and other types of transfers of conventional weapons was expressed by a number of States, including Chile, the German Democratic Republic, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Jordan, Rwanda, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, the Ukrainian SSR, the USSR and the United States. Sweden cited figures showing that the international arms trade had reached a value of \$35 billion a year, of which 75 per cent represented imports by developing countries.

Several developing countries, including Barbados, Bhutan, Jamaica, Lebanon, Mauritania, Nigeria and Rwanda, deplored transfers of armaments to developing countries, in particular because they consumed resources vitally needed for development and provided opportunities for regional mistrust and conflict. With regard to the Middle East, Iraq, Jordan and the Syrian Arab Republic believed that United States arms transfers to Israel threatened peace and security, while Israel contended that Arab States were engaged in a costly programme of arms acquisition aimed at Israel. Viet Nam condemned United States arms transfers to certain Asian countries, arguing that they encouraged subversion and destabilization, particularly in South-East Asia. Cuba and Nicaragua similarly deplored United States arms supplies to certain Latin American countries, and Cuba denied allegations that weapons it had acquired from the USSR for its defence had been redistributed in Latin America.

The United States contended that the USSR surpassed any other country in the transfer of weapons to developing countries, having signed arms sales agreements with such countries in 1980 worth \$15 billion. The USSR stated that the United States, in 1978, had unilaterally broken off talks with the USSR aimed at limiting conventional arms transfers.

Several measures proposed in previous years were reiterated during the 1981 debate. These included proposals by the Federal Republic of Germany to establish a United Nations register

of conventional arms exports and imports, by Warsaw Treaty Organization members to freeze the conventional armaments and armed forces of the permanent members of the Security Council and their military allies as the first step towards reduction, by Italy for a United Nations body to monitor and control the international arms trade, and by Turkey to control arms sales by private companies with the aim of countering terrorist activities.

India reiterated its view that nuclear disarmament must not be based on progress in conventional disarmament and that the nuclear Powers and their allies, bearing primary responsibility for the conventional arms race; had to take the first step towards conventional disarmament.

Report: ("Disarmament Commission, A/36/42.

Resolutions: GA: ⁽²⁾35/152 G, para. 1, 12 Dec. 1980 (YUN 1980, p. 100); ⁽³⁾35/156 A, 12 Dec. 1980 (ibid., p. 115); ⁽⁴⁾36/97 A, 9 Dec. 1981, text following.

Financial implications: Committee on Conferences observations, A/C.1/36/L.51/Add.1; 5th Committee report, A/36/805; S-G statements, A/C.1/36/L.51/Rev.1, A/C.5/36/93.

Meeting records: GA: 1st Committee, A/C.1/36/PV.3 & Corr.1, 4-10, 12-26, 28-32, 34, 36, 37, 42, 43 (19 Oct.-25 Nov.); 5th Committee, A/C.5/36/SR.68 (9 Dec.); plenary, A/36/PV.91 (9 Dec.).

General Assembly resolution 36/97 A

114-0-26 (recorded vote) Meeting 91 9 December 1981

Approved by First Committee (A/36/756) by recorded vote (98-0-21). 25 November (meeting 43): draft by Denmark (A/C.1/36/L.3/Rev.1). amended by Brazil (A/C.1/36/L.55); agenda item 55.

Study on conventional disarmament

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 35/156 A of 12 December 1960 in which it approved, in principle, the carrying out of a study on all aspects of the conventional arms race and on disarmament relating to conventional weapons and armed forces, to be undertaken by the Secretary-General with the assistance of a group of qualified experts appointed by him on a balanced geographical basis,

Recalling the discussions at the substantive session of the Disarmament Commission in 1981 on the general approach to, and the structure and scope of, the study on all aspects of the conventional arms race and on disarmament relating to conventional weapons and armed forces,

1. Requests the Secretary-General to establish the Group of Experts on All Aspects of the Conventional Arms Race and on Disarmament relating to Conventional Weapons and Armed Forces, in accordance with the provisions contained in paragraph 1 of General Assembly resolution 35/156 A;

2. Requests the Disarmament Commission, at its substantive session in 1982, to complete its consideration of the general approach to, and the structure and scope of, the study and to transmit the conclusions of its deliberations to the Group of Experts;

3. Agrees that the Group of Experts should pursue its work after the above-mentioned session of the Disarmament Commission, taking into consideration such conclusions as the Commission may submit to it, and, if necessary, the deliberations at the substantive session of the Commission in 1981, in particular those reflected in paragraph 21 and annex III of the report on that session;

4. Requests the Secretary-General, in accordance with paragraph 4 of resolution 35/156 A, to submit a final report to the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session.

Recorded vote in Assembly as follows:

In favour: Angola, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Bhutan, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Burundi, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Democratic Kampuchea, Denmark, Djibouti, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malts, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Kingdom, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, United States, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia.

Against: None.

Abstaining: Afghanistan, Bahrain, Benin, Bulgaria, Byelorussian SSR, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, German Democratic Republic, Grenada, Hungary, India, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Mongolia, Mozambique, Poland, Qatar, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, United Arab Emirates, Viet Nam.

Study on regional disarmament

By a resolution adopted without vote on 9 December 1981,⁽²⁾ the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to submit at its 1982 special session on disarmament (p. 27) the study on regional disarmament completed in 1980 by a group of governmental experts established at the Assembly's request.⁽³⁾ The Assembly requested similar treatment for a 1981 report by the Secretary-General containing views on the study presented by 32 States.⁽¹⁾ This resolution, sponsored by 31 States from all geographical regions, was approved by the First Committee on 20 November, also without vote.

Introducing the resolution, Belgium noted that the views which States had submitted revealed broad areas of agreement on some essential points: first, security requirements, were most easily perceived at the regional level; second, States in a region would have to take the initiative for regional disarmament; and third, as the region should not be dissociated from the global context, relations with third States should be closely examined. Belgium added that a number of topics had been identified as particularly suitable for regional action, notably the creation of denuclearized zones, cessation of the conventional arms race and implementation of confidence-building measures.

India stated that it would have abstained had a vote been taken, as it believed that partial disarmament measures had a rationale only as integral components of general and complete disarmament on a global basis.

In the First Committee debate, Chad remarked that regional disarmament would prove useful only within a framework leading towards general and complete disarmament; the disarmament of

some parts of the world while others continued to accumulate weapons would not serve the cause of peace and stability. France suggested that potential confrontations might be mitigated through the establishment of a regional or subregional system for the evaluation of military forces, or by concluding agreements, backed by control and verification measures, on the self-limitation of armaments in a regional framework. Portugal said that two elements were essential for regional disarmament: verification of compliance and the agreement of all States concerned. Israel suggested the establishment of United Nations regional disarmament commissions, composed of all States in the region, which would concentrate on two aspects: limitation of military budgets and confidence-building measures.

Eastern and Western European States emphasized the importance of the Vienna Talks on Mutual Reduction of Forces and Armaments and Associated Measures in Central Europe. Austria hoped they would lead to at least a first-phase agreement for reducing USSR and United States troop strength in the area. The Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom, the latter speaking for the EC members, saw the goal of the Vienna Talks as mutual reductions in conventional forces in the region to improve military stability and rid central Europe of the fear of possible surprise attack, starting with reductions in the level of USSR and United States forces. The German Democratic Republic said it should be possible to agree on a proposal by the socialist States of Eastern Europe for the simultaneous withdrawal of 20,000 USSR military personnel and 13,000 United States military personnel, while other parties froze the strength of their troops pending a further agreement. Nigeria noted the universal interest in the Vienna Talks and said it would help build confidence if the rest of the international community was periodically briefed on their status.

Nations of both Eastern and Western Europe voiced support for the idea of convening a conference on disarmament in Europe and noted that the mandate for such a meeting was under discussion at the session at Madrid, Spain, of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. Poland said it would shortly confirm its readiness to offer Warsaw as the site for beginning such a conference, and Romania also favoured a conference on strengthening confidence and disarmament in Europe. Finland hoped that, while the conference would begin by examining concrete confidence-building measures, attention would later focus on a comprehensive view of arms control and disarmament in Europe. Similarly, Yugoslavia stated that

negotiations at such a conference should concern disarmament and not only confidence-building.

France mentioned the proposal it had made at Madrid for a two-stage conference, dealing first with militarily significant confidence-building measures and later with the reduction of conventional weapons. Turkey saw this proposal as providing an opportunity to deepen the military dimension of detente, through such measures as advance notification of military manoeuvres and troop movements, and mutual military visits to build trust. The United Kingdom, for the EC members, renewed their support for the French proposal as a means of negotiating confidence-building measures binding on the whole of Europe up to the Urals. The proposal was also supported by Denmark and Norway.

Report: "S-G, A/36/343 & Add. 1.

Resolution: ⁽²⁾GA, 36/97 H, 9 Dec., text following.

Yearbook reference: ⁽³⁾1980, p. 111.

Meeting records: GA: 1st Committee, A/C.1/36/PV.3 & Corr.1, 4-10, 12-26, 32-34, 36-38 (19 Oct.-20 Nov.); plenary, A/36/PV.91 (9 Dec.).

General Assembly resolution 36/97 H

Adopted without vote Meeting 91 9 December 1981

Approved by First Committee (A/36/756) without vote, 20 November (meeting 38): 31 -nation draft (A/C.1/36/L.37): agenda item 55 (e).

Sponsors: Argentina, Austria, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Bolivia, Chile, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Greece, Guatemala, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, Viet Nam.

Study on all the aspects of regional disarmament

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 35/156 D of 12 December 1980 concerning the study on all the aspects of regional disarmament,

1. Takes note with appreciation of the report of the Secretary-General containing the views of Member States on the study:

2. Requests the Secretary-General to submit the Study on All the Aspects of Regional Disarmament and his report containing the views of Member States to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament, so that it may consider their substance and any action on them that may be required.

Other aspects of disarmament and related matters

Military budgets

Reduction of military budgets

DISARMAMENT COMMISSION CONSIDERATION. In 1981, the Disarmament Commission continued to consider two aspects of the reduction of military budgets: (a) harmonization of views on concrete steps to be undertaken by States regarding a gradual, agreed reduction of military budgets and reallocation to economic and social development of resources currently being used

for military purposes; and (b) examination and identification of effective ways of achieving agreements to freeze, reduce or otherwise restrain military expenditures in a balanced manner, including adequate measures of verification.

Romania and Sweden presented a working paper calling for moderation in States' military expenditures until agreements were concluded on the freezing and reduction of military budgets; the savings would be reallocated for economic and social development.

The Commission established a working group on the subject, which met three times between 28 May and 4 June. In addition, the group's Chairman conducted consultations and, at the request of the group, compiled a background paper containing some principles and ideas put forward by delegations on the freezing and reduction of military expenditures. The paper dealt with such points as the right of States to security, the special responsibility of nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States, release of resources for economic and social development, reporting procedures, verification and the role of the United Nations.

The discussion revealed that no agreement could be reached at that stage on the content of the background paper. Consequently, the Commission agreed to recommend⁽¹⁾ to the General Assembly that it be allowed to continue consideration of this question in 1982, with a view to identifying and elaborating the principles that should govern further actions of States in regard to freezing and reduction of military expenditures.

GENERAL ASSEMBLY ACTION. By a resolution adopted without vote on 9 December,⁽²⁾ the General Assembly reaffirmed the need to reinforce action regarding reduction of military budgets, and reiterated its appeal that States, in particular the most heavily armed States, pending agreement on reductions, exercise self-restraint in their military expenditures with a view to reallocating the funds thus saved to economic and social development, particularly for developing countries. The Assembly requested the Disarmament Commission to continue consideration of this question in 1982, keeping in mind the possibility of embodying in a suitable document the governing principles for the freezing and reduction of military expenditures. The First Committee approved the text on 20 November, also without vote.

The resolution, sponsored by 14 States, was introduced by Romania, which believed that self-restraint in regard to military budgets would create a favourable climate for negotiations on the subject and would support efforts for

economic and social development and international assistance to developing countries. Subsequently, Romania orally revised the first preambular paragraph of the text by deleting the word "unprecedented" before the phrase "growing military expenditures".

The United States expressed a reservation about the resolution, stating that the need for verification had regrettably been relegated to a position of lesser importance by being placed in the preamble. India explained that it would have abstained had a vote been taken on the text, as it did not believe concepts such as military balance and so-called parity could serve as the basis for measures of arms limitation or disarmament, and they were equally untenable as the basis for reduction of military budgets. Brazil, which supported the resolution, shared the view of India that the reduction of military budgets was first and foremost incumbent on the nuclear-weapon States, which accounted for the bulk of global military expenditures.

In the debate, Bangladesh attached importance to any proposal that would lead to savings from disarmament which could be reallocated for development. Egypt urged the super-Powers, when they resumed their bilateral talks on arms limitation, to consider freezing and then cutting their military expenditures by an agreed amount. Italy believed it would not be excessively difficult to reduce defence expenditures if States could rely on the absolute reciprocity of neighbouring countries, or at least of those countries from which they perceived a potential threat. Nepal supported the development of an international instrument to monitor the reduction of military expenditure, while ensuring verifiability and comparability. Romania urged the immediate conclusion of an agreement to freeze military budgets at the 1981 level, and the adoption by the Assembly, at its 1982 special session on disarmament (p. 27), of a declaration of principles governing actions by States to halt and reduce military expenditures. Zambia believed that unilateral reductions of military budgets would contribute to disarmament.

Chile, on the other hand, believed that military budgets could not be reduced as long as international tension persisted and super-Power confrontation became more acute because of the need to curb USSR imperialism. Portugal, while supporting efforts to elaborate principles that could guide States in this area, remarked that effective action which could have a lasting effect on the rise of military expenditures must be directed against the causes that impelled States to increase their military budgets. The United Kingdom, speaking for the EC members, said the approach to military budget reduction should be

based on generally accepted procedures providing for adequate comparability and verification, while safeguarding the right of States to individual and collective self-defence.

In several statements during the Assembly session, the United States criticized what it regarded as a unilateral Soviet arms build-up of great proportions in the 1970s, said its own military expenditures had declined in real terms by 25 per cent since 1968, and called on the USSR to publish data on its military budget and equipment in order to establish a basis for enduring agreements. The USSR, for its part, maintained that by inflating the myth of the Soviet military threat as an ideological underpinning for the build-up of its defence potential, the United States was sharply increasing military appropriations and intended to spend \$1.5 trillion for military purposes in the next five years.

Report: ⁽¹⁾Disarmament Commission, A/36/42.
Resolution: ⁽²⁾GA, 36/82 A, 9 Dec., text following.
Meeting records: GA: 1st Committee, A/C.1/36/PV.3 & Corr.1, 4-10, 12-26, 27, 33-36, 38 (19 Oct.-20 Nov.); plenary, A/36/PV.91 (9 Dec.).

General Assembly resolution 36/82 A

Adopted without vote Meeting 91 9 December 1981

Approved by First Committee (A/36/741) without vote. 20 November (meeting 38): 14-nation draft (A/C.1/36/L.38). orally revised: agenda item 40 (a).

Sponsors: Austria, Bangladesh, Ecuador, Indonesia, Ireland, Niger, Nigeria, Peru, Romania, Rwanda, Senegal, Sudan, Sweden, Uruguay.

The General Assembly,

Deeply concerned about the ever-spiralling arms race and growing military expenditures, which constitute a heavy burden for the economies of all nations and have extremely harmful consequences for international peace and security,

Reaffirming the provisions of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, according to which gradual reduction of military budgets on a mutually agreed basis, for example, in absolute figures or in terms of percentage points, particularly by nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States, would be a measure that would contribute to the curbing of the arms race and increase the possibilities of reallocation of resources now being used for military purposes to economic and social development, particularly for the benefit of the developing countries,

Reaffirming that it is possible to achieve continued and systematic reductions in military budgets without affecting the military balance to the detriment of the national security of any State,

Recalling its resolution 34/83 F of 11 December 1979, in which it considered that a new impetus should be given to endeavours to achieve agreements to freeze, reduce or otherwise restrain, in a balanced manner, military expenditures, including adequate measures of verification satisfactory to all parties concerned,

Recalling also the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade, which provides that during this period renewed efforts should be made to reach agreement on the reduction of military expenditures and the reallocation of resources thus saved to economic and social development especially for the benefit of developing countries,

Recalling further its resolution 35/142 A of 12 December 1980, in which it requested the Disarmament Commission to continue at its session to be held in 1981 the consideration of the item entitled "Reduction of military budgets" and, in

particular, to identify and elaborate on the principles which should govern further actions of States in the field of the freezing and reduction of military expenditures, keeping in mind the possibility of embodying such principles into a suitable document at an appropriate stage,

Having considered the report of the Disarmament Commission on the work accomplished during its session in 1981 and taking into account the proposals and ideas submitted by Member States concerning the principles which should govern further actions of States in the field of the freezing and reduction of military expenditures, and which are contained in the working document annexed to the Commission's report,

Aware of the various proposals submitted by Member States and of the activities carried out so far within the framework of the United Nations in the field of the reduction of military budgets,

Considering that the identification and elaboration of the principles which should govern further actions of States in the field of the freezing and reduction of military budgets and the other current activities within the framework of the United Nations related to the question of the reduction of military budgets should be regarded as having the fundamental objective of reaching international agreements on the reduction of military expenditures,

1. Reaffirms the urgent need to reinforce the endeavours of all States and international action in the area of the reduction of military budgets, with a view to reaching international agreements to freeze, reduce or otherwise restrain military expenditures:

2. Reiterates the appeal to all States, in particular the most heavily armed States, pending the conclusion of agreements on the reduction of military expenditures, to exercise self-restraint in their military expenditures with a view to real-locating the funds thus saved to economic and social development, particularly for the benefit of developing countries:

3. Requests the Disarmament Commission to continue at its session to be held in 1982 the consideration of the item entitled "Reduction of military budgets", taking into account the provisions of General Assembly resolution 35/142 A as well as those of the present resolution and other relevant proposals and ideas, with a view to identifying and elaborating on the principles which should govern further actions of States in the field of the freezing and reduction of military expenditures, keeping in mind the possibility of embodying such principles into a suitable document at an appropriate stage;

4. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-seventh session the item entitled "Reduction of military budgets".

Reporting procedures for military budgets

In August 1981, the Secretary-General submitted the first of a series of annual reports,⁽¹⁾ requested by the General Assembly in December 1980,⁽³⁾ containing information from States on their military expenditures. Of the 21 reporting States, 16 filled out a table, in matrix form, based on a standardized reporting instrument devised in 1980 by the Ad Hoc Panel on Military Budgeting.⁽⁵⁾

GENERAL ASSEMBLY ACTION. On 9 December, by a resolution on the reporting system on military expenditures,⁽⁴⁾ the General Assembly stressed the need to increase the number of reporting States with a view to the broadest participation from different geographic regions and budgeting systems. It reiterated its recommendation that all Member States make use of the reporting instrument devised in 1980 and report

their military expenditures to the Secretary-General by 30 April of each year. It requested him to examine ways of making the collection and assembling of such data an integral part of the United Nations statistical services, and to arrange and publish the data according to statistical practice.

The resolution was adopted by a non-recorded vote of 120 to none, with 19 abstentions, following the First Committee's approval of the text on 20 November by a recorded vote of 102 to none, with 15 abstentions (Bulgaria, Byelorussian SSR, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, India, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Mongolia, Mozambique, Poland, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, Viet Nam, Zambia).

In introducing the resolution, sponsored by 19 States, Sweden stressed the urgent need to reach agreements on the freezing and reduction of military expenditures, asserting that such agreements could be concluded without affecting the military balance to the detriment of any State's security. Sweden further believed that agreements on such measures would have the advantage of imposing constraints, not only on certain kinds of weapons but on all kinds of military activities. However, without generally accepted procedures for comparing military expenditures, it would probably be difficult to arrive at long-lasting and substantial agreements to limit expenditures.

India explained its abstention on the resolution by stating that the reduction of military expenditures could not be based on untenable concepts such as military balance, and that the international reporting system needed further refining before all States could accept it. The USSR, recalling that it had initiated the 1973 Assembly resolution aiming at a 10 per cent reduction of the military budgets of the permanent members of the Security Council and the allocation of part of the savings to developing countries,⁽²⁾ abstained as it believed the abstract research conducted in recent years by the United Nations was removed from reality and did not serve the cause of reducing military budgets.

Among those voting in favour, the United States said that a certain openness as well as means of verification were necessary in regard to military expenditures and, ultimately, disarmament. Yugoslavia stated that the recommended action could be useful and efficient only if all States used the reporting instrument.

In the First Committee debate, the Federal Republic of Germany reiterated its proposal for a United Nations register of each industrial country's per capita expenditures on armaments

and on development assistance, and regretted that no Eastern State had answered the questionnaire on military budgets. The same regret was voiced by the United Kingdom on behalf of the EC members. Italy mentioned the problems of comparability and verifiability. Portugal, while attaching importance to the principle of the openness of military budgets, pointed out that comparability entailed many practical problems, not only between States having different political and social systems but even between States with similar systems.

Brazil held that nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States should take the lead in utilizing the reporting instrument, thus showing their willingness to reduce their arms expenditures. Egypt remarked that, since the Assembly's 1973 recommendation that the permanent members of the Security Council reduce their military budgets by 10 per cent, global military expenditure had increased tremendously while the Assembly remained engaged in a marginal exercise in accounting and reporting; reductions in military budgets should not depend solely on the comparability of military expenditures.

The socialist States of Eastern Europe did not share the positive assessment of United Nations efforts to set norms for military budget cost accounting; in their view, that exercise tended to obfuscate what they considered the true cause of the continued arms race, namely the lack of political will on the part of some States to undertake genuine disarmament measures. Poland viewed as unfounded the contention that the lack of information about the military efforts of States was one of the main factors contributing to the arms race; it added, on behalf of a number of socialist States, that efforts in the United Nations to collect data on military expenditures and elaborate a military spending comparability system were being used by some to cover up their unwillingness to agree to the reduction of their military expenditures.

Report: ⁽¹⁾S-G, A/36/353 & Corr.1,2 & Add.1,2.

Resolutions: GA: ⁽²⁾3093 A (XXVIII), 7 Dec. 1973 (YUN 1973, p. 13); ⁽³⁾35/142 B, para. 1, 12 Dec. 1980 (YUN 1980, p. 89); ⁽⁴⁾36/82 B, 9 Dec. 1981, text following.

Yearbook reference: ⁽⁵⁾1980, p. 79.

Meeting records: GA: 1st Committee, A/C.1/36/PV.3 & Corr.1, 4-10, 12-26, 27, 33-38 (19 Oct.-20 Nov.); plenary, A/36/PV.91 (9 Dec.).

General Assembly resolution 36/82 B

120-0-19 Meeting 91 9 December 1981

Approved by First Committee (A/36/741) by recorded vote (102-0-15). 20 November (meeting 38); 19-nation draft (A/C.1/36/L.39): agenda item 40 (b).

Sponsors: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Denmark, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Mexico, Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Romania, Rwanda, Sudan, Sweden.

The General Assembly,

Deeply concerned about the arms race, its extremely harmful effects on world peace and security and its deplorable waste of human and economic resources,

A/armed by present tendencies to increase further the rate of growth of military expenditures,

Considering that gradual reductions of military expenditures on a mutually agreed basis would be a measure that would contribute to curbing the arms race and would increase the possibilities of reallocating resources now being used for military purposes to economic and social development, particularly for the benefit of the developing countries,

Convinced that such reductions could and should be carried out on a mutually agreed basis without affecting the military balance to the detriment of the national security of any state.

Reaffirming its conviction that provisions for comparability and verification will have to be basic elements of any agreement to reduce military expenditures,

Recalling the fact that these matters are being studied by the Group of Experts on the Reduction of Military Budgets, established in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 35/142 B of 12 December 1980, and that this Group is expected to submit its report before the second special session of the Assembly devoted to disarmament, to be held from 7 June to 9 July 1982,

Recalling further that a standardized system for international reporting of military expenditures has been recommended for use and that the first national reports have been received this year,

Emphasizing the value of a full implementation of such a reporting instrument and of its further refinement as a means to increase confidence between States by contributing to greater openness in military matters, which is particularly important for arriving at international agreements to reduce military expenditures,

Reaffirming also its conviction that the reporting of military data and the examination of problems concerning comparability and verification have the fundamental objective of making possible the conclusion of international agreements to reduce military expenditures,

Taking note with appreciation of the first report of the Secretary-General on these matters,

Considering that the activities related to the reporting of military expenditures as well as to the questions of comparability and verification and other current activities within the framework of the United Nations related to the question of the reduction of military budgets should be regarded as having the fundamental objective of reaching international agreements on the reduction of military expenditures,

1. Stresses the need to increase the number of reporting States with a view to the broadest possible participation from different geographic regions and representing different budgeting systems;

2. Reiterates its recommendation that all Member States should make use of the reporting instrument and report annually, by 30 April, to the Secretary-General their military expenditures of the latest fiscal year for which data are available;

3. Requests the Secretary-General to examine ways and means to make the collection and assembling of data on military expenditures, reported by States on the basis of the reporting instrument, an integral part of the regular United Nations statistical services and to arrange and publish these data according to statistical practice;

4. Also requests the Secretary-General to include these matters in his next annual report on military budgets to the General Assembly.

Indian Ocean as a zone of peace

ACTIVITIES OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE INDIAN OCEAN. In 1981, the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean held two sessions, from 17 February

to 6 March and from 1 to 19 June, as a preparatory committee for the projected Conference on the Indian Ocean; a regular session from 17 to 28 August; and additional meetings between 21 October and 16 November to conclude its work for the year. All 50 meetings were held at United Nations Headquarters.

At its preparatory sessions, the Committee sought unsuccessfully to harmonize views on issues related to the convening of the Conference on the Indian Ocean and the political and security climate in the region. In its report to the General Assembly,⁽¹⁾ the Committee stated that two broad views had emerged during the debate on dates for the Conference, which the Assembly had decided in 1979 to convene during 1981.⁽⁵⁾ A large number of Committee members favoured convening the Conference in 1981 as scheduled. While conceding that further harmonization of views was preferable, they felt that complete harmonization of views was not essential since the Conference itself would be a stage in the process of reaching the objective of making the Indian Ocean a zone of peace, and that the grave deterioration of the political and security climate in the area compelled the urgent convening of the Conference. Other members, however, considered it premature to set the dates, believing that adequate progress had to be made on the harmonization of views before a Conference could be convened. These members felt that a Conference convened in the current adverse political and security climate in the area would be unlikely to succeed and would therefore jeopardize the eventual realization of the concept of a zone of peace there.

The Committee concluded that, while there was agreement on the need to hold the Conference, the question of setting a new date was open. It was also noted that the Committee's mandate should be maintained unless there was a consensus for changing it. Some members did not believe that this estimation accurately reflected the range of views expressed in the Committee.

Following discussion at its regular session in August, the Committee approved on 16 November a draft resolution for adoption by the Assembly, proposing the renewal of the Committee's mandate and requesting the Committee to make efforts to accomplish the preparatory work for the Conference, including consideration of convening it not later than the first half of 1983 (p.94).

On the Committee's recommendation, the Assembly President, on 5 March, appointed Thailand, which had applied for membership the previous year, as the forty-sixth member of the Committee. The Committee reached no consensus on

membership applications from Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Hungary, Mongolia, Nicaragua, Swaziland and Viet Nam.

GENERAL ASSEMBLY ACTION. On 9 December, the General Assembly adopted without vote the resolution recommended by the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean. By this text, the Assembly expressed regret at the lack of consensus on the dates for the Conference on the Indian Ocean and emphasized its decision to convene the Conference. It requested the Committee to continue work on the harmonization of views on remaining issues related to convening the Conference and to make every effort to accomplish the preparatory work for the Conference, including consideration of its convening not later than the first half of 1983. Renewing the Committee's mandate, the Assembly requested it to hold six weeks of meetings in 1982, including a meeting outside New York at a place to be decided. The First Committee approved the text on 25 November, also without vote.

In a resolution on strengthening international security,⁽⁵⁾ also adopted on 9 December, the Assembly reiterated its support for its 1971 Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace,⁽²⁾ expressed hope that the Conference would be held no later than the first half of 1983 and called on all States to contribute to the Conference's success.

The First Committee debate saw a reiteration of the divergence of opinion between those who thought the Conference should be convened as soon as possible, without awaiting further harmonization of views, and those who believed that the political and security climate in the area militated against the early convening of the Conference.

Among those which favoured an early Conference, India said it would have preferred a resolution more appropriately reflecting the concerns of the littoral and hinterland States of the area but joined the consensus in the hope that the Ad Hoc Committee would be able to complete preparations to convene the Conference well before the first half of 1983; setting pre-conditions with regard to harmonization of views or the political and security climate in the Indian Ocean area were merely pretexts to kill the proposal for a conference. Seychelles expressed reservations with regard to the paragraph mentioning 1983; it felt that arguments about the need to harmonize views and faulty and outmoded declarations harboured ill-intentioned manoeuvres, and that the Conference should be held during the first half of 1982.

Sri Lanka observed that the non-aligned countries did not expect the Conference to establish overnight a viable and effective zone of peace in

the Indian Ocean; they could not understand the argument that insecurity and instability in the area necessitated postponement. Support for an early Conference was also voiced by Afghanistan, the Congo, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Indonesia, Oman, Uganda and Yemen.

Madagascar, stating that complete agreement need not be achieved before the Conference, asserted that its joining the consensus on the resolution did not signify its acceptance of the argument that the Afghanistan situation justified postponement; it added that 30 positive replies had been received to its invitation to a summit meeting in Tananarive to draw up a convention on the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace, as a complementary measure to the projected United Nations Conference. The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and Uganda supported the Madagascar initiative. Democratic Yemen mentioned that it had taken an initiative at the beginning of 1981 to convene a summit conference for the Gulf, the Horn of Africa and other concerned countries, to discuss measures to dismantle foreign bases.

Afghanistan, the Lao People's Democratic Republic and Viet Nam said the United States and its allies were impeding the work of the Ad Hoc Committee and working against the convening of the Conference. Iran questioned why States which did not fully agree with the Ad Hoc Committee's mandate or which blocked its work were participating in that body. Pakistan believed the Committee should start substantive discussion on the principles of agreement to be adopted at the Conference, in elaboration of the 1971 Declaration. Rwanda called for an end to the presence of a foreign military force in the area which had promoted manoeuvres that had prevented the convening of the Conference. The Sudan said the manoeuvring in the Ad Hoc Committee was not in keeping with the security interests of the countries in the region or with their need for peace, free from the threats posed by the bases and fleets of the world Powers. Yemen stated that the pre-conditions set by certain Western countries for convening the Conference were an attempt to impose a fait accompli and make the area a field for military rivalry.

China favoured the earliest possible convening of the Conference but said such action was being impeded by the hegemonism, aggression and expansion practised in the region by the super-Powers, one of which had occupied a hinterland State of the Indian Ocean and thus undermined the climate of trust necessary for convening the Conference. Malaysia, while stressing the need for a spirit of compromise between the super-Powers to narrow the divergence of views, called on the littoral and hinterland States to exercise

restraint and responsibility and act in a manner consistent with the spirit of the Declaration on the Indian Ocean. Nepal felt that the current military build-up and rivalry in the area could only worsen the situation.

Afghanistan said the peoples of Asia were being endangered by stepped-up militaristic activities of the United States, including the building of facilities for the rapid deployment force and the expansion of the naval and air force bases on Diego Garcia. Iraq called on the major Powers to dismantle their military bases in the area, particularly the Diego Garcia base, and referred to threats by successive United States administrations to use so-called rapid deployment forces, particularly against the oil-producing countries of the area.

Oman hoped that foreign forces which had invaded land near the Ocean would withdraw and that foreign military presence and the desire for hegemony would be ended. Somalia said that regional instability had been increased by a super-Power's military intervention in a local conflict in the Horn of Africa, its introduction of surrogate forces there, its establishment of naval bases and a strong military presence in a littoral State, and its military occupation of Afghanistan.

Canada, Japan, the United States and the EC members questioned the validity of the existing concept of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace, and called for a change in the Ad Hoc Committee's mandate to enable it to explore elements for a zone of peace and facilitate co-operation within the region as well as with outside Powers. The United States pointed out that it had never accepted the 1971 Declaration, which it regarded as faulty and outmoded, inconsistent with the right of States to individual and collective self-defence, and difficult to reconcile with freedom of navigation; the United States future participation in the Ad Hoc Committee would be guided by the ability of that body to continue to operate on the basis of consensus. France and the United States also cited their reservations about the reference to the Declaration when explaining their position on the 9 December resolution on strengthening international security.

The suggestion for widening the established concept of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace was supported by Canada, Japan and the Netherlands. Canada saw a need for accompanying measures designed to improve regional trust and confidence, as well as a broader framework that would contribute to removing such causes of tension as poverty, lack of mutual comprehension and inequality of individual rights. The Netherlands suggested that provisions for economic co-operation and assistance should complement a declaration setting down rules of conduct be-

tween States of the region and others, based on non-interference in internal affairs.

Australia found it difficult to imagine how a conference on the Indian Ocean could succeed when a non-aligned hinterland State of the region had been invaded and continued to be occupied by the military forces of a major Power whose co-operation would be essential to creating a zone of peace. Similarly, Japan and the United Kingdom, the latter speaking for the EC members, considered it inappropriate to convene a conference while Afghanistan continued to be occupied by foreign troops and in the absence of any real progress in the harmonization of views on many fundamental issues. France hoped the Ad Hoc Committee would make substantive progress in 1982, particularly in harmonizing views on the Conference's goals, so that its convening might not be deferred indefinitely.

Ethiopia and India disagreed with objections to the zone of peace concept for the Indian Ocean, remarking that the 1971 Declaration reflected the interests and aspirations of the littoral and hinterland States.

Czechoslovakia supported the efforts of the regional States to establish a zone of peace and liquidate foreign military bases. The German Democratic Republic held that the Conference would ease tensions and opposed attempts to prevent its convening. The USSR, asserting that States should refrain from imposing pre-conditions for convening the Conference, said the United States was using the events in Afghanistan as a pretext to justify introducing its military, naval and air forces into the region; the USSR was ready to discuss, in international negotiations, the situation around Afghanistan, either together with the problem of ensuring security in the Gulf area or separately.

Albania dissociated itself from the consensus on the resolution and reiterated its disapproval of the concept of zones of peace, on the ground that there could not be islands of peace in an ocean of armament and war practices resulting from super-Power policies.

Report: ⁽¹⁾Committee on Indian Ocean, A/36/29.

Resolutions: GA: ⁽²⁾2832(X XVI), 16 Dec. 1971 (YUN 1971, p. 34); ⁽³⁾34/80 B, para. 3, 11 Dec. 1979 (YUN 1979, p. 67); ⁽⁴⁾36/90, 9 Dec. 1981, text following; ⁽⁵⁾36/102, para. 12, 9 Dec. (p. 145).

Financial implications: Committee on Conferences observations, A/C.5/36/72/Add.1; 5th Committee report, A/36/803; S-G statements, A/C.1/36/L.56, A/C.5/36/72. Meeting records: GA: 1st Committee, A/C.1/36/PV.3 & Corr-1, 4-10, 12-26, 34-38, 44 (19 Oct.-25 Nov.); 5th Committee, A/C.5/36/SR.67 (8 Dec.); plenary, A/36/PV.91 (9 Dec.).

General Assembly resolution 36/90

Adopted without vote Meeting 91 9 December 1981

Approved by First Committee (A/36/750) without vote. 25 November (meeting 44); draft by Committee on Indian Ocean (A/36/29); agenda item 49.

Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace

The General Assembly,

Recalling the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, contained in its resolution 2832(XXVI) of 16 December 1971, and recalling also its resolutions 2992(XXVII) of 15 December 1972, 3080(XXVIII) of 6 December 1973, 3259 A (XXIX) of 9 December 1974, 3468(XXX) of 11 December 1975, 31/88 of 14 December 1976, 32/86 of 12 December 1977, S-10/2 of 30 June 1978, 33/68 of 14 December 1978, 34/80 A and B of 11 December 1979 and 35/150 of 12 December 1980, and other relevant resolutions,

Recalling a/so that at its tenth special session, the first special session devoted to disarmament, it stated that the establishment of zones of peace in various regions of the world under appropriate conditions to be clearly defined and determined freely by the States concerned in the zone, taking into account the characteristics of the zone and the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and in conformity with international law, can contribute to strengthening the security of States within such zones and to international peace and security as a whole,

Recalling further the report of the Meeting of the Littoral and Hinterland States of the Indian Ocean,

Reaffirming its conviction that concrete action for the achievement of the objectives of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace would be a substantial contribution to the strengthening of international peace and security,

Recalling its decision, taken at the thirty-fourth session in resolution 34/80 B, to convene a Conference on the Indian Ocean at Colombo during 1981,

Recalling further its decision, at the thirty-fifth session in resolution 35/150, to make every effort, in consideration of the political and security climate in the Indian Ocean area, particularly recent developments, as well as the progress made in the harmonization of views, to finalize, in accordance with its normal methods of work, all preparations for the Conference, including the dates for its convening,

Recalling the exchange of varied views in the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean and noting that, while progress has been made, a number of issues remain to be resolved,

Noting the exchange of views on the adverse political and security climate in the region,

Noting that the Ad Hoc Committee has failed to reach consensus on the dates for the convening, during 1981, of the Conference on the Indian Ocean at Colombo,

Convinced that the continued military presence of the great Powers in the Indian Ocean area, conceived in the context of their confrontation, gives urgency to the need to take practical steps for the early achievement of the objectives of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace,

Considering that all other foreign military presence in the area, whenever it is contrary to the objectives of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace and the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, gives even greater urgency to the need to take practical steps towards the early achievement of the objectives of the Declaration,

Considering a/so that the creation of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean requires the active participation of and full co-operation among the littoral and hinterland States, the permanent members of the Security Council and major maritime users to ensure conditions of peace and security based on the purposes and principles of the Charter as well as the general principles of international law,

Considering further that the creation of a zone of peace requires co-operation and agreement among the States of the region to ensure conditions of peace and security within the area, as envisaged in the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, and respect for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the littoral and hinterland States,

Calling for the renewal of genuinely constructive efforts through the exercise of the political will necessary for the achievement of the objectives of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace,

Deeply concerned at the danger posed by the grave and ominous developments in the area and the resulting sharp deterioration of peace, security and stability which particularly seriously affect the littoral and hinterland States, as well as international peace and security,

Convinced that the continued deterioration of the political and security climate in the Indian Ocean area is an important consideration bearing on the question of the early convening of the Conference and that the easing of tension in the area would enhance the prospect of success being achieved by the Conference,

1. Takes note of the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean and the exchange of views in the Committee;

2. Regrets that the Ad Hoc Committee has failed to reach consensus on the finalization of dates for the convening, during 1981, of the Conference on the Indian Ocean;

3. Emphasizes its decision to convene the Conference at Colombo as a necessary step for the implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, adopted in 1971;

4. Emphasizes a/so, in pursuance of this decision and in consideration of the political and security climate in the Indian Ocean area, its decision to request the Ad Hoc Committee to continue its efforts for the necessary harmonization of views on the remaining issues related to the convening of the Conference;

5. Requests the Ad Hoc Committee to continue its work on the necessary harmonization of views on the relevant issues, including those set forth in paragraph 4 above, and to make every effort to accomplish the necessary preparatory work for the Conference, including consideration of its convening not later than the first half of 1983;

6. Renews the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee as defined in the relevant resolutions;

7. Requests the Ad Hoc Committee to hold further sessions in 1982 of a total duration of six weeks, including the holding of a meeting at a venue outside New York to be decided upon;

8. Requests the Ad Hoc committee to submit to the General Assembly, at its second special session devoted to disarmament and at its thirty-seventh session, reports on its work and on the implementation of the present resolution;

9. Requests the Secretary-General to continue to render all necessary assistance to the Ad Hoc Committee, including the provision of summary records.

Disarmament and development

STUDY BY THE GROUP OF EXPERTS. The Group of Governmental Experts on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development, appointed by the Secretary-General at the request of the General Assembly at its 1978 special session on disarmament,⁽⁴⁾ submitted its study⁽¹⁾ on 3 September 1981. The 27-member Group held 10 sessions between September 1978 and August 1981, of which all three sessions in 1981 were held at Geneva: 19 to 30 January, 21 April to 1 May and 17 to 28 August.

In presenting the study to the Assembly, the Secretary-General pointed out that, while the observations and recommendations contained in the report were those of the experts, he considered it to be an important attempt by the international community to investigate thoroughly the proposition that a balanced and generally acceptable pattern of global economic and social development was inextricably related to disarmament.

The study contained six substantive chapters: framework and scope of the relationship between disarmament and development; present-day utilization of resources for military purposes; economic and social effects of a continuing arms race and of the implementation of disarmament measures; conversion and redeployment of resources released from military purposes through disarmament measures to economic and social development purposes; possible institutional measures for international reallocation of resources from armaments to development; and summary, conclusions and recommendations.

The Group argued that the arms race had developed into a threat to the security of nations and that failure to control it was likely to be associated with a vicious circle of confrontation and mutual denial, with declining prospects for mutually advantageous economic co-operation and shrinking options for all nations.

The Group stated that steadily high or increasing military outlays were likely to have a depressing effect on economic growth, directly through displacement of investment and indirectly through constraints on productivity resulting from insufficient research and development in the civilian sector. While identifying inflation-stimulating and employment-depressing consequences of military expenditures in the developed countries of East and West, the experts observed that the developing countries were the worst affected victims of an adverse strategic environment dominated by the seemingly endless arms race. On the other hand, diversion to developing countries of a part of any resources released by disarmament would substantially improve their gross domestic product, industrial employment and capital stock, and provide significant economic gains for all regions, including the most developed.

In the experts' view, the opportunity to apply science and technology more directly and systematically to economic and social problems was one of the most important dividends of disarmament. They saw a need to plan for conversion from military to civilian production by thinking through the problems that would be faced by workers, industries and communities.

The Group of Experts unanimously adopted nine specific recommendations. It called on Governments to: assess the nature and magnitude of the economic and social costs attributable to their military preparations; identify and publicize the benefits to be derived from reallocating military resources, in a balanced and verifiable manner, to address national and global economic and social problems; compile and disseminate systematically data on the military use of human and material resources and military transfers, so

as to avoid having excessive secrecy and the arms race reinforce each other; facilitate the conversion to civilian purposes of resources freed by disarmament; and consider making available to the General Assembly the results of their experiences and preparations for solving conversion problems.

The Group also suggested: incorporation of the disarmament-development perspective into the activities of the United Nations system, with the help of co-ordination initiatives by the Secretary-General; consideration of the establishment of an international disarmament fund for development; and increased emphasis by United Nations organs and agencies, in their disarmament-related public information activities, on the social and economic consequences of the arms race and the corresponding benefits of disarmament.

Introducing to the First Committee the report of the Group of Experts, its Chairman, Inga Thorsson, Under-Secretary of State in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Sweden, said the study documented the fact that at least 50 million people were directly or indirectly engaged in military activities world-wide, including some 25 million in armed forces, 10 million in paramilitary forces, an estimated 500,000 scientists and engineers in research and development for military purposes, and at least 5 million workers directly engaged in the production of weapons and other specialized military equipment. She added that, according to conservative estimates, global industrial production for military purposes in 1980 amounted to more than \$127 billion, 95 per cent of which was in industrialized countries; that some 20 per cent of the world's scientists and engineers were engaged in military work, at a cost of some \$35 billion in 1980; and that virtually all such research and development took place in the industrialized countries, 85 per cent in the United States and the USSR. World-wide military expenditures by 1981 would exceed \$520 billion, representing 6 per cent of world output, roughly equal to the value of all investment capital in the developing countries.

Mrs. Thorsson cited the Group's estimate that the international arms trade comprised more than \$35 billion annually, 75 per cent of which represented imports by developing countries. Five Middle East countries had accounted for over one third of all major weapons imported by developing countries in the period 1977-1980. On the supplier side, the United States, the USSR, France and the United Kingdom had accounted for 80 per cent of the cumulative value of arms exports in 1974-1978.

GENERAL ASSEMBLY ACTION. By a resolution on the study on the relationship between

disarmament and development,⁽⁶⁾ the General Assembly commended the report, its conclusions and recommendations to the attention of all Member States and invited them to submit their views. The Assembly also decided to transmit the report for action at its 1982 special session on disarmament (p. 27) as well as to the Committee on Disarmament, and recommended that it be taken into account in future disarmament negotiations. Governments were asked to distribute the report widely, having it translated into their national languages where appropriate, and specialized agencies and national and non-governmental organizations were invited to use their facilities to make the report widely known.

The Assembly adopted the resolution on 9 December without vote. The First Committee approved the text in like manner on 24 November.

Sponsored by 31 States, the resolution was introduced by Sweden, which pledged to cooperate in efforts to establish a public and governmental awareness of the relationship between disarmament and development so that action could be taken at the proper moment.

Brazil asserted that the study was the subject of innumerable reservations by some of the major Powers, which did not agree with the report's treatment of the pressing issues of disarmament. Belgium, France and the Federal Republic of Germany indicated that they had reservations on some methodological shortcomings and on some of the substance of the study, though France hoped the study would help promote the French proposal for a disarmament fund for development. The United Kingdom regretted that the study had not been produced on a consensus basis, that the Group had voted on amendments to the text and that the report failed to give a clear picture of the Warsaw Pact countries due to insufficient data. Japan believed a number of the report's suggestions should be considered in depth and said it would be pleased if more resources could be released through disarmament resulting from the collective will of all States.

Poland-speaking also for Bulgaria, the Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, the Ukrainian SSR and the USSR-stated that the report drew correct conclusions but it underestimated the positive significance of agreements on strategic arms limitation, should have tied any international disarmament fund for development to military budget reductions and contained the unfounded contention that lack of information about the military efforts of States was a main factor in the arms race. The USSR regretted that its expert's viewpoint had not been duly

reflected in the report because the members of the Group had been given little time to study the final draft and propose amendments.

In the First Committee debate, many developing countries noted with special satisfaction that the study had projected the disarmament-development relationship as being of mutual benefit to both developed and developing countries. Algeria described the study as a timely reminder of the tragedy of a world working on its own destruction through unacceptable waste of resources while blind to any serious solution for its socio-economic problems. Bangladesh noted with satisfaction that the Second Disarmament Decade had been proclaimed almost simultaneously with the declaration of the 1980s as the Third United Nations Development Decade. Ghana viewed the study as confirming that disarmament and the reallocation of released resources to socio-economic development was no longer just a moral issue but an inescapable international obligation.

The Congo remarked that \$20 billion of the \$550 billion spent annually for military purposes would be enough to resolve most of the world's economic and social problems. Making a similar point, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya observed that 5 per cent of the world's annual military expenditure would have been sufficient to attain the official development assistance targets set forth in the International Development Strategy for the Third United Nations Development Decade (1980-1990).⁽⁵⁾

Angola noted that even developing countries which could least afford it were building arsenals beyond their legitimate defence requirements and at the expense of their people's need for food, education and employment. Nigeria remarked that the pattern of conventional arms transfer to the third world and the consequent lopsided distribution of scarce resources to armaments constituted a disservice to the order of national priorities and a flight from realities. Rwanda observed that arms producers and merchants had found a fertile field in exporting to third world countries weapons far in excess of their needs.

In Canada's view, the study had shown that military spending wasted resources, did not generate capital assets and promoted inflation. Ecuador, too, spoke of the economic effects of arms expenditure at the rate of more than \$1 million a minute, including inflation, international trade disturbances and distortion of economic principles. Kenya remarked that the arms race did not provide more jobs; in fact, there was ample evidence that it prevented more jobs from being provided. Noting that the military spending of developing countries had nearly doubled

during the past decade, Ireland said it was tragic that scarce resources were squandered on increasingly sophisticated weapons when a fraction of the cost could achieve so much if diverted to alleviating hunger and disease. The world could arm itself to death, said Trinidad and Tobago, or it could use resources in more productive and beneficial directions; it could not do both.

The United States said that during the entire quarter of a century from 1954 to 1979, the USSR had disbursed only \$8 billion in economic assistance to developing countries, while the United States had extended approximately \$100 billion; further, the USSR recognized that much of its political influence in the developing countries derived from its role as an arms peddler.

CONSIDERATION BY OTHER UN BODIES. At its 1981 session (New York, 23 March-1 April), the Committee for Development Planning declared⁽²⁾ that the rising levels of armaments expenditures not only threatened the security of mankind but also represented a serious economic burden, by increasing inflationary pressures and the burden of public expenditure at a time when less inflationary forms of public expenditure—which generated more employment and contributed directly to community and family welfare—were being sharply cut back. The Committee considered it the duty of all nations to seek ways of reducing the tensions and distrust which occasioned that disastrous course.

The Group of Governmental Experts to Study the Institutional Arrangements relating to the Process of Disarmament (p. 105) recommended in July that the Secretary-General submit, at the Assembly's 1982 special session on disarmament (p. 27), proposals on possible institutional implications for the United Nations in regard to the relationship between disarmament and development.

The Trade and Development Board of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), after hearing a statement by the UNCTAD observer at the meetings of the Group of Experts on disarmament and development, decided on 9 October⁽³⁾ to consider at its twenty-fifth (1982) session the future UNCTAD activity in this area in the light of the recommendations of the 1982 special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

Publication: ⁽¹⁾The Relationship between Disarmament and Development. Disarmament Study Series 5 (A/36/356 & Corr.1), Sales No. E.82.IX.1.

Reports: ⁽²⁾CDP, E/1981/27; ⁽³⁾TDB, A/36/15.

Resolutions: GA: ⁽⁴⁾S-10/2, para. 94, 30 June 1978 (YUN 1978, p. 45); ⁽⁵⁾35/56, annex, sect. II, 5 Dec. 1980 (YUN 1980, p. 505); ⁽⁶⁾36/92 G, 9 Dec. 1981, text following.

Meeting records: GA: 1st Committee, A/C.1/36/PV.3 & Corr.1, 4-10, 12-26, 27, 34, 36, 38, 39, 42 (19 Oct.-24 Nov.); plenary, A/36/PV.91 (9 Dec.).

General Assembly resolution 36/92 G

Adopted without vote Meeting 91 9 December 1981
Approved by First Committee (A/36/752) without vote, 24 November (meeting 42); 31 - nation draft (A/C.1/36/L.21); agenda item 51 (d).

Sponsors: Austria, Bangladesh, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, Finland, France, Iceland, Ireland, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, Niger, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zaire.

Study on the relationship between disarmament and development

The General Assembly,

Recalling paragraph 94 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, in which it decided to undertake a study on the relationship between disarmament and development and requested the Secretary-General to carry out the study with the assistance of a group of qualified governmental experts,

Having examined the report of the Secretary-General containing the study,

1. Welcomes with satisfaction the report of the Secretary-General and the study contained therein;

2. Expresses its thanks to the Secretary-General and to the Group of Governmental Experts on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development, as well as to the Governments, international organizations and non-governmental organizations that have rendered assistance in the preparation of the report;

3. Commends the report, its conclusions and its recommendations to the attention of all Member States;

4. Requests the Secretary-General to make the necessary arrangements for the reproduction of the report as a United Nations publication and to give it the widest possible distribution;

5. Invites all Member States to inform the Secretary-General, not later than 15 April 1982, of their views regarding the report and, in particular, its recommendations;

6. Decides to transmit the report to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament for its substantive consideration and appropriate action;

7. Requests the Secretary-General to transmit the report to the Committee on Disarmament and recommends that it be taken into account in future disarmament negotiations;

8. Notes with appreciation that arrangements have been made for the preparation of a short version of the report aimed at a mass audience;

9. Recommends to all Governments the widest possible distribution of the report, including, where appropriate, its translation into their national languages, so as to acquaint public opinion in their countries with its content, and invites specialized agencies and national and non-governmental organizations to use their facilities to make the report widely known.

Disarmament and international security

STUDY BY THE GROUP OF EXPERTS. The Group of Experts on the Relationship between Disarmament and International Security, consisting of 10 persons appointed by the Secretary-General pursuant to a 1978 request by the General Assembly,⁽⁵⁾ submitted the results of its three-year study on 6 November 1981.⁽¹⁾ The Group held nine sessions between June 1979 and November 1981, the last four of which were in 1981: at Geneva, 30 March to 10 April and

29 June to 17 July, and New York, 17 to 28 August and 2 to 6 November. The Chairman was Carlos P. Romulo, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Philippines.

The study consisted of seven chapters, on the following aspects: the detrimental consequences of the arms race; analysis of the interrelationship of disarmament and international security; the process of disarmament and international security; detente and international co-operation as means of strengthening international security and promoting disarmament; the relationship between specific disarmament measures and international security; disarmament, international security and the role of the United Nations system in the maintenance of peace and the implementation of the system of international legal order and security; and conclusions.

The study stressed the importance of consolidating and expanding detente, strengthening international co-operation in all aspects, making decisive progress towards the elimination of underdevelopment and oppression, creating more equitable international relations, and achieving just and peaceful settlements of outstanding conflicts.

Stating that ways had to be found for States to protect their security without engaging in an arms race, the Group suggested two interrelated approaches, to be pursued in parallel, for achieving security without reliance on armaments: agreements among States for mutual regulation, limitation and reduction of armaments and armed forces; and collective arrangements, such as a system based on United Nations organs and bodies, primarily the Security Council with its responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security and its mandate for taking enforcement action if necessary.

The study also pointed out that, in order to create an effective system of collective security, the United Nations system should be used more consistently than in the past and that it was important to increase the confidence of States in the readiness of the Security Council for effective and prompt action.

One member of the Group, Zenon Rossides, from Cyprus, submitted what he termed a complementary set of conclusions and recommendations on the study.⁽²⁾

Also on the question of disarmament and international security, the Secretary-General submitted a report,⁽³⁾ in compliance with a 1980 Assembly recommendation⁽⁶⁾ that United Nations organs responsible for peace and security should consider requirements for halting the arms race and developing modalities for the effective application of the system of international security provided for in the Charter of the United

Nations. In the report, he stated that he had seized every opportunity to reiterate the need for halting the arms race and developing modalities for applying such a security system.

GENERAL ASSEMBLY ACTION. By a resolution of 9 December 1981,⁽⁷⁾ the General Assembly called on States to act promptly in implementing its 1980 resolution on disarmament and international security,⁽⁶⁾ which would render effective the decisions of the Security Council and thereby be conducive to meaningful disarmament negotiations. The Assembly deemed it necessary that the Council take measures towards implementing Chapter VII of the Charter (on threats to the peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression), which would reinforce the foundations of peace, security and order through the United Nations and avert the growing threat of nuclear conflagration. The Assembly took this action by a recorded vote of 132 to none, with 11 abstentions, following approval by the First Committee on 25 November by a recorded vote of 114 to none, with 9 abstentions.

By another resolution adopted on the same date,⁽⁸⁾ the Assembly noted with satisfaction the study prepared by the Secretary-General with the assistance of the Group of Experts, commended it to all Member States and invited them to inform him of their views. The study and the views of States would be transmitted to the Assembly at its 1982 special session on disarmament (p. 27). This resolution was adopted without vote following its approval by the First Committee in similar fashion on 24 November.

The first of these resolutions was sponsored in the First Committee by 12 States after an original draft submitted by Cyprus had been revised, mainly in its preamble, to gain wider acceptance. Before the vote, the draft was further revised orally by Cyprus on behalf of the sponsors, so that paragraph 2 referred to the implementation of Chapter VII of the Charter as a whole rather than of Article 43 only, as had been the case in the original version. (Article 43 concerns agreements for making available to the Security Council armed forces and facilities for the maintenance of peace and security.)

Introducing this resolution, Cyprus stated that the sponsors were convinced that progress on arms reduction required first a halt to the arms race, which could not be done while the doctrine of deterrence and strategic balance were regarded as the sole means of security. The alternative was to develop the measures and modalities for collective security mandated by the Charter. The resolution was aimed at stimulating co-operation among Security Council members, particularly the permanent members, in implementing the Charter system of international security.

The second resolution, on the study, was sponsored by Cyprus, Ecuador and the Philippines. Introducing the text, the Philippines referred to a parallelism between disarmament and international security, observing that most members of the Group of Experts had endorsed the view that there could not be substantial progress in one area without progress in the other. It had been recognized that, as a first step towards the parallel achievement of substantial measures of international security and of disarmament, progress would be required in the development of detente and confidence-building measures.

Canada and Japan, while voting in favour of the first resolution, objected to the fifth preambular paragraph, which stated that the arms race could not be stopped as long as the concepts of balance of weapons or of deterrence continued to be regarded as the sole means of security; Canada remarked that arms reduction agreements could be negotiated while maintaining prudent deterrent capability. Italy abstained because of this paragraph.

In the view of Cyprus, the study's conclusions were incomplete and inadequate, and did not reflect the two essential elements for peace and security and their interrelationship, identified in the Final Document of the 1978 special session on disarmament:⁽⁴⁾ genuine and lasting peace could be created only through effective implementation of the security system provided for in the Charter and the speedy and substantial reduction of armaments and armed forces.

The United Kingdom, speaking for the European Community (EC) members, asserted that some points in the report might not be entirely satisfactory to those States; their position would be communicated to the Secretary-General in accordance with the terms of the resolution. The United States said it had not had time to analyse the study.

Commenting on issues of disarmament and security, the Philippines warned against four false assumptions: that increased armament meant increased security, that delaying negotiations in order to build more military strength would result in a better outcome, that disarmament would in itself provide security, and that States would disarm without a workable and proven system for maintaining peace and security. Lebanon hoped the Assembly would take up at its forthcoming special session the proposal Lebanon had submitted at the 1978 special session -that small States whose stability was affected by external rivalries should have their neutrality internationally guaranteed and should be protected by a permanent United Nations peace-keeping force.

Publication: ⁽¹⁾Relationship between Disarmament and International Security, Disarmament Study Series 8 (A/36/597), Sales No. E.82.IX.4.

Reports: ⁽²⁾Conclusions and recommendations by Zenon Rossides, A/C.1/36/17; ⁽³⁾S-G, A/36/612.

Resolutions: GA: ⁽⁴⁾S-10/2, para. 13, 30 June 1978 (YUN 1978, p. 40); ⁽⁵⁾33/91 I, 16 Dec. 1978 (ibid., p. 119); ⁽⁶⁾35/156 J, 12 Dec. 1980 (YUN 1980, p. 101); ⁽⁷⁾36/97 K, 9 Dec. 1981, text following; ⁽⁸⁾36/97 L, 9 Dec., text following.

Meeting records: GA: 1st Committee, A/C.1/36/PV.3 & Corr.1, 4-10, 12-26, 36, 38, 41, 44 (19 Oct.-25 Nov.); plenary, A/36/PV.91 (9 Dec.).

General Assembly resolution 36/97 K

132-0-11 (recorded vote) Meeting 91 9 December 1981

Approved by First Committee (A/36/756) by recorded vote (114-O-9), 25 November (meeting 44); 12-nation draft (A/C.1/36/L.45/Rev.1), orally revised; agenda item 55 (i).

Sponsors: Argentina, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Cyprus, Ecuador, Egypt, India, Kenya, Niger, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Yugoslavia.

Disarmament and international security

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 34/83 A of 11 December 1979 and 35/156 J of 12 December 1980.

Alarmed by the present grave state of international affairs characterized by marked deterioration in the relationship between the major military Powers, which seriously jeopardizes the process of detente and results in the flaring up of new, and in the continuation of old, conflicts in various parts of the world,

Deeply concerned over the long stagnation in the disarmament process, the intensification of the arms race, both quantitative and qualitative, and the increased threat of a nuclear conflagration,

Convinced that to achieve progress on the reduction of arms and armaments, the arms race must first be stopped,

Convinced further that the arms race cannot be stopped as long as the concepts of balance of weapons or of deterrence continue to be regarded as the sole means for the security of nations,

Aware that the best hope for arresting the pernicious spiral of the arms race is by the provision of alternative means of security for nations rather than through reliance on the balance of armaments or of deterrence,

Aware further that the rational alternative means for such security is to move towards a halt in the arms race by developing in a parallel way the measures and modalities for collective security as mandatorily required by the Charter of the United Nations,

Recalling paragraph 13 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, in which it is stated that genuine and lasting peace can only be created through the effective implementation of the security system provided for in the Charter and the speedy and substantial reduction of arms and armed forces by international agreement and mutual example,

Considering that it is of essential importance to create a climate of confidence in the United Nations which will open the way to co-operation among Member States, in fulfilling the common and basic obligations under the Charter,

Noting with satisfaction the references to statements made by representatives of a number of Member States, including the two major Powers, in the First Committee during the current session of the Assembly, indicating positive attitudes towards effective use of the United Nations in improving the international situation and preventing war,

Reaffirming its resolution 35/156 J, adopted by consensus, in which, inter alia, it recommended that the main organs of the United Nations responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security should give early consideration to the requirements for halting the arms race, particularly

the nuclear-arms race, and developing the modalities for the effective application of the system of international security provided for in the Charter,

Reiterating its request to the permanent members of the Security Council to facilitate the work of the Council towards carrying out this essential responsibility under the Charter,

1. Calls upon all States to take prompt action for the implementation of General Assembly resolution 35/156 J, which would render effective the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the charter of the United Nations and thereby be conducive to meaningful disarmament negotiations;

2. Deems it necessary, as a first step in this direction, that the Security Council take the required measures towards the implementation of Chapter VII of the Charter, which would reinforce the foundations of peace, security and order through the United Nations and avert the growing threat of nuclear conflagration.

Recorded vote in Assembly as follows:

In Favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian SSR, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia.

Against: None.

Abstaining: Belgium, China, France, Germany, Federal Republic of Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, United Kingdom, United States.

General Assembly resolution 36/97 L

Adopted without vote Meeting 91 9 December 1981

Approved by First Committee (A/36/756) without vote, 24 November (meeting 41); 3-nation draft (A/C.1/36/L.46); agenda item 55 (f).

Sponsors: Cyprus, Ecuador, Philippines.

Study on the relationship between disarmament and international security

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 32/87 C of 12 December 1977, in which it requested the Secretary-General to initiate a study on the relationship between disarmament and international security,

Recalling also paragraph 97 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament, in which it requested the Secretary-General, with the assistance of consultant experts appointed by him, to continue the study on the relationship between disarmament and international security,

Recalling further its resolutions 34/83 A of 11 December 1979, by which it took note of the progress report of the Secretary-General, as well as resolution 35/156 E of 12 December 1980, in which it requested the Secretary-General to submit the final report to the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session,

Having examined the report of the Secretary-General transmitting the study prepared by the Group of Experts between Disarmament and International Security,

1. Takes note with satisfaction of the study on the relationship between disarmament and international security;

2. Expresses its appreciation to the Secretary-General and the Group of Experts which assisted him in the preparation of the study;

3. Commends the study and its conclusions to the attention of all Member States;

4. Invites all Member States to inform the Secretary-General, not later than 15 April 1982, of their views regarding the study;

5. Requests the Secretary-General to make the necessary arrangements for the reproduction of the study as a United Nations publication and to give it the widest possible distribution;

6. Requests the Secretary-General to transmit the study, together with the views of Member States, to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament, to be held from 7 June to 9 July 1982.

Confidence-building measures

STUDY BY THE GROUP OF EXPERTS. The Group of Governmental Experts on Confidence-building Measures, consisting of 14 experts appointed by the Secretary-General in response to a 1979 request by the General Assembly,⁽³⁾ submitted its unanimously adopted study to the Secretary-General on 14 August 1981.⁽²⁾ Of the four sessions the Group held in 1980 and 1981, two were in 1981, in New York from 26 May to 5 June and at Geneva from 3 to 14 August. Gerhard Pfeiffer of the Federal Republic of Germany chaired the Group.

Among the issues considered in the study were the characteristics of and opportunities for confidence-building measures, a historical survey of their evolution, principles to be considered in the establishment and implementation of such measures, various approaches to negotiating and eventually implementing them, and the role of the United Nations in the process.

A foreword by the Secretary-General defined the aims of confidence-building measures as strengthening peace and security and fostering a climate of trust and international co-operation in order to facilitate progress in disarmament. An illustrative list in the report divided such measures into two categories: military and security-related measures (including information exchange and publication, notification of military activities, reduction of military budgets, personnel exchanges and visits, consultation, establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and zones of peace, verification, improved communication and dispute settlement) and broader political, economic and social measures (including respect for State sovereignty and territory, termination of aggressive and colonialist policies, respect for human rights and for sovereignty over natural resources, international economic co-operation and joint economic development projects).

The Group stated that measures for building confidence and facilitating disarmament negotiations were urgently needed in the light of a serious deterioration in international relations. The

study emphasized measures related to military concerns, as these made up the bulk of proposals made by Governments. Among causes of mistrust and fear, it noted, were a lack of reliable information on the military activities of States and matters related to mutual security.

However, the Group recognized that international confidence could not be achieved through the building of military confidence alone and that political, economic and social efforts were also needed. Moreover, confidence-building measures could not replace disarmament and hence should not be used as a pretext for avoiding real progress in arms control or even legitimizing a continuing arms build-up. Although all experts agreed in principle on the need for an exchange of information on military activities and mutual security matters, there were differences of view concerning the degree of openness necessary for building confidence.

The experts concluded that the United Nations could help promote governmental and public awareness of the value of confidence-building measures for the strengthening of peace and security. It might be useful if the Secretary-General kept a voluntary register of the types of such measures applied around the world. The Group hoped that the United Nations might build on the study, focusing more on non-military approaches.

By a letter of 23 November,⁽¹⁾ Austria submitted a working paper on measures to improve the reliability and objectivity of military information. Stating that the inadequacy of reliable information often led Governments to initiate arms programmes on the basis of "worst-case" estimates, which further escalated the arms race, Austria suggested that confidence-building through dissemination of reliable information could be promoted through such steps as a refined standardized reporting instrument for military expenditures and the establishment of an international satellite monitoring agency.

GENERAL ASSEMBLY ACTION. On 9 December, the General Assembly adopted without vote a resolution on confidence-building measures⁽⁴⁾ by which it took note of the Secretary-General's study and recommended that further efforts be made, within and outside the United Nations, to widen the scope of such measures to include non-military approaches. The Assembly believed that the promotion of confidence-building measures, where appropriate conditions existed, would significantly contribute to facilitating disarmament, and invited States to consider the possible introduction of confidence-building measures in their regions.

The First Committee approved the proposal on 25 November, also without vote. The text

was sponsored by 32 States and was revised twice before its adoption.

Introducing the resolution, the Federal Republic of Germany said it presented the concept of confidence-building measures as a useful approach in reducing and eventually eliminating potential causes for mistrust and misunderstanding, thereby helping to facilitate disarmament.

The United Kingdom, speaking for the EC members, said that one essential element of confidence-building measures was transparency in military matters, which could effectively reduce or eliminate miscalculations or misapprehensions that might lead to the creation or exacerbation of tensions. Yugoslavia supported the basic thrust of the text while pointing out that confidence-building measures could not replace real disarmament measures. India, which shared a similar view, also stated that, because it had not had the opportunity to study the report carefully, it would have preferred a procedural resolution taking note of the study and referring it to States for further consideration. Japan, while supporting the idea contained in the resolution, remarked that, in the light of the situation in the region to which it belonged, it did not consider conditions to be ripe for the introduction of specific confidence-building measures there.

Cuba indicated that, had the text been put to a vote, it would have abstained because the list of sponsors included the United States, which it regarded as the originator of the deteriorating international situation. Albania would not have participated if there had been a vote, as it maintained that the root causes of the arms race and wars lay not in misunderstandings but in the nature of imperialism and social-imperialism.

In the First Committee debate, Canada expressed disappointment that the study had stopped short of recommending an open door to military activity, planning and doctrine, which Canada viewed as the only way to reduce fear and suspicion about the military intentions of potential adversaries. France and the United Kingdom stressed the importance of verification provisions as necessary conditions of mutual confidence in disarmament agreements, while Nigeria said that the impregnable margin of information disadvantage of a certain State was not conducive to the generation of mutual confidence necessary for disarmament.

The Netherlands subscribed to the Group's recommendation that the United Nations and States should encourage further exploration of ways in which confidence-building measures could strengthen peace and security. Peru thought such measures should be seen as encompassing all rules of inter-State behaviour.

Ecuador hoped the guidelines emerging from the study would serve as a basis for the negotiation of concrete regional, interregional and international measures. The Federal Republic of Germany suggested that regional organizations concern themselves with confidence-building measures, with a view to setting up negotiating mechanisms or other arrangements that could stimulate practical steps.

Letter: ⁽¹⁾Austria, 23 Nov., A/C.1/36/14.

Publication: ⁽²⁾Comprehensive Study on Confidence-building Measures, Disarmament Study Series 7 (A/36/474 & Corr.1). Sales No. E.82.IX.3.

Resolutions: GA: ⁽³⁾34/87 B, 11 Dec. 1979 (YUN 1979, p. 91); ⁽⁴⁾36/97 F, 9 Dec. 1981, text following.

Meeting records: GA: 1st Committee, A/C.1/36/PV.3 & Corr.1, 4-10, 12-26, 27, 31, 32, 34, 36, 38, 39, 44 (19 Oct.-25 Nov.); plenary, A/36/PV.91 (9 Dec.).

General Assembly resolution 36/97 F

Adopted without vote Meeting 91 9 December 1981

Approved by First Committee (A/36/756) without vote, 25 November (meeting 44); 32-nation draft (A/C.1/36/L.23/Rev.2); agenda item 55 (c).

Sponsors: Austria, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bolivia, Canada, Chile, Congo, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ecuador, Finland, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Mauritania, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Zaire.

Confidence-building measures

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 33/91 B of 16 December 1978, in which it invited Member States to submit their views and experiences regarding confidence-building measures,

Noting with satisfaction that numerous Member States responded to that invitation and provided the Secretary-General with substantive information,

Recalling also its resolution 34/87 B of 11 December 1979, in which it requested the Secretary-General to carry out a comprehensive study on confidence-building measures with the assistance of a group of qualified governmental experts appointed by him on an equitable geographical basis,

Expressing its concern about the deterioration of the international situation and the further escalation of the arms race, which both reflects and aggravates the unsatisfactory international political climate, tension and mistrust,

Desirous of strengthening international security and, at the same time, creating and improving conditions conducive to further measures of disarmament,

Mindful of the fact that, while confidence-building measures cannot serve as a substitute for disarmament measures, they play a very significant role in achieving disarmament,

Convinced of the usefulness of confidence-building measures freely arrived at by the States concerned and agreed upon, taking into account the particular conditions and requirements of the regions concerned,

Expressing its conviction of the need for the exchange of pertinent and timely information on military activities and other matters pertaining to mutual security, which would contribute to an improved climate of trust and confidence among States, and the conviction that agreement can be reached on measures to this end,

Noting with satisfaction the encouraging results of some confidence-building measures agreed upon and implemented in some regions,

1. Takes note of the comprehensive study on confidence-building measures, prepared by the Secretary-General;

2. Expresses its appreciation to the Secretary-General

and to the Group of Governmental Experts on Confidence-building Measures which assisted in the preparation of the study;

3. Requests the Secretary-General to make the necessary arrangements for the reproduction of the study as a United Nations publication and to give it the widest possible distribution;

4. Recognizes that confidence reflects a set of interrelated factors of a military as well as of a non-military character and that a plurality of approaches is needed to overcome fear, apprehension and mistrust between States and to replace them by confidence;

5. Recommends that, building on the experience gained from the application and development of confidence-building measures, further efforts should be made, both within and outside the United Nations, to widen their scope, so that account is also taken of non-military approaches;

6. Regards the concept of confidence-building measures as a useful approach in reducing and eventually eliminating potential causes for mistrust, misunderstanding, misinterpretation and miscalculation;

7. Believes that the promotion of confidence-building measures where appropriate conditions exist will significantly contribute to facilitating the process of disarmament;

8. Invites all States to consider the possible introduction of confidence-building measures in their respective regions and, where possible, to negotiate on them in keeping with conditions and requirements prevailing in each particular region;

9. Decides to submit the study to its second special session devoted to disarmament, to be held from 7 June to 9 July 1982, for further consideration.

Proposed international agency for monitoring disarmament agreements

The Group of Governmental Experts on the Question of the Establishment of an International Satellite Monitoring Agency submitted a report to the Secretary-General on 10 June 1981⁽¹⁾ containing the results of a study requested by the General Assembly in 1979.⁽²⁾ The report was transmitted to the Preparatory Committee for the Second Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament, prior to its submission to the Assembly at the 1982 special session (p. 27). The unanimous report was prepared during four sessions of the Group between February 1980 and February 1981, and was adopted at the final session, held at Geneva from 16 to 20 February 1981. Hubert G. Bortzmeyer of France was Chairman of the 13-member Group.

The report dealt with the technical, legal and financial implications of establishing an international agency that would use satellites to monitor compliance with international disarmament agreements—an idea originally placed before the General Assembly by France in 1978.

The Group concluded that observations from satellites to gather information related to verification of compliance with treaties and for crisis monitoring was technically feasible. Satellites and other technical facilities might be acquired in three stages, comprising: first, an image processing and interpretation centre; second,

stations to receive data from national satellites; and finally, a number of satellites belonging to the agency. Regarding legal aspects, the Group stated that there was no provision in international law that would prohibit an intergovernmental organization from monitoring by satellite.

As to the financial implications, the Group said a number of technical options were possible, with a broad range of cost estimates. An image processing and interpretation centre might cost \$8 million to acquire and \$25-30 million a year to operate. A 10-station ground-receiving network might require an initial investment of \$60-80 million and entail annual operating expenses of \$20 million. Launching three satellites for area monitoring might cost \$900-1,200 million, with \$50-200 million needed each year to manage the system and replace the satellites every two or three years. Launching and operation of a single low-altitude manoeuvrable satellite for "close-look" might cost approximately \$1,500 million, spread over 10 years. Even the most expensive phase, the experts noted, would cost, well under 1 per cent of the total annual expenditure on armaments.

Publication: ⁽¹⁾The Implications of Establishing an International Satellite Monitoring Agency (A/AC.206/14), Sales No. E.83.IX.3.

Resolution: ⁽²⁾GA, 34/83 E, 11 Dec. 1979 (YUN 1979, p. 99).

Study of institutional arrangements

STUDY BY THE GROUP OF EXPERTS. The 20-member Group of Governmental Experts to Study the Institutional Arrangements relating to the Process of Disarmament, appointed by the Secretary-General in accordance with a 1979 General Assembly request,⁽²⁾ held four sessions in 1980 and 1981, the last two of which were in New York, 19 to 29 January and 22 June to 2 July 1981. The study was transmitted to the Secretary-General on 2 July by the Group's Chairman, Carlos Ortiz de Rozas of Argentina.

In the study,⁽¹⁾ the experts stated that, however adequately the United Nations serviced disarmament efforts, it was ultimately the will of States to make the best use of them and their readiness to negotiate which would determine the extent of progress. Some of the important measures that had followed the Assembly's 1978 special session on disarmament,⁽⁴⁾ such as the re-establishment of the Disarmament Commission and the enlargement of the Committee on Disarmament, had offered wider opportunities for deliberations and negotiations. The Group did not wish to express an opinion on those bodies.

The Group considered that the United Nations Centre for Disarmament, despite its limited resources, had satisfactorily coped with the additional responsibilities arising from the

increasing length of sessions of the deliberative and negotiating organs. It found, however, that a clearer co-ordination of functions was desirable between the Centre and the Department of Public Information as regards dissemination of information on disarmament.

In view of the central role of the United Nations and its primary responsibility in disarmament, the Group thought the Secretary-General's co-ordinating responsibility for disarmament activities in the United Nations system should be clearly reaffirmed. The most appropriate official for that role was the Assistant Secretary-General in charge of the Centre for Disarmament, who should strive to ensure better use of limited human and material resources, avoid duplication, and thus improve the effectiveness of efforts in such a multidisciplinary sphere.

The Group recommended that the Secretary-General consider possibilities for strengthening the Centre with an appropriate number of additional staff, within existing United Nations resources, to meet anticipated growing needs. Other recommendations concerned the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (p. 107), possible institutional arrangements in regard to the relationship between disarmament and development (p. 99), and disarmament training and fellowship programmes (p. 108).

GENERAL ASSEMBLY ACTION. On 9 December, by a resolution on institutional arrangements relating to disarmament,⁽³⁾ adopted without vote, the General Assembly took note of the study on this subject and invited Member States to transmit their comments. The Assembly requested the Secretary-General to transmit the study to the Committee on Disarmament and decided to transmit the report and States' comments to the Assembly at its 1982 special session on disarmament (p. 27) for consideration and action. The First Committee approved the resolution, sponsored by 24 States, on 20 November, also without vote.

Introducing the resolution, Argentina said the basically procedural text was aimed at ensuring that Governments gave the study the consideration it deserved.

During the Committee debate, Mexico reiterated a position first expressed in 1980 that the Centre for Disarmament should be changed to a Department headed by an Under-Secretary-General, and that after a few years the United Nations should consider whether to establish a specialized agency for disarmament. Egypt and Nigeria also favoured the idea of a disarmament department, while France favoured a review of the Centre's status within the Secretariat. Austria,

Greece and Sweden saw merit in the proposed creation of a United Nations disarmament agency, to reflect what Greece referred to as more ambitious goals and priorities, and the Netherlands recalled its 1978 proposal on an international disarmament organization.⁽⁵⁾ On the other hand, India said the Centre was adequately equipped and fully competent to carry out both a promotional role with respect to disarmament and preparatory work in support of disarmament activities; it saw no need for a separate United Nations disarmament organization.

Italy thought consideration should be given to entrusting the United Nations with specific new functions in such areas as verification of compliance with disarmament agreements. Austria, Canada, France, Nepal and New Zealand also hoped the United Nations would have an increasing role in verification.

Israel considered that the United Nations should create regional bodies to negotiate on reducing the scale and speed of a regional arms race (p. 89); it questioned whether organizational proliferation had influenced the substance of disarmament negotiations.

Reports: ⁽¹⁾S-G and Group of Experts, A/36/392.

Resolutions: GA: ⁽²⁾34/87 E, 11 Dec. 1979 (YUN 1979, p. 100); ⁽³⁾36/97 D, 9 Dec. 1981, text following.

Yearbook references: 1978, ⁽⁴⁾p. 17, ⁽⁵⁾p. 56.

Meeting records: GA: 1st Committee, A/C.1/36/PV.3 & Corr.1, 4-10, 12-26, 29, 30, 34, 36-38 (19 Oct.-20 Nov.); plenary, A/36/PV.91 (9 Dec.).

General Assembly resolution 36/97 D

Adopted without vote Meeting 91 9 December 1981

Approved by First Committee (A/36/756) without vote. 20 November (meeting 38); 24-nation draft (A/C.1/36/L.9); agenda item 55 (b).

Sponsors: Argentina, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Belgium, Cuba, Ecuador, Finland, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Greece, Ireland, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Romania, Sri Lanka, Sweden, United Kingdom, Yugoslavia.

Institutional arrangements relating to the process of disarmament

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 34/87 E of 11 December 1979, in which it requested the Secretary-General, with the assistance of qualified governmental experts, to carry out a comprehensive study assessing current institutional requirements and future estimated needs in the United Nations management of disarmament affairs and outlining possible functions, structure and institutional framework that could meet those requirements and needs, including legal and financial implications, and formulating recommendations for possible later decisions on the matter.

Having examined the report of the Secretary-General transmitting the study prepared by the Group of Governmental Experts to Study the Institutional Arrangements relating to the Process of Disarmament,

1. Takes note of the report of the Secretary-General and of the study of the institutional arrangements relating to the process of disarmament;

2. Expresses its appreciation to the Secretary-General and the Group of Experts which assisted him for the efficient manner in which the report was prepared;

3. Recommends that all Member States should study the report;

4. Invites all Member States to transmit to the Secretary-General by 31 March 1982 their comments on the study and its conclusions and recommendations;

5. Requests the Secretary-General to transmit the study to the Committee on Disarmament;

6. Decides to transmit the report and the comments of Member States to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament for substantive consideration and the adoption of appropriate decisions;

7. Further decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-seventh session an item entitled "Institutional arrangements relating to the process of disarmament".

Research and studies

Seven United Nations studies on various aspects of disarmament were completed in 1981. Six of them were presented to the General Assembly and dealt with the following topics: Israeli nuclear armament (p. 51), the relationship between disarmament and development (p. 96), the relationship between disarmament and international security (p. 99), confidence-building measures (p. 102), institutional arrangements relating to the process of disarmament (p. 105) and a World Disarmament Campaign (p. 109). The seventh study, dealing with the implications of establishing an international satellite monitoring agency (p. 104), was submitted to the Preparatory Committee for the Second Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament.

One study in progress during the year dealt with the economic and social consequences of the arms race and of military expenditures. In addition, a study on conventional disarmament was initiated by the Assembly in 1981 (p. 86).

ACTIVITIES OF THE ADVISORY BOARD. In 1981 the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies held its sixth and seventh sessions at United Nations Headquarters, from 4 to 15 May and from 28 September to 9 October. According to a report on its activities which the Secretary-General submitted to the General Assembly,⁽¹⁾ the Board considered proposals for new studies, its own mandate and functions, the work of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), and a proposal for a study of a new philosophy on disarmament.

Regarding possible new studies, the Board said it continued to attach importance to three topics which it had identified as suitable for study in the near future: zones of peace and co-operation, the verification problem, and cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons and means of delivery and of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes.

The Board devoted a substantial part of its 1981 sessions to consideration of its mandate and functions, in view of the fact that institutional arrangements relating to disarmament (p. 105) were to be discussed at the General Assembly's

1982 special session on disarmament (p. 27) and since the terms of appointment of the Board members expired at the end of 1981.

Board members generally agreed that its original mandate as laid down by the Assembly in 1978,⁽²⁾ which was to advise the Secretary-General on various aspects of United Nations disarmament studies, left sufficient flexibility to cover additional activities. The Board believed that, since it was in the unique position of discussing and formulating conceptual aspects in the disarmament field, it could be requested by the Secretary-General and the Assembly to give advisory opinions.

It was generally felt that the Board's name did not adequately reflect its range of activities, which included: initiation and recommendation of studies; elaboration of a comprehensive programme of studies; advising the Secretary-General on planning and executing studies; rendering advice, on request, to delegations intending to submit study proposals; co-ordination of study activities; recommendation of ways to provide greater efficiency and cost savings in conducting studies; promotion of the work of UNIDIR; and assisting the Secretary-General regarding the World Disarmament Campaign.

The Board held an exchange of views on a proposal for the elaboration of a new philosophy on disarmament—a topic on which it had submitted its advice in 1979⁽⁵⁾ as requested by the Assembly in 1978.⁽³⁾ The Board recognized the subject as vast, complicated and at times nebulous, and concluded that it could not, within the time at its disposal, complete a fruitful discussion on the subject. It therefore recommended to the Secretary-General that continued consideration be given to the question.

The Group of Governmental Experts to Study the Institutional Arrangements relating to the Process of Disarmament, in a report for the General Assembly adopted in July 1981 (p. 105), called for development of the co-ordinating role of the Advisory Board. It also suggested five factors to be borne in mind in considering proposals for new studies: the extent to which the study would help the conclusion of disarmament agreements, the opinion of the Board, the studies already available in that area, the assistance which United Nations bodies could give and the estimated cost.

ACTIVITIES OF THE UN INSTITUTE FOR DISARMAMENT RESEARCH. The initial work programme of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, established in 1980,⁽⁶⁾ was approved in 1981 by the Institute's Advisory Council, which held two sessions during the year. The programme consisted of: the compilation of a repertory of disarmament research

(completed in 1981); a general conceptual analysis of the disarmament field; and projects entitled "Security of States and the lowering of the levels of armaments", "Prevention of accidental nuclear war", "Science and technology for disarmament", "Disarmament data base", "Disarmament and development: continued research on various aspects of the problem in the light of the report of the Group of Experts on Disarmament and Development" and "Negotiating disarmament".

The Institute organized at Geneva, from 16 to 18 November, a conference of directors of disarmament research institutes, with the objective of strengthening international co-operation on disarmament research. The aims were to make better use of resources, avoid unnecessary parallelism and duplication, and strengthen the impact of research on government policies, deliberations and negotiations. More than 50 officials of national and international institutes participated.

The Group of Experts on institutional arrangements for disarmament recommended that the future status of UNIDIR should be decided at the 1982 special session on disarmament.

GENERAL ASSEMBLY ACTION. On 9 December 1981, by a resolution on the programme of research and studies on disarmament,⁽⁴⁾ the General Assembly took note with appreciation of the Secretary-General's report on the work of the Advisory Board and requested him to submit the report to the Assembly at its 1982 special session on disarmament for further consideration. This resolution was adopted without vote following its approval by the First Committee in similar fashion on 23 November.

In introducing the resolution, also sponsored by Argentina, Canada, the Philippines and Poland, Pakistan noted that the text was purely procedural and that the Assembly, at its special session, was already scheduled to review institutional arrangements relating to disarmament.

Report: ⁽¹⁾S-G, A/36/654.

Resolutions: GA: ⁽²⁾S-10/2, para. 124, 30 June 1978 (YUN 1978, p. 47); ⁽³⁾33/71 N, 14 Dec. 1978 (ibid., p. 118); ⁽⁴⁾36/92 L, 9 Dec. 1981, text following.

Yearbook references: ⁽⁵⁾1979, p. 97; ⁽⁶⁾1980, p. 113.

Meeting records: GA: 1st Committee. A/C.1/36/PV.3 & Corr.1, 4-10, 12-26, 37, 40 (19 Oct.-23 Nov.); plenary, A/36/PV.91 (9 Dec.).

General Assembly resolution 36/92 L

Adopted without vote Meeting 91 9 December 1981
Approved by First Committee (A/36/752) without vote, 23 November (meeting 40): 5-nation draft (A/C.1/36/L.47); agenda item 51 (c).
Sponsors: Argentina, Canada, Pakistan, Philippines, Poland.

Programme of research and studies on disarmament
The General Assembly,

Taking note with appreciation of the report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies in 1981,

Requests the Secretary-General to submit that report to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament for its further consideration.

Disarmament fellowships

The Secretary-General, reporting to the General Assembly on the third year of operation of the United Nations programme of fellowships on disarmament,⁽¹⁾ stated that 20 fellows, selected from among 39 nominations received from Member States, participated in the 1981 programme from 29 June to 30 November.

The programme included lectures, seminars, observation of the proceedings of disarmament bodies, submission of research papers, a four-day course at the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna (25-28 August), and study visits to the Federal Republic of Germany, Hungary and Sweden. The major portion of the programme took place at Geneva and in New York.

GENERAL ASSEMBLY ACTION. By a resolution on the United Nations programme of fellowships on disarmament,⁽²⁾ the General Assembly decided to continue the programme and requested the Secretary-General to make adequate arrangements for 1982 in accordance with guidelines approved by the Assembly in 1978.⁽³⁾ It also requested him to submit to the Assembly at its 1982 special session on disarmament (p. 27) an assessment of the programme since its inception in 1979.⁽⁴⁾

The resolution was adopted on 9 December without vote. The First Committee approved it on 20 November in similar fashion. Nigeria introduced the text on behalf of 23 sponsors and, when the resolution was adopted, expressed its understanding, as did Turkey, that 20 fellowships would be awarded in 1982, as in 1981.

Report: ⁽¹⁾S-G, A/36/606.

Resolution: ⁽²⁾36/92 A, 9 Dec., text following.

Yearbook references: ⁽³⁾1978, p. 110; ⁽⁴⁾1979, p. 98.

Meeting records: GA: 1st Committee, A/C.1/36/PV.3 & Corr.1, 4-10, 12-26, 27, 30, 34, 38 (19 Oct.-20 Nov.); plenary, A/36/PV.91 (9 Dec.).

General Assembly resolution 36/92 A

Adopted without vote Meeting 91 9 December 1981

Approved by First Committee (A/36/752) without vote, 20 November (meeting 38): 23-nation draft (A/C.1/36/L.1); agenda item 51 (e).

Sponsors: Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Congo, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, France, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Nigeria, Panama, Philippines, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yugoslavia.

United Nations programme of fellowships on disarmament
The General Assembly,

Recalling its decision, taken at the tenth special session, the first special session devoted to disarmament, to establish a programme of fellowships on disarmament,

Recalling also its resolution 35/152 A of 12 December 1980, in which it requested the Secretary-General to make adequate arrangements relating to the programme for 1981 in accordance with the guidelines approved by the General Assembly at its thirty-third session,

Expressing its satisfaction at the fact that Governments, particularly those of developing countries, have continued to manifest serious interest in the programme,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of the United Nations programme of fellowships on disarmament for 1981,

1. Decides to continue the United Nations programme of fellowships on disarmament;

2. Requests the Secretary-General to make adequate arrangements relating to the programme for 1982 in accordance with the guidelines approved by the General Assembly at its thirty-third session;

3. Also requests the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament a report containing an assessment of the United Nations programme of fellowships on disarmament since its inception in 1979;

4. Commends the Secretary-General for the diligence with which the programme has been conducted;

5. Expresses its appreciation to the Governments of the Federal Republic of Germany, Hungary and Sweden for inviting the fellows to their capitals to study selected activities in the field of disarmament, thereby contributing to the fulfilment of the overall objectives of the programme, as well as providing additional information sources and practical knowledge for the fellows.

Status of multilateral disarmament agreements

The General Assembly, by a resolution adopted on 9 December 1981,⁽⁴⁾ requested Member States depositaries of multilateral disarmament agreements to furnish the Secretary-General with information regarding their status by the beginning of each of its regular sessions. The Assembly also requested the Secretary-General to prepare for each of its regular sessions a composite table of signatories of and parties to such agreements with a view to enabling the Assembly to take up the question of their status if it deemed it appropriate.

The Assembly adopted this resolution by a recorded vote of 115 to none, with 23 abstentions. The First Committee approved the text on 23 November by a recorded vote of 91 to none, with 22 abstentions.

The resolution was sponsored by Bulgaria, which recalled that the Assembly, in the Final Document of its 1978 special session on disarmament,⁽³⁾ had stated that universality of disarmament agreements helped create confidence among States. Bulgaria hoped the information to be supplied each year would be a reminder that the participation of States in such agreements was important for the attainment of their objectives and might help in achieving their universality.

In explanation of vote, China stated that since it had different views regarding certain disarmament agreements, it had not participated in them and, accordingly, it could neither agree with the resolution nor participate in the vote. Brazil abstained, asserting that the text did not take into full account the sovereign right of

States to decide whether to adhere to agreements and dealt only with the quantitative aspect of participation while leaving aside the more important aspect of the absence of compliance by the nuclear-weapon States with provisions of agreements to which they were parties. India abstained because it continued to maintain that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons⁽¹⁾ was discriminatory and therefore unacceptable.

Guinea, which voted affirmatively, announced that it would have abstained had a separate vote been taken on paragraph 1, reaffirming the importance of the provisions of the 1978 Final Document concerning the universality of multilateral disarmament agreements; Guinea believed that States parties to agreements should persuade other States to join them. Mexico voted in favour because the text reaffirmed the importance of universality of multilateral agreements, although Mexico did not consider the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques⁽²⁾ to be universally acceptable.

Resolutions: GA: ⁽¹⁾2373(XXII), annex, 12 June 1968 (YUN 1968, p. 17); ⁽²⁾31/72, annex, 10 Dec. 1976 (YUN 1976, p. 45); ⁽³⁾S-10/2, para. 40, 30 June 1978 (YUN 1978, p. 42); ⁽⁴⁾36/92 H, 9 Dec. 1981, text following.

Meeting records: GA: 1st Committee, A/C.1/36/PV.3 & Corr.1, 4-10, 12-26, 32, 40 (19 Oct.-23 Nov.); plenary, A/36/PV.91 (9 Dec.).

General Assembly resolution 36/92 H

115-0-23 (recorded vote) Meeting 91 9 December 1981
Approved by First Committee (A/36/752) by recorded vote (91-0-22).
23 November (meeting 40): draft by Bulgaria (A/C.1/36/L.24); agenda item 51.

Status of multilateral disarmament agreements

The General Assembly,

Recalling the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament,

Having in mind that a number of multilateral disarmament agreements have been concluded so far,

Considering that the participation in the above-mentioned agreements of as many States as possible is of special importance to the attainment of their objectives,

Taking note with satisfaction of the special supplement to the United Nations Disarmament Yearbook, entitled Status of multilateral arms regulations and disarmament agreements, as well as of the information on this matter included in the yearbooks,

1. Reaffirms the importance of the provisions concerning the question of the universality of multilateral disarmament agreements contained in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, in particular paragraph 40;

2. Requests Member States depositaries of such agreements to furnish the Secretary-General with information regarding their status by the beginning of each regular session of the General Assembly;

3. Further requests the Secretary-General to prepare for each regular session of the General Assembly a composite table of signatories of and parties to such agreements with a view to enabling the Assembly to take up the question of their status, if it deems it appropriate.

Recorded vote in Assembly as follows:

In Favour: Afghanistan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Burundi, Byelorussian SSR, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Indonesia, Iraq, Ireland, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia.

Against: None.

Abstaining: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Denmark, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Iceland, India, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay.

Study on a World Disarmament Campaign

STUDY BY THE GROUP OF EXPERTS. The Group of Experts on the Organization and Financing of a World Disarmament Campaign under the Auspices of the United Nations, established in pursuance of a 1980 request by the General Assembly,⁽³⁾ submitted a unanimously adopted report to the Secretary-General on 26 August 1981.⁽¹⁾ The report was prepared at two sessions held at United Nations Headquarters, from 3 to 6 March and from 22 to 26 June. The six-member Group, appointed by the Secretary-General, included three United Nations Secretariat officials. Its Chairman was Ingrid Lehmann, Political Affairs Officer in the United Nations Centre for Disarmament.

The Group stated in its report that the objectives of a World Disarmament Campaign would be to inform, to educate and to generate public understanding and support. Although the Campaign would be universal, the Group suggested that particular and sustained attention should be paid to certain constituencies, including elected representatives, parliamentarians and public officials, information media, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), educational communities and peace research institutes.

The experts considered the United Nations system to be a major source of initiative, materials, co-ordination and guidance, using to the fullest its network of information centres and other field offices. Further, Disarmament Week, observed each October (p. 112), could provide an annual focus for the Campaign.

The Group suggested that the Campaign be placed under the overall guidance and co-ordination of the Secretary-General, who would report annually to the General Assembly; that

a voluntary fund for the Campaign be established to finance the increased activities; and that pledging conferences could be held, starting at the Assembly's 1982 special session on disarmament (p. 27).

GENERAL ASSEMBLY ACTION. On 9 December, by a resolution on the World Disarmament Campaign,⁽⁴⁾ the General Assembly commended the study by the Group of Experts and invited Member States to transmit to the Secretary-General suggestions and comments for implementing its recommendations. The Secretary-General was requested to transmit to the Assembly at its 1982 special session on disarmament both the study and the opinions of Governments, so that decisions might be taken at that time to launch the Campaign, including a pledging conference at the initial stage of the special session.

The resolution, revised by its sponsors, was adopted by a recorded vote of 143 to none, with 2 abstentions. The First Committee approved the text on 20 November by a recorded vote of 119 to none, with 3 abstentions.

The resolution had nine sponsors: Cuba, Mexico, Nigeria, Panama, Romania, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, Sweden and Yugoslavia. It was introduced by Mexico, which stated that the benefits of the Campaign would be felt equally in all parts of the world, irrespective of political, economic and social systems.

Some States which voted affirmatively—Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom, the last speaking for the European Community (EC) members—as well as the United States, which abstained in the vote, found it difficult to support the idea of a pledging conference at the initial stage of the special session. Canada felt that the organization of the Campaign should be considered prior to such a conference, as did Japan, which abstained in the Committee but voted affirmatively in the Assembly. The United Kingdom reserved the right of the EC members to comment later on the recommendations contained in the study, including the idea of a pledging conference.

France and the Federal Republic of Germany, which voted in favour, stated that a World Disarmament Campaign could be of value only if it was based on balanced, objective and relevant information, and if there was a free flow of information world-wide. The United States said it could not accept a financial burden for an impractical public-opinion initiative that would inevitably focus only on free societies, since it would have no effect on public opinion in closed societies. Responding to this point, Mexico noted that information dissemination on disarmament was a concept adopted by consensus in 1978 in the

Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly,⁽²⁾ and that a World Disarmament Campaign would be guided and coordinated by the Secretary-General, through United Nations information centres around the world.

The USSR, which voted for the resolution, was gratified at seeing demonstrations in various parts of the world, including Europe, against the threat of nuclear and other types of weapons; it thought detailed consideration would have to be given to the study and to other proposals regarding the Campaign.

In the Committee's general debate, Chile saw a need to disseminate information about the horrors of a war waged with available means of destruction, so that world public opinion would back disarmament measures. Cuba thought the World Disarmament Campaign should assemble convincing proof of the dangers of war, the cost of the arms race and the great harm which could be done by the war-mongering campaign waged by imperialist spokesmen. Understanding the intricacies of the arms race was crucial, Lebanon felt, if public opinion was to influence policy. Romania suggested that the Campaign take into account the special role that could be played by scientists, who were well aware of the destructive force of modern weapons. Sierra Leone's view was that the Campaign should provide objective information on the arms race and disarmament to Governments, NGOs and individuals, for the purpose of building a world-wide disarmament constituency. If world opinion was fully aware of the many aspects of competition in weapons production, said Venezuela, that could be of invaluable assistance in promoting disarmament.

Report: ⁽¹⁾S-G and Group of Experts, A/36/458.

Resolutions: GA: ⁽²⁾S-10/2, paras. 99-107, 30 June 1978 (YUN 1978, p. 45); ⁽³⁾35/152 I, 12 Dec. 1980 (YUN 1980, p. 117); ⁽⁴⁾36/92 C, 9 Dec. 1981, text following.

Meeting records: GA: 1st Committee, A/C.1/36/PV.3 & Corr.1, 4-10, 12-26, 30, 34, 38 (19 Oct.-20 Nov.); plenary, A/36/PV.91 (9 Dec.).

General Assembly resolution 36/92 C

143-0-2 (recorded vote) Meeting 91 9 December 1981

Approved by First Committee (A/36/752) by recorded vote (119-0-3), 20 November (meeting 38): 9-nation draft (A/C.1/36/L.11/Rev.1): agenda item 51 (i).

Sponsors: Cuba, Mexico, Nigeria, Panama, Romania, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Yugoslavia.

World Disarmament Campaign

The General Assembly,

Recalling that, in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament, it stressed the importance of mobilizing world public opinion on behalf of disarmament.

Recalling its resolution 35/152 I of 12 December 1980, in which, for the achievement of that purpose, it requested the Secretary-General to carry out a study on the organization and financing of a World Disarmament Campaign under the auspices of the United Nations,

Having examined the study transmitted by the Secretary-General as an annex to his report of 17 September 1981.

1. Notes with satisfaction the contents of the study on the World Disarmament Campaign and commends its conclusions:

2. Expresses its appreciation to the Secretary-General and to the experts who assisted him for the prompt and effective manner in which the study was prepared;

3. Invites all Member States to transmit to the Secretary-General, not later than 15 April 1982, the suggestions and comments which they deem appropriate to formulate for the implementation of the recommendations contained in the study;

4. Requests the Secretary-General to transmit to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament both the study on the World Disarmament Campaign and the opinions thereon received from Governments, in order that the Assembly may take the decisions it considers advisable for the solemn launching of the Campaign, including a pledging conference to take place at the initial stage of the special session.

Recorded vote in Assembly as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian SSR, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Grenade, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriyah, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia.

Against: None.

Abstaining: Israel, United States.

Proposed collection of signatures in support of disarmament

On 9 December 1981,⁽²⁾ the General Assembly invited Member States to communicate to the Secretary-General their views and suggestions concerning a world-wide collection of signatures in support of measures to prevent nuclear war, to curb the arms race and for disarmament. It requested him to report, at its 1982 special session on disarmament (p. 27), on a format and methods of carrying out such action under United Nations auspices.

The Assembly adopted this resolution by a recorded vote of 78 to 3, with 56 abstentions. The First Committee approved the text on 24 November by a recorded vote of 68 to 3, with 46 abstentions.

The resolution was sponsored by Bulgaria, Cuba and Mongolia. Introducing the text, Bulgaria noted the recognition given by the Assembly at its 1978 special session on disarma-

ment to the potential influence of world public opinion and to the importance of Disarmament Week (p. 112) for promoting public awareness of arms and disarmament issues.⁽¹⁾ Bulgaria added that the sponsors of the resolution felt it was more important than ever that the peoples of the world clearly expressed their will to foster implementation of practical disarmament measures.

The Byelorussian SSR and Czechoslovakia supported the idea of a world-wide collection of signatures, as did the German Democratic Republic, which recalled that an NGO-sponsored campaign in that country two years earlier had yielded 13 million signatures in favour of arms limitation and disarmament. Guinea shared the view that the resolution would promote, in a dynamic way, the task of informing world opinion. Hungary believed the proposal would also contribute to the Second Disarmament Decade (1980-1990) and the World Disarmament Campaign in mobilizing world public opinion on behalf of disarmament. Mexico voted affirmatively on the understanding that the Assembly, at its 1982 special session on disarmament, would act to prevent duplication of activities under the World Disarmament Campaign (p. 109).

Among those which abstained in the vote, Austria regarded it as highly problematical to involve Governments in a practice designed to facilitate input into the political process from the grass-roots level; at the same time, it doubted whether the proposed measure could usefully contribute to disarmament. The Netherlands called the resolution redundant and propagandistic, and stated that mass demonstrations in Western Europe provided evidence that public opinion there was not in need of government guidance to be mobilized for disarmament. Finland and Pakistan considered that the proposed action could have been more appropriately dealt with in the context of the World Disarmament Campaign; Finland added that the proposed action fell within the compass of NGOs. Also believing that this was a matter for private organizations, China did not participate in the vote.

Japan, which voted in favour, similarly stressed that such matters should be left to private initiative, and recalled in this connection the voluntary effort made at the time of the 1978 special session on disarmament by Japanese NGOs which had brought to United Nations Headquarters some 20 million signatures in support of nuclear disarmament. Brazil voted against the resolution, believing that it was not incumbent on the United Nations to engage in such activities.

Resolutions: GA: ⁽¹⁾S-10/2, paras. 99-107, 30 June 1978 (YUN 1978, p. 45); ⁽²⁾36/92 J, 9 Dec. 1981, text following.

Meeting records: GA: 1st Committee, A/C.1/36/PV.3 & Corr.1, 4-10, 12-26 37, 38, 41 (19 Oct.-24 Nov.); plenary, A/36/PV.91 (9 Dec.).

General Assembly resolution 36/92 J

78-3-56 (recorded vote) Meeting 91 9 December 1981

Approved by First Committee (A/36/752) by recorded vote (68-3-46). 24 November (meeting 41); 3-nation draft (A/C.1/36/L.32): agenda item 51.

Sponsors: Bulgaria, Cuba, Mongolia.

World-wide action for collecting signatures in support of measures to prevent nuclear war, to curb the arms race and for disarmament

The General Assembly,

Deeply concerned over the growing threat of a nuclear war and the continuation and escalation of the arms race,

Conscious of the need to mobilize world public opinion on behalf of disarmament, as called for in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament.

Considering that world-wide action for collecting signatures in support of measures to prevent nuclear war, to curb the arms race and for disarmament would be an important manifestation of the will of the world public and would contribute to the creation of a favourable climate for achieving progress in the field of disarmament.

Considering also that it is desirable to carry out such world-wide action under the auspices of the United Nations and with the active participation of non-governmental organizations and other public institutions.

1. Invites Member States to communicate to the Secretary-General their views and suggestions concerning world-wide action for collecting signatures in support of measures to prevent nuclear war, to curb the arms race and for disarmament:

2. Requests the Secretary-General to prepare a report on the most appropriate format and methods of carrying out such world-wide action under the auspices of the United Nations, taking into account the views and suggestions of Member States, and to submit it for consideration to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament.

Recorded vote in Assembly as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Angola, Bahrain, Barbados, Benin, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Burundi, Byelorussian SSR, Cape Verde, Chad, Chile, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Hungary, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jamaica, Japan,

Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia.

Against: Brazil, Canada, United States.

Abstaining: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Belgium, Bhutan, Central African Republic, Colombia, Comoros, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Maldives, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Portugal, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Sweden, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, Yugoslavia, Zaire.

Disarmament Week (24-30 October)

Disarmament Week 1981 was observed at United Nations Headquarters on 26 October at a special meeting of the First Committee, where messages were read on behalf of the President of the General Assembly and the Secretary-General, and statements were made by the representatives of regional groups. The President said that disarmament could be accomplished only if States that were devoting so much effort to the arms race decided to stop. The Secretary-General appealed to Governments to help make the Assembly's 1982 special session on disarmament (p. 27) the start of a new and productive phase of disarmament negotiations.

By a resolution of 9 December on international co-operation for disarmament, the Assembly called on Member States to disseminate widely, in connection with Disarmament Week, the principles of international co-operation designed to achieve the goals of disarmament.⁽²⁾ The Secretary-General submitted to the Assembly the replies received from 10 Governments concerning their activities in connection with Disarmament Week.⁽¹⁾

Report: ⁽¹⁾S-G, A/36/568 & Add.1.

Resolution: ⁽²⁾36/92 D, para. 5, 9 Dec. (p. 26).

Meeting record: GA, 1st Committee, A/C.1/36/PV.11 (26 Oct.).