peace and security in consequence of a decision in which they had not concurred. Therefore, if a majority voting in the Security Council is to be made possible, the only practicable method is to provide, in respect of non-procedural decisions, for unanimity of the permanent members plus the concurring votes of at least two of the non-permanent members.

10. For all these reasons, the four sponsoring Governments agreed on the Yalta formula and have presented it to this Conference as essential if an international organization is to be created through which all peace-loving nations can effectively discharge their common responsibilities for the maintenance of international peace and security.

II

In the light of the considerations set forth in Part I of this statement, it is clear what the answers to the questions submitted by the Sub-Committee should be, with the exception of Question 19 [with respect to the preliminary question as to whether a matter is procedural]. The answer to that question is as follows:

1. In the opinion of the Delegations of the sponsoring Governments, the Draft Charter itself contains an indication of the application of the voting procedures to the various functions of the Council.

2. In this case, it will be unlikely that there will arise in the future any matters of great importance on which a decision will have to be made as to whether a procedural vote would apply. Should, however, such a matter arise, the decision regarding the preliminary question as to whether or not such a matter is procedural must be taken by a vote of seven members of the Security Council, including the concurring votes of the permanent members.

In the course of the debate that ensued, several delegations indicated that they would be more favorably inclined to accept the proposed voting procedure if a revision of that procedure were made possible at another conference. They hoped that such a revision would not be subject to the rule of unanimity of the permanent members of the Security Council.

The Australian representative proposed that decisions of the Security Council with respect to pacific settlement of disputes should be made by a majority of any seven members, i.e., should be considered as decisions on procedural matters. The Australian representative stated that he was reluctantly prepared to accept the veto power in connection with enforcement measures, but that in pacific settlement of disputes no one power should block any Council decisions. The Australian amendment, like several others, was not adopted.

Committee III/1, Commission III and eventually the Conference adopted the Yalta voting formula, which constitutes Article 27 of the Charter. The statement of the delegations of the sponsoring Governments on the voting procedure of the Security Council, however, was not formally accepted as the official interpretation of Article 27.

Committee III/I agreed to the Dumbarton Oaks recommendations: (1) that Members of the United Nations should confer upon the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security and should agree that in carrying out these duties under this responsibility the Security Council should act on their behalf; (2) that in discharging these duties the Security Council should act in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations; and (3) that Members should obligate themselves to accept the decisions of the Security Council and to carry them out in accordance with the provisions of the Charter.

b. Pacific Settlement

Section A of Chapter VIII of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals was the subject matter considered by Committee III/2, which made some changes in the order and wording of the paragraphs. The substance of this section constitutes Chapter VI of the Charter.

The Committee thought the first Article in this Chapter should set forth the basic obligations of Members to settle disputes by pacific means. The Dumbarton Oaks text had stated that parties to a dispute should seek a solution "by negotiation, mediation, conciliation, arbitration or judicial settlement, or other peaceful means of their own choice." Committee III/2 added "inquiry" and, upon the recommendation of Committee III/4, "revert to regional agencies or arrangements" to the list of pacific means.

The Dumbarton Oaks text had suggested that any State, whether a Member of the organization or not, might bring any dispute, or any situation which might give rise to a dispute, to the attention of the General Assembly or of the Security Council. Committee III/2 revised this text so as to make it clear: (1) that any Member might bring any dispute or situation to the attention of the General Assembly or of the Security Council; and